That Freedom Shall not Perish
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Source: http://www.somalilandgov.com/bank.htm
THE BANK OF SOMALILAND
ESTABLISHMENT
One of the provisions of the National Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland is the establishment of a Bank to carry out Central Banking functions. The bank of Somaliland (Baanka Somaliland) was thus inaugurated in 1994 together with appropriate Banking Laws, to insure that Banking regulations are carried out to the letter.
Board of Directors has accordingly been appointed together with a Governor of the Bank, Vice-governor, and a Director General. In addition, the Bank of Somaliland besides its functions as Central Bank, runs the activities of Commercial sector.
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE BANK
The Bank's main objectives are detailed in Article 3 of the Constitutive Law of Somaliland Bank as follows: Fostering Monetary stability maintaining the internal and external values of the Somaliland Currency and promoting credit and exchange conditions conductive to the balanced growth of the economy of the Republic and within the limits of its powers, it shall contribute to the financial and economic policies of the state.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The Board of Directors is the highest policy making body of the Bank. Its powers, among others, include establishing and closing of branches; recommending an increase in capital determining net annual profit; establishing the general terms and conditions of service for the bank's staff and general rules on its . Expenditure; proposing the distinguishing features characteristics and amount of banknotes and coins to be issued; deciding on the general terms of external reserves; granting and revoking bank licences; deciding upon general terms and conditions for credit controls to authorised banks; approving the annual report and accounts of the bank.
The Board consists of seven members, comprising:
The Governor (Chairperson);
The Director General (Deputy Chair) and
Five members of which three members are prominent private businessmen.
THE OPERATIONS OF THE BANK
The Bank of Somaliland performs both the functions of Central Bank of the Republic of Somaliland and the Services of the Commercial Bank.
THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE BANK
The departments of the bank are as follows:
Accounting Department
Audit and Supervision Department
Personnel Department
Loans and Economic Research Department
Technical Department
Secretarial Department
Central Cash Department
FUNCTIONING BRANCHES
Functioning Branches & Exchange offices The main Branches and Exchange Offices of the Bank are as follows:
01. Head Office (Hargeisa), Tel: 253-210005 Ext. 3000/3024 252-213 4500, Fax: 252-213 4551
02. The Main Branch (Branch Number 1 in Hargeisa)
03. Main Foreign Exchange Branch (Hargeisa)
04. Berbera - Tel: 253-212003 Ext 2016, Fax: 253-212000
05. Burao
06. Borama
07. Gabiley
08. Eri Gabo
09. Foreign Exchange at Hargeisa Airport
10. Foreign Exchange at Berbera Airport
11. Foreign Exchange at Borama Airport
12. Foreign Exchange at Gabiley Airport
Currency
In October, 1994 with reference to the "Law of the establishment of the Bank of Somaliland" the Bank has formally introduced, for the first time, the Somaliland currency. While the cabinet ministers unanimously approved and administrative decree promulgating the Somaliland Shilling as the official currency of the Republic and accordingly announcing a three-month-long period for the eventual conversion of the old currency (Somali Shilling).
The Somaliland currency consists of the following denominations:
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1. One Shilling Coin
2. Five Shilling Note Sample
3. Ten Shilling Note Sample
4. Twenty Shilling Note
5. Fifty Shilling Note
6. One Hundred Shilling Note Sample
7. Five Hundred Shilling Note Sample
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 2, 2005/SOURCE: Radio Midnimo, Boosaaso, in Somali 09:20 GMT, 2 Sep 05
Puntland official issues warning
Barud said he was aware of some individuals from the region, who have recently been fostering growing insecurity and anti-Puntland activities in Laas Caanood town, HQ of Sanaag Region. He said that any person found committing such crimes would be arrested and dealt with harshly, without consulting any quarters, as he put it. [Passage omitted]
Chairman Barud promised that his administration would use force against anyone seen with weapons or with anything threatening security.
Barud's warning comes at a time when the Somaliland administration is busy carrying out campaigns for the forthcoming parliamentary elections [likely to cover up to Sanaag Region].
Press Release
Somaliland Society of Europe
Somaliland Conference 1st & 2nd September 2005
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House,London, UK.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I bring you greetings from the people and Government of Somaliland and honoured to be representing my country during this historic conference.
Sincere congratulations to Somaliland Societies of Europe for having conceived this initiative and for having the determination and the stamina to make it happen.
Thank you also to the Royal Institute of International Affairs for hosting this conference which has added to the value of the meeting.
From the outset, I wish to convey to Her Majesty the Queen the respect of her former loyal subjects, the people of former British Somaliland Protectorate. I also wish to make it known to the world that the Government and people of Somaliland totally deplore and condemn the brutal acts of terrorism that have taken place in London recently. We extend sincere condolences to the families and friends of the innocent victims and share in the sorrow of the nation since Somalilanders have also been victims of terrorist acts in recent years.
2-Our policy in this regard is clear and we are totally opposed to all forms of terrorism that jeopardize the harmony, peace and security of nations. Somalilanders are determined to be active participants in regional and global war against terrorism.
My next task here today is to present the case of the people of Somaliland to the nations of the world, and particularly to the Government of Great Britain with whom we have been linked since 1884 and who currently holds the Presidency of the G8. The Treaty of Protection that we had with the United Kingdom until 1960 is one that is remembered with nostalgia to this day, and the affection of our people for those of the British Isles was vividly and so spontaneously demonstrated during the visits of British Parliamentarians and Cabinet Ministers to Somaliland.
The case of Somaliland, which I wish to present today, is not a message but is a loud cry from millions of desperate Somalilanders who have been dealt a raw and unfair deal by the international community for over two decades.
The message that I carry is the cry of people who have been victims of genocide, who have been denied justice and who have been denied their day in court to present their case. It is the cry of people who have been denied the dignity of their hard-earned and legitimate sovereignty, and it is the cry of people who have been denied their basic human right to life itself.
Few other people and nations have suffered similar injustice as our people have done during the past twenty-four years. We were left to fend for ourselves during the ten years of struggle, from 1981 to 1991, when we were liberating ourselves from the tyranny of the military regime of Somalia's dictator, Siyad Barre. The world looked the other way when war crimes and acts of genocide were perpetrated against civilians and when Somalia government airplanes indiscriminately bombed our major cities. Our people were left to their own while tanks and heavy artillery pounded civilian dwellings and leveled schools, hospitals, mosques, and most of our major cities to the ground.
3-To escape the carnage, over half a million of our people became internally displaced, and an additional million sought refuge in camps in neighboring countries. Others fled to wherever else they could find asylum, which has brought many to your shores.
Where was the world when thousands of our people were massacred in cold blood and countless victims were thrown into mass graves?
Where are the United Nations and the guardians of Human Rights today? I hope they are not busy pouring more of your taxpayers' money to reward the warlords of Somalia because it seems that Somaliland does not exist for them and, therefore, Somalilanders do not have rights.
Where are our African brothers today who refuse to accept the fact that Somaliland is a country with well-defined post-colonial borders and a sovereign country that pre-dates the birth of the Organization of African Union? They spend more time and effort over Africa's failures instead of giving credit and encouragement to Africa's achievements similar to the shining example we have in Somaliland today.
Do we need to remind the world about the massive amounts of international tax-payers money that have been wasted when millions of dollars were poured into never-ending peace and reconciliation conferences for the warlords of Somalia? Fourteen such conferences have been held for them in different countries when we all know that nothing has and will come out of them.
How many millions have been wasted on them to form one government after the other for the past fourteen years?
The last government formed a year ago is still roaming the world, un-willing and afraid to go home and still begging for more money to further destabilize Somalia?
4-Is it not ironic that Somaliland could demobilize its massive militia with less than $100,000 of its own money, when Somalia is asking the international community for Seventy Million US Dollars to do the same!
In Somaliland, we went home to our country in 1991 and started to clean it up with our own resources and established law and order for our people; Somalia is asking the International community to provide 20,000 troops to escort them home and make it safe for them. Are they really serious ?
Where are our Arab brothers ? Did our brothers come to our aid when we picked ourselves up by our bootstraps and brought our people home from refugee camps ? Did they drill a well or two for them? Did they help our destitute with shelter? And did they build a school or a hospital for the needy?
The only `attention' we were given was to impose a ban on the export of our livestock to Arab countries in order to interrupt the only traditional means of livelihood our people had.
Where is justice today ? When Somalilanders who have been the innocent victims are being punished, justice is being given to those who were the cause of the problems of Somalia. Obviously, a case where the assassin is representing the victim !
Where are the rewards of the world when after liberating Somaliland, we sheltered and fed over ten thousand prisoners of war from Somalia for three months at a time we had little food ourselves? Finally, where was the world while we protected those prisoners until we could arrange a safe passage home for them to go home unharmed?
When Djibouti, the Fifth Region of Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya opted to stay out of a union with Somalia, these countries were never forced into unity with Somalia and they have all gone their separate ways to
5-Why then is Somaliland being forced into unity with Somalia when that country has disintegrated into nothing? An East African Federation would be more attractive to us instead of becoming re-attached to the decaying and dead corpse that is Somalia.
After finally liberating Somaliland, we were left to our own to broker our reconciliation process, to consolidate peace our way from the grass roots, to demobilize our massive militia with our own resources, and to draft a Constitution for our people. We were left to our own devices to put in place a democratically elected government, to maintain law and order, and to rely on our limited resources to rebuild our country to where it is today. Most importantly, we held a referendum in May 2001 during which 97% of our people voted for our separation from Somalia. We have since held Local Government Elections, Presidential Elections, and in a few weeks will be holding our first Parliamentary Elections.
Today, we are proud that Somaliland is a country of peace, hope and determination. Millions of our people have returned home from the refugee camps and from the Diaspora, thousands of dwellings have been rebuilt and major economic infrastructure have been repaired such as roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, ports and airports.
Our economic development has been very dramatic, and since we have never been given any loans, Somaliland is the only country in Africa without any foreign debts. We make do with what we have.
The system of free market economy of our country is one that fully agrees with the entrepreneurial character of our people. Consequently, our country is increasingly attracting foreign investors who wish to do business with us and who are interested in our un-tapped mineral resources, including our oil, gas, coal, and the world's largest gypsum deposits. Our 850 kilometer-long coastline is rich with marine resources and is ready for development.
6-Our main Port of Berbera serves as a major outlet/inlet for our goods as well as for land-locked Ethiopia with a population of over 75 million who uses our port for much of its food-aid. We have recently signed an agreement with Ethiopia to formalize their use of our port as well as the use of the Berbera airport for heavy air cargo since it has the longest runway in Africa having been built by the USA as one of the six landing sites for the Columbia space shuttle.
The good relations we enjoy with neighboring States are the cornerstones of our foreign policy, which envisions a more stable, democratic and prosperous Horn of Africa.
The fundamental objective of our foreign policy is to achieve international recognition, become a legitimate and a full member of the nations of the world, as well as to build strong external partnerships based on friendly relations and on mutual interest and respect with all countries, peoples, and International Organizations.
To this end, it is the prime task of Somaliland to protect the territorial integrity of the Nation and the inherent interests and dignity of its citizens.
We stand neither for secession, nor for the revision of Africa's borders. Somaliland was among the first African States to be free from colonial rule, and our demand for recognition implies full respect of the borders received at the time of independence from Great Britain in accordance with article 4(b) of the OAU Constitutive Act.
We are by no means the first African State to have entered into a voluntary union with another and subsequently withdrawn from that union intact.
7. The following countries have all done likewise and have never been punished for it: -Senegal and Mali, in 1960, -Egypt, and Syria, in 1961, -Rwanda and Burundi in 1962, -Senegal and Gambia in 1968, -Cape Verde/ Guinea-Bissau in 1975, -Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1993. -Elsewhere, Sweden and Norway were one country at one time and have since separated -So have countless States in Eastern Europe and in Asia in recent years.
The International community should realize that undermining the achievements of Somaliland, sadly also undermines the universal goals that are to promote peace, stability, and good governance in Africa.
Failing to recognize Somaliland would be a great discredit to Human Rights and to democracy itself. It would destroy the hard-won stability that Somaliland enjoys today, and would result in another mass exodus from the Horn of Africa that would once again scatter our people to the four corners of the world.
Somalilanders have made a clear choice during our referendum. We now urge the international community to respect the rights and the choice of the people of Somaliland whose steady progress should be an example to the rest of the continent.
Thank you all for your attention.
Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 2005-09-06
IRIN news, 2005-09-06/Source: Irin
Donors concerned over low representation of women in Somaliland
"The representation of women remains very low and fails to reflect the pivotal role they play in Somaliland's socio-economic life," members of the Somali Democratisation Programme Steering Committee said in a statement issued in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, following a mission to Hargeysa, Somaliland's capital, on 30 and 31 August.
The committee is made up of the European Commission (chair), the War-Torn Societies Project International (implementing partner), Britain, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.
Somaliland, the northwestern region of Somalia, declared independence from the rest of Somalia following the overthrow of President Muhammad Siyad Barre in 1991, but has not been internationally recognised as a separate state.
The international committee however commended the electoral body and civil society groups in Somaliland for their efforts in promoting democracy through voter education initiatives ahead of the polls.
"Considerable progress has been made in the preparations for the elections, which will conclude the first full cycle of the democratisation process in Somaliland," it said, adding that it had been encouraged by the commitment expressed by all three political parties to holding peaceful, fair and free elections in line with a code of conduct agreed on 18 July.
"The Steering Committee urges maximum tolerance and restraint on all parties, and looks forward to the rapid establishment of the Election Monitoring Board to assist the NEC [Nation Electoral Commission] in the event of disputes," the committee said in a statement issued by the European Commission's delegation in Kenya, which also handles the commission's Somalia operations.
It said donors had contributed 1.4 million euros (US $1.75 million) to fund Somaliland's parliamentary elections.
http://www.somalilandedu.com/ 04 Sep 2005/ Source : Yvette Lopez
Somali Singers and Instruments
He is nicknamed such because of his admirable way of strumming ud (arabian lute)and his compositions. Unlike the contemporary beat of songs like Nagmay, Dararamle is known for the traditional Somali sound.
I wondered how his music differ from that of King Khalid or that of Abdil Jabar Alkhaliji, o-ne Somali friend in his mid-20's described it as "Our version of country music".
I met Dararamle in a very small gathering of foreigners and Somalilanders weeks ago and watched him strum those strings and witnessed the spontaneous rhythm of claps and voices that joined the flow of Somali sound in the air.
Our thanks to Said, Haroon and Sacadia for giving us the chance to experience the event.
Durmaan
Duurmaan is the Somali drum made of cattle skin, this instrument is widely used by women sometimes in all female religious gatherings, in weddings and in social occasions.
Nowadays, the production of durmaan must have doubled due to the coming electoral campaign. During elections, groups of women are mobilized by political parties to hop from o-ne village to another. Drum beating in villages with women ululating is a typical sight during campaign season, don't be surprised if bus full of drum beating, clapping, ululating women pass by.
From Jamhuuriya Online, Sep 4 2005
Opposition Calls on NEC to Restrain Government
Both parties (KULMIYE & U"ID) announced that the ruling party (UDUB) is not respecting the Code of Conduct they agreed on stating, "Ministers abusing power by dismissing staff who support the opposition. New ministers and senior staff are being nominated, and some supporters of the opposition have been sent to Prison."
The two parties accused the government of threatening opposition candidates, creating an atmosphere of suspicion among the people and creating tension and agitation by trying to demark the regional borders of Hargeisa, Awdal and Sahil.
The opposition parties called on the NEC to restrain the government from all actions that can have negative effect on the election, make sure that public funds - such as the newly printed money in the national Bank or incomes from the ports, Airports, Hargeisa Water are not used by the ruling party for the campaign.
The two parties called on the people to show patience and perseverance, to respect the law and avoid anything that might disrupt the stability.
They called on the government to contribute towards ascertaining that a free and fair election is held, refrain from any action that might affect the election and drop the Public Order Law which the government is still using (this law has been voted against almost 2 years ago by Parliament) and the threatening of candidates which is new to our culture.
The two parties concluded their Press Conference with the message that they will do everything to have a fair and free election.
From Jamhuuriya Online, Sep 4 2005
Campaign for Parliamentary Elections in Full Swing
On the first day of the election campaign, thousands of supporters of the opposition Justice and Welfare party took part in a rally held at the Independence Park in Hargeisa, after going through the main streets using buses and small cars. The supporters were carrying party flag, pictures of their regional candidates and shouting slogans such as "UCID will be the winner".
4 party candidates, one of them a woman addressed the rally with their main theme and message focusing on unemployment and social services. They promised to provide employment and better social services than the ruling party if they are elected.
The Regional Chairman of the Justice and Welfare Party, Omer Aw Ali Jama called on supporters to vote for party candidates.
The Campaign for the Parliamentary elections began in the early hours of the morning with a policy speech by Faisal Ali Warabe released by Radio Hargeisa (This is the first time that a policy speech by the opposition is released by the State radio).
Faisal Ali Warabe said; "We will introduce compulsory primary education for children between the ages of 7-14. We will provide free health service for nationals and recognition will be our priority".
Speaking about the parliamentary election, he said; "Our party will refrain from doing everything that will contribute towards holding a fair, free and democratic election".
On the second day of the campaign, thousands of supporters of the main opposition KULMIYE party went through the streets in Hargeisa on buses and small cars and loud speakers carrying party flags, pictures of candidates and shouting that their party will be the winner.
At the Independence Park where they hold their rally in Hargeisa, Deputy Chairman of KULMIYE and former Vice-president, Abdirahman Aw Ali spoke about the two previous elections saying that the party took major strides forward and was successful.
Abdirahman spoke the need for change and said that KULMIYE will make change in the Judiciary and Justice, society Welfare and provide support for the nomadic population.
The Deputy Chairman in his speech said, "We have saved the country from the clutches of Siad Barre by using the bullet, but today we are going to do that, by voting democratically and as such I call on those communities who intend to boycott the election not to do so".
Chairman of KULMIYE Party Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo addressing the rally said, "The parliamentary election will be the most important election and as such i urge all eligible voters to vote for those candidates, who will lead the people of Somaliland to the realization of their destiny."
Silanyo appealed to the people to preserve peace and stability. He said, "We need to have a functioning government and I assure you that our candidates are fit to do that".
He stressed that KULMIYE will fight corruption, embezzlement, nepotism, lack of transparency, unaccountability and secret agreements.
He said, "We are afraid that secret agreements concerning our land and sea oil resources might have been reached. We call on the government to clarify its position on secret agreements".
He concluded his speech, saying, "Let us put the country on the right track through the ballot box. Vote for KULMIYE".
On the 3rd day of the Campaign thousands of supporters of the ruling party UDUB took part in the rally at the Independence Park in Hargeisa, in support of their party and candidates.
Thousands of supporters carrying party flags and pictures of candidates were inside the Park and outside it. The Independence Park was over crowded and many supporters were playing folklore dances.
Abdillahi Mohamed Du'ale, minister of Information speaking in the name of the government, said; "The government has resolved to complete the democratic process that it began by holding a free and fair election. I appeal to the people to support the government to achieve this goal".
Speaking about the media, he said; "You have seen that the state media is neutral and that all parties are releasing their campaign. I remind the private media and journalists not to be carried away by friendship and as such loose their objectivity".
The minister of Information called on the people to give their votes to God-fearing candidates, who will represent them.
"This is the first time for the majority of our youth to vote, in a parliamentary election. We urge all the parties to refrain from taking any act, that might arouse their feelings and as such cause instability and have negative consequences on our aspirations, for the world is watching us," he said addressing the parties and their candidates.
Abdillahi Mohamed Du'ale warned the administration of Puntland to respect neighbourliness and as such not to meddle or interfere in the election saying that Somaliland will loose its patience.
The Secretary General of UDUB, Mohamed Ismail Bullale addressing the rally stated that SNM, which freed the country, belongs to the people and as such cannot be claimed by any party alone. He said, "Public property is the responsibility of the government. The parties can complain if they are denied access to the state media or holding rallies at public squares."
Mohamed Ismail Bullale, criticized KULMIYE leaders. He said, "They were those who led the country from 1991-1997 and were the cause for confrontation civil strife and displacement."
Speaking about the opposition UCID he said, "Most of its leaders are from the Diaspora, who have good intentions but are inexperienced in our culture".
How To Decide Who To Vote For
With the date of the parliamentary elections getting closer and closer, Somalilanders will soon have an opportunity to reshape the political landscape for the better or the worse. It will all depend on one decision: who they vote for. This is not only an important decision, but a difficult one. So we thought of a way that may help people decide. We will call it voting by categorization and elimination using a set of criteria.
The first category is the easiest one. It is those who held public office before. The voter knows, or should know, the record of these candidates, then decide whether to vote for them or not based on that record. It does not matter whether they were parliamentarians, ministers or held some other public office. What is important is how well they did their job.
The second category is those who have not held public office. Although it is difficult to predict future behavior of political candidates, there are some relevant pointers. For example, the voter could ask himself how did this candidate get on the party list. Was he approved by his community elders? Was he a party activist? Or did he pay a bribe or use some other crooked way to get on that party's list. If the answer is that the candidate got on the list through some irregular means, then chances are that he will commit bigger irregularities once in office, therefore, the voter should avoid voting for such a candidate.
In addition, the voter could ask himself the following questions:
- Has the candidate displayed a sense of civic duty in the last few years? For example, did he initiate or participate in projects that help the community?
- Has the candidate shown entrepreneurship and initiative?
- Is the candidate employed, self-employed or is he an idler who probably looks at being in the parliament as an opportunity to make easy living?
- Is the candidate disciplined and goal-oriented in his personal life?
- Is the candidate addicted to qat or any other drugs?
Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - (IRIN) 01 Sep 2005
Human rights abuses rampant, says UN expert
NAIROBI, 1 Sep 2005 (IRIN) - Human rights violations, including harassment of minorities and trafficking in human beings, have remained rampant in Somalia despite the creation of a transitional government for that country, an independent expert said on Thursday.
"The human rights situation has not improved," Ghanim Alnajjar, the UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, told a news conference in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, at the end of an 11-day mission to Somalia.
He said the fledgling Somali transitional federal government lacked the capacity to deal with the human rights problem, mainly because it had still not established its authority on the ground.
That government - led by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed - was formed in Nairobi in October 2004 and relocated to Somalia in June 2005.
Alnajjar said minorities continued to be harassed and the lack of an authority to police Somalia's long coastline had encouraged human trafficking.
"The world is not paying enough attention to the situation in Somalia," he said, and added that the international community looked at Somalia as a "security problem" yet the country received little external support to restore stability.
"The lack of coastline monitoring encourages human trafficking, often with fatal consequences for those who seek to leave Somalia for a better life elsewhere, many of whom drown or arrive at their destination only to discover that their hopes for a better life cannot be realised," he said.
Illegal fishing by foreign vessels in Somalia's territorial waters had also continued to deplete the country's marine resources, he added.
"The lack of protection of the Somali coastline has allowed illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities by foreign vessels to take place, diverting resources that could considerably improve the livelihoods of Somalis," he added.
He reiterated his call for the launch of an organisation mandated to safeguard the Somali coastline until Somalia's own authorities developed the capacity to undertake that function.
Alnajjar, a professor of political science at the University of Kuwait, expressed concern over the plight of Somalia's 370,000 internally displaced persons, whom he said lived in desperate conditions.
He said he was also concerned about recent reports that non-Somali refugees inside Somalia were being unfairly targeted and harassed by authorities "under the guise of anti-terrorism operations".
The independent expert spoke out against reports that "certain countries" were stepping up efforts to repatriate - at times forcibly - Somali refugees and asylum seekers without ascertaining that their safety would be guaranteed inside Somalia.
Lamenting the lack of access to primary and secondary school education for many Somali children, Alnajjar said: "With an estimated enrolment rate of 19.9 percent, efforts to ensure the basic right to education of these children should be stepped up."
Associations of disabled people had reported numerous cases of discrimination, Alnajjar said, and many of them had urged him to support their efforts to increase awareness of the challenges they faced in their daily lives.
He condemned the recent killings of human rights activist Abdulkadir Yahya Ali, local journalist Duniya Muhaydin and the BBC's Kate Peyton, and appealed to political, religious and business leaders in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, to ensure that attacks on human rights defenders and media personnel ceased.
Alnajjar also said he was appalled by conditions in the main prison in Hargeysa, the capital of the self-declared republic of Somaliland; the prison was built in 1942 with the capacity to hold 150 inmates, but nearly 700 prisoners were crammed into it despite the lack of sanitary and medical facilities.
"It is a shameful place, the lack of medical facilities is beyond belief," he said. "Prisons in Somalia remain unacceptable and much below international human rights standards, mainly due to lack of funding and management know-how."
He noted, however, that land had been set aside for the construction of a new prison in Somaliland.
Alnajjar said Somali Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Gedi had expressed his commitment to include the establishment of an independent national human rights commission in the agenda of the interim government.
Source: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 01 Sep 2005
Human Rights envoy hails civil society, condemns attacks on human rights defenders and media
During his mission to Jowhar, Hargeisa (Somaliland), Garowe (Puntland), and Nairobi, Dr. Alnajjar met with local authorities, civil society organizations, journalists and the international community including representatives of UN agencies and donor countries in an effort to investigate and report on the prevailing human rights situation in Somalia.
The Independent Expert is concerned by reports that certain countries are stepping up efforts to repatriate - at times forcefully - Somali refugees and asylum-seekers to Somalia without certainty that their safety would be guaranteed. Dr. Alnajjar is equally concerned by recent reports that non-Somali refugees inside Somalia are being unfairly targeted and harassed by the authorities under the guise of anti-terrorism operations. He calls upon the international community to ensure that the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers are fully respected.
In Somaliland, Dr. Alnajjar was encouraged to see that preparations for parliamentary elections, scheduled for 29 September 2005, were well underway. In this context, he held discussions with leaders of the political parties contesting the elections. He highlighted the need to ensure that the voices of women, minorities and the disabled be heard, and was pleased with the positive responses he received in this regard. Dr. Alnajjar also welcomed the decision of Somaliland authorities to allocate land on the outskirts of Hargeisa for a new prison, allowing for the demolition of Hargeisa Central Prison, an issue which the Independent Expert has been campaigning for over the past several years. The prison, built in 1942 with a capacity to hold 150 inmates, currently houses nearly 700.
Dr. Alnajjar continued his efforts to secure the release of prisoners of war in Puntland and Somaliland, held in captivity as a result of the Sool/Sanag conflict. After talks with top officials on both sides, Dr. Alnajjar is hopeful of a speedy resolution of the issue. He met with Somaliland POWs held in Puntland, and was pleased to see that they were well treated. He was informed by independent sources that the same applies to Puntland POWs held in Somaliland. He was happy to note that the ICRC has confirmed its willingness to provide logistical assistance to facilitate the exchange if and when a final agreement is reached between the two parties.
Dr. Alnajjar is on his fifth annual fact-finding visit to the region since being appointed Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in June 2001. His mandate is to assess the prevailing human rights situation in Somalia and report his findings to the UN Commission on Human Rights. Dr. Alnajjar is a professor of Political Science at the University of Kuwait and carries out his duties on a voluntary basis. During his mission, Dr. Alnajjar was accompanied by Human Rights Officer Paul d'Auchamp, of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Women: The IE applauded the initiative and persistence of countless Somali women who are showing leadership in a wide variety of fields such as education, development and, in particular, the demobilization of militia in Mogadishu.
Establishment of independent human rights institutions: Independent human rights institutions have on-going, advisory authority in respect to human rights at the national and/or international level. These purposes are pursued either in a general way, through opinions and recommendations, or through the consideration and resolution of complaints submitted by individuals or groups.
The IE welcomes the commitment by TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi to include the establishment of an Independent National Human Rights Commission as an agenda item to be discussed in the next meeting of the TFG Cabinet. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has extensive experience in providing technical assistance towards the establishment of such institutions, and stands ready to assist the TFG. In Somaliland, an independent human rights institution is in the final stages of establishment, with the assistance of UNDP's Rule of Law and Security.
Programme
IDPs: There are approximately 370,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Somalia and Somaliland and the IE wishes to draw attention once more to the desperate conditions under which they live. He appreciates the efforts of the United Nations, NGOs and others to improve the conditions in which they live and encourages donors to support them generously.
Children: The IE is particularly concerned about many Somali childrens' lack of access to primary and secondary education. With an estimated enrolment rate of 19.9%, efforts to ensure the basic right to education of these children should be stepped up.
The disabled: Associations of disabled persons in Somaliland reported numerous cases of discrimination and urged the IE to support their efforts to increase awareness of the challenges they face in their daily lives.
Minorities: Minority groups continue to be marginalized and discriminated against. In Somaliland, representatives of some of these groups requested that the IE support them in raising their concerns with Somaliland authorities and the three main political parties, and stressed their desire to be included in the political process.
Coastline: With the pressing need for diversified income generating activities, the lack of protection of the Somali coastline has allowed Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities by foreign vessels to take place, diverting resources that could considerably improve the livelihoods of Somalis. The lack of coastline monitoring encourages human trafficking, often with fatal consequences for those that seek to leave Somalia for a better life elsewhere many of whom drown or arrive at their destination only to discover that their hopes for a better life cannot be realized. The IE reiterates his calls for the establishment of an organization mandated to safeguard the Somali coastline until such time that the Somali authorities are able to undertake such functions.
Joint Needs Assessment: The Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) is intended to help begin to achieve sustained reconstruction and development and deepen the peace process by having teams of Somali and international technical experts work together to assess needs and develop prioritized initiatives to achieve reconstruction and development and reinforce peace building. After extensive consultations with stakeholders, the Somali Joint Needs Assessment Concept Note has been prepared jointly by the United Nations and World Bank and reviewed by the TFG Minister for Planning and International Cooperation.
The IE applauds the efforts to conduct the JNA and emphasizes the need for full participation by civil society and calls that due consideration be given to the complex political context at this critical stage of the transition process.
Prison conditions: Prisons in Somalia remain unacceptable and much below international human rights standards mainly due to lack of funding and management know-how. Whilst recognizing the sensitivity of this issue, the IE requests the international community to reconsider their hesitancy to support effort to improve prisons.
Somaliland refers to the self-declared, but unrecognized Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland refers to the self-declared Federal State of Puntland in the northeast
Letter to Dr. Ghanim Alnajjar
Independent Human Rights Commissions
C/o Sandra Macharia, Information Officer
UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator's Office for Somalia
Re: Human Rights issues in Somalia
Dear Dr. Ghanim Alnajjar
We are glad to hear you visiting Somalia again to assess human rights issues. We would like to take this opportunity to highlight some issues which we are concerned about. Human rights issues have not been better since your last visit of the country.
We believe that human rights abuses were one of the main reasons for the collapse of the former Somali Democratic Republic. Similarly, taking no account on human rights issues and humanitarian law in the Somali peace negotiations are some of the main reasons for the failures of setting a working government in Somalia for the last fourteen years.
Our concerns is shared by the majority of Somalis as they feel that those believed responsible for the worst human rights atrocities in Somalis have been rewarded with high office government office. One of this is President Abdullahi Yusuf who on 23 March 2005 lost damage case to the widow and children of the late Sultan Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud (known as Sultan Hurre) in the UK Court. The respected Sultan was killed on the 17th of August 2002 at Kala-bayrka, in Puntland state of Somalia, by the personal bodyguards of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf.
The real intention of the killing of Sultan Hurre was intended to threaten and curb the grassroots development from taking root in Somalia. This trend has not ceased as they are still in many part of Somali regions.
It is unfortunate that after two years of Somali reconciliation in Kenya, Somalia is embracing a renewal of violence as there is a build up of tension and political hostility within the new Somali institutions. Since the formation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, two main problems seem to have stalled its activities. These are: (i) The deployment of foreign peacekeeping troops in Somalia, and (ii) The temporary relocation of the capital until it is cleared of militia and freelance gangs. These matters have divided the government, the parliament and the presidency into two or more groups.
The real losers are the Somali people while the warlords, turned to `statesmen', are employing media rhetoric tension to shore up their position. SHHRF believes that a warlord is a warlord and he should be held responsible for his deeds.
by Sultan Hurre Human Rights Focus (SHRRF)
Campaigning for Somaliland's 2005 Parliamentary Elections Launched
In the capital Hargeysa, the 3 parties have so far conducted their campaigns in the same style. Each party announced the launching of its campaign by vehicles mounted with loudspeakers that went through the streets as early as 7 o'clock in the morning. A long procession of vehicles carrying supporters of various party candidates for parliament, then filled the streets en-route to the Liberty Garden where rallies were held later. Pictures of candidates were sticked onto buses and cars that had been specially hired for the occasion or provided freely by supporters. Few political banners were visible and most candidates seemed as though they were not at ease with public campaigning. The majority of contenders still preferred campaigning through the Mafrish (Qat chewing place), as rival candidates from the same tribal constituency competed against each other to win as much support as possible from members of the common lineage.
Since no marches were held, it was difficult to guess the strength of the supporter turn-out for each candidate or party. However pressure is already mounting for the contenders in this parliamentary campaign to announce their policies with regard to some pressing issues such the country's high unemployment rates, poor public services (education, health, judiciary, roads, land) and corruption within government.
The September 29 elections for the lower house of parliament (House of Representatives) will constitute Somaliland's third experimentation with multi-party elections in less than 3 years, following the local council elections and presidential elections held in 2002 and 2003 respectively.
246 candidates will compete for the 82-seat House in all the regions of Somaliland including Sool and eastern Sanag. There are only 7 women candidates or less than 3% of the total test of candidates.
The upcoming elections are expected to witness a higher level of voter participation, compared to the previous two elections, given the greater number of candidates and polling stations available for this polling. However preparations for the conduction of these elections have already posed gigantic challenges for both the National Electoral Commission and the contesting political parties' candidates.
The struggling NEC does not have enough money even to cover basic logistical, administrative and technical needs, while neither the political parties nor their candidates have funds for fielding their own monitors at polling stations. Although a donor delegation that visited the country few days ago was said to have pledged support, however the international community has largely remained indifferent to Somaliland's democratic electoral process.
The next few days are expected to witness thousands of political activities going into action, campaigning for the candidates of their political parties by holding rallies and making speeches in towns and villages. Despite facing tremendous odds, Somalilanders however seem to be determined to seize this opportunity in order to elect their true representatives in parliament.
Graduation at University of Hargeisa
Arrest of a Norwegian Who Swindled African Leaders
According to the Norwegian business journal Dagen Naeringsliv, Meier was accused of creating bogus business entities including a fake firm by the name Inverse International, purporting to be involved in oil exploration.
By claiming to be in the oil business, Meier was reportedly able to trick a number of African leaders including Somaliland's President Dahir Rayale and Somalia's factional Premier, Ali Gedi. Meier visited Somaliland in December 2002. He was accompanied by another accomplice, Rakesh Rajan, a Briton of Indian decent. The two signed a deal on oil exploration in Somaliland with the then Minister of Water and Mineral Resources, Mohamed Abdi Farah (Malow). Meier and Rajan then met with President Rayale.
Dagens Naeringsliv ran a long story on Magne Andreas Meier's fraudulent oil businesses in its August 27 edition. It referred to a front page article published by Somaliland Times on December 28, 2002 under the banner "Fake Company Strikes Deal with Minerals Ministry". The Norwegian publication said despite Somaliland Times' revelations, Somaliland Minister of Water and Minerals at the time M. A. Farah [Malow] defended the deal by insisting that "Inverse International" was a genuine company. (see below the full text of the Times' Dec 28, 2002 article).
More recently Meier was quick to establish ties with Somalia's latest factional Premier Ali Mohamed Gedi.
Gedi became so impressed by Meier's credentials that he appointed the Norwegian as his special advisor and Somalia's Consular General in Norway. The 2 men were introduced by Abdirahman Libaan, one of Gedi's supporters living in Norway.
Gedi announced last Sunday that his government was ready to start granting oil concessions soon. He also warned international oil companies against dealing with anyone other than his faction in the so-called Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.
Gedi cited an agreement under which an Australian oil company offered cash money to the authorities in Somalia's Puntland region for oil exploration. Puntland reacted angrily to Gedi's statement, saying that it wasn't his business to interfere with the deal.
It isn't yet clear what prompted Gedi to talk about oil concessions at this particular stage, or whether his relations with Meier had influenced him.
Below is the De
c 2002 article in which Somaliland Times first blew the whistle on Meier: "Fake Company Strikes Deal With Minerals Ministry
Inverse International Doesn't Exist As A Real Company, Somaliland Times, Issue 49 December 28, 2002
London (SL Times): A company by the name of Inverse International which had concluded an oil exploration deal with Somaliland Ministry of Minerals and Water earlier this month, has turned out to be fake.
"Inverse International" address has been traced to an apartment in Essex, England, dwelled by an Indian family. The company listed its executive officers as Magne Andreas Meier and Rakesh Rajan. It was registered in earlier this month as being located at 9 Clarendon Gardens, Ilford, Essex, IG1 3JN.
Two persons purporting to represent Inverse International came to Hargeisa two weeks ago. They were welcomed by Somaliland's Minister of Mineral Resources, M. A. Farah. The Minister then announced that an oil deal has been concluded. Later, he was lavish in his praise of the "company" as one with the necessary financial and technical capabilities to do the job - oil exploration and drilling - "The people who used to come here were mostly brokers and not real companies. This is a real company with extensive experience in Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Europe."
It is not the first time that the Minister has been cheated by people pretending to represent an oil company. Out of 4 agreements he had signed since assuming office, none has been implemented.
However, following revelations that Rakesh Rajan has connections with Italian Mafia group engaged in toxic waste disposal, the faltering of Farah's last deal could be a blessing from the sky.
Rakesh Rajan and a Somali holding an Italian passport by the name of Omer Osman are also listed among the directors of Bushido Security Services Ltd. The Somali lives in Italy but his address in Britain is 40 Montague Road Leytonstone, London E11 3EN. Bushido is registered as a toxic waste disposal company.
There were reports in the recent past that Somalis recruited by the Italian Mafia have been involved in international operations for dumping nuclear waste along the coast of Somalia. Osman had reportedly introduced "Inverse" to Somaliland's Minister of Minerals. It is not clear yet whether Osman is the same man charged with taking part in nuclear waste dumping operations."
Africa Illegal Fishing Off Somalia Nets $300m A Year
Illegal fishing off Somalia's coast has reached proportions of about $300-million annually, a United Nations official said on Thursday in Nairobi.
"It is mostly foreign vessels but we don't know who they are," said Ghanim Alnajjar, the UN's independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia.
"Some Russians claim they have previous agreements and have paid licences, but no one can prove that", he added.
This has led to serious environmental concerns of the depletion in the fish-rich Somali waters.
The expert also said that despite the relocation back home of the Somali government from Kenya, the human rights situation in the conflict ridden country had not improved.
Alnajjar, who had just visited several parts of the country, said there were still massive security problems and he could not go to Mogadishu as planned.
"The situation remains catastrophic," he said.
The prospects of a planned election in Somaliland on September 29, however, were a positive sign, he said. The semi-autonomous northern region of Somaliland did not participate in the peace process. - Sapa-DPA
Source: http://somaliland.org/ns.asp?ID=05083104/ Aug 31 2005
Secret Deal Between The Government Of Somaliland And Unknown Company Called REC Is Exposed By Group Of Experts In The Field Of Petroleum Ex
Dr. M.Y. Ali and Dr. Ali keli - Hargeisa, Somaliland - 31 August, 2005
Open letter to His Excellency Dahir Riyale Kahin, President of Somaliland regarding PSA between the government of Somaliland and unknown Company called REC for exclusive right to conduct petroleum operations in Somaliland
Dahir Riyale Kahin, President of Somaliland, Hargeisa, Somaliland. 29th July 2005
Dear President,
We are a group of experts in the field of petroleum exploration with no political aspirations. As compatriots of this country we feel compelled to warn the government and the people of this country, the dangers that the country may face if they neglect and destroy the natural resources that are present in the country.
We believe that hydrocarbon is Somaliland's most important asset. Handled correctly, it will be the basis of the country's future development. However, our main concern here is the destruction and exploitation of the country's hydrocarbon resources by its own elected authorities with the help of professional bandits. As you are aware, your government has secretly signed a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with an obscure UK-based company called Rova Energy Corporation Limited (REC) in April, 27, 2003 for the sole and exclusive right to conduct Petroleum Operations including exploration, appraisal, development and production in blocks 35, 36, M10 and M10A (East of Berbera to East of Laasqoray, offshore and onshore). These blocks are located in the heart of petroliferous province and were operated by Amoco and its partners before they declared force majeure in 1989. Furthermore, your government has recently (July, 2005) permitted REC to commence the Second Exploration Phase, although the Initial Exploration Phase has expired in April 26, 2004, while REC did not fulfil its obligation under the Agreement.
We remind your government that there should be a high level of competency and transparency in all agreements that the government has entered into, including how the resources from these investments will be used for the interests of the people. After examining the Agreement and a report prepared by REC, we believe that this Agreement is illegitimate, and it should be terminated immediately. The reasons for pronouncing this are listed below:
1. Rova Energy Corporation (REC) Limited. The registered office of REC is Falcon House, 257 Burlington Road, New Malden, Surrey, KT3 4NE, UK. The Company's registration Number is 03861142. REC changed its name on April 10, 2003 from Rova Energy Limited. It claims that the nature of its business is services to oil and gas extraction. There are only four officers in the company with directors being Ananda Kumar CHAKRABARTI and Jawahir CHAKRABARTI and the secretary as Amina CHAKRABARTI. All three of them are residing at the same address. The fourth individual is Vincent Dato LEONG, a Malaysian who is living in Kuala Lumpur. The company has only issued 100 shares worth œ1 each. Therefore, the total nominal value of issued shares is only œ100. The shareholders are Dr. Jawahir ALI who held 16 shares, Dr. Jawahir Mohamed ALI who held 1 share, Ananda Kumar CHAKRABARTI who held 17 shares, Anandar Kumar CHAKRABARTI who held 1 share, and Westmont Offshore HK Ltd who held 65 shares. The first four shareholders are residing at the same address of that of the directors of the company. It is, therefore, obvious that they are the same two individuals who are using different names to deceive the authorities.
From the attached documents and the above account it is clear that this company was established to trick the government of Somaliland with the intention to filch the hydrocarbon resources of the country. As seen from the Annual Return, this company has no means to conduct petroleum operations in the country. It is a broker, trying to take advantage from the lack of law and order in the country, and it is not a genuine company.
Furthermore, this company has no track record of exploration and production of hydrocarbon in anywhere else in the world. Moreover, it has no qualified Petroleum Geologists, Geophysicists and Petroleum Engineers who can assist the hydrocarbon potential in the Contract Area. As a result your government should have not appointed this bogus company to be the Contractor for the Petroleum Operations in the Contract Area.
2. Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)
There are a lot of flaws in the Agreement which your government have signed with REC. Some of these are listed below: a. Mining/Hydrocarbon Act Somaliland has no approved Mining/Hydrocarbon Act. Therefore, we believe that the PSA should have not been signed without the existence of Mining Act in the country. The priority should have been to establish the Mining Act, so that the future PSA and Exploration Licenses should be according to the Mining Act of the country.
b. Concession Holders: For the interest of Somaliland, we believe it is better to renegotiate with the concession holders (i.e. BP and its partners), instead of signing a new agreement with a bogus company. Furthermore, it is questionable whether this Agreement is legal since the concession holders declared force majeure in 1989 due to the civil war in the country.
c. Exploration Phase
Under the Agreement the Contractor is not obliged to carry out rigorous exploration activities for the purpose of exploring the oil and gas potential within the Contract Area. The Contractor is not required to acquire geological and geophysical data, for example it is not obligatory for the Contractor to: i. Shoot, process and interpret two dimensional or three dimensional seismic lines. It is a common practice with this type of agreements to demand the Contractors to acquire minimum area coverage (e.g. 300 sq. km) of 3D seismic. ii. Carry out an upper section site investigation survey in the Contract Area to ensure a safe and environmentally sound base for drilling. iii. Drill exploration wells in the Contract Area during the Initial Exploration Phase. This phase should include the drilling of two to six exploratory wells.
d. Acreage Fees
Under the agreement, the Contractor is not obliged to pay annual acreage fees in the Contract Area. It is a common practice in the industry for the Contractors to pay an annual acreage fee of up to one thousand ($1,000) dollars per square kilometre of the Contract Area during the Exploration Period. Knowing that the concession area of blocks 35 and M10A is 16,272 square kilometres, it is apparent that the country is losing a huge amount of needed income.
e. Employment and Training Opportunity
The Agreement does not include providing training opportunities to the Ministry's professionals, and employment preferences for the citizens of Somaliland. It also does not include a community benefits component.
3. Contractor has not fulfilled its Obligation under the PSA
Obligations under the Agreement include:
"5.2 (a) (i) During the Initial Exploration Period, the Contractor shall conduct the
following exploration work programme:
A. Review, reprocess and reinterpret existing seismic data;
B. Define drilling location(s) and logistical programmes for one or more wells.
The Minimum Expenditure for this period shall be Five hundred thousand US dollars (US$ 500,000)."
The Initial Exploration Period was 12 months from the date of the contract. It is clear (as documented below) that the Contractor has not fulfilled its obligation in the Contract Area under Article 5.2 (a) (i). Therefore, the Agreement should have expired in April 26, 2004 after the end of the Initial Exploration Period.
a. Failure to Review Existing Data
Under the Agreement, the Contractor is required to review existing geophysical and geological data. However, the only report that the Contractor submitted to the Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources was not an original report. The Contractor has copied the report from existing reports and publications. It is clear by examining the report that the Contractor has cut and pasted without adding new data or interpretation, and at the same time claiming to be its own work. This is a crime that deserves a punishment. In addition, the report does not contain enough detailed information that can be used to plan drilling locations for exploratory wells.
b. Failure to Reprocess and Reinterpret Existing Seismic Data There is no evidence at all to show that the Contractor has either reprocessed or reinterpreted the existing seismic data. Once more the Contactor has copied a few sections of 2D seismic profiles from existing company reports to allude that it reinterpreted these lines. Moreover, in the report there is no evidence to indicate that the Contractor understands the Petroleum System of the Contract Area.
c. Failure to Define Well Location
In the report, the Contractor has not mentioned the location of exploratory wells as
demanded by the Agreement. This is not surprise because the Contractor:
- Never visited the Contract Area
- Has no knowledge of the Petroleum System of the Contract Area
- Has not reprocessed and reinterpreted the existing data
- Has not acquired new seismic data that can be used to define the location
of exploratory wells
It is, therefore, foolish to suggest that the Contractor can define the location of exploration wells without the help of 2D and 3D seismic data. 2D seismic data has been very effective in mapping traps for hydrocarbon accumulations. 3D seismic surveys are now being implemented, and have proved very successful in the exploration for oil in small fields.
- Has not interpreted exploration models that forms the basis for a decision
about potential exploration drilling
- Has not planned logistical programmes for drilling exploratory wells
d. Failure to Meet Expenditure Commitment
Under the Agreement, the Contractor should have expended no less that US$ 500,000 during the Initial Exploration Period. However, there is no record to show that the Contractor has spent this amount for the purpose of exploring the oil and gas potential within the Contract Area. It should be noted that the Contractor never visited the Contract Area. The only activity that it claims to have carried out is the report that it copied from the existing publications.
4. Recommendations
On the basis of the above account, it is apparent that: a. Rova Energy Corporation Limited is a fake company that has no income to conduct exploration activities in the Contract Area. It is trying to take advantage of the situation of the country, to exploit the hydrocarbon resources of the country. b. There are a lot of imperfections in the Agreement including the lack of Mining Act, the absence of rigorous exploration activities and the lack of annual acreage fees. c. The Contactor (REC) has breached its obligations in the Contract Area under Article 5.2. (a) (i). i. It failed to complete the activities listed in Article 5.2. (a) (i). ii. The Initial Exploration Period has expired in April 26, 2004 d. The Contractor did not carry out the Petroleum Operations in the Contract Area diligently; with due regard to good oil field practices. e. This bogus Contractor is blocking well known oil and gas companies that have skills and capital to invest and explore the country. f. To be in an agreement with this phoney company is a disgrace to our nation. It highlights your government's view with regards to international exploration licence awarding processes and how to safeguard the country's natural resources.
Therefore, we urge the President to:
- Unilaterally terminate this Agreement immediately.
- To stop this fake Contractor to have further rights to conduct Petroleum
Operations or recover any Petroleum Costs in the Contract Area.
- To investigate the corrupt government officials who authorised this
Agreement, and bring them to justice.
Finally, whatever the motives and the intentions behind this scandal are, we believe that it is within your government's duties to protect the country's natural resources.
We hope the will of the sincere citizens like us, shall have more thought with your Excellency.
We look forward to hearing from you.
Yours Sincerely,
Mohammed Yusuf Ali, BSc, MSc, PGCE, FGS, Ph.D.
Professor Ali teaches and researches in petroleum geophysics at The Petroleum
Institute, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He can be reached at
E-mail: mali@pi.ac.ae
Ahmed Ali, BEng (hons), MSc, Ph.D, DIC
Dr. Ali is a Petroleum Engineer currently working at Kings College London,
University of London. He can be reached at E-mail: Ahmed.2.Ali@kcl.ac.uk
Cc: Qasim Sheik Yusuf, The Minister of Water and Mineral Resources
Annex
Register information1 of Rova Energy Corporation Ltd 1. Current Appointments Report, 2. 363s Annual Return, 3. DCA
1 These documents are obtained from Companies House, which stores company information delivered under the Companies Act. www.companieshouse.gov.uk
BBC Monitoring International Reports, August 31, 2005/Source: Radio Hargeysa in Somali 1700 gmt 31 Aug 05 BBC Monitoring
SOMALILAND LEADER RECEIVES EU POLL OBSERVERS
The leader of the delegation, who represents the EU, Richard [second name indistinct], told the president that the visit was related to observing the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which he described as historic.
The EU official said his team had already held talks with Somaliland's electoral commissioner, civil society groups, the interior minister, women and members of political parties. He said they were happy with the way things were being conducted.
For his part, the president of the republic thanked the delegation for the assistance it had extended to Somaliland, particularly to the electoral commission, saying it was necessary and badly needed in the country.
Fellow Journalists, Let's Play It By The Book This Time
By Yassin Ismail, Kent, UK
As a Somalilander living in Diaspora Internet is naturally the most convenient way of keeping closely abreast of the events taking place back home. I was reading Haatuf online the other day as I saw this compelling editorial piece under the heading of First Lady's Illegal Activities and having read it on a reported face value, the nature of the alleged illegal wrong-doings I felt gobsmacked and deeply disgusted that the wife of the very man that we allotted for our leadership is now being implicated of having a 'thief' wife. This is so sad and if proven true it illustrates the disturbing realities of moral decadence that we 'as a nation' are going through. The revelations also cast dim shadow of deception, dishonesty and pure pilfering of public resources.
On the other hand I felt proud of the valor and bravery of the local press in keeping a vigilant eye of the public interest and bringing such a story into light. Well done guys but let's prove it. I also call upon the nation as a whole, urging them to play an impartial role in overseeing the progression of such a unique pursuit to bring our rulers accountable to the laws. Let's see if they are worthy of our trust.
Personally I will follow up this matter with special interest, being a former journalist working for the local press and should the Government bring into play their high handed ways of dealing with free press, I will offer my services for free to apprehend any further abuse of local journalists and press houses from the Government by inviting other International Freedom of press groups to keep up as the situations unfolds its dramatic dimensions.
To my fellow journalists I say let's play it by the book this time.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 28, 2005/SOURCE: Somaliland Times, Hargeysa, in English 27 Aug 05
Somaliland: Government denied warrant to search newspaper offices
The HMN publishes three newspapers: the Somali language daily Haatuf, the Arabic weekly Al-Haatef, and this newspaper.
Somaliland government announced earlier this week that it was going to sue Haatuf for false information. The announcement came after the newspaper published allegations of corruption and nepotism in connection with the procurement of television equipment.
There was no information as to why the government wanted to search HMN offices. It was also unclear whether the government would appeal the regional court's decision denying the search warrant.
Meanwhile, the government-owned media continued its attacks on Haatuf and Somaliland Times through most of the week. However, the campaign has so far been counter-productive; failing to produce sympathy for the government while triggering a tremendous public support for the two sister newspapers.
BBC Monitoring International Reports, August 28, 2005/Source: Somaliland Times, Hargeysa, in English 27 Aug 05 BBC Monitoring
SOMALILAND: UN OFFICIAL SAYS NEW PRISON TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN HARGEYSA
Ghanim Al Najjar who is in the country since Wednesday said that Somaliland government has already promised to make the necessary plot of land available for the construction of Hargeysa's new central prison.
The new prison facility is to replace the existing one which has been over-congested and without basic utilities and services over the years. Al Najjar described the state of the prison as on the border of a real humanitarian tragedy.
Ghanim Al Najjar who was appointed by Kofi Anan in 2001, has taken upon himself to secure funds for the establishment of a new Hargeysa prison.
Green light will be given for the project once a site has been assigned he said.
The international expert on human rights for Somaliland and Somalia arrived in Hargeysa on Wednesday on a four-day visit. His mission is to look into a variety of issues ranging from human rights, including the rights of women and children, to the administration of justice as well as the state of minorities. He will be expected to meet government officials, human rights activists and political as well as civic leaders.
On Thursday, Dr Ghanim Al Najjar met with leaders of Somaliland Society for Independent Journalists and Writers (SSJW) and Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA) to discuss issues related to freedom of expression.
The UN expert is also expected to follow up an earlier offer to mediate exchange of prisoners of war between Somaliland and Puntland.
Somaliland Times, Issue 188, Aug.27, 2005/EDITORIAL
Somalilanders Want Accountability, Not Denials
If public interest in a story doesn't die quickly or keeps growing, then the government takes the next step, which is to attack the newspaper or the person who made the information public. The government took this second step when it realized that the public's interest in its violations of the law and fraudulent activities by government ministers, the president and the first lady are not going away, so they have decided to attack Somaliland Times and Haatuf for revealing these unlawful activities. The point man in this campaign against the Haatuf and Somaliland Times is Somaliland's Minister of Information, Abdillahi Dualeh who did not say the usual automatic denial of wrongdoing by the president or his wife and went on to accuse the journal of having been paid, by a third party, to smear the presidential couple's reputation. When that did not seem to work, the government took the third step, which was to bring legal proceedings against Haatuf and its sister journal Somaliland Times.
It is clear to us that the President of Somaliland and most members of his government think that they are above the law, and that the law is just an instrument that they could use against whoever does not do their bidding or dares to challenge them. Furthermore, they think they could cherry pick whatever laws they want, even if it is the much hated Siyad Barre's dictatorial laws, and disregard the law of the land regarding the press that was passed by parliament and signed by the president. But just as they want to re-impose Siyad Barre's laws, we reiterate that the only laws that we acknowledge regarding the press are those that were passed by Somaliland parliament.
The series of illicit activities by President Rayale and his ministers have shown not only how deep is the corruption and lawlessness in his administration, but also how alien the notion of accountability is to his government. The worst offender in this regard is the president himself, who until now, has made no effort to honestly address the serious charges against him, his family and ministers. The president seems to think that the three-step tactics that had worked for him in the past would work for him this time, but he is mistaken. The illegal activities by him and people around him are too many, the looting of the public purse is too massive, and the number of people who are disgusted with what the president and those around him have done are too many and growing, the old tactics just won't work. Denials won't work. Blaming the press won't work. Time for accountability.
Human Rights Expert Secures Funds For New Prison
Ghanim Al Najjar who has been in the country since Wednesday, said that Somaliland government has already promised to make the necessary plot of land available for the construction of Hargeysa's new central prison. The new prison facility is to replace the existing one which has been over-congested and without basic utilities and services over the years. Al Najjar described the state of the prison as on the border of a real humanitarian tragedy. Ghanim Al Najjar who was appointed by Kofi Anan in 2001, has taken upon himself to secure funds for the establishment of a new Hargeysa prison. "Green light will be given for the project once a site has been assigned" he said.
The international expert on human rights for Somaliland and Somalia arrived in Hargeysa on Wednesday on a 4-day visit. His mission is to look into a variety of issues ranging from human rights, including the rights of women and children, to the administration of justice as well as the situation of minorities. He will be expected to meet government officials, human rights activists and political as well as civic leaders.
On Thursday Dr. Ghanim Al Najjar met with leaders of Somaliland Society for Independent Journalists & Writers (SSJW) and Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA) to discuss issues related to freedom of expression.
The UN expert is also expected to follow up an earlier offer to mediate exchange of prisoners of war between Somaliland and Puntland.
Government Denied Warrant To Search Haatuf Offices
The HMN publishes 3 newspapers: the Somali language daily "Haatuf"; the Arabic weekly Al-Haatef and this newspaper.
Somaliland government announced earlier this week that it was going to sue Haatuf for false information. The announcement came after the newspaper published allegations of corruption and nepotism in connection with the procurement of television equipment.
There was no information as to why the government wanted to search HMN offices. It was also unclear whether the government would appeal the regional court's decision denying the search warrant.
Meanwhile, the government-owned media continued its attacks on Haatuf and Somaliland Times through most of the week. But the government campaign has so far been counterproductive, instead of triggering sympathy for the government, it resulted in tremendous public support for the two sister newspapers.
Somalia politics: Somaliland refuses to negotiate on reintegration
Somaliland's president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, has consistently stated that Somaliland's independence is beyond discussion, and that therefore negotiation on the reintegration of Somaliland into Somalia is not an option. It is also clear that any attempt to coerce Somaliland back into a united Somalia would lead to further futile conflict. When the time does come for discussions of Somaliland's status, the obvious broker is Ethiopia, the country with which leaders from both countries have strong ties. Meanwhile, the decision to proceed with the scheduled parliamentary elections in Somaliland on September 15th, despite the lack of a national census--which means that the 82 parliamentary seats will be allocated on a clan basis rather than on the principle of one-person-one-vote--is a practical one. The elections, postponed from March, are widely viewed as the final phase of the self-declared republic's democratisation process, and the new date is soon enough to help to restore international confidence in Somaliland as a viable nation state worthy of much-needed recognition. In that respect, it is imperative that the election is seen to be both free and fair, particularly in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag, where Somaliland's rule is not total. The outcome is likely to be close, given the narrow margin by which President Dahir Riyale Kahin beat his main rival in the presidential election of April 2003. It is possible that the result will leave Kahin's party, the Democratic United National Party (UDUB), without a majority in parliament, which means that he would have to make concessions to Somaliland's two other parties--Kulmiye and the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID). Whatever the outcome, all political forces will remain united in continuing to insist that Somaliland's independence is not a topic for discussion and that any attempt to coerce Somaliland back into a united Somalia would result in open conflict.
The Independent (London)August 23, 2005, Pg. 22,23
THE DRUG OF A NATION: BITTER HARVEST; KHAT BRINGS A FEW HOURS OF PLEASURE FOR THE POOR OF SOMALILAND
HIGHLIGHT:Right: A Somali chews the bitter-tasting khat. Left: khat leaves, which are legal, for sale in the market of the capital, Hargeisa TOM PILSTON
The piles of khat at Parcharafi market were of prime quality, a luminous dark green, glistening in their wrappings of banana leaves. The muzzein's afternoon call to prayer had come and gone and a queue of buyers was forming to start the long, langorous hours of hallucinogenic chewing.
In Hargeisa, the capital of a country ostracised by the rest of the world, khat is among the very few pleasures left for the vast mass of the dispossessed. Even the fortunate few who are in work rush to get their fix. What passes for business life is over by mid-day, with clusters of men squatting on the floors in tin shacks beside the dusty, pot-holed streets, rolling wads of the leaves in their mouths.
A few days ago, officials in Somaliland launched an initiative to try to regulate the sale and consumption of khat, one of the last chances the country has, they say, of pulling back from the abyss before turning into a fully fledged narco-economy.
The mayor of Hargeisa, Hussein Mohamud Jiir, has set aside tracts of land on the outskirts of the capital where sellers of the drug can be installed and monitored. Abdulkarim Adan Omar, the development director at the environmental ministry, declared that as well as fracturing Somaliland's social and commercial structure, khat was also causing huge damage to nature. 'Young people in rural areas are burning charcoal to buy khat. Their common saying is, 'Cut a tree to chew a twig'.' But the dealers in the dusty streets of Hargeisa protest that they are providing a valuable service.
Ali Omar, whose stall is near the government offices in the centre of Hargeisa, shrugged. 'It is a silly question to ask why I sell khat. Can you just go to the store across the road and ask why he is selling food? People need us.'
The plant, which contains a natural amphetamine, is a main source of revenue for the government, which sells licences to those involved in the business. It is also a valuable export crop, with Britain a prime destination.
The price of khat in Somaliland reflects the poverty of the country, a former British protectorate and now one of the poorest countries in the world, internationally unrecognised and starved of aid 14 years after seceding from neighbouring Somalia.
The drug sells for 50p a bunch here. But the real money for those dealing in the potent leaves is in the West, with the same amount fetching œ5 in the streets of Britain, where it is legal, and 10 times more in the United States, where it is not. Regular flights leave from the Horn of Africa to Liverpool, Birmingham and London packed with khat leaves. Seven tons arrive at Heathrow, perfectly legally, every week.
But the sheer amount of revenue, estimated at œ150m a year, has attracted the involvement of organised crime, police and customs say. Kenneth Noye, the notorious gangster, was said to be considering investing œ500,000 in the trade before his conviction for murder at the Old Bailey.
There are also reports that proceeds from the trade are being used to subsidise terrorism. Osama bin Laden was based in Somalia before moving to Taliban-run Afghanistan, and the July 21 London bombings, with suspects from Somalia and Eritrea now under arrest, point at links between the Horn and Islamist militancy.
Robert Emerson, a security analyst, said: 'It is a simple and effective way for groups, be they purely criminal or political, to raise money with very little risk, after all the product is not even illegal in this country and there are well-established trade routes.' The underworld uses Britain as a staging post for other countries where khat is banned including many states in Europe as well as North America. But there is also a large customer base in the UK among the Somali and Ethiopian communities and a growing market among other ethnic groups.
Two psychiatrists, Dr Mansfield Mela and Dr Andrew McBride, carried out a survey in south Wales, which has a large Somali population. They found 72 per cent of Somalis questioned said they had used khat at some time and 46 per cent said they had done so in the previous week.
Abdulkarim Adan, the director of the Somali Progressive Association in Cardiff, said: 'I chew khat on the weekends with my friends. It is a cultural and social thing, a bit like going down the pub. And it is like anything; if you use too much, there are going to be problems. It's the same as alcohol; if you abuse it, you are going to get problems. A lot of people I know have given it up because of the health risks.'
Abdi Jama, a youth worker from Newport, added: 'Lots of the teenage boys are taking it up and it has a real effect on them; this is very worrying.'
Studies had been made of the risks posed by the leaves, also known as African salad, whose main ingredient is the chemical cathinone, the equivalent of a class A drug in the US. Users of khat describe symptoms ranging from hyper-activity to aggression followed by tremendous 'downs' of depression and lethargy.
Professor Peter Haughton, of King's College London, said: 'Clinicians who work with patients who chew khat regularly, certainly in this country, pick up that quite a few have psychological problems.' In other countries, 'there seems to be a high incidence of strokes and heart attacks. The effects on the heart and bladder can be explained by what's known about the pharmocological properties of some chemicals in khat'.
The Home Office says there are 'no immediate plans to control khat or ban it under the Misuse of Drugs Act', with the rider that the situation is being kept under continuous review and further research is being done.
But studies at King's College also showed that cathinone in khat produced a chemical which could boost the power of men's sperm, and help infertile couples. Lynn Fraser, professor of reproductive biology, said: 'It might be relatively easy to develop products. And the amount that's required isn't that high, so it's not a question of taking very high doses and becoming overstimulated.'
The debate in the West about khat is academic in Somaliland. Its main export, livestock, has suffered a crippling blow after the biggest customer, Saudi Arabia, imposed an embargo, saying Somali cattle suffered from Rift Valley fever. Somaliland government says this is a political decision taken under pressure from other Arab and African countries determined that a breakaway state should not be allowed to prosper and become an example to their own disaffected regions.
Khat is now one of the chief money-earning export crops. But it is also hugely in demand at home. Hundreds of khat chewers marched in protest in Somaliland when the price of the leaves doubled recently. There were similar protests in Somalia when Kenya temporarily banned khat flights to Mogadishu as an 'anti-terrorist measure'.
Officials in Somaliland are deeply worried by khat dependence among the young. Abdurrahman Mohammed Mal, the director general at the education ministry, said: 'You see boys no more than 13 starting on khat. They then drop out of the education system and get involved in all kinds of things to feed their habit. It is a bad, bad thing.'
Abebaw Zeleke, the programme manager for Save the Children UK in Somaliland, said: 'The hopelessness of the economic situation adds to the problem. But it is not just the younger generation being affected. Most office work stops after lunchtime because of khat-chewing. It is deeply ingrained in Somali life.'
Buying his khat, Sher Hassan Abdulrahim claimed it was his consumption of the drug for more than 40 years which has equipped him to continue his construction business at 66. 'It gives you energy, it keeps you going; the light is always on,' he said with a chortle. Abdulrahim, who served with the British Army during the Aden emergency, added: 'It gives you energy and keeps you young. It is better than smoking tobacco.'
But Abdulrahim's children have eschewed chewing. 'All 16 of them. They all live in England, and none of them chew.' He shook his head with regret. 'Most of them are graduates, they are in professional jobs, and they think it is old-fashioned. I know it is still very popular in Britain among Somalis, but the more educated they become the less they want khat.'
Hamid Abdullah Hassan says he is 16 but looks a lot younger. Munching his khat, he is defiant. 'Why shouldn't I take it? If there was any chance of a job then I will stop. But there is no chance and there is nothing else to do.'
What about sperm strengthening tendencies of khat? The mere mention of this makes Majida Ali Abbas and her friends hoot with laughter at the coffee shop of the Al-Mansoor Hotel. 'The men have a strange way of showing it, if that is the case. All they do is chew khat and spend seven, eight hours in the company of other men jabbering. It is very much a world of men, everyone involved in it are men.'
Ginao Mhabi, 30, selling khat at the market, is one of the exceptions. 'I am not doing this out of choice as a woman. But my parents are old and I have 10 brothers and sisters to support. The men who could have earned money for the family were all killed in the civil war. But it is not easy being a woman in this job. The men are addicted; they will come and demand you give them khat even when they do not have the money. They insult you and rob you. If I could find something else to do, then I would. I do not make much money out of it.'
Ahmed Daoud Juma is someone who does make money out of khat, and does not apologise. His family farm in Gabiley, west of Hargeisa, is covered with acres of swaying, 5ft-high khat shrubs. 'What else can we grow? The government has given us nothing to replace it with. Anyway, khat is legal, not just in this country, but England as well. It is not like heroin and cocaine.
'The Ethiopians sell it and we must as well. Some people in the West are complaining about it because Africans are making money out of it, but the money the dealers are making in England and America is far more than we do. But that is not a surprise, that is always the way among white and black people.'
But the cousins Usman Mohammed and Ahmed Awali, who have a 20-acre khat farm, say they would change to another crop, given the chance. 'We are not the ones making the money from this,' said Mohammed, 35. 'We would earn much more if we could plant fruit trees, but we haven't got the money for the irrigation that needs. We also know khat is damaging the health of people who take it and that includes us. It stops people from working properly and that is not good for the country.'
Consolidating Somaliland-South Africa Relations
1. The Director of the Institute for Practical Training and Research in Somaliland, Dr. Ahmed Esa, visited the Republic of South Africa from 9 to 14 August 2005, as part of the larger bi-lateral momentum to consolidate educational, political and economic ties between the two countries.
Dr. Esa responded positively to a call made by the University of South Africa to Somaliland educational institutions, to attend the 1st African Council for Distance Education (ACDE) conference, which was hosted in the City of Tshwane (Pretoria).
At the inaugural ACDE Conference, which was attended by leading university Vice Chancellors from the continent, African education ministers and the Deputy President of South Africa, Dr. Esa contributed to the discussions on mobilizing African leadership, economic growth, capacity building, health and the organic link with education.
During the ACDE Conference, Dr. Esa shared ideas on Somaliland's growth and growing challengers with a range of delegates, such as the Vice Chancellor of the University of Abuja, Professor Nuhu Yaqub, and the British High Commissioner, the Rt. Hon Paul Boateng.
2. Particular focus was given to discussions with the University of South Africa's Head of Religious Studies and Arabic, Professor Yousuf Dadoo, on ways to initiate joint Islamic studies workshops, as part of the on-going efforts by Somalilanders to deepen Somaliland's democracy, traditional structures and good governance.
3. The up-coming Somaliland parliamentary elections on 29th September 2005, attracted particular attention. In this respect, Dr. Ahmed Esa responded to invitations to appear on South Africa's SABC Africa TV, and Channel Africa Radio programme Tam Tam Express. This opportunity was also utilized to explore ways to initiate the exchange of radio programmes between South African radio stations and Somaliland.
4. During his visit, Dr. Esa visited the headquarters of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and held discussions with its Director, Ms Elizabeth Sidiripoulis. Dr. Esa expressed his appreciation of the events and good research work of SAIIA on Somaliland, such as the South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2003/04, and the The Security Intersection, which explores Somaliland's political and economic trajectory. Discussions also focused on ways to deepen Somaliland's parliamentary elections by possible joint capacity-building programmes between the South African Institute of International Affairs and Somaliland's Institute for Practical Training and Research.
Dr. Esa was briefed on the programmes of the Academy of Self-Knowledge and also addressed members of the South African Muslim Community at the Rasooli Centre mosque in Centurion.
5. On his concluding day, Dr. Esa addressed members of Somaliland community at the Suleiman Nana Memorial Hall in Johannesburg and up-dated the community on developments in Somaliland.
6. Finally, Dr. Esa made a courtesy call to Dr. Jandayi E. Frazer, the Ambassador of the United States of America to South Africa and newly appointed US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Furthermore, a valuable meeting was held with the visiting Nigerian Minister of Education, Her Excellency Mrs. Chinwe Obaji, on developing educational links and exchanges between Nigeria and Somaliland.
7. On his departure, Dr. Ahmed Esa expressed his appreciation to Somaliland Liaison Office, in Tshwane (Pretoria), "for all the support extended to him, that made this visit valuable and possible".
Issued by: Somaliland Liaison Office, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa
14 August 2005.
Enquires: Telephone: + 27 82 880 8603/
Further information on Somaliland, see :
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/somaliland
Africa News, August 20, 2005/BYLINE: The Republican
Somaliland's Case for Recognition Needs Rethinking
Let us first deal with the broader context. In the struggle for political recognition, Somaliland often justifies the country's reassertion from the voluntary unity with Somalia mainly by referring to the bitter experience people of Somaliland suffered at the hands of southerners during that unity. We point out the way our people were treated as second-class citizens with all major political positions and development funds going to the south. Also emphasized is the mass massacre subjected to the people of Somaliland and the bombardment of their towns and cities that followed. The perception is that Somaliland is a response to a cruel behaviour and extermination policy by the south partner of the former Republic of Somalia. An independent state of Somaliland is viewed as being a mechanism for preventing a repeat of such cruelty. Worth mentioning is also the death of the idea of Greater Somalia as a guiding principle for Somali unity, after Djibouti decided to go alone and NFD remained part of Kenya. It is against this background that Somaliland has decided to regain its independence and is now seeking recognition.
The realities discussed above offer legitimate grounds for the secession. However, the approach taken shows three weaknesses. The first is the claim by Somaliland politicians that they will win international community's approval if only they can get the world understand the difficulties the people of Somaliland had suffered at the hands of the former Somali regime. After pursuing this policy for 14 years, however, the issue of recognition of Somaliland is as remote as ever.
The second weakness is the insistence that the creation of Somaliland will somehow prevent from further conflicts and abuse of power. Yet in Somaliland we have experienced an armed civil conflict and political discomfort. The creation of state of Somaliland must not be seen as a panacea for conflicts inherently associated with clan-oriented societies.
Thirdly, the present strategy denies that Somaliland is a nation that consists of different communities who actually hold different views on the country's present and past history. And in fact some of them may even feel as being particularly misrepresented in the rationale for the state reassertion. The road to recognition will continue to prove difficult, until our leaders grasp the need for identifying more unifying arguments for our recognition, taking into full account of what binds us together today rather than what divided us yesterday.
For this matter, a finger of blame is pointed towards the current Somaliland administration as well as the previous ones. In Tour's government, the issue of Somaliland 's recognition was not given a serious thought at all. The country was faced with other priorities. But in the Egal era, the strategy towards recognition took some shape. His foreign policy, however, lacked initiatives and was mainly reactionary. It can be captured in one of his famous phrases 'the world has turned its back towards us'.
Unlike his predecessors, Riyaale administration is reaching out the world, but his message lacks substance and vision. First, there is a problem of conceptualisation. The way the case for Somaliland is often set out seems to be emotional and undiplomatic. The arguments underpinning the case paint a picture of a victimized people whose healing process demands an international support in a form of political recognition. At the root of this conceptualisation lies past experience as a rationale for the recognition and little is offered in the way of forward thinking. We need to emphasize on what we as the new nation of Somaliland can offer to the region and the world and what we have so far achieved. We should also be linking this into the international and regional agenda. For example, Somaliland can be presented to the world as a potential partner in the spread of democracy, war on terrorism, and in mechanisms for peace and conflict resolution in the region and the world. Yes, this should include the role that a recognized state of Somaliland can play in making peace in Somalia and the region. This holistic approach could win Somaliland more friends than solely focusing on victim-focused approach.
There is a problem of policy co-ordination too. Edna Ismail, the Foreign Minister, has the responsibility for maintaining our foreign contacts while Awil, the Finance Minister, apparently, has a role in that too. We often see conflicts arising from this arrangement, which results in substance of our foreign policy being lost in the race of out-performing each other's contribution. The president can assign a member of his government for special tasks, tapping into unutilised skills. But we need him to draw clearer lines of responsibilities and let the public know where the accountability lies.
We also need to take note of experiences elsewhere. Southern Sudan is a case in point. When SPLA lost the support of Mengistu Haile Mariam, John Garang looked west and switched his policy, stressing the faith card and war against terrorism. He skilfully harnessed American might behind his movement. Learning from this experience, Somaliland can abandon its allegiance with the Arab world and adjust its flag accordingly to demonstrate that shift. We should understand that the American power is unavoidable fact and that the trick is how to mobilize it in our favour. We can do this by becoming a strategic partner of the American war against international terrorism by offering a base in Berbera.
Moreover, the expectation from some of our so-called friends is substantially inflated. In fact the idea that Somaliland has countries it could call allies is less convincing. Take Ethiopia as an example. If Somaliland were a true friend or an alley of Ethiopian government, surely Abdullah Yusuf would not have contemplated to invade Sool and East Sanaag, let alone annexing them. Instead, Ethiopia prefers to support Abdullah Yusuf in his plan of taking control of Somalia. Although I appreciate the South Africa 's efforts to campaign for Somaliland within the AU, we are yet to see a tangible progress from that relationship either.
But the suggestion here is not that Riyaale should pack up and go home. The aim is that the poor performance of his foreign policy should be recognized and addressed. This means that a comprehensive approach with clear vision and strategy is required. This should feed into the direction the policy takes in relation to which countries, organizations or groups that can be seen as potentially useful for building relationships with, and managing the process. The last but not the least, a critical though should be given to the arguments for the recognition- less emphasis on the victim-focused arguments and more attention on our collective success in the last 14 years, benefits to the security of the region and our potential prospects as a nation. The latter unifies the people of Somaliland more than the former. Finally, visits to Hargeisa by foreign delegates, and Edna or Awil's frequent appearances in abroad should no longer be a valid benchmark for our international relations success. We need to rethink, adopt our approach and see some progress.
The First Lady's Illegal Activities
First a confession: in order to write this editorial, we had to overcome a lot of our own self-imposed resistance. One source of the resistance was that the person we are writing about does not hold public office. Another source was that she is Somaliland's first lady, Huda Barkhad, and we believe we should not rush into putting her on the spot without enough evidence. But we finally overcame our resistance when it became clear that we are not dealing with a mistake here and an allegation there, but rather with a persistent and deep-seated problem. We also realized that if we do not write about the first lady's felonious and harmful activities, we maybe indirectly encouraging her to continue in her reprehensible path.
What is the first lady's persistent problem? Answer: she has engaged in unethical and illegal financial as well as political activities. First, her political irregularities:
1- The first lady constantly meddles in very sensitive political issues. In a previous editorial we had briefly touched on how she was responsible for removing some parliamentary candidates from UDUB's Hargeisa list, and how she replaced them with others as a favor to some of her friends.
2- The first lady is known to have her own favorite clique of ministers who execute her wishes, and who in turn rely on her to champion their cause with the president.
Now the financial ones:
- The first lady has insisted on posting some of her close relatives to the customs collections posts.
- During her recent visit to Egypt, she went to follow up a controversial agreement signed with Egyptian fishing companies to fish in Somaliland's territorial waters. Needless to say, the first lady pocketed the fees that the Egyptians paid for their illegal fishing activities. There are also reports that she bought a house in Egypt while she was there.
We must say this about the first lady: she is no ordinary embezzler. To give some idea of how well-versed in the art of looting she is, one has to look back on how she decided to throw some crumbs from her loot to worthy and charitable causes such as the Gabiley hospital. By giving away a tiny fraction of what she claimed was her own private money, she figured she could hit two birds with one stone: on the one-hand, it would be good public relations, and on the other hand, it would trump the few hundred dollars that were donated to the same hospital by the rival UCID party shortly before she did. The first lady's move was so clever, it made the UCID party Chairman's question of where she got the money, look irrelevant, even foolish.
What do the first lady's illegal activities say about President Rayale? The short answer to this is that given the extent and frequency of these activities, it is very unlikely that they are taking place without his knowledge, which means he is part of the racket; and even if he does not know about them, he is culpable for negligence. After all, how could Somalilanders trust someone who does not know what is going in his own household, to run their affairs?
The other important question is what Somalilanders are going to do about these blatant and endless violations of the law by the president's wife? We suggest that Somaliland's citizens and civic organizations should petition the courts to look into the first lady's illegal activities. The coming parliament should also hold hearings on this matter as soon as it is sworn in.
President Rayale and Somalilanders in general, often, and rightly so, blame Egypt for not treating Somaliland right. But when Somaliland's first lady engages in shady activities in Egypt, clearly, the blame belongs more to Somaliland than Egypt. Aside from its legal implications, blaming someone assumes that they still have a sense of shame, something in short supply at the presidential household. An Egyptian saying captures this lack of sense of shame "Illi yikhtashu matu (those who had a sense of shame died)", the implication being, if you want to get ahead, do whatever it takes, which is exactly the presidential couple's motto.
Somaliland Gov't Paid $380,000 Above Actual Price for Procurement of TV Station
The contract for the purchase, provision and installation of the TV station was awarded without a bid to a a man called Mahmud Abdi Nasser who happens to be the husband of Ilhan Barkhad Adan, the sister of Somaliland's first lady, Huda Barkhad.
The TV station has now been established at the Radio Hargeysa compound. Transmission will only cover Hargeysa city and its surrounding areas. Though broadcasting started earlier this month, most of the material shown consists of pre-recorded video songs and old Somali plays. The contractor simply didn't bring along the studio facilities needed for programme production and news broadcasting. Only a transmitter and an old antenna have been provided.
According to reliable sources, the procurement contract for the TV station was awarded as a result of pressure put by the first lady on the president who in turn pressured the finance ministry into compliance with the wishes of his spouse.
The first lady was also reported to have been involved in an agreement allowing Egyptian Fishing companies to fish in Somaliland waters. As a result, an Egyptian fleet of over 20 ships has been engaged in intensive fishing in Somaliland coast, particularly off Zaila, Lughaya and Eil-Sheikh.
Ms. Huda Barkhad recently returned from a visit to Cairo and according to press reports she bought a house while in the Egyptian capital.
Film On Somaliland To Be Shown On BBC World Today
The first programme of this BBC produced documentaries will be on Somaliland. The first episode will be shown at 17:30 and 00:30 today and 12:30 in the morning on Sunday (all Hargeysa times).
The second episode is on 17:30 and 00:30 on Saturday 27th, and 12:30 on Sunday, 28th, with the other 3 episodes on the following 3 weekends at the same times.
Ethiopian Airlines to Expand Its Somaliland Operations
Ethiopian Airlines currently operates regular daily flights between Addis Ababa and Hargeysa. The route was introduced 4 years ago.
Essentially designed to meet the traveling needs of thousands of diaspora Somalilanders who annually spend their holidays here, the route has since turned into a highly lucrative business. As the runways of Hargeysa airport were technically unfit to receive jet planes, only small and medium size aircrafts were utilized for the Addis Ababa - Hargeysa route. However Berbera airport could easily handle large aircrafts.
In August 2003, Ethiopia had reached an agreement with Somaliland over the use of Berbera port. The agreement has been formalized recently and will enable Ethiopia to import goods and fuel through Somaliland port.
Meanwhile a youngman carrying 2 knives was stopped from boarding Ethiopian Airlines Thursday afternoon flight. The Airlines security staff discovered the 2 knives while being hidden under the shoe socks worn by the youngman, who was identified as Ali Hussein Ali. Later it was revealed that he was actually the son of Somaliland's Finance Minister, Hussein Ali Duale. The flight was delayed for about 45 minutes as passengers and their luggage went through another security checking before the plane was finally given green light for take off.
Source: AFP, Aug 16, 2005
UN warns of possible HIV/AIDS explosion in Somalia
The latest edition of the UN's monthly report on the humanitarian situation in Somalia said current infection rates were relatively low in areas where testing has been done compared to other parts of Africa, but could rise dramatically.
"The findings show that HIV will soon become a major health problem if concerted efforts are not put in place to contain the vulnerability factors fueling the epidemic," the report said, citing a survey carried out in 2004.
The survey found Somalia's average HIV infection rate to be 0.9 percent but with "zonal variations," particularly in its two self-declared autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland, where the average was one and 1.4 percent respectively.
Poor education, high mobility, the transfusion of unsafe blood and negative cultural practices, including female circumcision and commercial sex, were some of the "vulnerability factors" the report said needed to be addressed.
Somalia, a nation of about 10 million people, has been without a functioning government since the 1991 ouster of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre plunged the Horn of Africa country into anarchy.
Humanitarian groups have in the past warned of a possible explosion of HIV/AIDS when tens of thousands of Somali refugees return home if current efforts to restore a government succeed.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 7, 2005/SOURCE: The Republican, Hargeysa, in English 7 Aug 05
Somaliland: Seven women candidates launch political campaign for poll
Ms Fadumo Sudi, minister of family welfare and social development in a speech at the closing ceremony of the workshop financed by SILICK of Sweden said, "I am happy to be here with seven women candidates for the parliamentary elections. I would have been happier if you were already elected. I wish you all success for it means that women will take part in decision making bodies".
The minister urged all women to vote for women candidates saying, "You should vote for women candidates even if your husbands, brothers or sons are also candidates".
Ms Ikran Hagi Daud of opposition Kulmiye Party from Awdal Region speaking about what her priorities said, "I have been part of the nation building process. I know the needs of my region and the way to tackle them and I will do that".
Ms Hodan Abdi Husayn of the ruling UDUB Party from Sool Region said, "Two administrations from Somaliland and Puntland exist in my region, because regional politicians forced the people to be in such a situation. I need to make the change men had failed to achieve. Women are not only the majority, but have been exploited and dominated. I will unite them to make changes in the region."
Ms Anisa Hagi Abdi Awad of the opposition Justice and Welfare party (UCID) Hargeysa, said: "A lot of unfulfilled promises have made to the people from such a platform. I will not say that I will turn the salty water to honey, build skyscraper or end hunger. If elected I will strive hard to improve the condition of life of the poor and low-income groups".
Ms Nimo Husayn Qowdhan from Kulmiye Hargeysa, said; "If elected, I will see that the constitution and the law are respected in parliament. I believe that women today are more efficient and more loyal to their country than men. I will see that laws are passed to deal with society related problems as well as business problems. I urge all voters particularly women to vote for their representatives....[ellipsis as published] for us".
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 6, 2005/SOURCE: Radio Hargeysa in Somali 17:00 GMT, 6 Aug 05
Egypt to send observers for Somaliland parliamentary polls - minister
The minister said she had held talks with the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa and discussed education, livestock exports in relation to Arab states and on the political front - Somaliland question.
Lady Isma'il said she was received by the Egyptian foreign affairs minister in charge of African affairs. She said it was the first time that the two had talks at ministerial level.
The minister said they had agreed Egypt sends a fact-finding team and a trade delegation and said they would like similar delegations from Somaliland.
They said they would also send observers to monitor the forthcoming Somaliland parliamentary elections.
The minister also said the talks among other issues, dealt with the security of the Red Sea.
The minister also said she had met the South African foreign minister and several diplomats in Addis Ababa.
Source: http://www.tvsomalilandeurope.net/ 06 Sep 2005
United in making a difference: Somaliland Communities in Europe
- History: Survival, Reconciliation and Peace
- Present: Re-construction and Democracy
- Tomorrow: Development and Prosperity
A. Background
Somaliland Societies in Europe (SSE) is primarily a network for Somaliland communities and organisations in Europe. SSE is a non-political but charitable organisation. It is in its formative years and its vision is "to bring together and utilise the skills and resources of its members, Somaliland organisations and communities in Europe for the benefit of Somalilanders in Europe and back home - Somaliland".
Main SSE's Strategic Objectives include:
1. To promote the development and empowerment of Somaliland communities in Europe and Somaliland
2. To link and liaise with indigenous and International and Somaliland NGOs and Institutions
3. To promote, publicise and market the achievement of Somaliland, its people and institutions in the International Community
4. To lobby for more resources and development grants for Somaliland Communities in Europe and those in Somaliland
5. To be vigilant about the on going Somaliland democratisation process and challenge any undemocratic obstruction and hindrance instigated by individual (s) and or groups in this democratisation process
The idea to form SSE as an organisation took place in May 2003 in Holland (Utrecht), but it was formalised and structured in May 2004 in London. All the EC that Somaliland communities reside are represented at SSE. Somaliland community in UK holds the chairmanship and Secretariat and SSE address is: Phoenix House, 389 Newport Road, Cardiff CF24 1TP.
B.1 Introduction
SSE will hold an International Conference and a Grand Exhibition in London on 1st and 2nd September 2005. Our choice of London is strategic as UK holds the Presidency of G8 this year, UK is chairing the EC as of July and the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Tony Blair, has created a flagship for Africa democratisation and development: Commission for Africa. This year (2005) is a very exciting one that holds opportunities and prosperity. It will hopefully be the year Somaliland people succeeds to become part of the International Community. We believe that every human being is entitled to "a life of dignity and opportunity".
Against all odds Somaliland has successful managed to overcome the destruction carried out by the military dictatorship. Now Somaliland is a country of peace, freedom, equality and enterprise. On 15th August 2000 The Financial Times reported, "It (Somaliland) could serve as a model for Africa: peaceful, stable, little crime, no debt, a liberal economic regime as of this month, a multi-part electoral system".
Since then a new constitution establishing a multi-part electoral system was approved in 31st May 2001, Local Government elections followed in December 2002 and peacefully contested presidential election was held in April 2003. With only parliamentary election scheduled for 15th September 2005 remaining, Somaliland's multi-party democratisation process is complete.
Many distinguished politicians, academicians, researchers and commentators across the world are calling the international community to be realistic about the permanent and drastic shift and change of the paradigm that the so-called "Pan Somalism " was based. They are relentlessly calling the International Community to recognise the unprecedented achievements of Somaliland people in terms of peace, reconciliation, democracy and governance and development. They argue that Somaliland, without the help of the International Community, managed to rise from the ashes and destruction of the unjust war and has achieved most of the goals, targets and milestones the Commission for Africa, chaired by The Rt. Hon Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is asking the African Countries to attain.
There is over a century of connection between Somaliland and United Kingdom as Somaliland was part of the British Empire and as a result many Somalis settled in this country. This conference is paramount and a unique event, the first of its kind. It will highlight the background and profile of the British Somali Community and their country of origin. This is the year for Africa, as Rt. Hon Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said on Sunday 24th April 2005, and this event is very relevant and on time.
The British people and Her Majesty Government were very supportive and sympathetic to Somaliland people during the terrible years of war in Somaliland. This country had welcomed many Somaliland refugees. The British Media, Politicians, Human Rights Organisations particularly Amnesty International were relentlessly and fully engaged in unmasking the Hidden War in Somaliland and the atrocities committed against Somaliland people by the military dictator, General Siad Barre.
The British people showed solidarity with Somaliland people during the 10 (1981-1991) years Hidden War as a result of which many Somalilanders have received sanctuary and safety in this country. This conference makes tribute to the British people for their generosity and unprecedented support in those dark years.
B.2 Strategic Objectives of the Conference
1. To raise the profile of Somaliland Communities in Europe
2. To demonstrate Somaliland achievements and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead
3. To explore the role Diaspora plays and could play in the Development of Somaliland
4. Learning about the fascinating history and culture of Somaliland people - past and present
B.3 Among Others Benefits of Attending Include
- Learning about the fascinating history and culture of Somaliland people - past and present
- Learning about the strength and weakness of Somaliland communities in Europe and how you can be helped and supported
- Exploring and discussing challenges and opportunities facing Somaliland Communities and Somaliland
- Discussing the role Somaliland Diaspora could play in the development of Somaliland
- Exploring and developing ideas and concepts to improve the status quo to make a difference
- Networking, sharing and exchanging information with colleagues in your area of interest.
For further information please contact:: Eid Ali Ahmed, Chair Abdulkadir Maacalesh, Secretary. Email: info@sse4.com Email: info@sse4.com. Tel: + 44 (0) 29 2043 2972 Tel: + 44 (0) 120 453 5093/ Mobile: 07971531761 Mobile: 07984142942
Somaliland Societies in Europe Press Release-immediate United in making a difference: Somaliland Communities in Europe (Diaspora) and SomalilandAug-10-2005 WWW.SSE4.COM
5th August 2005: Press Release - immediate
United in making a difference: Somaliland Communities in Europe (Diaspora) and Somaliland: History: Survival, Reconciliation and Peace; Present: Re-construction and Democracy; Tomorrow: Development and Prosperity 1ST - 2ND SEPTEMBER 2005
First Somaliland communities in Europe would like to condemn the callous and inhumane act of killing and the maiming of innocent people. Our sympathy and deeply heartfelt condolence goes out to the British people particularly to those families that have lost their loved ones and/or have been hurt in these insane attacks. This indiscriminate killing of innocent people is totally forbidden in Islamic Practice. There is a long and solid historical ties and friendship between Somaliland and British people. The British people and Her Majesty's Government were very supportive and sympathetic to Somaliland people and many Somaliland refugees during the terrible years of war in Somaliland. The British Media, Politicians and Human Rights Organisations were relentlessly engaged in unmasking the Hidden War in Somaliland and the atrocities committed against Somaliland people by the military dictator, General Siad Barre.
The British people showed their solidarity with Somaliland people during the 10 (1981-1991) years of Hidden War as a result of which many Somalilanders have received sanctuary and safety in this country. Somaliland people are thankful to the British people and Her Majesty Government for their generosity and unprecedented support in those dark years. Second we would like to announce that we are holding an International Conference and a Grand Exhibition in London on 1st and 2nd September 2005. Our choice of London is strategic as UK holds the Presidency of G8 this year, UK is chairing the EC as of July and the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Tony Blair, has created a flagship for Africa democratisation and development: Commission for Africa. There is a significant Somaliland community in the UK since the 19th century as Somaliland was part of the British Empire. Over the years Somaliland people have contributed into the development of this country and they took part in the first and second world wars and Falkland war in 1982. Since 1980s many Somalilanders came to UK through family reunion by the old British Somaliland community and as refugees as well. Hemione Harries (June 2004, ICAR) wrote a comprehensive report on the community. This year (2005) is a very exciting one that holds both opportunities and prosperity. It will hopefully be the year Somaliland people succeeds to become part of the International Community. We believe that every human being is entitled to "a life of dignity and opportunity". Against all odds Somaliland has successfully managed to overcome the destruction carried out by the military dictatorship. Now Somaliland is a country of peace, freedom, equality and enterprise. As of August 2000 The Financial Times reported, "It (Somaliland) could serve as a model for Africa: peaceful, stable, little crime, no debt, a liberal economic regime as of this month, a multi-part electoral system".
Since then a new constitution establishing a multi-part electoral system was approved in 31st May 2001, Local Government elections followed in December 2002 and peacefully contested presidential election was held in April 2003. With only parliamentary election scheduled for 15th September 2005 remaining, Somaliland's multi-party democratisation process is complete. Contrary to the unfortunate and sad loss of lives in most African countries during their elections not a single person was killed, harmed or arrested in Somaliland during all these elections and no doubt the case will be the same for the coming Parliament election in September. This is not by accident but Somaliland people have a deep-rooted tradition of tolerance, fairness, equality and freedom.
Sir Bob Geldof recent series on Africa (BBC - Africa Lives - Geldof in Africa) and other credible national and international TV and Radio programmes confirmed the success story of Somaliland. With very little assistance from international community Somaliland people has achieved all the milestones and goals that The Rt Hon Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has asked African leaders to achieve under the powerful and revealing Commission for Africa Report. There is no doubt Somaliland is a showcase and benchmark on good governance for many Africa countries but one wonders when Somaliland people will get the dividend of peace, reconciliation and good governance?
The success story of Somaliland and its unparalleled achievements were vigorously debated in British Parliament on 4th February 2004. In this debate the Rt. Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International Development, said:
"I concur completely with what we have heard today about governance and the progress that Somaliland has made. Indeed, it provides some important lessons, and in some respects acts as a beacon to other parts of Africa because of the relative stability that it has enjoyed for 10 years. It has held democratic elections-municipal and presidential-and aims to hold parliamentary elections in, we all hope, the not too distant future. It has a traditional bicameral Parliament...It has a police force, a defence force, its own currency and a relatively free and lively press. Undoubtedly, in contrast to the rest of Somalia, it has achieved an enormous amount for its people."
For the complete debate (4th Feb 2004: Column 2723WH) please see UK Parliament website: www.publications.parliament.uk.
This ministerial testimony confirmed what was said fifty-three years ago in a report (1952) by the British Colonial Administration in Somaliland to Her Majesty Government saying about Somaliland people:
"they have ethnological and political claims to racial individualism that would seem to be at least as good as our own, while there is no reason to suppose that their love of independence and liberty is any less than that of the Americans or ours".
BBC Radio, 15 August 2005, 07:03 GMT 08:03 UK (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4145400.stm)
Getting to grips with khat in Somaliland
A mayor in breakaway Somaliland is trying to cut down on the problems caused by khat, a mild stimulant, by moving dealers to the outskirts of the city. "Out of sight, out of mind," the mayor hopes
Hussein Mohamud Jiir, mayor of the capital Hargeisa, has set aside tracts of land where he hopes to install the khat merchants.
Dealers, however, say there is no point trying to restrict their activities.
Khat is a natural amphetamine derived from the leaves of the Catha edulis plant.
The problem of addiction in Somaliland - which has broken away from Somalia - is huge.
Addicts - mostly men - will spend all their money on the drug, while their children have nothing to eat.
And khat is also blamed for the small plastic bags which litter the city.
Pink, blue and red bags, used to hold khat, block drains, hang on trees and fences, stick to telegraph and electricity poles, or are even eaten by goats.
The mayor's plan would give each of the city's five districts its own khat "areas".
Bursts into life
He was confident that the plan would work.
"The same thing that happens here today, used to happen in Mogadishu. Sinai market was a similar initiative. People will go to wherever there is khat," he said.
"It has become so cumbersome to declare every Thursday as a general clean- up exercise", said Abdiwahab Nakruma, Hargeisa health officer
The drug is grown in Ethiopia's highlands. Every day, dozens of trucks loaded with tonnes of it arrive in Hargeisa, flooding the streets by mid-morning.
The city bursts into life with their arrival. People run after the trucks, some pushing carts and wheelbarrows.
There are the khat sellers, bystanders, the jobless, pilferers and pickpockets, all wanting to make something out of the excitement.
Khat dealer Ali Omar says there is no point trying to control the trade. "It is a silly question asking why I sell khat. Can you just walk over to the opposite store and ask why he sells foodstuffs? What a laughing matter," he said before resuming his shouts to attract customers.
Single mother-of-three Amina Derie has been selling khat for three years and is unrepentant.
She says the trade allows her to buy food for her children. "I even pay their school fees through it. Thanks to God, I am comfortable," she said with a knowing smile.
Environmental problems
The drug has a huge impact on the economy of Somaliland - whose independence from the rest of Somalia has not been internationally recognised.
Hargeisa's former mayor Mohamed Hashi was once quoted as saying that $60m was spent annually importing the drug from Ethiopia.
Somaliland is one of the poorest places on earth.
The thousands of small polythene bags scattered all over the city's streets are a clear sign of the scale of the problem.
It appears that this huge mess is one reason why local leaders have taken action.
Hargeisa Regional Public Health Officer Abdiwahab Nakruma says khat has led to a fall in hygiene and sanitation standards.
"It has become so cumbersome to declare every Thursday as a general clean- up exercise."
Rangeland Development Director in Pastoral and Environmental Ministry Abdikarim Adan Omar says khat is also contributing to the degradation of the natural environment.
He says that unemployed young people in rural areas have resorted to burning charcoal in order to buy khat.
"The common saying in the rural areas amongst the charcoal burners is: 'Cut a tree to chew a twig'," he said.
Hargeisa residents are hoping that some of these problems can be solved by moving the khat markets out of the city centre.
Lady, it does matter
Three things are noteworthy about Somaliland foreign minister's most recent press conference. First, it came after visiting Egypt, a country that, like the Middle East in general, has not received the right amount of attention from Somaliland's foreign ministry. It was therefore, an important and welcome step to see Somaliland's foreign minister diplomatically engaging that country, and we hope more steps will follow, not only toward Egypt, but other Middle Eastern countries as well.
The second issue that drew our attention was the foreign minister's answer to a question about reports in the press regarding a meeting between Somaliland's Finance Minister, Hussein Ali Duale (Awil) and the Prime Minister of the so-called government of Somalia, that took place in Addis Ababa. Somaliland's Foreign Minister, Edna Adan, said she was not in Addis Ababa at the time, and does not know about such a meeting. A diplomatic answer one might say. But in the context of existing reports about the meeting, it only raised more questions than it answered.
But the most disappointing part of the foreign minister's press conference was her answer as to how she sees the constant interference of the finance minister in foreign affairs. The foreign minister totally trivialized the issue. She recounted how she often talks about finance, health, livestock, forestry and many other subjects; the implication being that since she regularly talks about these subjects even though she is not in charge of those ministries, then Awil could also "talk" about Somaliland's foreign policy. Needless to say, the foreign minister is mixing apples and oranges here. The question is not whether the finance minister or any other minister can "talk" about topics that do not fall within the immediate purview of his ministry, but rather, whether it is proper or in the country's interests, for the finance minister to conduct foreign policy.
In addition to trivializing the issue of who is in charge of Somaliland's foreign policy, the foreign minister also showed one of the major weaknesses of her approach to foreign policy, in that she utterly personalized the issue. She talked about her self-confidence, how she does not see the finance minister as a threat, and how she and her fellow ministers are members of a team. The inescapable conclusion from her explanation is that, not only does she think it is all right for one minister to share in, or do the work of another, but that she also sees herself as a minister but not as the head of a ministry. For one thing, if she saw herself as not just a minister or a member of an exclusive club but the head of a ministry, she would have thought of officials in her ministry as the logical candidates to share in the work-load, to take a visible part in formulating and executing policies, and to fill in for her when she is away, instead of justifying the finance minister's intrusion into her work.
As if to emphasize how she is not bothered by the finance minister's involvement in foreign policy, the foreign minister used the phrase "it doesn't matter". That phrase summed up the weaknesses in Lady Edna's approach to foreign policy. Somaliland must move from this thin, anemic, personal approach to a more substantive approach that emphasizes institution building. Whether Somaliland follows its current personality oriented foreign policy or adopts an institutions-oriented framework will have serious consequences. That is why we disagree with the foreign minister when she said, "it does not matter." We say, "Lady, it does matter."
Somaliland Editors Adopt New Code of Conduct For Elections
Hargeysa, Aug 08, 2005 (International Journalist's Network) - Print and broadcast editors in Somaliland, recently drafted a new code of conduct to guide their coverage of upcoming elections. They worked on the code as part of a workshop organized by press freedom group Article 19.
The workshop took place in early July. The aim was to help ensure fair and balanced monitoring of the upcoming elections in Somaliland, which has declared independence from Somalia but is not recognized internationally.
The new code calls for news media to "avoid excessive and privileged coverage of incumbent politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties" during the electoral campaign. It also calls for the use of "neutral for impartial, dispassionate election reporting." Since declaring its independence in 1991, Somaliland has been more politically stable than the rest of Somalia. However, authorities still prohibit private radio stations and sometimes harass independent journalists, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). The full text of the code is as follows:
Media Code of Conduct for the 2005 Somaliland Elections
The media plays an important role in monitoring the electoral process. By covering the election events and the political campaign, the media insures that the public is aware of what is happening. Good media coverage of the electoral process can increase public knowledge and information on the elections, the candidates and the issues. The coverage of elections in the media, and its analysis of candidate platforms and election issues, provides voters with the information they need to make an informed choice on voting day. It can also provide factual information needed by voters to participate, such as the day, hours and locations of polling stations. In order to fulfill this role several conditions must be met:
- All media must have access to the electoral process and its participants.
- Reporters must have access to electoral managers, electoral sites, candidates and voters.
- It is essential that the media have access to public information.
- The media must be able to investigate and report in a safe environment, without fear of intimidation or retribution.
- The media should be free to cover and report on election events without restrictions or censorship.
- The media needs to be able to circulate freely throughout the country so that it can follow national campaigns or candidates and see how the election administration is working in outlying areas.
- All media should be treated equally, whether it is the government media or private. This applies to access to political parties, candidates, the electorate, electoral sites and information.
- Public authorities and other concerned parties should refrain from interfering with the activities of journalists and other media personnel with a view to influencing the elections.
- In order to combat the Danger of speculation the election results must be released in a timely manner.
- The foreign broadcast media, particularly the BBC Somali Service, have significant geographic coverage, listenership and potential influence on voters. For this reason, these services should be encouraged to report on Somaliland election campaign in a considered and in depth manner giving due regard to their own codes for election coverage and the code adopted by Somaliland media below. The NEC is encouraged to monitor the election coverage of foreign broadcast media and establish a liaison mechanism for dealing with complaints. In return and with due respect for editorial freedom, Somaliland media has adopted the following code of conduct for the election period.
- To cover the electoral campaign in a fair, balanced and impartial manner.
- To ensure accurate, balanced and impartial coverage of the news and current affairs and in the content of interviews and debates that may have an influence on the attitude of voters.
- To avoid excessive and privileged coverage of an incumbent politicians from the both the ruling and opposition parties..
- Not to disseminate any partisan electoral messages on the day preceding voting, to allow voters to take a decision without pressures.
- As far as possible, to report the views of candidates and political parties directly and in their own , rather than as others describe them.
- To guarantee a rapid right of reply to a candidate or political party, if so required, in order that this right can be exercised during the campaign period.
- To ensure that news content is factually accurate, complete, relevant and in context.
- To use neutral for impartial, dispassionate election reporting and take care with technical terms and statistics and ensure headlines reflect the facts of the story.
- To avoid inflaming emotions over controversial issues through impassioned handling of these issues.
- To label opinions and personal interpretations as such, and limit opinions and editorials to the editorial and opinion pages/programmes.
- To label advertising clearly so it is not confused with the news and to ensure that advertising coverage complies with the code of conduct for political parties adopted between by the NEC.
- Journalists are obliged to introduce themselves as such and to be honest and fair in the way news is gathered, reported and presented.
- To honour pledges of confidentiality to a news source, otherwise identify sources of information.
- Not to plagiarise and to give due credit to secondary sources of information.
- Not to alter photographs or graphics to mislead the public.
- Not to accept any inducement from a politician or candidate
- Not to give favourable advertising rates to one political party and not to another.
- Not to give money for sources of stories
Source: Source: http://www.article19.org/pdfs/other/code-conduct-somaliland.pdf/Aug 08, 2005
Somaliland editors adopt new code of conduct for elections
The workshop took place in early July. The aim was to help ensure fair and balanced monitoring of the upcoming elections in Somaliland, which has declared independence from Somalia but is not recognized internationally.
The new code calls for news media to "avoid excessive and privileged coverage of incumbent politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties" during the electoral campaign. It also calls for the use of "neutral for impartial, dispassionate election reporting."
Since declaring its independence in 1991, Somaliland has been more politically stable than the rest of Somalia. However, authorities still prohibit private radio stations and sometimes harass independent journalists, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).Full Artcle in PDF Read here http://www.article19.org/pdfs/other/code-conduct-somaliland.pdf.
Parliamentary Election Postponed To Sept 29
Hargeysa, August 13, 2005 (SL Times) - President Rayale issued a decree on Wednesday postponing Somaliland parliamentary elections from September 15 to September 29, 2005.
The postponement was requested by Somaliland's National Electoral Commission. The NEC said it was unable for technical reasons to meet the original Sept 15 deadline.
A dispute over the number of seats to be allocated to some parts of Sanag and Sool regions and the selection of the official sign to appear opposite the portrait photo of each candidate had also been cited as one of the causes of the delay.
Political parties were also blamed for taking too long to replace the candidates who failed to meet the NEC criteria.
Egypt To Send Observers To Somaliland
Hargeysa, August 13, 2005 (SL Times) - The Egyptian government will send observers to Somaliland to monitor the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held here on September 29, 2005, Somaliland Foreign minister Edna Adan Ismail told local reporters last Saturday. Ms. Edna, who returned from a recent trip to the Egyptian capital Cairo, also disclosed that Egypt agreed to send a fact-finding team and a trade delegation to Somaliland.
The minister said she had talks with Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa and discussed with him various issues including education, Somaliland livestock exports and Somaliland's independence.
Edna was received by the Egyptian Foreign minister in charge of African Affairs. She said it was the first time the two had talks at ministerial level. The minister said the talks dealt among other things with the security of the Red Sea.
She also said she had met with the Foreign minister of South Africa and several diplomats in Addis Ababa.
Winning The Hearts And Minds Of British Muslims
In one of his first statements to the press following the July 7 blasts in London, British Premier, Tony Blair, had referred to the importance of winning the hearts and minds of British Muslims as part of an over-all long-term strategy for defeating terrorism. To prove that they were genuinely interested in mobilizing their Muslim citizens against terrorism, Blair and his senior ministers hosted a series of meetings with so-called leaders of Muslim communities in Britain. But these meetings produced nothing as to prevent young Muslim terrorists from striking back again on July 21. This doesn't mean that the British government's policy, seeking a broader Muslim engagement and support in the fight against domestic terrorism, has been theoretically wrong. However for this policy to become fruitful, the UK government must ensure that it actually deals with the right representatives of various British Muslim communities. The present self-styled Muslim leaders have willingly or unwillingly failed to do something about the spread of the philosophy of the newly-coined extremist versions of Islam among a significant number of Muslim youth in Britain.
Obviously, extremists disguised as moderates, have succeeded in establishing themselves as respectable Muslim community leaders. In fact some of the Muslim communities in the UK, such as the sizable Somaliland one, have been deprived of even a nominal representation on Britain's Islamic Council. The pan-Islamists on the council consider Somaliland's withdrawal from its 1960 union with Somalia as weakening the "Islamic cause". It is not a coincidence that Al-Itihad, an extremist Somali Group linked to Al-Qaeda, also cites the same reason for its opposition to Somaliland's de facto independence.
Blair's government should create the necessary environment for British Muslim communities including the marginalized Somaliland one, to elect their own truly representative leaders. Only leaders who enjoy the support of the moderate mainstream Muslims could be relied on to successfully challenge the homicidal cult culture advanced by terrorists.
Source: http://www.qarannews.com/ Aug 8 2005
EU funds Somaliland parliamentary polls
The chairman made the remarks yesterday morning while addressing some local journalists who were attending a seminar at Radio Hargeysa station.
The chairman, Adami, said the EU support came after a fact-finding team arrived in the country, carried out independent assessment and became satisfied with the electoral process. He said as a result of this, the EU was funding 70 per cent of the elections, and the government was meeting the remaining 30 per cent.
Adami said they had received more pledges from the EU, as well as other countries like Switzerland, which had donated 50,000 US dollars to Somaliland government.
He said during last elections, the ECS did not receive as much support as it was receiving now. He noted that many countries were willing to openly assist us with both financial and technical support.
Copyright c 2005 BBC Monitoring/BBC. Source: Financial Times Information Limited
Eyro Emerges As Islamic Courts' New Leader
Eyro succeeds Hersi Abdi (Lugey) who was slain by gunmen earlier last month. A ceremony held to mark Eyro's appointment as the new chief of the Eyr subclan's Islamic Courts militia was held in the presence of Sheikh Hassan Awais, who is widely held as Al-Qaida's top leader in Somalia, and Sheikh Nur Ma'alin.
Until recently, Eyro headed a small terror group that targeted foreigners and Somalis who worked with them. According to the International Crisis Group, Eyro's group has been implicated in the assassination of a number of aid workers in Somaliland during 2003 and 2004.
When Abdulkader Yahya, a prominent peace mediator, was assassinated at his home in Mogadishu on July 18, 2005, Eyro was suspected of carrying out the killing. Eyro's predecessor, Lugey, was gunned down a day later. Jama Kutiye the leader of the group currently on trial in Somaliland for the murder of Kenyan GTZ consultant Ms Florence Cheriout on March 19, 2005 as well as for participation in the plotting and execution of other assassination attempts against foreign aid workers, had confessed to interrogators that Eyro was their commander.
During last Wednesday's ceremonies in Mogadishu, the names of Eyro's assistants in the Islamic Courts hierarchy were also read and acknowledged by the attendants.
Britain, Europe And The US Should Not Be Safe Havens For ONLF Terrorists
Since the July 17 failed attack in London, when it was revealed that the terrorists involved were originally from the Horn of Africa, there has been increasing media attention on the Horn of Africa as an exporter of terrorism to Europe. This view of terrorism as a one-way traffic is simplistic. For many years, both Ethiopia and Somaliland were subjected to terrorist attacks by the so-called Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), most of whose leaders reside in Britain and other western countries. These leaders of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), many of whom were former officers, soldiers and plain mercenaries in Somalia's now defunct army, have taken advantage of the West's liberal asylum laws and openness and used them as bases from which they directed and financed their deadly activities.
The ONLF claims that it is a national liberation movement, but its tactics and actions show that it is a terrorist organization whose main targets are innocent civilians. Just like the terrorists who attacked London's subways and buses, the ONLF often attacks public transportation. According to the latest count, it has, so far, set on fire 38 trucks that were owned by civilians from Somaliland. ONLF head, Mohammed Omar Osman even boasted on BBC Somali Radio Service that they did carry out those attacks and warned that they will set more trucks ablaze unless their demands were met. Their chief demand from Somaliland is that it allow its territory to become a playground for ONLF terrorists, something Somaliland refuses to do.
Although the ONLF's terrorist activities were previously directed at Somaliland and Ethiopia, lately, it has expanded its targets to include other Somali communities such as the Sheekhal and the Harti of Ethiopia. In the past, Britain and western countries had looked at the ONLF as a Horn of Africa problem. But bitter experience has shown that terrorists from remote countries may at some point decide to target their host countries. That is why Britain and western countries must now move against the ONLF and dismantle it before it becomes deadlier and more intractable. But this is only part of the solution. Another part of the solution is to help in finding a political settlement that addresses the legitimate grievances of Somalis in Ethiopia. The ONLF's alienation of so many Somali clans, its unwinable fight against Ethiopia, and the death and destruction it brought on one of the poorest regions of the world, has finally convinced some Ogadeni elders to take the initiative and open peace talks with the Ethiopian government. It is in Britain and the west's interests to encourage those peace talks between the Ethiopian government and Ogadeni elders, and at the same time, deny the ONLF a safe haven in Britain and the west in general. The third part of the solution is that Britain and the west must engage with Somaliland Republic at a level that reflects its importance to the global fight against terrorism and the stabilization of a dangerous part of the world. It just doesn't make practical or ethical sense to expect Somaliland to continue being a positive force in the region while at the same time keeping it unrecognized and diplomatically isolated.
Awil's Secret Meeting With Geedi
Addis Ababa, August 6, 2005 (SL Times) - Somaliland's Finance Minister Hussein Ali Duale, widely known as Awil, had reportedly held a secret meeting in Addis Ababa last month with Ali Geedi, premier of the Abdillahi Yusuf-led faction in the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.
News that the secret meeting took place was first reported by our sister newspaper "Haatuf" in its July 26, 2005 edition. Awil denied that the meeting took place. In a written response to Haatuf, (see the full text in Haatuf's July 27, 2005 edition), Awil described the news about his purported meeting with Geedi as baseless. Accusing Haatuf of following a pattern of habitual fabrication of lies about national leaders, Awil also instructed his staff to cancel the finance ministry's subscription to the country's leading independent daily with immediate effect. However, Somaliland Times can now confirm that Awil actually met with Geedi in Addis Ababa's Sheraton Hotel shortly after the arrival of the latter in the Ethiopian capital on July 20, 2005. Officially, there is no information yet on the nature of the topics that the two men had actually discussed during their meeting. But one of Somalia's news websites quoted Geedi last week as saying that he was highly satisfied with the outcome of his talks with Awil.
An investigation conducted by Somaliland Times revealed that Awil arrived in Addis Ababa a few days before Geedi got there. (Geedi's visit to Addis Ababa was reported in a news dispatch datelined July 21 by the official Ethiopian News Agency). Somaliland finance minister concealed his arrival in Addis Ababa as well as his intention to meet Geedi from officials of Somaliland mission in the Ethiopian capital. Word about Awil's pre-arranged meeting with Geedi first surfaced when 2 TFG supporters living in Addis Ababa started looking for Somaliland finance minister's whereabouts. For this purpose, the 2 men contacted a number of the members of Somaliland community in Addis Ababa. When asked why they were so interested in finding Awil, the 2 TFG agents disclosed that they were supposed to inform minister Awil that Geedi was in town and ready to receive him at the Sheraton Hotel. How Awil was finally located remains unclear. But according to highly reliable sources, he eventually managed to meet with Geedi, in the latter's residence, at Addis Ababa Sheraton Hotel on Wednesday July 20, 2005.
Officials of Somaliland mission in Addis Ababa contacted by Somaliland Times on July 24, stayed non-committal on the whole affair. But after being pressed the next day by Somaliland Times for a response, at least one of those officials conceded that the meeting between Awil and Geedi did happen. He however quickly pointed out that no one from the mission had prior knowledge about the meeting between the duo or had taken part in it. Credible independent sources confirmed to Somaliland Times that the head of Somaliland Liaison Office, Yusuf Jama Burralle, was actually unaware about the meeting. Since becoming finance minister in June 6, 2003, Awil was often criticized for spending more time on suspicious trips to East African capitals, particularly Addis Ababa and Nairobi, than on his work at the ministry in Hargeysa.
Omar Haji Mahmoud, a former chief of Somaliland mission in Addis Ababa recalled by saying, "It wasn't unusual for Awil to appear unannounced in Addis, and then be seen conducting meetings with the strangest kinds of peoples." When recently the US consulate in Addis Ababa declined to issue him a US visa, Awil insisted to friends that his application was still being considered.
Despite Awil's poor performance, whether as finance minister or as a special diplomatic emissary, he continued to enjoy blind support from President Rayale. Instead of distancing himself from Awil's latest blunder in meeting Geedi, Rayale not only remained silent about the issue but bizarrely enough commissioned his controversial finance minister to fly to Djibouti last Tuesday to meet with a visiting US Congressional delegation. A lot of people now believe that Awil wouldn't have met with Geedi had he not received a green light from Rayale. The President's passive response to the whole affair of the meeting between Awil and Geedi has already led many people to question for the first time his true stand on the issue of Somaliland's independence. While Somaliland government returned Osman Atto from Hargeysa airport on July 11 on the pretext that he was a member of the Mbagathi government, the Awil-Geedi meeting is seen as though Rayale is up to something fishy.
It has been the policy of successive Somaliland governments, including the present one, headed by President Dahir Rayale Kahin, not to meet with the officials of any government of Somalia that claims jurisdiction over Somaliland. Since its liberation from Somalia and declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland has never participated in the series of internationally and regionally sponsored attempts to resolve the conflict in Somalia. The country's position has been that independent and peaceful Somaliland should not allow itself to melt into the externally-led efforts to form a central government for Somalia. Somaliland held that any such attempts to form a government for Somalia, should deal with the former Italian colony of Somalia only. According to this policy, Somaliland and Somalia can talk about their future relations as two equal and sovereign countries, a position that Premier Geedi's government has not yet accepted.
As predicted by most political analysts, Awil's clandestine meeting with a senior official of a government officially claiming to have legal jurisdiction over Somaliland territories is likely to spark further public backlash against President Rayale's government, which is already faced with widespread popular discontent.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 1, 2005/SOURCE: Haatuf, Hargeysa, in Somali 31 Jul 05
Ethiopia said brokering talks between Somaliland, new Somali government
[Prime Minister] Ali Muhammd Gedi briefed Abshir Ali Nur - a Jawhar-based correspondent of the Nairobi-based Wagga-cusub Internet website. Jawhar is the Mbagathi administration's interim HQ. Gedi added that Ethiopia was involved in the talks between Somalia and Somaliland.
"The nature of our talks with Somaliland will be announced simultaneously, same day, by both parties. We thank the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry for playing a major role in the talks between us and Somaliland which are going on very all. I have met Somaliland finance minister, Awil Ali Du'ale," said Ali Muhammad Gedi.
This confirms a report published on 26 July by Haatuf which said Somaliland finance minister had held a secret meeting with the prime minister of the Mbagathi-founded Somali government. Credible sources in Addis Ababa had confirmed to us that the duo held talks in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
However, the following day the Du'ale denied meeting Gedi and described the report a fabrication. The minister also said Somaliland had decided not to hold any talks with the Somali government
Details of the subject discussed or whether they were any ongoing talks between the two sides is not available. Reports from Addis Ababa said no-one from Somaliland accompanied Awil during the meeting.
Source: http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/unicef-som-31jul.pdf
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Date: 31 Jul 2005
UNICEF Somalia Monthly Review Jun-Jul 2005
On 26 July, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia arrived in Jowhar, 90km north of Mogadishu, to establish the temporary seat of his administration. The President has chosen Jowhar as an interim location due to ongoing insecurity in Mogadishu. On his arrival, the President was met by hundreds of residents and members of his government including Prime Minister Ali Gedi, various Ministers and Members of Parliament. In an address to residents of Jowhar, the President and Prime Minister called for reconciliation and political stabilization. To strengthen the presence of the TFG in the location, Prime Minister Gedi launched construction of an improved airport in June and inaugurated the Duduble Canal, constructed in a collaborative effort between the Jowhar administration, the local community and the United Nations.
The President has also visited Northeast Somalia (or `Puntland') and met members of the Puntland administration.
Prior to election as President of the TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf was the leaders of the Puntland administration, a semiautonomous region of Somalia that has committed to remain an integral part of Somalia. Unlike Puntland, Northwest Somalia (or `Somaliland') has declared sovereignty and asserts their independence from the rest of the country.
Also in July, the three main political parties in Somaliland submitted their nominees to contest for seats in their House of Representatives. Elections will be held on 15 September.
HIV/AIDS - taking charge: The President Dahir Rayale Kahin has assumed the chairmanship of the National HIV/AIDS Commission, underscoring the seriousness with which his administration is taking the HIV/AIDS threat. In late June, the President met with a joint mission for HIV/AIDS from Nairobi, including the Director of UNAIDS Somalia, Leo Kenny, UNICEF Somalia staff and other UN and NGO representatives. Kenny briefed the President on the role of the UN in AIDS prevention, control and awarenessraising. A woman and child seek refugee under a UNICEF supplied tarpaulin sheet following floods that hit Huriwaa village, Mahaday district in Central Southern Somalia in June. Credit: UNICEF Somalia/001-06-05/CSZ Office.
Security update.
Abdulkadir Yahye - a Mogadishu-based peace activist, chairman of the Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD) and member of the Board of Directors for the Elman Peace Project- was killed in Mogadishu on 11 July 2005. Agencies working in Somalia, including the UN and both national and international NGOs, have condemned the killing, calling Yahye, "a committed advocate for peace and reconciliation." CRD through the leadership of Abdulkadir Yahye conducted several reconciliation meetings for feuding faction leaders, politicians and intellectuals.
In Galkayo, the administrative capital of Puntland, revenge killings occurred during July. The killings spiraled into conflict between government forces and militia belonging to one of the clans involved in the killings. The conflict later abated through dialogue. In Gedo region, 32 people died and 64 were wounded in fighting between rival militia over the control of Elwak town. In June, intermittent fighting in various parts of central and southern Somalia claimed many lives. One of those killed was a reporter with Horn Afrik, a Mogadishu-based news agency, who was shot dead as she covered the dismantling of an illegal roadblock at a checkpoint near Afgoi along the Mogadishu-Afgoi road. Finally, trainees at the Hiilweyne militia demobilization/training camp received salary incentives as part of the demobilization activities in Mogadishu during June.
Health update.
Training: UNICEF trained 30 Traditional Birth Attendants from Awdal region in Borama town, Somaliland. The training focused on delivery skills and basic hygiene services. Ten mid-wives from maternal and child health (MCH) centres were trained at the Edna Aden Maternity hospital in Hargeisa. UNICEF provides child delivery equipment and medical supplies to MCH centres.
Polio: A major polio immunization campaign kicked off throughout Somalia on 18 June. The campaign came after the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a warning that Somalia could become re-infected with polio from nearby Ethiopia and Yemen, the latest two of 16 previously polio-free countries re-infected due to an outbreak in west and central Africa. Somalia has been polio-free since October 2002. Supported by WHO and UNICEF, tens of thousands of volunteers, health workers, parents and community, religious and traditional leaders went house-to-house across the country to hand-deliver polio vaccine to every child under the age of five years. The activity was held from 17 to 19 June in Puntland; from 18 to 20 June in Somaliland and from 24 to 26 June in central and southern Somalia.
Malaria: The distribution of long-lasting Insecticide Treated bed-Nets (ITNs) procured with funds from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) has started. The first consignment of 80,000 ITNs is being distributed through partners. The target groups are those most vulnerable to malaria: pregnant women and children under five years of age.
Nutrition update.
Food demos: UNICEF and the Somaliland administration initiated food demonstration sessions in 30 MCH centres during the reporting period for women with malnourished children.
While most cases of malnutrition among children currently seen at the centres are due to lack of food, others are due to improper food use. Similar sessions were introduced at three MCH centres and two displaced persons' camps in Mogadishu as well as five centres run by partners in Lower Shabelle region. In Puntland, UNICEF and the Association for Integration and Development (AID) a local NGO, distributed food supplements to malnourished children in eight districts affected by drought.
Review: A review of the UNICEF support to the nutrition sector in central and southern Somalia reports that a total of 703,754 children aged less than six years received vitamin A supplements during immunization carried out in the period January-June 2005. An additional 26,824 pregnant women receiving ante-natal care at MCH centres were provided with ironcum- folic acid supplements for prevention and treatment of anaemia. A total of 4,903 malnourished children received nutritional support with about two-thirds of them recovering satisfactorily while the remainder required more specialized attention in hospitals.
Breastfeeding: UNICEF and the Somaliland Red Crescent Society (SRCS) launched a breastfeeding promotion campaign among mothers in Hargeisa town. The promotion targeted about 1300 pregnant and lactating mothers, including those from displaced communities.
Water and environmental sanitation update.
A mission from the Government of Denmark visited water projects in Somaliland that had received support from their government.
In Puntland, UNICEF provided equipment, construction and repair support to various water projects including the Galkayo and Garowe water systems and completion of the Dhahar borewell, the latter serving 15,000 people. Earlier in June, repair works were completed for the Gardo Urban Water Supply System. UNICEF handed management of the Water System over to Hodman, a privatepublic sector partnership company. The Gardo project will provide water to about 25,000 people. In June, UNICEF and a local NGO supported rehabilitation of six wells serving about 3,500 people in villages around Jowhar district of Middle Shabelle Region, central and southern Somalia. UNICEF also helped rehabilitate the Gulane village borewell in Adan Yabaal district. The borewell will serve 2,000 people.
Construction and rehabilitation of the Hafun water supply system has started. Hafun was the worst-affected location by the tsunami that hit the northeast Somalia coastline. An Italian NGO, UNA/Africa 70 is carrying out the construction.
Measles Campaign Underway
UNICEF and WHO have developed a new campaign to prevent measles. It will target children aged 9 months to 15 years and is scheduled to take place before end 2005.
Preparations are underway in Somaliland, Puntland and Bakool Region in central/southern Somalia. Administrations in Somaliland and Puntland have been involved in the planning process.
Sanitation: School sanitation and hygiene projects started in two schools in Burao town, Somaliland. The schools will serve pupils from internally displaced persons' camps. Exploratory drilling for an alternative water source for Hargeisa continued. UNICEF, through the international NGO Diakonia, will construct 30 latrines in Gara'ad and Kulub villages of Mudug region, Puntland, where facilities were destroyed by the tsunami that struck on 26 December 2004. Earlier in June, UNICEF donated 30 sets of sanitation tools for use by a local NGO in clean-up activities in displaced persons' camps in Bossaso, northeast Somalia.
In central and southern Somalia UNICEF trained 118 people in household sanitation and hygiene for prevention and control of cholera. The trainees were from Mahaday and surrounding riverine villages in Middle Shabelle and Goboto, Bakool Region.
Education update.
Back to school campaign: UNICEF, the Somaliland administration, communities and youth groups established registration points for out-of-school children. The registration will assist in getting as many children back into school as possible. In Puntland, UNICEF carried out a child-to-child registration drive in Bosasso, Gardo, Garowe, Galkayo, Hafun and Dangoray towns. The enumerators were 560 pupils supported by 30 teachers. Preliminary data revealed that there were 57,391 out-of-school children (of whom 53.5% were boys and 43.5% were girls). Between 150,000 and 200,000 children are estimated to be out of school in Puntland.
UNICEF continued discussions in Puntland with teachers and community elders in Gardo and Dangoray on the how to provide free coaching in Somali language and mathematics to out-ofschool children during the current holiday break (June-September). UNICEF will provide education supplies and nominal financial support to the hosting schools. Similar initiatives are planned for the Garowe and Galkayo communities.
Non-formal education: Some 74 youth completed non-formal education courses in Mogadishu and Bule Burti in central and southern Somalia. Nonformal education (NFE) helps those who missed out on formal schooling to learn how to read and write. Some of the graduates later continue formal learning in primary schools.
Training: 40 people from Somaliland were trained in Hargeisa on educational instruction and management issues. The training covered areas such as teaching methodologies, gender and life skills, peace education, conflict-resolution and education management. Following the training, the trainees in turn facilitated in-service teacher workshops in seven regional training centres in Somaliland. Some 1,280 teachers from nearly 200 primary schools were trained in July with another batch due for training in August.
Emergency update.
Unusually heavy late season flooding in central and southern Somalia has affected about 25,000 families. In June, UNICEF provided relief items to 414 families displaced following floods in Huriwaa village, in Mahaday district, Middle Shabelle region. In July, as part of a UN interagency response, UNICEF undertook cleaning and chlorination of 25 wells serving villages in four districts (Jilib, Jamame, Bu'ale and Sakow).
The floods destroyed crops making people vulnerable to hunger. Water points were contaminated and sanitation facilities rendered useless.
UNICEF trained communities in hygiene to prevent the spread of water-borne diseases. In mid-July, UNICEF, Save the Children Fund- UK, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Middle Shabelle administration organized a workshop to help build community capacities to respond to floods.
Education policy: The Puntland cabinet has approved the Puntland Education Policy Paper which was developed with support from UNICEF. Tsunami projects: Construction of schools that were hit by the tsunami in Hafun, Handha, Hurdia, Foar and Baarmadoobe in Puntland continued.
The construction should be complete before the 2005/2006 academic year starts in mid-September. A major constraint has been inaccessibility to the affected locations and lack of construction materials in the field. Displaced children: UNICEF anticipates enrolment of more than 3,000 children from displaced communities throughout Puntland in the coming academic year. Special tents will be erected to cater for the additional numbers.
HIV/AIDS.
Advocacy: Community leaders attended an advocacy and leadership training for HIV/AIDS prevention and control in Hargeisa during July. Earlier in June, 15 people were trained in raising awareness about HIV/AIDS issues among women and girls. In Mogadishu, UNICEF and the Somali National Network of AIDS Services Organization (SONNASO) held a sensitization workshop for religious and traditional leaders and local authorities. A total of 126 people from the Benadir Region attended. The workshop ended with a declaration of commitment from the participants to work at community and family level to support efforts for prevention and control of HIV/AIDS. Advocacy: In June, three HIV/AIDS awareness workshops were held in Jowhar, Dhusamareeb and Belet Weyne towns in central Somalia.
Participants were religious and traditional leaders who have influence at the community level. They are vital in the work toward eradicating stigma and discrimination against people living with AIDS as well as promoting support and care for them.
Counseling and testing: UNICEF trained health staff from central and southern Somalia in preparation for the establishment of voluntary counseling and testing centres (VCT) for HIV/AIDS. UNICEF has supplied VCT equipment to a facility in Mogadishu's, Hayat Hospital. It became operational on 23 June. Upto mid-July the centre in Mogadishu had received 13 clients. A major challenge is the low awareness of the availability of VCT services and limited number of facilities to provide services.
Communication for development.
Station boosted: The Somaliland Minister of Information and Guidance, Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, recently commissioned new equipment for the Somaliland National TV broadcasting station. Currently only covering Hargeisa, Somaliland, the station plans to expand its reach to the major towns of Berbera, Burao and Borama. UNICEF undertook audience surveys to gather information on the development of programmes in Somaliland, Puntland and central/southern Somalia. UNICEF staff were also trained in community dialogue for development at a session held in Hargeisa, Somaliland. UNICEF and the Somaliland Ministry of Family Welfare and Social Development discussed possibilities of enhancing collaboration to strengthen the community dialogue processes.
Youth development.
Youth magazine: A workshop was held in Hargeisa for youth representatives from throughout the country to review the content and quality of the youth publication called Koor. The publication, produced by youth with UNICEF support, discusses HIV/AIDS, conflict resolution, counseling, peace education and life skills. The first post-review edition of the publication is planned for early October 2005 and has expanded to include additional topics and issues. Training: A three-week session in leadership for 32 youth from Somaliland and Puntland started in late July. Earlier in June, 22 youth from central and southern Somalia were trained as trainers in leadership and organizational development. Among the areas covered in the training was HIV/AIDS. Youth centre: The rehabilitation of the Berbera Youth Multi-purpose Centre in Somaliland has been completed. In Mogadishu, UNICEF continues to support the Somali Youth and Development Network and receives about 20 readers daily. Most users of the centre are students from schools in its vicinity and adults. UNICEF has provided books and furniture. Among the constraints facing the centre are limited space and shortage of learning materials especially those for math, science and management.
Sports supplies: UNICEF donated sports equipment and materials to youth in Madera village in Middle Shabelle region.
Child Protection.
Child care: UNICEF trained 27 participants from Somalia in care related to the psychological and social dimensions of their lives. UNICEF assessed the social support needed by street children in Borama and organized public education sessions for the community on the problems these children face. Programmes for street children continued in Mogadishu and Belet Weyne. These programmes seek to re-integrate children with their communities; provide education and medical care and to educate leaders and communities on the situation of children living in the street. A total of 231 street children are currently participating. In June, a workshop was held in Mogadishu to sensitize participants on the need to protect children living on the street. The participants were businessmen, security guards, community and religious leaders.
Summit in Jo'burg: UNICEF and three partner organizations from Somalia participated in a UN consultative meeting on violence against children held in Johannesburg, South Africa between 18 and 20 July 2005. The team from Somalia provided insights into the situation of children there. The UN consultation on violence against children is a global initiative that seeks to collect information on violence against children.
If you have questions about the UNICEF Somalia Monthly Review please contact: Denise Shepherd-Johnson, Communication Officer. E-mail: dshepherdjohnson@unicef.org OR Robert Kihara, Assistant Communication Officer. E-mail: rkihara@unicef.org, Tel: 254-2-623958/ 623950/ 623862/ 623959/ 350410, Fax: 254-2-520640/ 623965
BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 27, 2005/Source: Ayaamaha website, Mogadishu, in Somali 27 Jul 05 c BBC Monitoring
SOMALILAND: EX-MINISTER ACCUSES PRESIDENT OF POOR LEADERSHIP
Abib Diriye Nur said he had sent his resignation letter to President Dahir Riyale Kahin.
The minister said he was unhappy with the president's leadership, adding he feared this could undermine his health.
The minister complained about the manner in which Dahir Riyale Kahin was choosing members of the House of Representatives [candidates to contest forthcoming parliamentary polls].
He said the hope of the UDUB [ruling party] to continue ruling was waning.
The aviation minister who has resigned was regarded one of the closest friend President Riyale had in the cabinet, although signs have been emerging recently of a growing rift between the two men.
The presidency has not issued any statement on whether the resignation has been accepted.
Summer 2005 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW/AFRICA
Clash of Clans; Challenges to Somali Government
NATALIA RIGOL, senior editor
On October 1, 2004, Somalia's newly established 275-member Parliament elected the country's 14th president, AbduUahi Yusuf Ahmed. Though Somalis and members of the international community hope that this new administration will bring peace to a region where intraclan warfare has caused more than 300,000 deaths since the early 1990s, the history of failed attempts at establishing governments makes it unlikely that this new president will be successful. Not only will Yusuf's dictatorial manner antagonize the myriad of Somali factions, but deep-seated structural issues within Somah society continue to make a centralized Somalia nearly unattainable.
Somalia's demographic homogeneity has prevented the ethnic disputes seen in other African countries. Despite this, the region has been torn by inter- and sub-clan warfare. Clans control different regions of the country and often fight over natural resources. British and Italian colonization deconstructed the decentralized clan structure to form a centralized government, which also reconfigured the traditional peaceful manner of conflict resolution. As a result, an attempt at the unification of the two European-controlled territories within Somalia following its independence caused antagonism between the largest clans (Dir, Isaq, Hawiye, Darod, Digil, and Rahanwayn), which used newly-brought European firepower to resolve their differences.
After two failed presidents Army Chief Siad Barre staged a coup in 1961 and initiated a dictatorial regime that lasted until 1991. His notorious divide-and-rule approach was supplemented by the ruthless slaughter of opposition members and clans. General Muhammad Farah "Aideed" and Ali Mahdi Muhammad, both members of different sub-clans of Hawiye and of the United Somali Congress overthrew Barre in a coup, but conflicts left more than 14,000 Somalis dead. Since then, rival clans and warlords have aspired to gain power in the region but have failed because of a disregard for centralized governments and a haphazard, artificial subdivision of power within those governments.
The current agreement for the establishment of a national government seems to be following the same path. It has been brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and, in particular, Kenya. However, the procedure of selecting government officials has been flawed. The peace talks, which began in 2002, were expected to go through three stages: recognition of key problems and setting up a cease-fire, dealing with issues of land ownership, disarmament, and drafting a constitution, and, finally, power sharing.
However, the "interests," both internal and external, that ran the conferences, have sped up the initial two phases without true resolution. No reconciliation has been achieved between warring factions in Somalia. The failure is apparent as 2 3 members of the current parliament are still fighting within the southern region of Somalia. One of the largest mistakes made in the government was omitting a provision to disarm warlords. As arms trading has increased since 2001, especially due to the United States' War on Terror, there remains a real danger that clans, unhappy with political decisions, may yet again resort to violence.
Furthermore, the majority of the members of parliament hold little legitimacy in the eyes of Somalis and the international community. Many have been sworn in, despite being disqualified by the Advisory Committee due to a lack of formal education, questionable humanitarian reputations, and records as war criminals. Agreements have been achieved through deceit and threats. This government is fighting for survival as it and its national military exist without structure and indifference is the status quo from the international community, foretelling that peace is unlikely to be acheived.
Additionally, many Somalis and international observers worry about Yusuf's history as a militant dictator. Since 1998, he was President of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. In his presidency, he eliminated much of his political opposition while playing up to pro-Ethiopian interests, which have been unpopular with Somalis. At the end of his term, he denounced Jama Ali Jama, the successor picked by the Congress of Elders to lead Puntland in 2001, and, a year later, removed Jama from power, reportedly with help from Ethiopia. Yusuf's obvious disregard for democratic government is worsened by his reputation within Somalia. Due to his history of military coups and clashes in the Puntland border, as well as the obliteration of peace agreements in 2001, the Isaaqs, Ogadens, Marehans, and Hawiyes are staunchly opposed to his leadership.
A combination of an authoritarian leadership and an illegitimate, backwards Parliament will cause clashes within the decentralized Somali society. The stable region of Somaliland, north of Somalia, has shown that before the formation of government, the people of the country have to integrate members of civil society and communicate on basic humanitarian issues through traditional clan conferences. If the government fails to recognize this, the region will only continue to be ravaged by violence and poverty.
NEW AFRICAN May 2005
Somalia: The north must continue to govern itself
I went to school in Hargeisa, the self-proclaimed capital of Somaliland. In November 2003,1 was invited there by a friend and stayed for a week. During my visit, I saw for myself the normality and progress that prevail in Somaliland. i say Somaliland because this is the name my brothers and sisters in the North have chosen.
From life-long experience, I must say the Northerners are largely very good people. They never deserved what they had been put through, nor did the rest of our people in other parts of the country. Hargeisa today is populated not only by Northerners but also by Somalls from other regions. For instance, the main telephone company laying cables in the streets of Hargeisa is owned by someone from the Somali regions in Ethiopia.
Throughout my week-long stay, I was able to witness the perseverance and ingenuity of our people in the North, i understand what they are up against. Even so, I also recognise that whilst the whole of Europe {including the former communist states of the east) is coming together to achieve the strength and benefits which unity brings, the world Is reluctant to stomach the emergence of two, three or four impoverished Somali states all carved out from the defunct Somali "Democratic" Republic.
As a Somali who loves his people regardless of their clan origins, the North has my sympathy. On the other hand, I am ashamed of those who support warlords and others who prolong our statelessness. Such individuals undermine the emergence of a new Somali state by failing to outgrow "clannism". Clinging to old grudges and prejudices is not the way forward. Our brothers and sisters in the North may today possess governance based on self-administration, but a vision of nationhood - which is the basic requirement for statehood and its success - is surely lacking. Governance based on clan and not nation, suggests a fiefdom rather than a state.
1, for one, am torn between two strong feelings. By all means i feel a desire to help the Northerners in their progress. They deserve the encouragement of all Somalis for their development Somali's new president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, wants to reunite the country and self-governance. And indeed, I am involved in the setting up of a salt plant in Berbera which I trust will benefit Somaliland and the wider region.
On the other hand, I have always believed in the nationhood and unity of Somalia. Despite divisions emphasised by pettyminded leaders, we are the fruits of one tree, we have many things in common and very few differences. I am wholeheartedly for the re-institution of a Somali state in which there will be good governance based on fairness, equal opportunity, enlightenment and justice: a working system which can accommodate the real needs of our nation and deliver sustainable development.
If one day the issue of unity should resurface, it is clear that there has to be a complete cultural change in the idea of governance. It was the misrule of the past which drove the Northerners away and was the root-cause of the state's demise since it could neither bring about good governance nor foster unity.
To ask the North to join a South where there is no functioning government is to ask someone to join in matrimony when there is no home to go to. Only when a proper Somali state is initiated which rights the wrongs of the past and brings about change, progress and hope for ordinary people, should the issue of unity re-surface.
The North must continue to govern itself. If one day the rest of the country has a system with a better future for citizens, they may join. If not, they will never and should never join. Unity is not out of charity. The best way to make it possible for Northerners to consider rejoining a future Somali state is by refraining from attacking their endeavours to govern themselves. Somali unity can never be achieved or maintained by force nor can it be attained by mere persuasion.
To our foreign friends, I say this: You have our respect and gratitude. At the hour of trial, only true friends stay constant. Those of you who, like many of us, have been frustrated by the folly of the many "peace conferences" and their dismal outcome, please do not despair.
Unity and trust, once lost have to be earned. It will take a visionary leader with a highly talented team to restore Somalia by establishing and developing governance that recovers trust and makes unity attractive once more. At the heart of that government there must be probity and transparency. Unity on a silver plate does not come twice.
Recognizing Somaliland: Forward Step in Countering Terrorism?
Abstract (Document Summary)
Prior to the Sep 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, diplomatic attempts to restore order in Somalia were driven by desires to limit the potential for drug trafficking and regional destabilization caused by outflows of arms, banditry, and refugees into neighboring states. The events of 9/11 added a new, more urgent dimension to international engagement in a region that had already experienced the devastation of terrorism. Shillinger discusses the approaches used to solve the crisis in Somalia within the context of global terrorism.
For the fourteenth time in as many years, the international community is attempting to restore central government to Somalia, which descended into clan-based fragmentation, statelessness and violence following the ousting of the Siad Barre military regime in 1991 and has yet to re-emerge. The new administration of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed is the product of more than two years of complex negotiations among rival groups hosted by neighbouring Kenya. Although the African Union (AU) has pledged thousands of regional peacekeepers to help the new government settle, prospects for its success are slim. Conceived and constituted in exile, the Ahmed government was met with varying degrees of praise and violent protest during its first foray into Somalia in early March 2005. This followed the killing of BBC producer Kate Peyton, who travelled to Mogadishu in February to prepare stories on the new government's arrival. Those with vested interests in the status quo, including neighbouring Ethiopia, remain powerful and exercised. Tellingly, Ahmed and his prime minister did not venture into the strife-torn capital.
At the same time, with much less fanfare, the secessionist province of Somaliland in the northwest was preparing for bicameral parliamentary elections to be held on 29 March 2005. While the south has festered, Somaliland has quietly and persistently demobilized its rival militias and erected the structures of statehood without external assistance. It has an elected president and a constitution that survived the death and succession of a head of state, and has drawn substantial inflows of aid and remittances to help rebuild its infrastructure devastated by a decade of civil war with the Siad Barre government prior to 1991. It now boasts reconstructed airports, ports, hotels, power plants and universities - but it remains unrecognized by the international community. Recognition, as the varying fortunes of both Somalia and Somaliland demonstrate, is not a prerequisite for statehood but, in the case of the latter, may well consolidate the process of nation-building at a crucial time both for Somaliland and a world fighting global terrorism.
As the pre-eminent British anthropologist I M Lewis noted in 2004, 'the overall achievement so far is truly remarkable, and all the more so in that it has been accomplished by the people of Somaliland themselves with very little external help or intervention. The contrast with the fate of southern Somalia hardly needs to be underlined.'1
Prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, diplomatic attempts to restore order in Somalia were driven by desires to limit the potential for drug trafficking and regional destabilization caused by outflows of arms, banditry and refugees into neighbouring states. The events of 9/11 added a new, more urgent dimension to international engagement in a region that had already experienced the devastation of terrorism. The key question since then, set against the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was whether the absence of state security structures would enable terrorist organizations to set up bases inside Somalia. For reasons that will be explored below, it has not quite worked out that way, but the 2002 hotel bombing in Mombassa on the Kenya coast illustrated Somalia's potential as a staging ground for terrorist activity and punctuated the region's overall vulnerability.
Given Somalia's location at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, its susceptibility to conflicting destabilizing interests from Ethiopia and the Arab Peninsula, and the Muslim identity of its people, it is time to rethink how to solve the country's enduring crisis in the context of global terrorism. Despite exhaustive debate, the Kenya peace talks on Somalia failed to convincingly resolve the key question of whether to pursue a federal or Unitarian solution in a patch-quilt political landscape of rival clan-based factions.
A better solution is partition. Although it runs contrary to the AU commitment to territorial integrity, recognizing Somaliland is consistent with the imperatives driving global counterterrorism. Emotively, the international community would be supporting the democratic aspirations of a Muslim state - a central pillar of the Bush antiterror'Liberty Doctrine'. Strategically, recognition would give the West expanded influence over 900 additional kilometres of coastline in a key transit zone off the Arab Peninsula and enable the international community to bolster regional security at a time when, according to the accumulated evidence of the different risks posed by failed and weak states, Somaliland is arguably becoming more vulnerable to exploitation by radical Islamist organizations the more it develops.
Bush Doctrine, Failed States, and Global Security
Re-casting his central foreign policy doctrine for an age of terror in his second inaugural address in January 2005, President George Bush stated that
it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.... America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.
Two immediate and correlative assumptions are implicit in this approach: that state repression promotes social radicalization, which in the current international security context poses threats to prosperous and peaceful nations; and that democracy is a universal and thus universally adaptable aspiration that, when realized, is the ultimate antidote to forms of ideological discontent that underpin transnational terrorism.
[Photograph] Hargeisa, Somaliland Capital. One of the warplanes ordered by the former Somali government to bomb the town in 1988 forms part of civil war monument, which also commemorates independence day, 26 June I960. Photo by Douglas Long
From these assumptions three critical questions arise. First, how are states or regimes determined to pose risks to global security serious enough to prompt foreign intervention? To put it differently, the selective application of force or coercion since 9/11 suggests that not all tyrants are regarded as the same, and some may even be acceptable. Saddam Hussein was overthrown on the premise - a false one, it turned out - that he was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction; Kirn jong Il is known to have nuclear weapons but is still in power. So is Robert Mugabe, who has neither long-range weaponry nor the desire to acquire them, but has dismantled the democratic edifice of Zimbabwe and suppressed popular aspirations through violence.
Second, how are 'democratic movements' identified and legitimated? The history of foreign meddling in the domestic affairs of far-off nations is troubled and inconsistent. Both Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the world's top terrorist, were once clients of Washington. Post-9/11, what interests and whose - shape the process of helping Others find their own voice' and indeed determine which voices emerge?
Third, what forms of external 'soft' engagement are implied by Bush's pledge and how should they be weighed against the prevailing'rules' of regional politics? The war on terrorism has many fronts - Central Asia, Indonesia, North Africa, and the Horn as well as the Middle East. Effecting'regime change' through force as in Afghanistan and Iraq is neither logistically possible nor internationally justifiable. It follows, then, that 'pre-emption' can utilize and, indeed, requires many means. These questions are most relevant and problematic with regard to dysfunctional states, where poverty and poor or repressive governance can give rise to radicalization. Before 9/11, such states were regarded primarily as regional problems, incubating threats such as disease, refugee flows, environmental destruction, drugs and arms trafficking, and so on. But the 2001 attacks convulsed thinking about the intersection between faltering states and security in the context of global terror, and it has taken a few years for both analysis and policy to unpack the question - indeed to differentiate the relationship between terrorism and collapsed, failed and weak states respectively.
Two studies in 2002 illustrate the importance of clarifying those distinctions. John J Hamre and Gordon R Sullivan argued that '[o]ne of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter - not just for humanitarian reasons but for national security reasons as well. If left unattended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with global reach....'2 The Bush administration, meanwhile, concluded that '[t]he events of September 11, ZO01, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.... [Pjoverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.'3
More time has shown that the distinction between collapsed states, of which Somalia is the most glaring example, and weak states - such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Kenya, Tanzania and Pakistan - matters deeply and has important implications for policy. As Ken Menkhaus shows in his excellent analysis of Somalia and terrorism, failed states lack the physical and financial infrastructure that terrorist organizations need to operate and are therefore unsuitable as havens, whereas weak states provide both the tools and the cover in a relaxed security environment:
Terrorists, like mafias, prefer weak and corrupt government rather than no government at all. In the Horn of Africa, weak states such as Kenya and Tanzania are much more likely bases of operations for al-Qaeda. They feature sprawling, multi-ethnic urban areas where foreign operatives can go unremarked; corrupt lawenforcement agencies which can be bought off; and a rich array of Western targets.... [A] collapsed state such as Somalia is more likely to serve a niche role as a transit zone, through which men, money or materiel are quickly moved into the country and then across the borders of neighbouring states."
Similarly, Greg Mills concludes that the weakening of state functions manifests in a number of interrelated ways, including the alienation of sectors of society and the emergence of an alternative, anarchic counter-culture; the related inability to provide basic security functions and extend other state functions to the majority of its citizens; and the state's vulnerability to external influences, both state and non-state.... The weak nature of the African state and the corruptibility of the African political class have, over time, made it a soft target for terrorist groups.5
Thus, determining which states pose the greatest risk to international security in relation to terrorism and defining measures of effective intervention requires more than simply identifying tyrants, mobilizing coalitions of force, and orchestrating elections. Fledgling, faltering and nominal democracies present equal or greater threats in terms of the exploitable advantages they provide to terrorist organizations. And while geography matters, it is not a limiting factor - a point underscored by Libya's ongoing material support for Mugabe. In this regard, countering terrorism by strengthening democracy must involve addressing the structural and causal elements of weak governance, risk to investment, and social radicalization: corruption, constitutional imbalance, political exclusion, social exclusion (health and education), economic exclusion (trade), monetary mismanagement and resource depletion.
Somalia and Somaliland
Prior to colonialization, Somalis organized themselves on the basis of a singular national identity. One of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, divided into a matrix of clans and sub-clans spread across some 400,000 square miles of the Horn, they speak just two common and intertwined languages - Somali and Arabic - and are almost all of them Muslim. In the latter half of the nineteenth century they were partitioned by the French, British, Italians and Ethiopians, a process that introduced a political element to Somali identity and over time created a tension of definitions of nationhood that endure today.
The modern state of Somalia - at least geographically - is an experiment in joining two distinct historical entities: Italian Somalia in the south and British Somaliland in the North. In 1940 the Italians captured the north and combined the country, but the merger lasted only seven months before the British recaptured their protectorate. Five years later the Italians lost much of their grip and British control extended deep into the south. The to-ing and fro-ing continued until 1950, when Italian control was formally re-established and the original boundaries re-affirmed under a ten-year plan overseen by the United Nations. Over the course of the next decade, a series of local elections and drafting of a constitution paved the way for independence in 1960 - first for Somaliland on 26 June and then, five days later, for Somalia. Each side was recognized separately by the UN, including each of the five permanent members of the security Council, according to their colonial boundaries.
Unification became both a preoccupation and a source of enduring division. Although the two entities joined within the year, it was a tense marriage marked by deep-seated clan rivalries. During the next three decades, northern dissent was repeatedly crushed by the military regime of Mohamed Siad Barre in Mogadishu. When that government was finally overthrown in 1991, the south descended into factional fighting- and the north 'seceded.' Since then, the two parts have followed dramatically different paths. While the international community launched one peace process after another to try to restore central government in Mogadishu, factional fighting - much of it foreign-backed - carved deep ethnopolitical furrows across the south. In the north, meanwhile, stakeholders engaged in the lengthy process of demobilization, reconstruction, and nation-building. In the course of three national congresses, an interim national charter was drafted, a bicameral parliament was established, comprising an elected house of representatives and a nominated house of clan elders, and a president and vice-president were voted in by congress delegates.
In 2001 the people of Somaliland ratified the new constitution in a nationwide referendum with impressive unanimity. Foreign-observed local elections followed in 2002, and when President Mohamed HaJi lbrahim Egal died during a trip to South Africa, peaceful succession followed through the ballot box, in line with the constitution, in which the victor emerged with a razor-thin 280-vote margin. The 29 March parliamentary elections marked the last step in creating a fully popularly elected government.
How does that position affect the two Somali entities vis-…-vis terrorism? Immediately following the 9/11 attacks Washington listed Somalia as a potential target in its war against terrorism and froze an estimated $500 million in foreign assets held by Somalia's al-Barakat bank and money transferring company.
But as Menkhaus observes, 'Somalia is less than ideal as a safe haven for alQaeda for several reasons': one, the mono-ethnic nature of Somali society makes it harder for foreigners to blend in unobserved; two, there is an absence of Western targets; three, the south lacks the financial, physical and communications infrastructure required by modern terrorist organizations such as Al-Qa'ida; four, the prevailing lawlessness poses a threat to terrorists as much as to anyone else; and fifth, the lack of state control over security would enable US special forces based in neighbouring Djibouti to mobilize within Somali territory faster and with fewer legal restraints.
Rather, two points are of greater and more realistic concern: one, the rise of Allttihad and Al-lslah, respectively radical and progressive Somali lslamist movements that either espouse antiWestern violence or are prone to manipulation by those who do; and two, evidence that terrorist cells are using Somalia as a staging point for operations elsewhere in the region. According to UN security Council assessments, those behind the December 2002 bombing of a hotel in Mombassa and attempt to bring down an Israeli airliner in the Kenyan port transferred materiel through and acquired missiles in Somalia.
No such activity has yet been evidenced in Somaliland, but it is arguable that the territory is becoming more attractive to foreign terrorist organizations the more developed it becomes. Somaliland's political progress has attracted a steady inflow of funds. The US Congress allocated $9 million in 1997 for government and military salaries. The same year the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development launched an $18 million project to improve communications links between the port of Berbera and other regional ports. The EU has funded road construction, the Italians water works, and the International Development Bank education. The British company Digital Exchange Projects, meanwhile, was contracted to rebuild Somaliland's telecommunications systems. The list goes on. In 2001, for example, the Great Wall Chinese oil Company announced plans to sink offshore oil wells and the Somali Diaspora sends an estimated $250 million annually to Somaliland to offset low forex reserves. Currently the Bank of Somaliland is pursuing ties with more established regional and German financial institutions.6
As the earlier discussion about failed and weak states indicated, Somaliland's development trend is also putting in place the very tools - banking systems, telecommunications, and transport links that foreign terrorist organizations require in a tenuous security environment.
Notions of Territorial Integrity
Article Four of the Constitutive Act of the African Union states that '[t]he Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: (b) respect of borders existing on achievement of independence.'This rule, carried over from the AU's predecessor, the Organization of African States, has and remains the fundamental stumbling block in Somaliland's quest for statehood.
In January 2004 a delegation from the British Parliament's Select Committee on International Development conducted a visit to Somaliland. Upon their return, MP Tony Worthington questioned in a parliamentary debate British and international resistance to breaking from the sovereignty principle. He said,
There is an understandable paranoia about changing old colonial borders in Africa, because of the fear that the habit may spread to other countries. Somaliland is a rare exception, however; it wants to return to its old colonial boundaries at the time of independence.... The longer the world ignores the achievement of Somaliland in creating stability and democratic institutions, the greater the risk that wilder elements will take over. Although the country has been governed by a moderate form of Islam since it declared independence, there is always the possibility that it will give way to a form of Islam that plays into the hands of those trying to stimulate terrorism, and there is tension in the country as a result.7
There is broad international sympathy for this argument, but there is also a kind of stasis akin to penguins on an ice bluff: no one wants to jump first. Washington, according to US diplomats in the region, want one of the African heavyweights - South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia or Senegal - to nod first. But Ethiopia, for one, has also stated that it would follow but won't lead an international movement for recognition.
The impasse is curious, and time will tell whether it may also be costly. Three points weaken the argument that recognition risks setting a precedent in Africa. First, as Foreign Minister Edna Adan lsmail argues, echoing the comment by Worthington, in the fortyfour years since it gained independence from Britain, Somaliland 'neither resigned from our membership in the UN, nor given away our sovereignty to anyone, we still claim ownership of our independence and that of our membership in the UN.'8 Recognizing Somaliland, then, is more a case of affirming post-colonial boundaries rather than redrawing them.
Second, seen as an international rather than exclusively African issue, the principle of separation is already well entrenched. Recent examples include the peaceful and internationally recognized Velvet Divorce' of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993.9 Third, Africa already has the precedent for partition set by Ethiopia and Eritrea, which was based on almost identical issues as those between Somalia and Somaliland.10 As part of a comprehensive peace settlement between those two countries, a UN boundary commission determined the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2002 based on historical and colonial maps. The European Union immediately endorsed the decision.
From legal, technical and diplomatic perspectives, therefore, recognition of Somaliland is neither as problematic nor precedent-setting as claimed, nor is international resistance as strong as suggested by the unanimous failure so far to do so.
Strengthening Somaliland, Countering Terrorism
In Somalia today, the mild narcotic shrub khat is as common as AK-47s. Once chewed primarily by men for occasional recreation, the drug is now consumed daily by broad segments of the population, including women and, ominously, the heavily armed young boys and youths aligned to various factional leaders. At the peak 150 flights ferried the drug into Somaliland from neighbouring states every day. Shortly after his election in 2002, President Dahir Rayale Kahin called for a decrease in inbound khat flights and banned all overland shipments. As Mills observes:
If enforced, this would likely provoke a political backlash in a nation where unemployment is high and a fragile - if impressively nurtured - peace has drawn into government warring militias and clans.... Like the global drug problem, dealing with khat requires breaking a pattern of helplessness and addiction through offering better economic prospects.11
Somaliland is a fragile entity in a fragile region with large Islamic populations - all demonstrably susceptible to radicalization. Despite the various developmental initiatives, a relatively strong livestock export sector, and the generous inflow of annual remittances, unemployment hovers at destabilizing highs. The eastern border, meanwhile, although clearly defined and recognized at independence in 1960, has been the subject of increasing dispute with the adjacent Somali region of Puntland, which makes ethnic-based claims to the two easternmost Somaliland provinces of Sanaa? and Sool.
Steven Simon has observed that in the current atmosphere of militancy and antipathy in much of the Muslim world, 'Islam's warm embrace of the West is too stark a reversal to expect in the foreseeable future. However, it is feasible to lay the foundation for a lasting accommodation by deploying the considerable economic and political advantages of the United States and its allies.'12
In Somaliland, the West has an opportunity to broaden the terms of global counter-terrorism strategy - to balance with carrots a policy meted thus far with sticks. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has dedicated himself to tackling Africa's developmental challenges in 2005. He holds the chair of the G8 in the first half of the year and the EU in the second. Both groupings will debate initiatives to double aid, cut debt, boost investment, combat disease and improve governance on the world's poorest continent. Emerging from these discussions should also be clearly defined recommendations for recognizing Somaliland through the UN. Politically, recognition would send a powerful signal to the Muslim world that internally driven aspirations toward secular democracy will be acknowledged and supported.
Economically, strengthening Somaliland's nascent democratic institutions and underwriting its path toward viability will go some measure toward depriving radicalized elements of a potential recruiting ground, just as a stronger state and improved governance will assist in reducing the volatile cocktail of endemic poverty, social alienation, radicalization and terrorism.
Withholding recognition from Somaliland runs contrary to the West's rhetoric about standing shoulder to shoulder with aspiring democracies. But the question is more urgent than that. Given what has been learned after 9/11 about broader security ramifications of weak states in an age of terror, it may be dangerous. If the West fails to assist a Muslim people striving to build their own safe, prosperous and, critically, democratic state, they may well end up looking for and finding - other patrons.
[Sidebar] "Somaliland now boasts reconstructed airports, ports, hotels, power plants and universities but it remains unrecognized by the international community"
[Sidebar] "Recognizing Somatiland is consistent with the imperatives driving global counter-terrorism"
[Sidebar] "Failed states lack the physical and financial infrastructure that terrorist organizations need to operate and are therefore unsuitable as havens"
[Sidebar] "Somaliland is a fragile entity in a fragile region with large Islamic populations"
[Sidebar] "In Somaliland, the West has an opportunity to broaden the terms of global counter-terrorism strategy"
[Sidebar] "Withholding recognition from Somaliland runs contrary to the West's rhetoric about standing shoulder to shoulder with aspiring democracies"
NOTES
1. I. M. Lewis, 'As the Kenyan Somaii 'Peace' Conference Falls Apart in Confusion, Recognition of Somalitand's Independence is Overdue', London School of Economics, 20 March 2004.
2. John J. Hamre and Cordon R. Sullivan, 'Toward Postconflict Reconstruction ', Washington Quarterly (Vol. 25, No. 4, Autumn 2002).
3. National security Strategy document dated 19 September 2002.
4. Ken Menkhaus, 'Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism', Adelphi Paper 364, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004
5. Creg Mills, The security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age of Terror (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2005), pp. 237-9.
6. See the chapter on Somali in Africa South of the Sahara 2005 (London; Europa Publications, 2005), fora fuller digest of assistance inflows into Somaliland in recent years.
7. For the full debate on 4 February 2004 in the House of Commons, see www.publications.parliament.uk
8. Taken from comments presented at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg on 3 February 2005.
9. The author is grateful to Dr. Chris Alden of the London School of Economics for discussions on this point.
10. See the final report of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission for detailed historical background.
11. Mills, Op. cit., p. 81.
12. Steven Simon, 'The New Terrorism', in Henry J. Aaron, James M. Lindsay, and Pietro S. Nivola (eds.), Agenda for the Nation, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 425.
[Author Affiliation] Kurt Shillinger is a research fellow specializing in security and terrorism in Africa at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg
From http://www.jamhuuriya.info/ Aug 7 2005
Women Candidates Launch Political Campaign
Hargiesa (The Rep) - Women candidates from the 3 political parties launch their campaign for the parliamentary election, which will be held on September 15/505 at the end of a 5 day workshop on raising women awareness in politics, political campaigns and function of parliament.Ms. Fadumo Sudi, minister of Family Welfare and Social Development in a speech at the closing ceremony of the Workshop financed by SILICK of Sweden said, "I am happy to be here with 7 women candidates for the parliamentary elections. I would have been happier if you were already elected. I wish you all success for it means that women will take part in decision making bodies".
The minister urged all women to vote for women candidates saying, "You should vote for women candidates even if your husbands, brothers or sons are also candidates".
Ms. Ikran Hagi Da'ud of opposition KULMIYE party from Awdal region speaking about what her priorities said, "I have been part of the nation building process. I know the needs of my region and the way to tackle them and I will do that".
Ms. Hodan Abdi Hussein of the ruling UDUB party from Sool region said, "Two administrations from Somaliland and Puntland exist in my region, because regional politicians forced the people to be in such a situation. I need to make the change men had failed to achieve. Women are not only the majority, but have been exploited and dominated. I will unite them to make changes in the region."
Ms. Anisa Hagi Abdi Awad of the opposition Justice and Welfare party (U'ID) Hargeisa, said; "A lot of unfulfilled promises have made to the people from such a platform. I will not say that I will turn the salty water to honey, build skyscraper or end hunger. If elected I will strive hard to improve the condition of life of the poor and low-income groups".
Ms. Nimoa Hussein Qowdhan from KULMIYE Hargeisa, said; "If elected, I will see that the constitution and the law are respected in parliament. I believe that women today are more efficient and more loyal to their country than men. I will see that laws are passed to deal with society related problems as well as business problems. I urge all voters particularly women to vote for their representatives.. for us".
NEC & Opposition reaction on supreme Court Letter on Sool Candidates
Hargeisa (The Rep) - The Supreme Court in a letter sent to the National Electoral Commission (NEC) called on the need to postpone the announcement of the list of Candidates for the Sool region in the parliamentary election, until it reaches a decision on the lawsuit presented by UDUB - the ruling party - that it is the only party entitled legally to have all 12 seats in the region, as the two opposition parties did not submit the list of their candidates, on July 17/05.Chairman of the NEC, . Ahmed Hagi Ali Adami told the Media that the commission will respond to the letter from the Supreme Court at the appropriate time but said; "The NEC and the three political parties had reached an understanding that the list of the candidates for region, should not be submitted until an agreement is reached in their meeting on July 25".
The opposition parties claim that the lawsuit by the ruling party to be illegal, for the three parties conform that there are areas in Sool region, where parliamentary election cannot be held.
The letter signed and sent by Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court, . Mohamoud Hirsi Farah to the NEC coincides with an understanding reached by the three parties, that they compete for the 10 parliamentary seats in Sanag region and put aside two seats for areas in East Sanag where elections cannot be held.
On Sool region the three parties are on the verge of reaching some sort of agreement. The two opposition parties want the six of the 12 seats be reserved for areas, where election can not be held, while the ruling party wants to put in reserve 5 parliamentary seats for areas where election cannot be held.
Members of the executive committee of the ruling party told the media that the lawsuit would not have any adverse effect, on the discussion between NEC and the three parties.
. Musa Bihi Abdi, member of the executive committee of the opposition KULMIYE party speaking to the media said, "Our party is not worried about the lawsuit in which the ruling party claims to be the sole contender for the 12 parliamentary seats in Sool. NEC is legally responsible for the election. It was the NEC that reached the decision to postpone submitting the list of the candidates for Sool. It is also the responsibility of NEC to respond to the letter from the Supreme Court."
Meanwhile, the NEC has released the list of 206 candidates who have fulfilled all conditions required to be an eligible candidate for the September 15/05 parliamentary elections. Candidates for the 12 Sool region seats have not been announced and there are few who did not fulfil eligibility conditions.
Awil's Secret Meeting With Geedi
Somaliland Times , Issue 185, August 6, 2005. The Full StoryAddis Ababa, August 6, 2005 (SL Times) - Somaliland's Finance Minister . Hussein Ali Duale, widely known as Awil, had reportedly held a secret meeting in Addis Ababa last month with . Ali Geedi, premier of the Abdillahi Yusuf-led faction in the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.
News that the secret meeting took place was first reported by our sister newspaper "Haatuf" in its July 26, 2005 edition. . Awil denied that the meeting took place. In a written response to Haatuf, (see the full text in Haatuf's July 27, 2005 edition), . Awil described the news about his purported meeting with Geedi as baseless. Accusing Haatuf of following a pattern of habitual fabrication of lies about national leaders, . Awil also instructed his staff to cancel the finance ministry's subscription to the country's leading independent daily with immediate effect. However, the Somaliland Times can now confirm that . Awil actually met with Geedi in Addis Ababa's Sheraton Hotel shortly after the arrival of the latter in the Ethiopian capital on July 20, 2005. Officially, there is no information yet on the nature of the topics that the two men had actually discussed during their meeting. But one of Somalia's news websites quoted . Geedi last week as saying that he was highly satisfied with the outcome of his talks with Awil.
An investigation conducted by the Somaliland Times revealed that Awil arrived in Addis Ababa a few days before . Geedi got there. (Geedi's visit to Addis Ababa was reported in a news dispatch datelined July 21 by the official Ethiopian News Agency). The Somaliland finance minister concealed his arrival in Addis Ababa as well as his intention to meet Geedi from officials of the Somaliland mission in the Ethiopian capital. Word about Awil's pre-arranged meeting with Geedi first surfaced when 2 TFG supporters living in Addis Ababa started looking for the Somaliland finance minister's whereabouts. For this purpose, the 2 men contacted a number of the members of the Somaliland community in Addis Ababa. When asked why they were so interested in finding Awil, the 2 TFG agents disclosed that they were supposed to inform minister Awil that . Geedi was in town and ready to receive him at the Sheraton Hotel. How Awil was finally located remains unclear. But according to highly reliable sources, he eventually managed to meet with Geedi, in the latter's residence, at Addis Ababa Sheraton Hotel on Wednesday July 20, 2005.
Officials of the Somaliland mission in Addis Ababa contacted by the Somaliland Times on July 24, stayed non-committal on the whole affair. But after being pressed the next day by the Somaliland Times for a response, at least one of those officials conceded that the meeting between Awil and Geedi did happen. He however quickly pointed out that no one from the mission had prior knowledge about the meeting between the duo or had taken part in it. Credible independent sources confirmed to the Somaliland Times that the head of the Somaliland Liaison Office, . Yusuf Jama Burralle, was actually unaware about the meeting. Since becoming finance minister in June 6, 2003, . Awil was often criticized for spending more time on suspicious trips to East African capitals, particularly Addis Ababa and Nairobi, than on his work at the ministry in Hargeysa.
Omar Haji Mahmoud, a former chief of Somaliland mission in Addis Ababa recalled by saying, "It wasn't unusual for Awil to appear unannounced in Addis, and then be seen conducting meetings with the strangest kinds of peoples." When recently the US consulate in Addis Ababa declined to issue him a US visa, Awil insisted to friends that his application was still being considered.
Despite Awil's poor performance, whether as finance minister or as a special diplomatic emissary, he continued to enjoy blind support from President Rayale. Instead of distancing himself from Awil's latest blunder in meeting Geedi, . Rayale not only remained silent about the issue but bizarrely enough commissioned his controversial finance minister to fly to Djibouti last Tuesday to meet with a visiting US Congressional delegation. A lot of people now believe that Awil wouldn't have met with Geedi had he not received a green light from . Rayale. The President's passive response to the whole affair of the meeting between Awil and Geedi has already led many people to question for the first time his true stand on the issue of Somaliland's independence. While the Somaliland government returned Osman Atto from Hargeysa airport on July 11 on the pretext that he was a member of the Mbagathi government, the Awil-Geedi meeting is seen as though . Rayale is up to something fishy.
It has been the policy of successive Somaliland governments, including the present one, headed by President Dahir Rayale Kahin, not to meet with the officials of any government of Somalia that claims jurisdiction over Somaliland. Since its liberation from Somalia and declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland has never participated in the series of internationally and regionally sponsored attempts to resolve the conflict in Somalia. The country's position has been that independent and peaceful Somaliland should not allow itself to melt into the externally-led efforts to form a central government for Somalia. Somaliland held that any such attempts to form a government for Somalia, should deal with the former Italian colony of Somalia only. According to this policy, Somaliland and Somalia can talk about their future relations as two equal and sovereign countries, a position that Premier Geedi's government has not yet accepted.
As predicted by most political analysts, . Awil's clandestine meeting with a senior official of a government officially claiming to have legal jurisdiction over Somaliland territories is likely to spark further public backlash against President Rayale's government, which is already faced with widespread popular discontent.
BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, 08/06/2005 04:03:24 PM EDT
Egypt to send observers for Somaliland parliamentary polls
The minister of foreign affairs Lady Edna Adan Isma'il, today briefed the media at her office, on her recent trip to Egypt and the talks she held with Egyptian government officials.The minister said she had held talks with the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa and discussed education, livestock exports in relation to Arab states and on the political front - the Somaliland question.
Lady Isma'il said she was received by the Egyptian foreign affairs minister in charge of African affairs. She said it was the first time that the two had talks at ministerial level.
The minister said they had agreed Egypt sends a fact-finding team and a trade delegation and said they would like similar delegations from Somaliland.
They said they would also send observers to monitor the forthcoming Somaliland parliamentary elections.
The minister also said the talks among other issues, dealt with the security of the Red Sea.
The minister also said she had met the South African foreign minister and several diplomats in Addis Ababa.
Source: http://www.hargeysa.org/ Aug 4 2005
THE PRIDE AND DESPERATE STRUGGLE LED TO HOPELESNESS BY IT SELF.
Egal's first missions was dismantling the S.N.M. because of his fear of revival of them, his first and last cabinet ministers were absolute clean from any S.N.M. members except only Ahmed Mohamed siilanyo who once was a S.N.M. leader, Siilanyo seemed that he couldn't care whatever situation that the veterans are because of his position of the governmental board.
Tuur unexpectedly left for Mogadishu to join with the late General Aideed's U.S.C. coalition government and changed his idea about Somaliland's republicanism into the federalism with the rest of Somalia, it is was clear why he did this because losing to Egal for his presidency who had nothing credit to the people of Somaliland for this rebirth of republic was a something he couldn't expect.
After Egal suddenly dead in south Africa this current president inherited from him as the constituition stated, Dahir Rayaale became the third president of Somaliland he successfully fulfilled his promises for holding the presidential elections where he narrowly won from other S.N.M. struggle veteran Siilaanyo he also promised for the parliament elections to be held later this year despite the opposition leaders accused him for delaying and there are rumours about him not accepting for his own region's designated share because of his clannish ground.
As egal and the current president were son and father alike, they were not that different, their only difference was that the late egal's programme was mainly focused internal affairs and of course gave him many victories but the current leader's aim seems a bit different of that as he is hunting to get a single country for getting a diplomatic recognition but they have a same vision towards on struggle veterans.
Somaliland's current home security situation is leaning to the wrong direction because of the violation of the constitution and rule of law by some senior ministers in Somaliland, most ministers are less educated or skilled for their tasks, their weakness ability accessed too many trespassing activities, some parts of the country declared that they are out of the picture of Somaliland east sanaag and sool region are openly boycotted the hargeisa administration and preferred for joining their blood related brothers in autonomous state of punt land for tribism based ideology.
The Somaliland two upper houses approved the government proposal to use whatever necessary means to secure the borders which resulted a huge military presence in eastern region of Somaliland but not action and not even at the border, the punt land advantaged the situation and of course gave a passage to mobilise their military movement inside Somaliland they fully controlled and set up an administration in las anood city,
According to the military experts Long time presence of Somaliland military in adhi adeeye village will be regrettable decision unless this army mobilise soon, strategically you can't leave an army like this situation of standby for this time of period. The overall Somaliland security situation is not guaranteed including the capital city of hargeisa where the police are limiting the movements at nights and also activating curfews.
In international relations of Somaliland hit the highest point since riyale was invited in Britain's house of commons where he made a speech in international development house in house of commons unfortunately that hope is descending from top to bottom, the closest allies of Somaliland openly admitted that they can't recognise as a independent state, the Somaliland senior officials are absolutely ignorant about the reason and they fail to sell the Somaliland ideology to the outsiders.
There are too many diplomatic campaigns which Somaliland politicians and intellectuals are encouraging inside Somaliland or outside world, but that no one absolutely understood fully why Somaliland couldn't gain a recognition from around the world it is simply clear that these campaigns is knocking at the wrong door
In the year of 1993 the united nation's security council met in new York chaired former secretary general of the board Dr Boutros qaali where the un programmes in Somalia UNISOM failed, they agreed a few things where the Somali unity will be one of the major factors they agreed, since that time no one Somaliland officials who asked the united nations to look again these unity stuff, no one single country who can recognise the Somaliland because of that, and they need to break that barrier where there is no sign of doing it.
It was the Egyptian idea to keep Somali unity because of their interest about the water of Nile, where Egyptians uses somalians as their deadly weapon against Ethiopians where somalians are much active than Ethiopians in a battle fields, and if Somalia separated in to the two different states that treat will no longer be exist and Ethiopia will be a dominant to this water thing.
Somaliland needs to address this issue as it needs, they have to ask officially the united nation's security council to look again the resolution as Abdillaahi ahmed the president of the impaghati group asked to lift the embargo where he was rejected by the united nations, unless Somaliland intellectuals do so this will never be succeed as a independent nation, and the whole world is ignorantly united for what the Egyptian man left in the file, and Abdillaahi Yusuf Ahmed will be the president overall Somali nation, which the stability of Kenya and Ethiopia will not be longer exist unless they release the rest of great Somali territories and the consequences will not effect an Egypt.
Written by Mohamed haashi KOODBUUR
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/crisis/download/somalia.pdf.
Employment For Peace in Somalia
International LabourOrganizationThe challenge of Somalia
Somalia is faced with the immense challenge of achieving peace and stability and beginning the process of reconstruction. After the destruction caused by the 1988 civil war and lower level damage caused by subsequent factional fighting, most of Somalia is suffering from the effect and delayed impact of violent clan conflicts.
Challenges:
- The economic infrastructure has been destroyed.
- There is widespread unemployment and young men turn to the gun for means of economic support.
- There is widespread displacement of people and social disintegration.
- In the context of violence, insecurity, lack of public institutions, extreme poverty, militias are able to thrive.
- Lack of security is considered as the major constraint to successful operations in many parts of Somalia.
What we are doing in Phase 1
Post Conflict Recovery
Model/EIIP/LEDILO/PERPS is supporting local economy recovery using a post conflict model tha thas been used successfully in other conflict afflicted countries such as Mozambique, Cambodia and in several countries in South America. The model involves two main components:
- An employment intensive job creation component that acts as an entry point to the community provides incomes and immediate temporary employment.
- A Local Economic Development component that includes a territorial approach to the development of a local Economic Forum.
Employment Intensive Infrastructure Project (EIIP)
The rehabilitation of infrastructure is vital for the social,economic, and physical needs of Somalia.It's rebuilding through Labour Based Methods has potential for creating massive immediate employment and incomes. It can act as an entry point, restoring hope and revitalizing local communities. It can also provide timely support to DDR initiatives by providing productive employment to large numbers of demobilized militias and their host communities as a first step in reintegration.
Local Economic Development.
This includes:
- Development of a local forum involving public and private sectors,donors, agencies, NGOs working in a particular area.
- The forum identifies economic opportunities and potentials.
- In many of the forums opposing sides have come together.
ILO Sub-projects in Somalia1.
Central Somalia
Employment intensive civil works in Mogadishu
In Mogadishu a community based employment project has commenced insix of the sixteen districts. This is a test to determine if it is possible to executeEIIP effectively in this challenging environment. The project is being implemented by a local NGO.
Seperate contracts for monitorng, evaluation and rights protection have been awarded to another NGO and a private engineering consultant.A major landmark has been the achievement of consenses with the representation of all sixteen districts. The project employs 600 people 70% of whom are women. This is the first small step in establishing a community based local economic development forum in Mogadishu.
North East (Puntland)
With NESHA the project has commenced a pilot EIIP project on the Jeriban to Gaarad road. This will introduce Labour Based Methods (LBM) to Puntland and act as a nentry point for longer term Local Economic Development along the Galkayo to Gaarad corridor. Approximately 4,000 workdays of employment has been created.
North West (Somaliland)
In the North West a more stable enviroment has allowed a number of EIIP projects to be launched. Sub-projects include:
Support to Somaliland Roads Authority(SRA)
The objective of this project is to develop capacity to manage community based employment intensive infrastructure work.
Training and Demonstration Site
A road close to Hargeisa has been selected by the SRA as a Training and Demonstration site. This is used to provide practical technical training tocommunity supervisors and technical personnel from local institutions. A workforce of between 50-100 people are employed in accordance with training course requirements.
EIIP Rural
Ceerigabo Community Contracting Programme
The nine site supervisors trained by the project and SRA are supervising road improvement works involving the employment of 200 people for a period of four months drawn from the four villages between Ceel Efweyn and Ceerigabo. Approximately 15,000 working days of employment has been created. This is the largest employment project in the Sanag region.
Shaficci group Community-Based Organization
This CBO was formed primarily on the initiative of the local community and their leaders to improve the unpaved section on the main road from Dilla to Boroma.
The maintenance contract has been awarded to the Local Community Based Organisation through SRA. Approximately 7,500 workdays of employment have been created.
EIIP Urban
Support to Hargeisa Municipality to construct a 600m long surface water drainage scheme. The municipality carried out the design and supervisionon the project. The construction works were contractedout to local contractors. It has created approximately 4,500 working days of employment and acted as a starting point for a longer-term initiative to contribute to a sustainable waste management system.
Burao Surface Water Drainage Scheme. This is similar to the Hargeisa project.
The immediate objective of this project is to create temporary employment in Burao by the lining of the main surface drainage channel in town. This will also act as an entry point for the project to the wider Burao community. Approximately 5,000 work days of employment will be created and the general level of sanitation will be improved in town.
Kossar Community Resource Centre
The Koosar Community consists of 1000 returnees families who have identified water, jobs and housing as some of their priorities. The construction of a community resource centre (a workshop to produce blocks, windows and door frames) will provide jobs training and supply building materials for a planned low cost housing project. It also acts as an entry point fora long term Local Economic Development (LED) effort to the community.
Other Initiatives
Over 3,000 appropriate technology, and local economic development publications have been procured as a first step in establishing resource centres as part of the LED Regional Technical Units to be established in phase two.
The Future*
In the North West and North East the ILO intends to expand the scale of EIIP projects and with other agencies support the development of LED forums and projects in the targeted areas. In Mogadishu subject to a successful outcome of phase 1 the project will continue to support the sixteen district to identify and implement community based employment projects but will also encourage the inclusion of the private and other sectors to provide a broader support base.The rate of engagement in other areas will depend on security, the capacity of local authorities and communities and more importantly their commitment to adhere to basic humanitarian principals.
ILO Areas of Intervention. *Subject to funding
ILO TOOLS
Community Contracting
The combination of labour-based method with community participation presentsmany advantages in terms of community empowerment, ownership, job creation and income generation as well as capacity- building and partnership development. The social stigmaassociated with manual labour seems to be less when it is linked as part of a community effort rather than as hired labour to a contractor. The sub-clan/local community systems can be a positive force for development. Considering the framework ofcommunity contracting it can be a solid means of mobilizing and organizing communities.
EIIP
Access to decent work is a basic human right that contributes to human dignity. ILO's Employment Intensive Infrastructure Projects help conflict affected communities through employment promotion.
EIIP projects through labour-based techniques have potential for creating massive immediate employment and income generation, guaranteeing that most labour recruited is local.
Gender
Traditionally women have played an overtly submissive role in the Somali society. However many women are heads of households and are responsible for their families. The Employment Intensive Infrastructure Project in Mogadishu employs 600 people, of whom about 70% of workers are women. These are often the most vulnerable groups in society. Equal access to work for both men and women is pursued at all levels of project implementation.
How to contact us
The Chief Technical AdvisorILO/PERPS Kalson Towers, 7th Floor, Crescent Street, Parklands Road. Postal Address 39981-00623 Nairobi, KenyaTel.: +254 20 3754159/60Fax: +254 20 3754157, Email:joe.connoly@ilosom.unon.org or ilojobs@hotmail.com.
Source: http://www.fao.org/reliefoperations/common/ecg/51543_en_Somalia_3.pdf
Project title: Improving the quality of livestock exported from Somalia
Somalia Appealing agency: FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATIONProject code: SOM-05/A03
Sector: Agriculture
Objective: To improve the nutritional status and health of exported livestock and the conditions of shipment in order to increase the value of the animals and the income of the pastoralists
Beneficiaries: All livestock producers and exporters in Somalia
Implementing partners: Ministry of Agriculture, of Livestock, NGOs
Project duration: January - December 2005
Funds requested: US$579 332
Summary
Livestock export is the core of the Somali economy. The recent FAO, WB, EU report "Somalia - Towards a Livestock Sector Strategy" identified improved livestock nutrition and better animal welfare as key issues to be addressed in order to increase livestock export prices and thereby improving pastoral livelihoods.
Activities
Animal Nutrition/Fodder production
A preliminary assessment mission will identify sites in irrigated and irrigated/rain fed areas of central and northern Somalia where trials of potential fodder crops can be made. These will be based upon a review of past work in Somalia, expert consensus, and limited aerial and ground surveys. Local workshops at the selected sites will promote the concept of fodder production, introduce the methodologies to be used and select up to 20 suitable farmers to run the trials. The impact of the trials will be assessed jointly by project specialists and local farmers, and, if successful, recommendations will be made for scaling up activities. Important project inputs will include new types of crop seeds, assistance with post harvest storage, and advice on marketing. Successful sites will be expanded to up to 200 farmers, and the creation of marketing co-operatives will be encouraged.
Welfare
A preliminary review of livestock shipping conditions from up to three main ports in Somalia will lead to recommendations as to how these can be improved. A series of workshops will introduce the recommendations to livestock owners and traders, to shippers and road transporters and to municipalities and livestock authorities. An outcome will be a set of jointly prepared and agreed recommendations on how to ensure immediate improvement of animal welfare during transport.
The project will then assist the various stakeholders in the implementation of these recommendations. These could include: further promotion and training in animal welfare; improved watering in transit, etc. Project inputs could include water tanks, watering facilities in boats, improved marshalling facilities prior to embarkation, etc. The condition and survival rate of livestock reaching Dubai and other markets will be assessed as an indicator of the success of the project.
Outcome
Sustainable export sales raise the incomes of poor pastoralists; and
more fodder available for drought relief.
FINANCIAL SUMMARY Budget items US$
Staff costs............................................186 000
Implementing costs (including training)...253 000
Operating costs (including duty travel)...103 000
Administrative costs..............................37 332
Total....................................................579 332
From http://www.jamhuuriya.info/ (The Republican (Weekly News paper in English) July 31 2005
Resigning minister
Hargiesa (The Rep) - Somaliland minister of Civil Aviation, Abib Diriye Nur, who was also a member of the candidate selecting committee of the ruling party (UDUB) resigned almost in week after the list of 246 candidates from the three political parties was submitted to the National Electoral Commission (NEC).The resignation of . Abib Diriye Nur, (the highest official so far to resign) was preceded by many sub-clans and individuals, including some members of the outgoing parliament who have announced the withdrawal of their support to the ruling party. Many of those who withdraw support were strong supporters of the party.
. Abib Diriye in a press conference explaining the reasons for his resignation said, "I was forced to resign not only to health reasons, but due to mal-administration in the government including the President and the highest officials."
"The President behaves like a person who is not interested in the welfare of the people. He seems to be apathetic to the parliamentary election that will be held on September 15/05. It is unfortunate that he is confirmed to his office and never leaves it," he added.
In answer to whether his resignation is linked to pressure from his clan, which is not included in the list of the candidates he said; "As a member of the selecting committee for the ruling party, we have selected party candidates in Hargiesa region on the basis of their C.V and the support they have from their clans. The President, who is also the chairman of the Party, put aside the list the committee prepared and submitted a list of his own without even consulting. He said, "I am forced to resign party to pressure from my clan, but I will not leave the party..."
. Abiib Diiriye, who served as Minister of Agriculture in the government of the late president Egal was not only very close to President, but a strong supporter to the ruling party UDUB.
UDUB's policy towards parliamentarian selection is bereft of clarity and Riyaale's malevolent intentions
In the run up to the parliamentarian elections of Somaliland, it is quite worrying how UDUB's selection of its purported nomination list is being drawn out without any consideration of its potential voters. The exclusion of 6 strong candidates in Hargeisa & Gabiley regions from UDUB's list is a policy bereft of clarity and Riyaale's intentions are malevolent to say the least.Unlike the previous party elections the parliamentarian election is to engage a fair representation of the people and their constituencies. The only acceptable way is a bottom-up approach whereby potential candidates is to be put forward by the people and not the Party, based on the public opinions. It is the only fair system which would makes both the party and its supporters at ease with each other, not to mention the importance of saving the country from yet another stumble and political setback. Thus, the onus is on the government and the ruling party to see through the process without being drawn into the dirty party politics we had seen in the past.
Unfortunately the early signs are not encouraging and the fact that 6 strong candidates were left out during the selection process throws a question mark into the whole procedure. These 6 candidates who have gone through the designated procedure quite satisfactorily are from the Hargeisa & Gabiley regions and as you might recall it is an area that has been fiercely contested in the recent elections and of considerable interest from all parties. And to exclude such strong candidates during the selection process the party in question is running the risk of losing support and only diminishing its chances of acquiring seats from these valuable constituencies. Needless to remind you that Hargeisa is the capital and Gabiley's local revenue contributes more than 30% of the national resources.
Quite simply, if the voters' hopeful list of candidates is not considered in the selection stages it is inevitable that all UDUB supporters from these regions will boycott the party and bestow their allegiance to the other rival parties. A result that will isolate the government and make Riyaale's government ever more crippled.
Oblivious of his malign intentions many of us still seem to hold the thought that Riyaale's policy towards electioneering is benign and he will not abuse his political power. Unfortunately it is only a wishful thinking and my observations over the last couple of years tells me he thinks he had cemented his stature and possibly went under the skin of na
Ahmed N. Amin (Assad) - Cardiff/Wales - UK.
. Jama Gas Mu'awiye, minister of Defence who was on a working visit to Burao said; "The Four officers have misused 20 Million Somaliland Shillings, which was part of the salary of the orphans and handicapped and which was in the safe of the army headquarters in Burao."
"Robbing the vulnerable is a very bad culture by it self and is totally abhorring in the security forces. No mercy be shown to those who committed this crime," the minister added.
Ali Ismail Hashi, head of the section said; "The four officers who are arrested and are being held in Burao Central Prison are responsible for misappropriating the funds".
This is not the first time that such funds have been misused in Burao army headquarters.
Security forces in front of the university stopped our regional correspondent from entering the hall where the graduation economy was being held.
The President in a short speech commended the management and the professors for their dedication and efforts to educate new generation of intellectuals. He also urged the graduates to work for the society and reminded them that universities were opened in the country because of its stability.
The hearings began amid a very tight security with all roads leading to the court blocked and all going to the court thoroughly searched.
The defendants were inside iron bars, because they made some disturbances - such as shouting - in the last hearing.
Bashir Abdi Hussein, one of the defense lawyers told the International media in Hargeisa that they would represent the defendants and not those who are at still at large.
The defence of the terrorists began after the London bombings and the blast that followed in which a suspected Somali was arrested.
The arrest of Yasin Ismail in London is the main topic of discussion in Caf,s, teashops
PREAMBLE:
After holding a series of meetings in which the upcoming parliamentary elections were discussed; the three political parties of Somaliland,
Have agreed to abide by the letter and the spirit of this Code of Conduct which was jointly developed by the National Electoral Commission and the three political parties and which was signed by the parties and witnessed by the National Electoral Commission on July 18, 2005
Objective
The objective of this code of conduct is to promote conditions that are conducive to free and fair elections including:-
SECTION ONE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
a) is bound by this Code
2. The Leaders of the political parties will issue directives to their parties' officials, candidates, members and supporters, requiring each one of them to -
a) Observe this Code of Conduct.
3. Every candidate, once accepted by NEC, must issue a letter signed by himself/herself in which he or she declares his or her acceptance to comply with this code of conduct and to ensure that the persons working in his or her candidacy will comply with this Code.
Compliance with the Law
1. Every Political party has agreed to adhere to the electoral laws, rules and regulations, and to take all necessary steps to ensure -
2. Every political party will take all necessary steps to promote inclusion of women candidates in their respective list of candidates for each region.
Campaign Management
1. Every political party will -
2. Every political party will ensure that it's party will not -
a. engage, before, during and after election, in activities that may jeopardize the peace and stability of the country.
The Election Process
Every party must: -
SECTION TWO: GAPS/DEFECIENCIES IN THE ELECTORAL LAW
Article 12, paragraph 4
This article does not address the remote but possible situation of having two or more candidates in the same party list receiving the same number of votes and there is only seat to be allocated. To address this deficiency in the electoral law, the parties have agreed to the following sequential steps to break the tie:
1. The National Electoral Commission will, in the presence of the concerned party's regional executive committee, recheck the spoiled ballot papers that were marked for the candidates who are tied for a seat to see if there are any valid ballot papers that were inadvertently counted as spoiled ballot papers. During the recheck, if valid ballot papers are found, they will then be counted for the candidate that they were marked for. If, however, the recheck process does not produce a clear winner, then
2. The National Electoral Commission will openly conduct a drawing of lots between or among the candidates to determine who wins the tie seat. This will be done in front of the concerned party regional executive committee, Election Monitoring Board, media, etc
Article 12 paragraphs 6, & 7
These two paragraphs need further elaboration which can only be provided when the National electoral Commission undertakes the inspection of the polling stations in late June and early July. Using the information gathered by NEC, the three political parties and the National Electoral Commission will devise a joint solution on the allocation of seats in these districts or regions. The agreed upon solution appear on annex 1 of this code of conduct
Article 14
.
This article deals with candidates who were unsuccessful in winning seats in the election and therefore remain as reserve candidates. However, this article does not address the possible situation of two or more reserve candidates obtaining the same number of votes.
To address this shortcoming, the parties have agreed that the same mechanism for breaking a tie that is specified in Code of Conduct for article 12 paragraph 4 (above) shall also apply to this situation.
Article 16 pargarph 1
The electoral law mandates that the parties submit to the NEC a list of their candidates' 6o days before the voting day. The law however, does not mention the possibility that a candidature could become vacant due to death or incapacitation. To remedy this situation the political parties have agreed to the following:
If, after the period established by the law to present the candidates and before 14 days before the voting day, a candidate's position becomes vacant due to the above-mentioned reasons, then the parties have the right to replace that candidate. However there shall be no change to the ballot paper and the replacing candidate will use the name and the symbol of the replaced candidate. When the final election results are announced, the replacing candidates name will appear in all official election documents.
If, however, the position becomes vacant less than 14 days before the election date then the party can not replace the candidate. However, if there area any votes for the vacant position then they will be counted for the concerned party.
Article 23
This article grants the mayor the right to ban the holding of demonstration if he is satisfied that they might damage the health, morals or public order. However, if any action taken by a mayor is considered unreasonable, the article does not specify the procedure for submitting complaints. To address this deficiency in the electoral law, the three parties have agreed to the following:
That the mayors shall prepare and publish a schedule of planned rallies and demonstrations for the three political parties during the campaign period. Furthermore, the schedule shall allocate equal number of days to the political parties for organizing rallies, demonstrations, etc. Copies of the schedule must be sent to they NEC and to the parties at least 15 days before the start of the campaign period.
The political parties shall inform the mayors 48 hours in advance of their intention to proceed with scheduled events (rally, demonstration).
Any party that has been denied by a Mayor the right to hold demonstration has the right to appeal to the National Electoral Commission.
Article 27 , pargraph 1
This article does not address the issue of who can grant permission for the movement of vehicles in the Election Day. To address this deficiency the parties have agreed to the following:
The NEC is the only authorized body to grant permission for the circulation of vehicles during the Election Day. In accordance with the electoral law, the NEC will inform the public through the media and through its regional and district offices the ban on movement of vehicles during the voting day.
NEC will also make it publicly known that any person who violates the ban will be dealt with in accordance with the law.
Article 28, paragraph 1
This article does not address the central issue of when can parties substitute their agents. The law clearly states that NEC shall train the political parties' agents. This implies that only trained agents can be poll watchers. To address this weakness the parties have agreed to the following:
Parties may, if a need arises, substitute their agents provided that the substitutes are the reserve agents that were trained.
The parties further agree that the Party agents at the polling stations cannot be candidates at the election
.
Article 29
This article does not specify the roles and responsibilities of the party agent, which are crucial to the efficient and peaceful conduct of the election. To address this, the parties have agreed to the following:
The NEC shall draft detailed terms of reference for the party agents, which shall form annex 2 of this Code of Conduct.
Article 44, paragraph 3
This article is very specific and restrictive in terms of the where the voter can put his/her mark in the ballot paper. Given the fact that a large percentage of the people are unable to read or write, the probability of disenfranchising a lot of voters due to high rate of illiteracy cannot be ruled out. To avoid this situation the parties have agreed to the following, which is in line with the practice that was used in earlier elections.
The voter is allowed to put his/ her mark on the ballot paper any where within the row that is designated for each candidate
Any mark be it a dot, cross, tick, sign, etc is acceptable so long as it is clearly within the row.
If a voter's mark spills over to an adjacent row then neither of the two candidates gets the vote. However, the vote shall be counted for the party of the candidates whose votes were counted as invalid.
.
If the Mark spills across two party columns, then that vote is treated as being an invalid vote.
Article 49, paragraphs 3 & 4
Paragraphs 3 & 4 of this article do not address the remote but possible situation of party agents from two political parties who have been present at the polling station and who deliberately refuse or disappear from the polling station before the signature of the outcome of the vote.
To remedy this, the parties have agreed on the following:
In order to avoid the loss of votes cast by the citizens, the signature of only one party agent and the signatures of the polling station officeholders shall suffice. However, the reasons for such an event shall be recorded.
Article 51, paragraph 3
This article requires that each presiding officer of the polling stations submit to the Supreme Court a copy of the written record of the polling station results. This is not logistically possible. Therefore, the parties have agreed to the following:
The presiding officer will send the copy of the written record of the polling station results intended for the Supreme Court to the District Election Officer who will then forward it to the Regional Election Officer for on-ward transmission to the Supreme Court.
SECTION THREE: PUBLIC FUNDS/PROPERTY/ GOVERNMENT RADIO AND MEDIA
Article 26 of the electoral law mandates the National Electoral Commission to ensure that the political parties have equal access to the government owned mass media and the use of the public assembly grounds during the election campaign. The article further states that no party may use for its own purpose the property of the nation. Article 64 gives NEC the power to impose administrative sanctions against anyone who commits acts that are contrary to the administration (of the election) or to the electoral law or procedures.
To effectively execute this mandate, the Commission shall put in place the following enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the electoral law and procedures.
1. Use of Government Mass Media
Implementation Mechanism:
Stage one: Daily Monitoring of Radio Hargeisa Somali language Broadcast
The National Electoral Commission will monitor and record daily Radio Hargeisa Somali language broadcast. The mechanism for monitoring Radio Hargeisa Somali service broadcast is detailed in annex 3 of this Code.
Stage two: Allocation of equal Radio Hargeisa air time for the three political parties
The National Electoral Commission will in consultation with the Ministry of information allocate equal airtime to the three political parties in line with the provisions of the airtime equal access schedule in annex 4
b) Maandeeq and Horn Tribune News Paper
The National Electoral Commission will make the following two arrangements in respect of Maandeeq.
The details of this arrangement are in annex 5 of this Code.
c) Privately owned Media
The privately owned media shall also provide equal access of the media to the political parties who are prepared to purchase space in the private newspaper. No party shall be discriminated against in terms of this access. This provision shall also be included in the media Code of Conduct and the Media Guide shall clearly state the need for objective and balanced reporting on the part of the media.
2. PUBLIC FUNDS/PROPERTY
The electoral law (article 26) prohibits the use of public property by any party for its own sole purpose. This article further states that no party may use directly or indirectly property owned by foreigners, as such as that of foreign NGOs and that of UN agencies. Furthermore, article 64 of the electoral law grants the NEC the authority to take administrative sanctions. To execute this authority, the National Electoral Commission shall establish an Election Monitoring Board that will ensure that the three parties have equal access to the Public funds, Government owned mass media and Public Assembly Grounds. The Board members representing a cross section of the society will be chosen on the basis of their moral authority (distinguished religious figures), academic qualifications, work experience, etc. The members will include academicians, former senior public finance officers, civil society members, etc. The terms of Reference for the Board of Monitors is in annex 3 of this Code.
The Board will perform its tasks under the overall direction and supervision of the National Electoral Commission.
Pre-requisites:
In order to enable the Board members to effectively carry out their responsibilities, the following pre-requisites must be obtained.
It shall be the responsibility of the National Electoral Commission to obtain from the President the above-mentioned decrees.
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Board, NEC will grant the Board the authority to investigate, on its behalf, any violation of the electoral law and the Code of Conduct and if they deem it necessary to recommend to the commission a course of action to be taken against the offender.
During the election period, the government Ministers are not allowed to use government vehicles for campaigning for the party that they belong to.
Civil Servants are also not allowed, in accordance with the civil service law, to publicly campaign for a party. Doing this will be considered as a serious contravention of the election management process and NEC might initiate appropriate disciplinary action against the culprit(s).
To enhance the trust and confidence among the parties and to create a conducive climate for the smooth and efficient conduct of the election, it is necessary that the government refrains from any action that might be construed as an abuse of power. Likewise, it is necessary that political parties refrain from any action that may be construed as being detrimental to the peace and stability.
SECTION FOUR: INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CODE
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Part One: Operational Mechanism
The objective of the meetings (preferably once in a week) will be to evaluate compliance with the CODE and the Electoral law and to lessen the inevitable polarization that a competitive campaign brings among the contenders.
UCID, Faisal Ali Warabe, Chairman, Signature_________, Date: __________
Academy For Peace And Development Hargeisa Somaliland
Overall, areas with increased nutrition concern have encountered persistent insecurity, with resultant population displacement; recurrent natural disasters and hindrance to humanitarian assistance delivery. On the contrary, areas with good humanitarian access coupled by general improvement in food security indicators, stable health situation, relatively more diversified diets, and relative civil security had improvement in the nutrition situation, e.g. Nugaal valley, Sool plateau, and most parts of NE Somalia.
This update provides highlights of current areas of nutrition concern compared with typical malnutrition levels observed in Somalia following the 2005 post Gu assessment. Results of nutrition assessment in North East Somalia are also presented.
OVERALL NUTRITION ANALYSIS IN SOMALIA
FSAU regularly updates interpretation of the nutrition status trends as well as current nutrition situation in Somalia using data from nutrition surveys, rapid assessments, health facility, selective feeding centre, sentinel sites surveillance, dietary studies and information from field observations. In the month of July 2005, FSAU carried out the annual post Gu food security and nutrition assessments, where integrated analysis was conducted. Information generated from this assessment has been triangulated with data from the previously mentioned sources to provide an overview of current situation vis-.-vis the revised baseline or usual trends of nutrition situation observed in Somalia. The results are presented on Map 1: Nutrition status trends(1) and Map 2: Current nutrition situation(2).
Recent changes in nutrition situation in Somalia compared to April 2005 analysis (April 2005, Nutrition Update)
Most of the areas with increased nutrition concern have encountered persistent insecurity, with resultant population displacement and hindrance to humanitarian assistance delivery. On the contrary, areas with good humanitarian access coupled by favourable influencing factors had improvement in the nutrition situation, e.g. Nugaal valley, Sool plateau, parts of Galgadud Region and most parts of NE Somalia (June 2005, Nutrition Update).
The current nutrition situation map shows that malnutrition levels in Jubba Riverine, Bossaso IDPs, and northern Gedo (mainly Luuq District) are significantly above the usual range typically observed in these areas. The nutrition situation in Dusamareb and Adaado Districts of Galgadud Region; Tsunami affected areas of Dangorayo District in north-eastern Somalia (mainly destitute families in the surrounding towns); and IDP camps in Hargeisa, Hobyo and Abudwaq Districts remain areas of concern. Parts of Bakool Region (mainly Wajid, Rabdure, Elberde), parts of Bay Region and Northern Gedo are also hot spots with malnutrition levels above usual ranges for the areas.
IDPs in major towns of Bossasso, Hargeisa and Kismayu: In the month of June, resettlement camps of IDPs in Bossasso were engulfed in huge fire leading to loss of shelter. In Kismayu, the poor status of the riverine communities in Jubbas greatly reduces the food sources of the IDP population. In general, limited income sources (at times attributed to social marginalisation), poor water and sanitation situation, and high disease incidences lead to heightened risks to malnutrition
Central Somalia: Access to adequate diets remains limited, though improving, in the conflict affected populations of Dusamareb, Adaado and Hobyo districts. However, both food security and nutrition indicators show an improving situation, though the positive gains continue to be jeopardized by the continuing civil insecurity. Humanitarian services delivery has not been successful in the whole of the Central Region due to insecurity. CARE -- Somalia has distributed maize and oil in some parts of Galgadud Region.
Sool plateau and parts of Haud of Togdheer: Currently, there are indications of improvement in nutrition situation (Taleex/Huddun nutrition survey, June 2005). However, such improvement is still precarious as it depends on temporary improvement in some short-term food security outcomes whose final impact are dependent on subsequent seasons as well as on the on-going interventions. For example, goat milk will soon dry up unless good onset of Deyr 2005 rains follows. The previous crises had also led to numerous pockets of destitute families in the areas whose recovery could even be much longer as most of them had lost virtually all their livelihood assets. The nutrition situation of these areas requires close monitoring.
Notes:
(1) The map represents the "usual" nutrition situation observed over time. It indicates the estimate of ranges within which malnutrition rates typically fall in Somalia. The map depicts that virtually the whole of Somalia has unacceptable levels of acute malnutrition of 5% or above, according to international standards and that some areas are consistently and substantially worse than others.
(2) The map presents the updated situation based on an interpretation of the latest available nutrition and related information. A shift of the nutrition situation from the "usual" ranges is portrayed.
80-year old Mumin Abdi's simsim farm is about 50 metres from the River Shabelle, but he can't access the river water because the canal that used to carry the water to his farm has silted up. This means that he can no longer rotate the four crops that he used to, which in turn reduces the productivity of the land and his income. His story is duplicated in farms all along the river for the past 15 years, in what was and to some extent still is the most fertile part of Somalia and renowned for its agricultural produce which was exported to the Gulf and other African countries.
One such canal, the Duduble (China) Canal, was built in the early 80s by Chinese contractors funded by Saudis, to avert flooding by diverting part of the river flow and to irrigate the surrounding land. Since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, infrastructure and canal maintenance were not undertaken resulting in the silting up of the canal, the gates either destroyed or malfunctioning, and vegetation growing on the embankments and in the canal. More devastating perhaps, is the fact that every year, whenever there is heavy rain in the Ethiopian Highlands, the source of the River Shabelle, the lowlands in Middle Shabelle flood, displacing thousands of people and destroying their homes, crops and livelihoods. International agencies have been providing emergency assistance to address humanitarian assistance due to flooding.
The rehabilitation of the Duduble Canal is the first development project in the south of Somalia for two decades, and is a joint venture between the local community and administration, UNDP and WFP. UNDP supported the rehabilitation of the barrage and gates, operation house and local capacity building to maintain and manage the canal following its rehabilitation, while WFP, under its Food for Work Programme, provided 600 metric tonnes (MT) of food commodities for the labourers to partially subsidize their contribution. The community and the Middle Shabelle Administration desilted the Canal, a mammoth exercise to remove an estimated 725,000 cubic metres of soil. They have absorbed 65% of the total project cost of USD one million by utilizing eight bulldozers and two cutters and engaging 750 labourers as their contribution. In two months, men and women dug down six metres to reveal the gates of the barrage and the concrete beds which had been buried for about 15 years.
The 15-kilometer canal has been dug up and is now feeding water to the reservoir which is also in need of rehabilitation. Between the canal gates and the reservoir, 1200 families are beginning to access water for their farms. It is estimated that at least 50,000 people will benefit from the rehabilitation of this canal.
At the inauguration ceremony on 7 June 2005, attended by Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, members of the Transitional Federal Government and the international community, the Prime Minister stated that the rehabilitation of priority infrastructure in Somalia is critical as it will support the economic activity that is essential to recovery of the country. The local administrant and community have agreed to allocate 50% of the additional irrigable land for the local community, 30% for the displaced families and 20% for the rehabilitation of demobilised militia, thereby contributing to the ongoing peace building initiatives.
With time, farmers like Mumin Abdi will be able to get the water they require not only for their subsistence needs, but also to engage in more farming activities to generate extra income and improving their quality of life.
Supporting the relocation of the Transitional Federal Institutions
UNDP's Somalia Emergency Budgetary Support Project (SEBSP) has been responsible for the arrangements of the relocation of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in response to the December 2004 request of Prime Minister Gedi to establish a mechanism through which budgetary support can be channelled in a coordinated and responsive manner. This request was echoed by the international donor community.
Arrangements were made for all 275 Members of Parliament, and as of mid-July 2005, the great majority of MPs, an additional 500 Government Officials, delegates and supporters had actually returned to destinations of their choice within the regions of Bakool, Banadir, Bari, Bay, Gedo, Galgudud, Hiiraan, Lower/Middle Shabelle, Lower/Middle Juba, Mudug and Nugaal. All 275 MPs received a set relocation allowance of EUR 2,500.
At the same time, the SEBSP has been providing support services to Government institutions such as the establishment of Transitional Federal Government (TFG)-led UNDP/Donor Working Groups/Task Forces on Civil Service Issues, Relocation and Revenue Generation, support to the TFG Liaison Office in Nairobi (Office of the President and Office of the Prime Minister) ensuring ongoing functioning of the facilities to the end of the year, completion of a draft "Development of Policies and Procedures to Guide the Payroll and Recruitment System for the TFG" and "Salary Survey to Guide the Establishment of TFG Civil Service Salary Levels" and finally, initial steps are underway to establish a Resource Centre in Jowhar and Mogadishu for interim use by the TFG/I prior to the establishment of longer-term Government Offices.
Anti Retroviral Therapy begins in Hargeisa
During the last week of June 2005, UNDP participated in a joint UN mission on HIV/AIDS to Somaliland. The mission met with the President and several ministers, as well as a range of civil society organisations active in the HIV/AIDS response.
A highlight of the mission included the launch of the first anti-retroviral therapy project in Hargeisa which is being supported by several UN agencies, including UNDP, as well as NGOs. Most importantly, it has been endorsed the Somaliland authorities.
Reducing the number of prisoners by Access to Justice
Hargeisa Central Prison was built in 1942 to house 250 inmates. Currently, there are 623 inmates and by the end of June 2005, 122 of those were in remand, meaning that the person has been accused of engaging in behaviour prohibited by Somaliland penal law and is waiting in prison for their `day in court' - to have a trial to determine whether or not they committed the crime(s) for which they have been accused of committing. Oftentimes the `wait' for trial can be for periods that exceed the generally accepted notion of a `trial without undue delay'.
On June 25, 2005, the University of Hargeisa Legal Clinic initiated an `Access to Justice Project' that seeks to reduce the waiting period in remand, as well as the number of those on remand by 50%. The Clinic is the public service component of the university's Faculty of Law and provides no-cost legal representation to individuals and groups who cannot afford legal services while providing the law students with first-hand experience of their profession in a supervised environment. The overarching mission of the clinic is to contribute to making justice accessible to all who are within the jurisdiction of the Somaliland justice system.
The legal clinic now has seven remanded individuals as clients - four men and three women - whose cases will be reviewed and processed by the Criminal Defence Clinic. From this point, law students and members of the Somaliland Lawyers Association will be going to the Hargeisa Central Prison on a regular basis to handle their cases. The Access to Justice Project will feature the active engagement of ten members of the Somaliland Lawyers Association, five members of the Legal Clinic staff, and upwards to sixteen law students. The Legal Clinic in cooperation with the Somaliland Lawyers Association has assigned every person held in remand status at the Hargeisa Central Prison to a Project Attorney. Every remanded person will be interviewed by their new lawyer and student assistant before mid-August 2005.
Puntland formulating a 5-year Regional Development Plan
UNDP has been supporting the Puntland Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MPIC) in the formulation process of a Regional Five-year Development Plan expected to be finalized by 15th September 2005. The Plan is expected to address various dimensions and challenges of the rehabilitation and development in Puntland, set development priorities, targets and estimate overall resource requirements, both internal and external. A Technical Unit has been established to support and coordinate the formulation of the Plan.
In addition, UNDP also supported the MPIC in conducting a consultative workshop in order ensure broad understanding of its objectives, contents and design process as well as to discuss policies and strategies to meet the development objectives. As a way forward, the workshop participants established a framework of sectoral and sub-sectoral focal points responsible for the coordination and formulation process within their areas of specialization. The participants from all regions of Puntland included private and public sector representatives, NGO's, INGOs and UN Agencies.
Enhancing financial management and planning
UNDP's Governance and Financial Services Programme recently launched its latest initiative, the Capacity Building of Somali Planners Project. Funded by World Bank through its LICUS initiative, the Project seeks to strengthen financial management in both the public and private sectors in Somaliland, Puntland and Central/Southern Somalia, through provision of a 9-month diploma course offered by open and distance learning. A preliminary needs assessment is being conducted in early August, with training scheduled to start in October 2005.
Doing better for countries in crisis and recovery
The Conflict Prevention and Recovery (CPR) Practice workshop for Arab States countries held 13- 15 June 2005 in Nairobi was the fifth regional workshop organized to mainstream CPR within UNDP. The goal was to engage a core group of UNDP staff working on CPR from country, subregional and regional levels in an interactive dialogue on key issues of crisis, conflict prevention and recovery, to share practical experiences, discuss current challenges in crisis settings as well as to analyze regional approaches, operational issues and emerging trends.
The participants from Iraq, Lebanon, Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP), Somalia, Sudan (including staff from the South Sudan sub-office), Syria, Yemen, New York and Beirut were diverse in terms of posts and functions, as well as their level of expertise in CPR issues and knowledge of the UNDP system.
New training centre opens its gates
The Civil Service Institute has recently opened in Hargeisa and is planning to offer its first courses in August 2005. CSI is a public-private partnership, whose main partners include the Civil Service Commission of Somaliland and the University of Hargeisa. UNDP, through its Governance and Financial Services Programme, has been facilitating the partnership process and is providing technical and budgetary support to the fledgling institute. While CSI's main focus will be on developing the capacity of the civil service in such areas as management, planning, office skills and accounting, private companies and NGOs will also be able to contract training services for their staff. Organisations interested in staff training can contact CSI at the University of Hargeisa campus, or by emailing: csiprincipal@yahoo.com or csisomaliland@yahoo.com
QUESTS expanding
The Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support (QUESTS) project established to engage the Somali Diaspora in the rebuilding of their country has increased both the number of Somalis coming home to assist for short periods of time, and the sectors of involvement to include Governance, Manufacturing among others. So far in 2005, 15 Somalis have committed to assisting organisations in Somaliland, Puntland and South/Central Somalia in the education, agriculture and health sectors. Four of the fifteen are female. So far two assistance projects have been completed in education and health.
UNDP's Poverty Reduction and Economic Recovery (PRER) Programme is currently assisting the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in Puntland in formulating a Regional 5-Year Development Plan, and is using QUESTS to sponsor external technical experts to support the process. For CDs on the completed projects please contact christopher.erefa@undp.org
Steps towards Fisheries Sector Strategy
To encourage economic diversification and to allow Somalis to benefit from their coastal waters, fishing sector assessments are now complete for Somaliland, Puntland and the Central/South. The Somali coastline, the longest in Africa, has thus far been exploited by artisan fishermen with little large scale commercial activity taking place to the benefit of the local communities. In fact, it is largely foreigners that profit from the Somali coastline - it is estimated that Somalia loses approximately USD 100 million to Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities, resources that could go a long way towards improving the livelihoods of Somalis.
The assessments will be synthesised and analysed by the World Bank and FAO and will help inform a coherent and sustainable strategy to develop a commercially viable fisheries sector.
Preparing the Reconstruction and Development Programme
After extensive consultations with stakeholders, the Somali Joint Needs Assessment Concept Note has been prepared jointly by the United Nations and World Bank and reviewed by the TFG Minister for Planning and International Cooperation. The Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) is intended to help begin to achieve sustained reconstruction and development and deepen the peace process by having teams of Somali and international technical experts work together to assess needs and develop prioritized initiatives to achieve reconstruction and development and reinforce peace building.
The resulting Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) will provide a framework for mobilizing, distributing and coordinating related international assistance, and will be the basis of a global donor conference to be held in Rome, Italy in 2006.
Sustainable Livelihoods and Drought Mitigation project to commence
The Sustainable Livelihoods and Drought Mitigation Programme is a step closer to actualisation after the signing of a framework of cooperation with the administrations in both Puntland and Somaliland and the implementing agencies Diakonia and PENHA respectively. The project aims to enhance livelihoods for people affected by drought thus contributing to food security and increased capacity to cope with future drought situations. Specifically, this will entail the rehabilitation of the environment through soil and water conservation (supporting communities to establish tree and grass nurseries , forage reserves and gabions to improve grazing resources); rehabilitation of water sources to improve water availability; supporting livestock health services through skills training and promoting incomegenerating activities (processing of livestock products to increase value, promote adoption of alternative economic activities through training, and micro-financing). It is expected that the project will increase household income, improve capacity for planning and sustainable management of local resources, as well as information and knowledge to facilitate informed decision-making.
The project will benefit pastoralists, while providing alternative economic opportunities to women, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and destitute people falling out of pastoralism livelihood system. The initial six months of the project will focus on the Nugal and Karkar districts in Sool and Bari regions; and Garadag and Hudun in Sanaag - areas have been categorised as being in `food crisis' by the FSAU. Other affected districts will be covered under the subsequent phases.
Strengthening Distance Learning
With the assistance of UNDP, Amoud University in Somaliland has been competitively selected to participate in the African Virtual University/African Development Bank (AVU/AfDB) Teacher Education Program and as a result, an agreement to participate in the AVU programs was also signed. To qualify for the Teacher Education Program, the university needed to meet certain criteria in e-readiness and online learning programmes.
Discussions are also ongoing with the AVU in exploring ways of expanding these Teacher Education Program benefits to the University of Hargeisa in Somaliland and East African University in Puntland. EAU is expected to join the AVU network before end of July 2005.
The Distance Learning Project is under the Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) World Bank Initiative that supports tertiary institutions provide additional learning programmes and knowledge resources to students and faculty.
Inter-agency strategies for IDPs and Refugees
UNDP has been participating in the development of the Joint UN Strategy to address the needs of Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia which is an operational and implementation tool for interagency-action for the benefit of IDPs and their communities. The strategy contains an analysis of the situation in Somaliland, Puntland and the Central/South, recommends interventions, delineates the responsibilities of the local authorities, and the coordination mechanisms present to assist in addressing the issue of IDPS in Somalia.
At the same time, UNDP has participated and contributed significantly to the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Somali Refugees (CPA), led by UNHCR. The CPA is a multi-pronged initiative which is being conducted in the four neighbouring countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen) as well as Somalia. It aims to identify and pursue appropriate durable solutions applicable to each Somali refugee sub-group and each host country; where durable solutions are not immediately available to identify measures to enhance the quality of asylum in current host countries, including through better legal and physical protection and improved assistance; to promote refugees' self-reliance in order to enable them to contribute to the development of their host communities, while at the same time preparing them for eventual voluntary repatriation; to further address the challenges posed to host communities through rehabilitation and development in areas affected by the presence of refugees; to make the option of voluntary return more attractive for refugees still in exile and to ensure sustainability of reintegration in the country of origin by providing access to protection, basic services and improved income generation opportunities for returnees, IDPs and other vulnerable populations.
Emergency Fund begins work
The newly created Emergency Fund assisted IDP flood victims in Burao, Somaliland (by improving water canals) and fire affected IDPs and returnees in Bossaso, Puntland by assisting in bush rehabilitation and construction of wind breakers to prevent further damage by heavy winds.
Meanwhile .. more info means better programming
Assessments on the vulnerable populations including IDPs, returnees and urban poor in Bossaso and Garowe have been completed. These assessment are crucial as the provide baseline data which allows for informed programming by various agencies. Based on this information, UN-HABITAT will fund the first housing project for IDPs, returnees and the host community in the old airport area of Garowe.
Re-establishing a civil service
UNDP is supporting the re-establishment of a civil service in Somalia through its Governance and Financial Services Programme. Although launched only two months ago, in June, the New Beginnings - Somalia Civil Service Project has already made significant progress. After holding extensive consultation with Transitional Federal Government representatives, the Project identified four areas in which policy studies were needed: Organisation & Structure of the Somalia Civil Service; Recruitment Policies & Procedures; Roles & Responsibilities of a Civil Service Commission, and; Terms & Conditions of Civil Servants. Draft reports from all four studies are expected in September. A dissemination forum at which both TFG and civil society representatives will discuss the reports' recommendations is planned for October.
Library Management Training
Librarians from Mogadishu, Beletweyne, Garowe and Bossaso took part in a 12-day Computerized Library Management Training conducted in Bossaso from 30 May - 10 June 2005 to introduce the UNESCO library software system and to train them to be proficient in using the software in their efforts to manage their libraries more efficiently.
At the finalization of the workshop each participant was provided a copy of the UNESCO library software. The specific aims of the workshop were to introduce the benefits to effective library management through computer software like WINISIS; training all participants in the installation of WINISIS software; provide training in the usage and trouble shooting of WINISIS software; assist in developing appropriate cataloguing system consistent with WINISIS software; assist in developing an appropriate database consistent with the WINISIS software and training in general principles of library management. The participants also established the Somali Librarians Association.
All references to Somaliland pertain to the self-declared but unrecognised Republic of Somaliland. All references to Puntland pertain to the self-declared Puntland State of Somalia.
Compiled and produced by UNDP Somalia Information Office:
UNDP Somalia, Springette, Spring Valley,
P.O. Box 28832 - 00200, Nairobi, +254 20 4183640/2,
www.so.undp.org. Contact: sandra.macharia@undp.org for additional information
Somalilanders who voted for President Rayale knew that he was not the candidate with the most experience or the best education, but they were hoping that, through hard work, discipline and a sense of fair play, he would make up for what was lacking in his resume. Lately, through a series of decisions, actions and inaction, Rayale has been intent on proving that his supporters were wrong and his worst critics were right. The most recent example is the UDUB candidate selection fiasco in which Rayale gave his word to community elders, and his own ministers, about the list of candidates from Hargeisa, only to violate the agreement later, which resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Aviation, . Abiib Diiriye Nuur, in disgust over what the president did. This was not the first time that Rayale had broken his word either. Another instance of such underhanded behavior by President Rayale was his giving a green light to one of Somaliland's highly respected elders, Haji Abdi Warabe, to run for the position of the head of the Gurti after Sheikh Ibrahim passed away, only to pull the rug from under Haji Abdi Warabe once he had publicly expressed his interest in the position. Well-informed sources also attribute the recent conflict between the President and the Speaker of the Parliament, . Qaybe, to Rayale's failure to uphold certain understandings between them. There are other examples too.
In addition to this pattern of duplicity and broken promises, there is another thread that runs through Rayale's performance as president: an inability to work with the various branches of government. His conflict with the speaker of the House, . Qaybe, was already mentioned. There was also the conflict with the parliament that almost resulted in impeachment proceedings against him, despite the fact that the majority of the parliamentarians belonged to his own party, which made plain either his lack of political skills or lack of accurate information about what is going around him (his inability to work effectively with a parliamentary majority from his own party should give many a pause about what is going to happen when the new parliament, a substantial percentage of which is expected to belong to the opposition parties, takes office). It is also no secret that his relations with the Head of the Gurti, . Sulayman Gaal is often strained. President Rayale has even failed to manage relations with his vice-president in a satisfactory manner, and embarrassing disputes between them has become public knowledge.
President Rayale's habitual deception and repeated breaking of his word has created a serious credibility gap for him, and less and less people are willing to believe him. When one adds to this his inability to deal effectively with the various branches of government, the picture of his presidency that is emerging is disturbingly grim. Rayale has already done enough damage to Somaliland's body politic, the question now is: does he want to continue in the same destructive path or is he going to change direction before it is too late?
Hargeysa, Somaliland, July 30, 2005 (SL Times) - Somaliland's minister of aviation, Abib Diriye Nur, issued a press statement in Hargeysa last Sunday 24/7/2005 to announce his resignation.
Abib Diriye Nur said he had sent his resignation letter to President Dahir Rayale Kahin.
The minister expressed his unhappiness with the president's leadership, adding he feared this could undermine his health. The minister complained about the manner in which Dahir Rayale Kahin chose members of the House of Representatives [candidates to contest forthcoming parliamentary polls]. He said the hope of the UDUB [ruling party] to continue ruling was waning.
The aviation minister who has resigned was regarded as one of the closest ministers to President Rayale, although signs have been emerging recently of a growing rift between the two men.
According to a statement issued Monday by the presidential spokesman, Abdi Idris Du'ale, President Rayale has accepted the resignation of Abib Diriye Nuh, minister for aviation and air transport. In his acceptance of the resignation statement, the President said: I inform you that I have accepted your resignation which you announced through the media, although it would have been better if you presented your resignation letter to the office [of the president], and as a result, I am now relieving you from the ministerial post that you held for the state, and you should quickly hand it over to the assistant minister of aviation and air transport.
Tshwane, SA, July 26, 2005 (Press Release by Somaliland Liaison Office) - The Republic of Somaliland's Committee for Concerned Somalis, appointed Mrs. Amran Ali Haji Mahmoud to attend the preparatory consultation on the UN Secretary Generals' Study on Violence against Children. This UN Conference was hosted by the South African Presidency's Office of the Rights of the Child and UNICEF, which was held in Johannesburg and, was attended by governments, NGOs, the African Union, and Pan-African Parliament.
On this occasion, Mrs. Amran Ali Haji Mahmoud met with South Africa's Deputy Minister for Social Development, Dr. Jean Benjamin and exchanged ideas and experiences.
Mrs. Amran Ali Haji Mahmoud also had the opportunity to attend a welcome cocktail in honor of the visiting South Sudan delegation from the SPLM/A, which was hosted by the South African Deputy Foreign Minister, Her Excellency Ms. Sue van De Merwe in the South African capital Tshwane (Pretoria).
Mrs. Mahmoud in her capacity as head of human resources at Hargeisa University also visited the University of South Africa's Centre for African Renaissance Studies to explore ways to further co-operation between the two universities in the field of international law and capacity building. The head of the University of South Africa's Centre for African Renaissance Studies, Prof. Shadrack Gutto, welcomed ways to initiate new avenues of co-operation between the two universities.
Mrs. Mahmoud visited the offices of the Academy of Self-Knowledge to up-date herself on the development initiatives of the world acclaimed Islamic scholar, Shaykh Fadhalla Haeri.
On her concluding day, Mrs. Mahmoud attended the national day of Egypt, where she had an opportunity to exchange ideas on Somaliland with South Africa's Minister of Public Administration, Her Excellency Ms. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi. Productive exchanges were also made with Britain's new High Commissioner to South Africa, the Rt. Hon. Paul Boateng, African ambassadors and the Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa, Dr. Eddy Maluka.
Briefings were given to members of the Somaliland community in South Africa on recent developments in Somaliland, and on ways for the Somaliland Diaspora to play an active role in advocacy issues in Southern Africa and the up-coming September 15 parliamentary elections in Somaliland.
Issued by: Somaliland Liaison Office, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa.
Enquires: Telephone: + 27 82 880 8603
In his acceptance statement, the President said, I inform you that I have accepted your resignation which you announced through the radio although it would have been better if you presented your resignation letter to the office [of the president], and as a result, I am now relieving you from the ministerial post that you held for the state and you should quickly hand it over to the assistant minister of aviation and air transport.
The Ministry of Presidential Affairs expects the minister to hastily hand over his post as stipulated in the statement.
. Abdikarim Hassan Nur told the Republican that the project funded by USAID provided 15 selected schools a full package, which included the learning environment.
He said; "New classes were constructed and existing ones rehabilitated. Water, health and sanitation facilities were provided and community education committees were trained."
In the one-year SSIP, which began in August 2004 and that will end on July 31/05, these schools were provided with educational support kits such as teaching aids, sport and students' kits.
. Noor added; "lack of female teachers has been attributed as one of the causes of the disparity of enrollment between boys (82%) and girls (28%) and as such CARE sponsored the training of 20 girls in Somaliland Teachers Training College, as primary school teachers".
According to our regional reporter, the 13 Students are local government employees, sponsored to be trained at Burao University.
Chairman of the University, . Hussein Mohamed Handulle, told our correspondent that the local government has not paid the fees of the students for the last 7 months.
"It is with the small fee we charge Students, that we manage the university. Officials from the Local Government refused to pay the sum of $2,900 that it owes us in front of the Students. As the students are sponsored by Burao Local Government, we had no alternative, but to stop the Students from sitting for the exam," he added.
Student Saleban Hassan Mohamoud, who met our correspondent said; "The Local Government had to pay the fee, for it has sponsored us. On our part, we can not pay the fee, for we have not been paid our salaries, for the last 6 months".
The acting Mayor, . Bashe Muse, said; "The Local Government owes the University and it has to pay the fees, but the Students should not be stopped from sitting for their exams".
The University of Burao was opened in August 2004 and depends on Somalilanders in the Diaspora and contribution from the community. 1,200 students are enrolled.
The decline is attributed to the season, which is a factor in the decrease of number of ships and the preference of those businessmen who import goods to other ports and airports, where they claim that revenue is lower.
According to our correspondent in the port town, businessmen who bring goods have been complaining about the revenue they pay in Berbera.
"Businessmen have to pay tax from 80 - 100% for the goods they import, in the port of Berbera; while in other ports and airports only 35% of the goods businessmen import are taxed. Similar goods brought through Berbera or the other placed can not be sold in the same market at the same price," this was quoted from businessmen our correspondent met.
The ministry of Finance is investigating the issue, after a lot of complaints by businessmen.
The national TV station has a power range of up to 1.5kw. Initially, the station will be viewed only in the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, and its environs; the second and third phase will extend viewing to the major towns of Burco, Berbera and Boorama.
In the third phase, a satellite connection will also be added to expand the station for a global reach.
The task of managing the TV station has been mandated to Ahmad Abdrahman Hirsi, alias "Helo".
The 2 laws that have been applied in the selection of the candidates have been typical to any society that is in a transition period. A period, which will safely carry Somaliland to the successful transition from community based representation to that of the highest order of democratic election of one-man one vote.
The selection of the candidates on the basis of these two different are clear indicators, that the way ahead is not smooth, but full of pit holes that require full vigilance and careful maneuvering towards the final countdown.
Community based selection is not viable in a democratic election. The internal feuds within a community and its persistence to the last minute of submitting the lists are evidence that tradition and the culture of accomplishing things cannot be washed away.
The two principles applied in the pre-election period has unveiled that the society is not yet ready to embrace women and to give them their rightful share and as such be represented in the House of Representatives.
The number of women candidates is far below what they hoped for, but it seems to be a good beginning. The women candidates listed are facing an uphill battle to succeed, in a society that has never elected women representatives.
The screening of the candidates is the sole responsibility of the National Electoral Commission. It is not an easy task for NEC members to screen 246 candidates in a country that has not reliable documentation and date system to help them assess claims of candidates.
It is not only the candidates that are on trial and that are to be judged, but so are members of the NEC.
As they are the few that currently the completion of the democratic process and the future of the candidates depend on, they are not only the stage, but in the limelight.
NEC members will be judged for their honesty, integrity, morality, reliability, and sense of justice, honour, decency and above all their loyalty to their country and the existence of Somaliland as a sovereign and separate state.
The people urge you not to be threatened, cajoled or bribed, but to show perseverance. They remind you that you will go in history as scoundrels and traitors who betrayed Somaliland, or as honourable men. The choice is yours. May God enlighten you to make the right selection.
The conventional view among educated Somalis is that the uneducated clan-oriented people are the cause of many of Somaliland's problems. This may be true in many cases, but there are many other cases, where Somaliland's ruling elite that is supposed to mitigate potential clan problems are the source that is actively stirring up conflict among clans, subclans, and lineages as well as between clans and the government.
A case in point is the current selection of parliamentary candidates. We all know Somaliland is supposed to be moving away from representation according to clans to representation by parties. We also know that in the transition period, clan considerations will have to be taken into account while moving from the old clan system to the new party system.
That is why the three parties devised an informal system whereby parties ensure that a candidate has the support of his lineage before he is selected as a candidate. As a matter of fact, UDUB, has even gone a step further and asked different clans and lineages to submit lists of their candidates. In some instances this arrangement worked, but there have been disturbing cases where this system was flagrantly abused by the very people who devised it. For example, in Hargeisa, a subclan that was asked to submit a list, did so, only to find out that some members were removed from the list, at the last minute, and were replaced with new people chosen by President Rayale (some say it was actually his wife who did the removing and replacing as personal favors).
This is what we meant by Somaliland's ruling elite abusing the very system they devised. The president, as the head of UDUB, has the right to have a say in who should be a candidate and who should not. But neither he, nor his wife, has the right to solicit lists from clans and promise them that their wishes will be honored, then turn around, and impose on them different candidates.
Hargeysa, July 23, 2005 (SL Times) - There is still confusion as to the identity of party candidates to stand in the upcoming elections (Sept 15) for Somaliland's House of Representatives. Though each of the country's 3 political parties submitted its list of candidates to the National Electoral Commission, however, both the parties and the NEC have so far refrained from officially disclosing the names of the finalized candidates.
The 3 parties had reportedly submitted their lists just minutes before the deadline was about to expire at 6pm on July 17.
According to electoral commissioner Abdillahi Jawan, the lists were still being screened by the NEC to ascertain that party nominees met the qualification criteria for candidates running for legislative elections.
NEC officials refused to comment further on the issue. However after most of the names of candidates were published by local daily newspapers earlier this week, none of the parties came forward to confirm or deny whether the press revelations were true.
Meanwhile, the 3 political parties signed a code of conduct for the election period on Monday. Similarly a media code of conduct for election coverage was also signed on Monday by representatives of the two Journalist associations, the Somaliland Society for Independent Journalists and Writers (SSJW) and the Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA).
The media code of conduct was formulated with the assistance of Article 19's John Barker.
Even when one takes into account the inherent difficulties of governments that are formed in exile, the performance of Col. Abdillahi Yusuf and his Prime Minister, Gedi has been so pitiful it is really a misnomer to call theirs a government. This is after all a government that has split into at least two main factions, one based in Mogadishu and the other floating between Nairobi, Jowhar and Garowe. It is also a government that is not interested in governing as such, but in forcing a military solution on Somalia. Most Somalis, of course, reject this military approach, and the international community knows it. Many Somalis also thought that this issue was put to rest months ago when the front line states were excluded from sending troops to Somalia, and when the United States made it plain that it is opposed to lifting the arms embargo against Somalia.
The fact that Abdillahi Yusuf insisted on bringing the issue of the arms embargo in front of the Security Council in such an unfavorable international environment is just another indication of his diplomatic illiteracy. As expected, his request was turned down, just as his previous request for troops from the front line states was turned down. This is the second blow that Abdillahi Yusuf received within a few months, and both blows were a direct result of his own miscalculations. The colonel seems to have mistaken the international community's willingness to subsidize his pretend-presidency for a commitment to back him militarily. The international community was willing to indulge his pretensions, but once he forced the issue, they made it clear that they consider him just one of the Somali factions, and that another round of Somali bloodletting is, to use their own words, "unacceptable". The result is that Abdillahi Yusuf is in a much weaker position than he started with, because whereas the international community was previously only reluctant to provide him with troops, the situation now is that the international community would neither provide him with troops nor allow him to engage in any military activities.
This semi-natural port facility has been handling the nation's trade with the rest of the world for at least 700 years. The wealth earned in this most unlikely of all places spread to every corner of the Somali speaking race from Borame to Bulo Xawo and every village and clan in between. Incredibly Somalis used to `walk' their herds of sheep, goats and camels from as far afield as the Jubba river valley in order to sell them at the lucrative marshalling market town of Burao from which they were transferred to lorries driven by suicidal maniacs who hauled the beasts over the treacherous Sheikh Mountain passes at break-neck speeds (the break-neck was quite literal for many drivers and their cargo). Those who made it were then off-loaded rickety ships who took them all the way to the slaughterhouses of Jeddah and Jizan.
The exciting smell of money was overpowering in Burao and Berbera during peak times like the Pre-Hajj season as hundreds of millions of dollars exchanged hands creating a whole new class of moneyed city dwellers known as `adhile'(seller of sheep and goats) and nomads flush with cash shopped for everything from teas and sugars to gold and silks.
The British colonial authorities recognised the economic importance of Berbera but never bothered to invest in it because Aden met their trade needs and the welfare of the Somalilanders was hardly a priority they cared about. This comes more into focus when you compare their neglect of Berbera with massive investment the French made in nearby Djibouti, a hithero completely unknown port with no history of trading with the outside world.
That neglect continued under the southern-run regimes of Somalia after independence and union. Strengthening Somaliland was not something they were particularly keen on since they fully well knew that an improved harbour facilities at Berbera could only lead to more wealth and influence for the already economically powerful Somalilanders.
Instead they fought hard to replace the whole of the livestock trade with the banana business in the South, and Berbera with the southern ports of Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bosaso. But both the banana trade and the infrastructural facilities erected to support it were simply not strong enough to compete with Berbera,(despite Somali bananas in Italy enjoying the monopoly established in 1937 by the then fascist regime) and by 1980 livestock exported from this Red Sea hub accounted for nearly 80% of Somalia's foreign exchange earnings.
But Berbera port was still left to rot. Its staff remained untrained and its ability to meet the needs of modern marine transport systems continued to decline. And then came the most devastating blow possible: the Saudi Arabian embargo on the livestock business, Berbera's and Somaliland's lifeblood. But to its credit Berbera survived all the colonial neglect, Southern Somalia envy and treachery and international skulduggery heaped on its stiflingly hot shores. Somaliland and Ethiopian traders started to use it as `bagaash' importation facility while rich SL diaspora returnees began bringing their luxury cars and over-stuffed sofas home from the four corners of the globe. In what could have been an opportunity of historical significance for Berbera, the Eritreo-Ethiopian conflict forced the Addis government to seek alternative outlets for the giant country's growing international trade.
Berbera seemed the most suitable harbour and number one Ethiopia's shopping list. Somalilanders were friendly to Addis, grateful for the protection it gave them as refugees from Somalia's genocidal war of the 1980s. Berbera is closer to Ethiopia's populated heartlands than any other port in the region including Djibouti. The roads from the port to Jijiga, Harar and Dire Dawa although far from perfect were nonetheless passable throughout the year. And then Berbera had a unique and age old link with the people of Ethiopia's huge, famine-prone and often restive Somali region. The traders travelled from this bush and scrubland area known as Ogaden to Berbera for hundreds of years and the trade routs are well trodden and well established.
Unfortunately the Ethiopians did not like what they saw in Berbera and once in a millennia opportunity was lost. The place was badly run, badly managed, badly maintained and riddled with corruption. The machinery was so dilapidated that it took three times more to unload a ton of food in Berbera than in Port Sudan(which turned out to be the final choice for Ethiopia). The management were not only greedy, abrasive and ill-trained but thoroughly incompetent and not in control of their own employees who behaved the way they saw fit.
Things have now gotten so bad that even the most loyal and patriotic of Somaliland traders are willing to use Bosaso port instead of risking another delay and bullying at Berbera. Shipping companies in Dubai refuse to go to Berbera point blank because they are sick and tired of being mistreated terribly while getting hit for extortionate bribes at the same time.
The solution is obvious but needs political courage from the government and generosity of spirit from Berbera's port workers as well as its traders and residents. The answer is to privatise the port with a controlling majority shares left in the hands of Somaliland-owned businessmen. The government is unlikely to make more than couple million dollars from the sale but the gains in the long-term could be highly lucrative for all involved.
Privatisation will bring capital for investment and upgrading. Competition will do wonders to improve the customer care skills of Berbera's famously unfriendly port workers. Efficiency will increase sharply as effective management procedures are put in place by people who have an interest in actually improving the facility because their bottom line will depend on it. The current unbelievably useless customs and immigration personnel will be retrained(or politely told to work elsewhere)
But I strongly suspect Riyale does not have the stomach for a fight over Berbera. There are reports he already clashed with his psychologically suspect vice president over a supposed `shir beeleed', a sleep (and sometimes psychosis) inducing marathon empty-talk fests beloved of Somalilanders. This particular `shir' was being organised by Berberawis, god knows why, except perhaps that they felt like one. Riyale turned it down, correctly in my opinion as `shir beeleeds' are a complete and total waste of time, money, effort and space. But the Vice president, who has a whispering reputation for being partial to the occasional dabkat-and-foox session, took serious umbrage over this unforgivable insult to his Berbera constituents and threw the mother of all wobblies, even physically assaulting the president according to one report. Raising Berbera privatisation at this stage could only further enrage the VEEP and some of his now shir-less clansmen there. But without such a bold step Berbera, and perhaps Somaliland with it will surely wither and die. And then we will need the biggest of all shir beeleeds just to rue the chances we missed and the opportunities squandered.
Guled ismail, halyey@btopenworld.com
From behind the shadow, a tyrant sighed
Yet in solemn I struggle and strive
Maandeeq the just - Maandeeq the true
Break the soil at the dry riverbed
A poem written by Said Omar Moussa of Livermore, CA, one of the Somalilanders in the diaspora who consistent with their tradition found the words to express his longing for his precious Somaliland.
Mandeeq is Somali for she camel. For Somalilanders abroad, it is the word to refer to their dear nation struggling for recognition.
., Chairman, honorable guests,
Let me say how happy and honored I am, for the opportunity to participate in this wonderful and pleasant event-the opening ceremony of this International Somaliland Diaspora Convention. I further wish to express my thanks and appreciation to our hosts- the organizers of the conference,-the Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute for the generous invitation extended to my collegues and myself to attend this meeting. I also wish to thank our American friends as well as other guests who gave their support to this initiative and who have honored us with their presence here today.
This meeting stands witness, not only to the determination of the people of Somaliland in distant corners of the earth to maintain the unity and independence of the country, but also to our capacity and willingness to come together and discuss the challenges we face in different forums and in different places. This, in my view, is what makes Somaliland what it is- a unique country indeed; -we are always prepared to put our own act together, by our selves anywhere, any time.
The history of Somaliland as a state, like that of most African countries is rooted in the colonial partition of the African continent by the European powers in the second half of the 20th century. Its borders with neighboring countries including Somalia were clearly demarcated and well established during that time. The edifice on which the organization of African Union or AU- as it is now called, stands upon is the golden rule adopted at its foundation-that borders between African states remain as they were at the time of independence from colonial rule.
Somaliland did emerge as a separate and independent state from British colonial rule on 26 June, 1960. It was recognized by the UN and other countries before it threw itself on the crest of an emotional wave, into a premature union with its neighbor Somalia, which was due to get its own independence a few days later. That fateful union as we all know now didn't work. Eventually Somaliland did not only had to withdraw from that ill fated union, but it paid for it with blood & tears, with the lives of its young and old, and with a physical destruction of its towns and villages, its bridges, its wells and its farm lands. The only thing they could not destroy was the Spirit, determination and courage of its people. That is why the Somali National Movement with the full support of the people was eventually able to defeat Siad Barre and chase his forces out of the country.
With regard to the issue of recognition, the international community, for the most part acknowledge and express appreciation for the stability we have achieved and admiration for the advances we have made in the democratization process- even though this still remains very much an unfinished business. It is also true, that there is a small but a growing number of independent organizations and individuals who have began to ask the question: why is Somaliland being held hostage to a squabbling bunch of war lords who have constantly frustrated international efforts to restore peace to Somalia, and who remain unmoved by the suffering of their people?. But the fact remains that these are, as yet no more than voices and whispers in the wind.
Then there is Puntland. This is a new creation, based purely on ethnicity. It had no existence or historical background as a political entity at any time in the history of Somalia, Somaliland or the region. The name came from a historical term (the land of Punt) applied by the ancient Egyptians to a much wider region including Somaliland, Majertenia, even parts of Eritrea with which the ancient Egyptians had trading relations.
There is also another interesting angle to the present debate on the Somali question. The now defunct Somalia republic was founded on the notion of promoting greater Somalia-a long cherished goal of Somali peoples in the horn of Africa. Attempts to realize these deeply held aspirations led to many wars in the region and still remain the basic cause for disgruntlement as well as the underdevelopment of Somali regions in neighboring countries. The question is: does the insistence of the international community, including neighboring countries to re-establish the defunct Somali republic have implications for the possible revival of the concept of greater Somalia?. After all, that was the rationale for its establishment in the first place. I will leave that question unanswered. But I want to make one thing very clear; Somaliland has no intention to violate the territorial integrity of any of its neighbors. On the contrary, we have the best of relations and live with them in peace and harmony and engage with them in economic and political co-operation on the basis of mutual respect.
We say to the international community, that we welcome their efforts to restore peace and stability to Somalia. This is in the interest of the region as a whole. But we warn that if and once that task is completed, there is another equally serious or even more sensitive one waiting; the need to help sort out the difference between Somaliland and Somalia. This issue can easily engulf the whole region in turmoil once again, unless the international community shows willingness and necessary determination to intervene once this first phase of restoring peace and establishing a government for Somalia is completed.
When the Imbegati meetings were under way, my party had suggested :
1) That recognition of the international community should at this stage confine itself to the establishment of an administrative body or a transitional government for Somalia (the ex-Italian colony). Today it is clear that the newly established Somalia government is not getting anywhere. Somaliland has been denied recognition long enough. We say to the Governments of the World `In the name of God, move and recognize Somaliland. That is the only decent thing left to do in this troubled region of the world. And that alone could create a new dawn for a people who had suffered for so long.
When it comes to domestic policies, I wish to say, I believe what we do in our country and the policies we follow will ultimately determine our destiny more than what outsiders do. My vision for the new and independent Somaliland is the establishment of a democratic, stable and prosperous nation where justice and the rule of law prevail. The challenges to build such a nation are formidable. It should be a matter of satisfaction to all of us that we have already achieved a great deal. Since the reclamation for independence, we have, no doubt, made impressive achievements in many areas. Education at all levels including primary and secondary levels has expanded and establishments of universities and colleges have moved ahead. Amoud and Hargeisa universities have already turned out graduates and others such as Burao university (Togdheer) are just getting under way.
In other sectors, progress is also being made. Air travel services, financial institutions such as money transfer services, are well established. Telephone and telecommunication services are also available in most parts of the country. Water and electricity supplies in the bigger towns are functioning, albeit with various degrees of efficiency. Housing construction in the main towns has done very well.
While we are on achievements, I must pay tribute to the Somaliland Diaspora who have actually taken the leading role in the reconstruction effort in the country.
On the negative side, there are some areas we seem to lag behind. Any kind of services to rural areas, such as animal health, water supplies to nomadic areas, as well as educational and other services are almost non-existent. Environmental degradation of the range land and burning of trees to supply charcoal to the growing demand in urban centers is truly alarming. We are not able to protect our seas from illegal fishing and dumping of nuclear waste. Facilities for livestock exports from our ports needs much to be desired, considering the fierce competition we are facing from other ports in the region.
On the plus side, there is another vital area, where we have scored notable success. That is the fight against international terrorism. Somaliland, like many other parts of the world has not escaped heinous crimes being committed in its territory over the past number of years, as a result of international terrorism. But thanks to the vigilance of our local population and the full cooperation they have given to our security forces, persons suspected of being the perpetrators of these crimes have been arrested and are now facing justice before the courts of law.
We must admit that there are also presently some negative developments which we need to look into more closely, if we are to avoid political crisis in the future. In our efforts to rebuild a new Somaliland, we must give due regard to the two sentiments that provided the basis for the restoration of the independence of Somaliland in Burao 1991; one was the bitter and long struggle of liberation led by SNM, and the other was the spirit of reconciliation, unity, and brotherhood that brought us together and made us into a proud and unified nation again. In our endeavors to build this new nation, we must never forget these pillars upon which our unity is founded. Any effort to re-write history as some of us presently try to do by demeaning or suppressing the historical role of SNM, are not only counterproductive, but they show lack of sensitivity and courage on the part of its proponents. Other adverse trends and policies followed by the government include:
1) Imposition of emergency regimes, which are completely outside the constitution. In short, we cannot, in all honesty, claim that we have a government committed to the democratic ideals, rule of law, or the necessary transparency in the management of state affairs which we aspire to.
If we live up to the values of democratic principles and justice we have adopted, if we fight corruption, mismanagement and poverty, if we take the task of rebuilding our economy seriously and release the energies of our people for the reconstruction of our country, I have no doubt in my mind, that we will ultimately achieve our goals and realize our objectives. In this context we must also ensure that we benefit from International initiatives designed to fight poverty and disease in Africa. We need to adopt or establish proper mechanisms to ensure that aid programmes reach the targeted groups and not wasted through corruption, mismanagement or else remain unutilized as so often occurs.
Long live Somaliland, and may peace and blessings of Allah be upon us all.
Thank you.
Edna said she was warmly received in the US. She said she had held talks with several US officials including the US secretary of state in charge of African affairs.
She said she discussed various subjects with the US secretary of state. The duo discussed bilateral relations, the democratic process in Somaliland, the need for the US to support the recognition of Somaliland and political and economic issues.
She said she had also discussed the same issues with leaders of various countries in Europe, America, and Africa. Other issues discussed included how those countries could improve their ties with Somaliland and aid it.
1. The Republic of Somaliland's Foreign Minister, Her Excellency Edna Adan Ismail, made a 3-day working visit to the Republic of South Africa during the period 6 July 2005 to 8 July 2005.
During the discussions held on Thursday, 7 July, in Johannesburg, attended by South African government and ANC leaders, both sides discussed ways to deepen Somaliland's promising democratic process with particular attention to the up-coming Somaliland parliamentary elections, scheduled for 15 September 2005.
2. The Somaliland Foreign Minister visited the headquarters of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and expressed appreciation for EISA's work, in facilitating the services of a rural election logistics specialist. The South African election specialist is in Somaliland and will support the work of Somaliland National Electoral Commission.
3. The Somaliland Foreign Minister and ANC leaders furthermore welcomed the recent African Union (AU) fact-finding mission to Somaliland, led by the AU's Deputy Chair, . Patrick Mazimhaka, and urged African leaders to cooperate with the African Union to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts whilst encouraging post conflict reconstruction and development and, to advance Somaliland's peace and stability in a fair manner.
4. The Somaliland Foreign Minister praised President Thabo Mbeki's efforts in the Horn of Africa, as Chairperson of the African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee in Sudan. In this respect, the Somaliland Foreign Minister expressed Somaliland's willingness to share with South Sudan, the successful Somaliland experience in military demobilization. A South Sudanese delegation is scheduled to visit Somaliland, to study Somaliland's experiences.
5. The Somaliland Foreign Minister appeared on BBC TV's premier political programme, Question Time, which was broadcasted from Johannesburg, South Africa. This TV panel included deputy chairperson of the South African Institute of International Affairs, . Moeletsi Mbeki; former international development secretary and Lord President of the Council, Baroness Amos; Zimbabwean opposition leader . Morgan Tsvangirai, and anti-poverty campaigner Ms. Bianca Jagger. Key issues discussed included the G8, poverty, debt relief, Aids, Zimbabwe and immobilizing violent global groups.
6. The Somaliland Foreign Minister expressed support for the efforts of the African Union's special envoy to Zimbabwe and also supported the African National Congress resolution taken at its last National General Council, which urged the South African government to deal with the current situation in Zimbabwe with urgency.
7. In addition, all panelists condemned the London bombings and attacks on civilians. The bombings constitutes an attack on all humanity. The Minister extended her government's heartfelt condolences to the Government and people of Great Britain and in particular the families of those who lost their loved ones and, prayed that those wounded a speedy recovery.
8. Discussions were also held with the Principal of the University of South Africa, Professor Barney Pityana. The Minister expressed her appreciation of the University of South Africa's publication project with Somaliland in the field of nursing, exchange of scholars and the University's vanguard research on Somaliland and Somalia, in order to contribute to the implementation of Nepad's goals and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals in education.
9. During her visit the Somaliland Foreign Minister also attended the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS (GBC) briefing, which covered the report of a working group made up of GBC members in South Africa advising commercial companies on how to support increased uptake of HIV testing and counselling services. Discussions were held with the keynote speakers, . Nicky Oppenheimer, chairman, De Beers Group; . Cyril Ramaphosa, vice-chairman of the GBC; and former US ambassador to the UN, . Richard Holbrooke, president and CEO of the GBC.
The Minister also had the opportunity to respond to invitations to appear on the South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) TV programmes : 180 Degrees and 60 Minutes in Africa, as well as its continental radio, Channel Africa. The programmes covered various aspects of developments in Somaliland. Also, the South African community and global satellite radio station, Channel Islam, interviewed the Minister.
10. On the concluding day, the Minister established courtesy contact with, Dr. Jandayi E. Frazer, the Ambassador of the United States of the America to South Africa (designate new US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs), and with leaders of the Somaliland community in South Africa.
11. The Minister once again expressed her thanks and appreciation to the Government of South Africa and its people, for the hospitality extended to her and to His Excellency the President's delegation in February 2005.
Amoud University made a decision to open the said faculty given the fact that agriculture is the backbone of our economy and in addition to that provides wider scope and opportunities for the people in the country. As this nation approaches twenty first century requires more people that are involved in agriculture as their primary economic activity than ever before but unfortunately agriculture only accounts for four percent of the country's GDP.
Faculty of agriculture of Amoud University will play a key role to the enhancement of crop production and the provision of people equipped with the latest knowledge in the field in addition to the provision of food for humans and animal feeds, Faculty of agriculture will play also a key role in the use of gene manipulation, better management of soil nutrients, and improved weed control and much more because all of these are machanism that increase yield per unit area. The developing world generally produce lower yields, having less of the latest science, capital, and technology base.
At the moment, Agriculture in our country is a subsistence agriculture (the production of enough food to meet just the needs of the farmer/agriculturalist and his/her family). Amoud university with the establishment of the faculty of agriculture wants to transform the current agricultural system into that of industrial agriculture, (often refered to as factory farming) long prevalent in "developed" nations and increasingly so elsewhere, which consists of obtaining financial income from the cultivation of land to yield produce, the commercial raising of animals (animal husbandry), or both.
In addition to that; the improvement of a country's human resource capacity for productivity is a pre-requisite for social and economic development. In the agricultural sector, both formal and non-formal education is essential for improving food security and rural employment and reducing poverty. Formal agricultural education is needed for the production of skilled manpower to serve the agricultural sector through extension, research, entrepreneurship and commerce. Non-formal agricultural education, often provided by both public and private extension services, is needed for training of farmers, farm families and workers and for capacity-building in a wide range of rural organizations and groups.
To meet the challenges of agricultural production and food security facing Somaliland today and in the 21st century, We must be willing to invest in our human capital for development. Improving human capital in agriculture is especially important for instance in our country where the shortage of trained human resources is a major limiting factor to development. However, Faculty of agriculture is taking advantage of good quality teaching staff holding higher degrees from prestigious universities in abroad. Besides it has also microbiology, biochemistry and soil labs equipped with state of the art instruments. Moreover, the library of the faculty of agriculture holds up to date text books on almost all the subjects of agriculture.
Abdirahman ibrahim abdilahi , Abdirahman119@hotmail.com
Even when one takes into account the inherent difficulties of governments that are formed in exile, the performance of Col. Abdillahi Yusuf and his Prime Minister, Gedi has been so pitiful it is really a misnomer to call theirs a government. This is after all a government that has split into at least two main factions, one based in Mogadishu and the other floating between Nairobi, Jowhar and Garowe. It is also a government that is not interested in governing as such, but in forcing a military solution on Somalia. Most Somalis, of course, reject this military approach, and the international community knows it. Many Somalis also thought that this issue was put to rest months ago when the front line states were excluded from sending troops to Somalia, and when the United States made it plain that it is opposed to lifting the arms embargo against Somalia.
The fact that Abdillahi Yusuf insisted on bringing the issue of the arms embargo in front of the Security Council in such an unfavorable international environment is just another indication of his diplomatic illiteracy. As expected, his request was turned down, just as his previous request for troops from the front line states was turned down. This is the second blow that Abdillahi Yusuf received within a few months, and both blows were a direct result of his own miscalculations. The colonel seems to have mistaken the international community's willingness to subsidize his pretend-presidency for a commitment to back him militarily. The international community was willing to indulge his pretensions, but once he forced the issue, they made it clear that they consider him just one of the Somali factions, and that another round of Somali bloodletting is, to use their own words, "unacceptable". The result is that Abdillahi Yusuf is in a much weaker position than he started with, because whereas the international community was previously only reluctant to provide him with troops, the situation now is that the international community would neither provide him with troops nor allow him to engage in any military activities.
Somalilanders were shocked and disgusted by the news of Thursday's terrorist strike against the people of London. Killing innocent people is so abhorrent and unjustifiable, most Somalilanders here felt as though they had been violated by the blasts as well. After all, the cowardly act had targeted the lives of innocent people who were commuting to their places of work, in a city that is home to a half of the estimated 300,000 Somaliland-born population currently living in Britain. These were mostly people who, during the eighties, had been forced to flee their homes to escape persecution and genocide in the hands of General Siyad Barre, Somalia's former dictator.
Since liberation from Somalia and its declaration of independence as a sovereign state in 1991, unrecognized Somaliland has crucially depended for its reconstruction on the half a billion dollars that its diaporra in the West, particularly in Britain, send annually back home. With Saudi Arabia's decision to ban import of Somaliland livestock (this country's only hard-currency earning export) entering the seventh year in a row, at least 1/3 of Somaliland's households rely on the income support money they regularly receive from relatives living in the West, particularly Britain. For the above reasons and others, it wasn't a surprise at all to notice how the impact of the explosions in London was widely felt by Somalilanders here. There is no doubt that the terrorists who were behind the carnage wanted to disrupt the G8 summit in Scotland where Tony Blair is trying to persuade the leaders of the richest nations in the world to commit substantial resources for the eradication of poverty in Africa! The terror strike also came in the aftermath of the Live 8 concerts that Bob Geldof and his friends had recently organized in order to make the citizens and leaders of rich countries aware about the extent of human suffering taking place in Africa. It is not yet clear whether the blasts were also designed to sabotage London's bid for holding the 2012 Olympic Games. But why anyone should be so inhuman as to want to undermine an international gathering such as the one held in Gleneagles whose prime purpose is to help Africa salvage itself from the misery of poverty and under development? Neither is there any sense in depriving London of the opportunity not only to host the 2012 Olympic Games but also to earmark close to $2 billion for developing some of the predominantly Muslim run-down boroughs in east London, the site where most of the games were planned to be staged.
We consider the explosions that ripped through London during rush hour on Thursday morning an attack on all human beings irrespective of their color, race and religion. It would be foolish to see it otherwise. While our sympathy goes to the families, relatives and friends of the victims, we express our solidarity with the people and government of Britain. It is to be hoped that people in the UK will emerge from Thursday's terror attacks as more united and resolved in not allowing the terrorists to change British values of tolerance, democracy and compassion.
Rayale also expressed sympathy for the families of those who were either killed or injured in the terrorist incident.
Rayale said, "the government and people of Somaliland were deeply shocked by the terrorist acts that occurred in London."
President Rayale stressed Somaliland's sympathy and solidarity with Britain in the wake of the explosions that rocked London on Thursday morning.
The president pointed out that there is a clause in Somaliland's constitution that commits Somaliland to the fight against terrorism..
The message was sent through the British Embassy in Addis Ababa.
Reports reaching us say the Somaliland Convention that took place in Los Angeles June 24-26, 2005 was a success. About 500 Somalilanders and foreigners from around the world gathered and discussed for three days subjects ranging from business and politics to health, education, and Somaliland's goal of international recognition. Although there was initially some concern that the conference might be marred by political disputes, those fears proved to be false. Of course, there were heated discussions and tempers occasionally flared but the exchanges were mostly conducted in a serious but civil manner. This is what was expected of the Somalilanders at the conference, and they did not disappoint their people.
Another noteworthy aspect of the conference was that in addition to the foreign and Somali academics, the conference had credible representation from both the American government and the Canadian parliament.
One way to gauge the success of events held by Somalilanders is to look at what Somaliland's adversaries are saying. Judging by what Somaliland's opponents have been scribbling in the internet, it is clear that this convention was a bitter pill for them. Worse yet (for them that is) there is nothing they can do about it. So, in their impotent rage and envy they alternate between trying to guilt-trip Somalilanders with a non-existent fake nationalism, castigating Somalilanders for getting together without consulting them first, and predicting failure for Somalilanders, undeterred by the fact that their predictions are often false. We say to them: get used to it. Somalilanders don't need anybody's permission to meet. We decide when and where we want to meet, and the days of using Somaliweyn nationalism as a trick to deceive people are over.
We salute the Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute (SOPRI) for organizing a successful conference. We hope it is the beginning of greater efforts on the part of Somalilanders in the United States to help their country, especially in its quest for international recognition.
In the beginning of May the African Union had undertaken a fact-finding mission headed by the Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mizimhaka to Somaliland. The purpose of the mission was to assess the state of affairs of the country specifically with its quest for international recognition as independent country and draw a report, which will be presented to the chairperson and so to the heads of state for their consideration and deliberations. The team visited different regions of Somaliland where thousands of crowds flocked out to the open to express their feelings. The Deputy Chairperson and his team met with all government bodies, civil society and law making bodies of both houses. They had the opportunity to talk to all sections of the community. They also had the opportunity to gauge the state of security and stability of the country.
The Sub-Saharan Informer had accompanied the AU mission in most of their visits and had the chance to touch base with the head of the delegation and Deputy Chairperson of the African Union . Patrick Mizimhaka in an exclusive interview to talk; about what his impressions were.
SSI: Why did it take this long for the AU to send this delegation because we have learnt that you were supposed to undertake this mission sometime last year? What is the reason that it took so long? Was it a logistic problem or other commitments?
Patrick Mizimhaka: You know that this problem lasted for very many years and the wars that went on around here were not very simple. Therefore the continent had an opinion. During the Cold War Somalia become client of Soviet Union and of United States of America. So the cold war kind of muddled the waters for African countries. The OAU was stuck with a policy of preservation of member states and now the African union came into scene in 2002 and in 2003 we were able to, as the interim lasted for about four years from 1999 all the way to 2003, when the present commission was put in place and so the commission that is implementing what was set out in the constitute act, which is different form the charter. Complementing the charter but with the new mandate. So the government of Somaliland engaged in discussions with the African union during that transition period started about four years ago. When we came-in in September 2003, we started engaging with the government of Somaliland, so that we developed an approach of-course the commission only serves the member countries therefore it takes time to get to a level where you get this kind of mission authorized. So there were no problems of logistics but I would say it was just a problem of processes. We agreed that the mission to take place sometime in around December 2004 but we have been late for four months because of other commitment, we had a summit in January in 2005 to meet and so on. Otherwise, we have been preparing to undertake this mission ever since the decision was reached. So even if it said that we have taken so long, I would say still it isn't that long, Of-course for the people who are suffering we cannot claim that we came to their rescue fast enough. Generally those are the causes of the delay.
SSI: What are your perceptions before you landed here? What did you think of Somaliland and what did you find out that is astonishing or surprising to you?
Patrick Mizimhaka: I think what was really amazing is that for somebody who doesn't visit or live here will be amazed to find out the way these people have been able to recover from the still very visible devastation of their villages, cities and facilities. But they have been able to keep the country running in normal fashion. Not only that, but in the institutions of government, particularly in the area of governance, if you look at the scenario in the other parts of Somalia, people understood War-Lordism as an ideology and one finds it difficult how this has been handled. Here, these have settled and new institutions, based on different approaches have established. Somalilanders have been able to stabilize the country that way; they have been able to enter democratization process and that is very robust. This is very obvious from the houses of representatives and the parliament, its obvious from the local councils, and its very obvious from the community organization. So we found that are very astonishing, there is advancement in those directions and also recovery and rehabilitation from the devastations. Something you cannot be able to see when you go to the other parts.
SSI: Why has there been so much silence from the African countries or the west on the issue of Somaliland and its achievement in maintaining peace and stability without any external assistance? Some intellectuals argue that in Europe when things did not workout, specially in the former eastern block, the international community had to reconsider the borders of the countries whose unity did not work, and let each one of them go their own directions and he asked why that could not be the case with Somaliland/Somalia affairs. What do you have to say about this?
Patrick Mizimhaka: I think when you say Europe; we are talking about Western Europe. Western Europe had an interest in the collapse of Soviet Union and other communist countries like Yugoslavia. Africa has no interest in the collapse of any of its member states; we come from different points of view, it would be unfair to compare the two. Africa is actively and ideologically working for the stabilization of each of its members, in the end to facilitate a union of the people of Africa. But to be able to unite the people, you must be under a situation that works towards that objective and therefore stable countries are very important. That is where Africans are coming from, where Europe was very interested in dismantling the soviet empire.
SSI: It is obvious that the fate of the country is going to lie on your hands - your assessment and recommendations would definitely influence the AU head of states decision. Although you and your team may have made sincere and professional assessment of their situation and achievements and table the report in the July summit, the decision of the summit may somehow delay the recognition of Somaliland as an independent country putting some requirements and modalities. How would you feel if this happens? And what do you think the logical conclusion of the summit should be?
Patrick Mizimhaka: As you may know the commission is a secretariat and its staff are not decision makers on such issues. What we are doing here is to assess and compile a report to the AU commission chairperson and it is the Chairperson who would present the case as one of the agenda during the summit. There are processes that are involved in looking at the issue and they should be fulfilled at the secretariat level. The report my team and I would be compiling will without any prejudice include all that has been investigated and assessed. I think the head of states will make their deliberations responsibly and make the needed recommendations. As for the logical conclusion, it would be premature to comment and as you know, I am a civil servant of the Commission, so it would be appropriate to leave it to those who will deliberate on it to come up with conclusion.
SSI: Will the AU be assisting Somaliland in social and economic development?
Patrick Mizimhaka: The AU has clear mandate of assisting its member states and communities in economic and social development so as to alleviate poverty. Within such framework, it will definitely assist Somaliland and this mission is just the beginning of such activity. So I am sure the AU will extend its assistance in whatever aspect it may be deemed.
To get a sense of the parlous situation Col. Abdillahi Yusuf is in, one has to just take a glimpse of the headlines. The British Times wrote: "President is told to pack bags after outstaying his welcome." After his much awaited re-location to Somalia turned out to be a hoax, Reuters wrote: "President fails to arrive in Somalia, plane diverted." These headlines only confirm what many Somalis already knew, that Abdillahi Yusuf's presidency, like those of Ali Mahdi, Aidid Sr, Aidid Jr, and Abdiqasim Salad Hasan , was in name only, and that the facts on the ground tell another story. Abdillahi Yusuf repeatedly announced that he was going to change those facts on the ground by conquering the south, especially Banadir region, with foreign troops. Instead of showing him the folly of his plan, his supporters saw it as their long overdue chance to conquer Mogadishu and to exact revenge on its people for past crimes. Finally, they had a man with a plan, and they egged him to march on to Mogadishu. They began writing about how Somalia needs a strong leader, and how the colonel was exactly such a man. The clock kept ticking, and they kept writing about how decisive, how strong-willed he is. Days, months went by, and they kept writing about how determined he is, how he has a plan. Then came the hour of decision, and it turned out to be not his decision but a Kenyan decision. The Kenyans were tired of him and the rest of the Somalis, so they kicked them all out. As if that were not bad enough, instead of going to Somalia as he had said he would do, Abdillahi Yusuf landed in Djibouti. The hero in shining armor whose supporters expected him to conquer Mogadishu for them, turned out to be a tired old warlord with no political skills who would rather be a guest, even an un-wanted guest, in one foreign country or another than deal with the problems of a broken country.
This bleak picture has led to big disappointment among his supporters. Whereas they used to write some pretentious and long-winded letters paving the way for the iron-fisted rule that Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf was going to impose on Somalia, they now write rambling notes about how Somalis don't want a government, about the death of Somali nationalism and how Kipling may have been right about Africans. The fact is, when they thought they could pull it off, they had shown no qualms about using foreign troops to spill Somali blood. Now that their designs have fallen apart, and their hero is homeless, they are playing a different tune to cover up what they stood for earlier, but it won't work because today's maudlin musings are being drowned by yesterday's war cries.
A source close to the oil company, who wanted to be anonymous explained, how the company was busy lately to root out any competition from other companies. For instance, he mentioned how TOTAL demanded from RED SEA Company; a small privately owned oil company will be allowed to use the fuel tanks only, if they paid $500,000 or deposited oil of equal amount in the fuel tanks.
At the beginning of March this year, RED SEA Company decided to bring a tanker to the Port, in order to use the fuel tanks, following TOTAL's initial demands. TOTAL refused to allow the tanker to use the fuel tanks. According to our source, the Port Manager, . Ali Xoor-xoor intervened and gave permission to the tanker, after two days.
Another bizarre act by TOTAL was to dismantle five sophisticated, state-of-the-art oil pipes, built by the Soviet Union during the late seventies in Berbera for refueling purposes and later rebuilt by the United States military to refuel, during the 1980s, when they used Berbera as a military base. The pipes were built to provide quick supply of fuel to tankers, vehicles and aircraft all at the same time.
According to some political analysts, the EU advised TOTAL and its government sponsors about the high cost of repair and maintenance of oil pipes. In addition the EU estimated that Somaliland uses only 2000 tons of oil each month and that small amount of oil can be used by only one pipe, they argued.
TOTAL decided to dismantle the sophisticated system, in order to use an old system, built by the British Shell company in the 1950s.
Other analysts, call the dismantling of the 5 pipes high noon robbery. They accuse TOTAL of selling the five sophisticated oil pipes to the Arab Financiers of the Port in Djibouti for the amount of 90 million dollars. How else can you justify the elimination of such incredible oil pipes and replace it for an old pipe that has to be maintained once every five years, they say. Many intellectuals call TOTAL's action an economic war, geared towards hurting the Ethiopia - Somaliland agreement on May 28. According to these groups, TOTAL, which is based in Djibouti has an economic stake in the area. They argue that TOTAL was the only oil company serving Ethiopia's oil needs from Djibouti, during the past decade, and that Ethiopia will be free to deal with other oil companies, if it uses Berbera as her main port of entry. Therefore, when Ethiopia decided last week to use Berbera port, TOTAL began to sabotage the agreement between the two countries, by destroying the main oil pipes and, essentially forcing Somaliland's government to use its oil fuel tanks for local consumption purposes only. Furthermore, Somaliland's inability to handle Ethiopia's economic needs, will force her to use Djibouti facilities. This will in turn, force Ethiopia to use TOTAL as its main source of oil, they maintain. TOTAL will not only dominate Ethiopia's oil needs but the company's aim is to control Somaliland's economy by becoming the only company that owns both the wholesale and retail of the oil in the country, the intellectuals conclude.
According to reliable sources, TOTAL rented several gas stations around the country already. They are also in the process of eliminating the competition entirely through their refusal to use the fuel tanks. If they succeed in doing that, they will become the only source of oil, which makes them a monopoly. In a free market economy, monopoly is not allowed, because it cripples the economy which leads to stagnation and political instability. The economic ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland will come to a standstill, if TOTAL gets away with its sinister moves, many analysts argue. It also reminds many people of the economic and political hurdles that Somaliland went through during her recent past, including the international ban of Somaliland livestock, and the role EU played. It was the EU's research claims about Somaliland's livestock trade, which was published on March 1997 that led to the livestock ban on November 1997. Many people are wondering if TOTAL's war on our economy is a result of EU's advice to limit Berbera Port for local consumption only.
Wednesday at 10 a.m, members of the Somali government-in-exile were finally kicked out of the Nairobi hotels where they have been staying for the last three years. The Kenyan government's action may seem a bit harsh and humiliating but then again, it is highly unlikely that Somalis would have vacated the hotels on their own. Moreover, the Somali politicians in Kenya have shown again and again that they have no sense of shame. This is a crowd that is used to assassination attempts on their head honcho and bloody fights among its parliamentarians, so being forced out of a hotel should be a minor thing by their standards. Initial reports confirm that is exactly how a lot of them look at it, and that many of them have reacted by simply taking their luggage to the Isli slum to join the Somalis who live there. This is a fitting end for a reconciliation meeting that had lost its way long ago. Even those who don't like this miserable ending cannot honestly claim it came as a surprise, for the writing was on the wall for a long time.
Now that the party is over, we can safely say this about the conference:
1- It was a great waste of time, money and energy
2- The selection of Col. Abdillahi Yusuf as president contributed a lot to the failure of the outcome. Abdillahi Yusuf's strategy was to get foreign troops to conquer the south for him. Barring a last minute change of heart, that strategy looks like it has failed because he could not get any foreign troops to do the dirty work for him. The fact that his calculations about getting foreign troops turned out so wrong, is an indication of his shallowness as a strategist.
3- With the end of the Nairobi saga and future action shifting to Somalia, the politics of southern Somalia is going to be mostly focused on Mogadishu, where Abdillahi Yusuf has no base, which will result in even more marginalization for him and his supporting cast.
This time we were a group, people working with Somalis in Norway, from local authority refugee offices and different organizations. Apart from Hargeisa we visited Las Geel, Berbera, Sheikh and Burco. After the rains the countryside was beautiful and green, and for those who were first time visitors to Somaliland it was wonderful and surprising!
The purpose of the trip was to get an impression of the country, and to create a better understanding and knowledge of the background of the people who are now our fellow countrymen. We have 15 000 Somalis in Norway, a large proportion from Somaliland.
After spending some time in the country, and having been welcomed so generously everywhere, our group has already developed a keen interest in the people, the history and the developments here, an interest which will have an effect on further contact between our two nations.
There were plenty of warnings about security and so on, but we never felt uncomfortable or threatened in any way, on the contrary, we were met with kindness and hospitality wherever we went.
One evening I realized I had lost a wallet containing nearly $ 500 and my return ticket to Norway. I tried to think where I might have lost it, feeling quite sure it hadn't been stolen. If I had accidentally left or dropped it somewhere, I wouldn't have blamed a person in need if he or she had been tempted and kept the money. As the days went by, I was beginning to think that had happened. Then I got a message from Bile Restaurant that it had been found by an employee there, and that they had taken time finding me. I went to pick it up, and everything was there! Imagine my relief and gratitude! I doubt if the same would have happened in Oslo, where I have had my bag stolen on several occasions!
It was a pleasure to introduce my Norwegian group to this city and country, which I have grown so fond of during several visits in the last 14 years, and from my work and friendship with Somalis in Norway, and to see what a positive impression they got, thanks to the brave and hospitable people.
About a hundred people who are now Norwegian citizens, but have returned to their original homeland, celebrated the Norwegian national day, May 17. in the NRC compound, along with us. It was a wonderful, emotional occasion.
I hope the good relations between our two nations will continue and develop further, that we can support you in your struggle to rebuild your shattered country.
The word has already spread about our successful stay, and I hope to bring many more Norwegians to Somaliland in the future, the fan club is growing!
Until next time, thank you!
Ingeborg Vardoen,
Oslo, Norway.
If one looks at the latest parliamentary mess in isolation, one would be baffled by what is happening. But if one sees it in the context of what has been going on for the last few years, one will notice that it is part of a pattern of manufactured, unnecessary and avoidable crises which appear in Somaliland suddenly and out of nowhere every few months and inflict great damage on the young republic. First there was the dispute about the impact (or "saamaynta" to use a much abused Somali word) that the Embagathi conference was going to have on Somaliland. Then there was the maneuverings by some parliamentarians to sack the speaker simply because they were unhappy with him which precipitated his resignation. Now some members of parliament are at it again. This time they want to impeach the president for alleged corruption and losing control of Sool region.
On the face of it, these are serious charges. But they have several problems. The most obvious one is why they didn't present their case against the president all these years and waited until now? Secondly, the reasons they gave for their drive to impeach the president are not the real ones. The real reasons, which are widely known, have to do with the coming parliamentary elections. Some of them are angry with the president for insisting on elections because they see little chance of being elected. Some are upset with him because his party, UDUB, would not back their candidacy. While others have some other misgivings about the elections or the president.
One of the unfortunate consequences of the impeachment drive was the disagreement that surfaced between the honorable speaker of the Parliament and his first and second deputies. These three gentlemen are some of the pillars of the country and we trust what happened was just a passing a cloud. Qaybe is one of the elder statesmen of Somaliland and should always be accorded the respect and honor he deserves. We condemn any signs of disrespect, threats or intimidation toward him or any Somaliland citizen.
To the parliamentarians involved in the latest crisis, we say: the elections are going to take place soon. No amount of diversion and stumbling blocks are going to solve it. They are going to take place not just because the president wants it but because the people want it, the international community wants it and Somaliland's democratic process requires it. So be good citizens and get ready for elections instead of doing further damage to your credibility.
There is an American saying: if it talks like a duck, walks like a duck, and feels like a duck, then it's a duck. Somaliland today talks, walks and feels like a sovereign state. The latest symbol of this was the spectacle of one of modern Africa's founding fathers, a former head of state, Dr Kenneth Kaunda disembarking from the Airlines of another sovereign state, Ethiopia, at Egal international airport.
Somaliland has come a long way, but it still has a long, hard road ahead of it. Somaliland's people expect their political elite to focus on consolidating what has been achieved, and to make plans for the tasks ahead. One way Somaliland's political elite can help the country is by breaking the habit of manufacturing one crisis after another.
This is the first time that the Somaliland issue, including the question of its identity and self-determination, was brought to the forefront of the AU.
The AU's fact-finding mission's report was handed to the AU's chairman, . Alpha Omar Konare. But the contents of the report is not yet known. It has been reported, however, by African diplomats in Addis Ababa, that some African regional powers are pushing for Somaliland's independence. Whether all 52 member states of the AU will vote for Somaliland's independence remains to be seen.
Somaliland's patient and persistent diplomatic efforts seem to be finally paying off. One only has to look at the steady stream of high-level diplomats and statesmen that have been visiting Somaliland in the last few months. There was the vice-chairman of the African Union, the British delegation, and now one of the founding fathers of modern Africa, H.E Dr. Kenneth Kaunda is in Hargeisa. There was also President Dahir Rayale Kahin's superb interview in al-Jazira where millions of Arabic-speaking people watched him explain Somaliland's achievements. Right now while Somaliland is receiving statesmen, Somaliland's foreign minister is in the United States discussing bilateral issues with the US government. Somaliland is definitely a country on the move. Even the BBC Somali Service had to admit the momentum toward recognizing Somaliland that is building up in the African Union.
President Dahir Rayale Kahin came to the May 18th celebration knowing full well that the diplomatic winds are now in Somaliland's favor, which put him in a strong position from which to address a host of questions. His performance was robust and engaging. He worked his audience and they responded. The only sour note was some of the harsh language the President used against the opposition. As the President of Somaliland, he should have been more restrained. Parliament should also know that it's not just the president, but many Somalilanders are fed up with their antics. Members of parliament should be busy preparing for elections instead of trying to blackmail the president with the threat of impeachment.
Ali Samater was the former prime minister and secretary of defense during Siyad Barre's dictatorial regime. He is now facing charges in the US of having committed crimes against humanity during the brutal war against the civilian populations in what was then called North Somalia and now is the Somaliland Republic.
Africa Watch estimated that 50,000 people were killed during the bombardment of the civilian population, and 300,000 had fled across the border to Ethiopia.
This paper makes a simple point: that patterns and impacts of refugee flight and return are
shaped by the resources refugees and their relatives can mobilise, and those resources are largely
determined by socio-economic background. The paper looks at the part class plays in shaping
forms, patterns and impacts of forced migration in societies that have undergone or are emerging
from conflict. It argues that as the costs of migration to escape conflict have increased, largely
as a result of the construction of an increasingly stringent international migration regime, socio-
economic background has become ever more important in shaping such forms, patterns and
impacts. Drawing on case material from Somaliland, which has enjoyed relative peace since
1991, and from Sri Lanka, which is just emerging from conflict, the paper will first explore how
socio economic status affects routes taken, means of migration and destinations reached. It will
then look briefly at how class determines the kinds of influence populations abroad can exert on
their countries of origin. Conditions of flight and of exile are considered in some detail because,
to state the obvious, understanding of such conditions is a prerequisite for comprehending the
dynamics of return. This is explored in the last section which focuses on how socio-economic
status shapes patterns of return and the differential impact such return may have. The paper
concludes by refining the approach to the linkages between class and forced migration and some
lessons are drawn from all this for the Palestinian case.
Class and flight
When people flee conflict, persecution or distress, a common pattern is for most to seek safety
in other parts of their country, for a substantial number to look for refuge in a neighbouring
country or countries, and for a smaller number to seek asylum in countries further afield,
perhaps in other continents. Some of those in neighbouring countries of first asylum may later
be resettled further afield, joining those who have gone there directly. If exile persists and
people consolidate themselves in their territories of refuge, complex relations will develop
among these different domains of what we may call the refugee diaspora: that is, among those at
home, those in neighbouring territories, and those spread further afield (Van Hear 2003).
Very crudely, the set-up may be depicted as in figure 1, which shows the flow of people,
resources, information and ideas among three kinds of location or domains of the diaspora. As
the international migration regime has become more stringent, the main factors which determine
the ability to reach these destinations have increasingly become cost, connections (or `social
capital'), and chance. At least the first two of these are shaped by socio-economic standing.
(Arguably chance is too, since the better endowed might be said to `make their own luck': ie
their greater wealth and social capital makes more likely the working of chance to their
advantage). It follows that access to more prosperous and desirable destinations will be limited
to better resourced migrants. This means that the capacity to migrate may not necessarily
correspond with the need to migrate, particularly in terms of security or protection. Looking at
the overall picture for a given migration order in this way reveals the importance of the class
dimensions of migration, which to some extent correlate with spatial distribution.
Let me illustrate this with reference to Sri Lanka and Somaliland, two territories that have
experienced protracted conflict over the last two decades, and which have generated substantial
diasporas that include many refugees, labour migrants and other kinds of migrant. The two
cases present useful points of comparison, because Somaliland has enjoyed relative peace since
1991, and Sri Lanka is just emerging from protracted conflict.
Sri Lankan migration
Sri Lanka has experienced complex forms of migration over the last two decades or more,
resulting in the formation of a large diaspora (McDowell 1996, Fuglerud 1999, Rotberg 1999,
Van Hear 2002a). At first migration was largely economically motivated, mainly involving
labour migration to the Middle East; by the 1990s about 200,000 Sri Lankans went each year to
work in the Middle East, as well as in south-east and east Asia (site 3 in figure 1). Out-
migration has also included a brain-drain of professionals and of people seeking educational
advancement abroad. After the civil war between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) took off in 1983, a large outflow of asylum-seekers,
mainly Tamils, took place. While much of this movement was initially to Tamil Nadu in
southern India (site 2 in figure 1), many Sri Lankan Tamils sought asylum further afield (site 3),
adding to the prior dispersal of Sri Lankan migrants who left for the purposes of education or to
take up professional positions abroad. By the 1990s, there were some 100,000 Sri Lankan
refugees in southern India, and 200-300,000 in Europe and North America who joined earlier
professional migrants. The reach of this wider diaspora is substantial. Statistics are not always
consistent, but the most important destinations for Sri Lankan asylum seekers and refugees in
Europe and North America appear to be the UK, Canada, France, Germany and Switzerland.
These countries are therefore significant bases from which mainly Tamil asylum seekers can
influence Sri Lanka economically and politically. In addition to migration outside the country,
there has been substantial internal displacement (site 1 in figure 1), ranging between 500,000
and one million people at any one time, depending on the intensity of the war.
There have thus been a number of migration strategies open to Sri Lankans against the
background of conflict since the early 1980s: internal migration to safer parts of Sri Lanka;
labour migration, usually to the Middle East; seeking asylum, initially in India and later in
Europe, North America or Australia; migration for educational or professional purposes; and
marriage to a partner abroad in Europe, North America or Australasia, or other forms of family
reunion or formation.
Partly because the different migration strategies require very different levels of outlay or
investment, these strategies divide broadly along class lines, or at least according to the scale of
resources that a household can muster. (It is not being claimed that class is the only, or even the
most important dimension: migration strategies also vary along ethnic, gender and other lines.
This is pursued further below).
Migration for work in the Middle East and elsewhere requires considerable outlays, but is within
the reach of farming and labouring households which have some resources: it is pursued by low
income rural and urban Sinhalese families, and among poorer Muslim and (to a lesser extent)
Tamil households who have been displaced. In the 1980s, Tamil households displaced by the
conflict were able to find refuge in south India with relatively modest outlays. That option
faded with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in 1991, after which India's general
tolerance of Tamil asylum seekers hardened and far fewer were admitted (US Committee for
Refugees 1995). Meanwhile, asylum migration to other destinations, particularly to Europe,
North America or Australia, has become increasingly costly: with agents' fees and other costs at
USD5,000 or more in the mid to late 1990s and upwards of USD10,000 by 2000-2002, this was
perhaps twenty times the cost of labour migration and thus out of the reach of poorer households
(see Van Hear 2002 and 2003 for cases which substantiate this). Asylum migration has
therefore become largely (though not exclusively) the preserve of well-to-do Tamils, who have
both the grounds and resources to pursue it. Migration for marriage may also be costly, for the
outlay that must be found is likely to be high when the spouse-to-be has residence status abroad,
as the `marriage proposals' advertisements in Sri Lankan newspapers and on websites illustrate,
giving a fascinating insight into the cost of migration by this means (on migration and dowry,
see Fuglerud 1999 and 2002); migration for other forms of family reunion may also involve
substantial costs. Migration for educational or professional advancement also requires large
outlays and is also pursued by the well-to-do.
Somali migration
Similar patterns can be observed for Somalia1, another country that has suffered protracted
conflict. In the last 30 years there have been two main forms of movement out of Somalia,
resulting in the formation of a large and influential diaspora. From the early 1970s, many
Somalis went as migrant labourers to work in the Gulf states during the oil boom of that time
(site 3 in figure 1); by the end of the 1980s up to 350,000 Somalis were working in the Middle
East. The outbreak of civil war in 1988 and the inter-clan fighting after the fall of Siad Barre in
1991 displaced hundreds of thousands of Somalis within the country and drove many others to
leave to seek refugee in Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen and other neighbouring countries (sites 2 in
figure 1), as well as to seek asylum further afield in the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Scandinavia,
Canada, the US and other Western states (sites 3 in figure 1). By 2000 there were thought to be
some 400,000 refugees in eastern Africa and in Yemen, and more than 70,000 refugees in
Western countries, out of a total diaspora in Western countries of perhaps 200,000 (UNHCR
2000, USCR 2000, Gundel 2002). The total number of Somalis living outside Somalia has been
estimated at one million (Nair and Abdulla 1998; UNDP 2001); this figure presumably includes
those who have naturalised in their countries of residence. As in Sri Lanka, there has been
substantial internal displacement (site 1 in figure 1), ranging between 500,000 and 1.5 million
people, and currently around 300,000-400,000 (UNDP 2001).
Somalis are one of the most widely dispersed refugee populations in the world: in the late
1990s, asylum applications by Somalis were recorded in more than 60 countries. By then
Somalis living in EU states were thought to number 120,000. The UK and Italy have the largest
communities, based on historical and colonial ties: these long-established communities have
been supplemented by more recent inflows of asylum seekers. In 2000, the UK received nearly
half the asylum applications by Somalis in European countries, nearly 4,800 out of 10,900. The
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries were the next most popular destinations for asylum
seekers. These countries, together with Germany, to which asylum applications in recent years
have been minimal, have substantial Somali populations, mainly based on asylum migration.
North America also has substantial Somali populations: some 19,000 Somalis applied for
asylum in Canada and 8,000 in the US in 1990-98 (USCR 2001, ECRE 2000).
As in the Sri Lankan case, the destinations reached depend on the resources that the migrant
household can raise. In the late 1990s it was reported to cost about USD3,000 for an
employment visa and ticket to the Gulf, and about USD5,000 for travel documents and a ticket
to Europe or North America (Ahmed 2000). The cost of flight to neighbouring countries has
been less than in the Sri Lankan case: for example, people fleeing bombing in Somaliland in the
late1980s were able to take advantage of long-standing connections with eastern Ethiopia in
terms of ethnicity and nomadic traditions which to some extent eased flight and reception.
Intermediate destinations are important in this case. As indicated above, most Somali migration
is to neighbouring countries, to the Gulf for labour migration and trade, and to western
countries. But small but significant numbers of Somalis make for India, Pakistan and other
1 The term `Somalia' is used here to refer to the territory still recognised internationally as such. In 1991, the
northern part of Somalia was declared the independent republic of Somaliland and a functioning administration was
established there. However it is largely unrecognised as an independent state. In some data the two entities are
nevertheless differentiated, and this is reflected in the text.
In both the Sri Lankan and the Somali cases, as elsewhere, international migration usually
involves substantial household investment. Money needed for migration has to be raised from
savings or from relatives. Resources accumulated for bride-wealth or dowries might be invested
in migration, meaning that marriage might have to be delayed well beyond the usual marrying
age. Substantial numbers of households, especially those displaced or otherwise war-affected,
resort to moneylenders, or have to sell, mortgage or pawn assets like land, equipment, houses,
shops or jewellery. For those who have been displaced or otherwise affected by conflict,
raising such resources may be especially difficult.
As the cost of migration to the west has inflated, largely as a result of increasing restrictions on
immigration imposed by western countries, movement to such destinations since the early 1990s
has increasingly become the preserve of those that can mobilise substantial resources: there is a
hierarchy of destinations that can be reached according to the resources mobilised. For the less
well-off, labour migration may be an option, but even this requires large outlays for low income
households. Those who seek refuge in neighbouring countries may also become labour
migrants who support both refugee kin and those who remain in the homeland. In a way, labour
migration can become poorer households' asylum migration, if the purpose of that migration is
thought of as being broadly the security of the whole household, rather than more narrowly as a
source of protection for an individual. For the poorest households migration outside the country
is rarely an option, since such households cannot afford to send any members abroad. These
differences of wealth and migration options are distinguished quite explicitly by displaced
people. Asked why some Tamils sought refuge in South India while others fled to other parts of
Sri Lanka, one displaced household in Jaffna district observed, `it depends on money'. Those
who could afford it went to India or further afield, or sent their children abroad: `the people
who went out are doing fine; those who stayed are suffering'. Or, as a woman returnee from
India living in Mannar district put it, in rather more political perspective, `Only the rich Jaffna
Tamils can afford to send people abroad to Canada and Australia. The wealthy could send five
children abroad, and could pay the LTTE [which demanded money for each person who left].
While the rich could send their children outside, the poor (in Mannar) had to send their children
to the LTTE [as fighters]'. These statements seem to me to be a clear articulation of the class
basis of flight and of the political economy of conflict.
Class and expatriate influence on the homeland
If socio-economic background affects routes, forms, means and destinations of migration, it also
helps to shape the influence of those abroad on the homeland. Again, it is important to
distinguish among the different sites of the diaspora identified above, because, to state the
obvious, the potential influence will vary from site to site according to the resources which
diaspora groups can mobilise.
One of the most important influences refugees and other migrants can have on their countries of
origin is through the remittances they send. There is increasing evidence that remittances from
abroad are crucial to the survival of communities in many developing countries, including many
which have suffered conflict and produced refugees. Estimated to total USD100 billion in 2000,
migrants' remittances represent a large proportion of world financial flows and amount to
substantially more than global official development assistance. To underline their importance
for the developing world, 60 percent of global remittances were thought to go to developing
countries in 2000.
It is difficult if not impossible from the macro level evidence to estimate the extent to which the
different types of migrant indicated above contribute to these flows of money. First, the data on
remittances generally are very patchy, and that for countries in conflict and which produce
refugees are even more so since data collection in such countries is generally very difficult.
Second, such data as exist do not allow the contribution of refugees to be disaggregated from
that of other migrants. Third, refugees in richer countries may remit both to the homeland and to
neighbouring countries of first asylum to support their relatives, making their contribution more
diffuse than that of other migrants.
However, scrutiny of particular countries does give some hints as to the relative importance of
remittances from different sources.
In the case of Sri Lanka it is impossible to disaggregate remittances sent by different kinds of
migrants, but an impression can be gleaned of the contribution of refugees to total remittances.
With the exception of the mid 1980s, remittances to Sri Lanka have grown throughout the
period of the war, from around USD150 million in 1980 to about USD1 billion in 2000; there
were significant upward shifts in the early and mid 1990s - both times of intensified conflict
(SLBFE 1998). Remittances have eclipsed official development assistance and humanitarian aid
(Sriskandarajah 2003). Most of the remittances recorded are sent by labour migrants in the
Middle East. However, the share of remittances has shifted geographically, hinting at a greater
contribution from refugees and others in the wider diaspora. Remittances from the Middle East
fell from a peak of 85% of total remittance inflows in the mid 1980s to just under 60% in 1999.
This proportionate decrease is partly due to the diversification of destinations for labour
migrants -- to south-east Asia, for example. But it is probably also due to increases in
remittances sent by refugees in Europe and North America. It is Tamils in the wider diaspora
who send the bulk of these remittances, rather than those in India who cannot afford to send
money, unless they have family members who have gone to the Middle East or occasionally to
Europe, North America or Australia. Moreover the Tamil diaspora's contribution is almost
certainly underestimated in these estimates, because much money is remitted through informal
channels: they utilise the hundiyal system of money transfer through agents or traders, which,
like the hawilaad system used by Somalis (see below), is quicker and cheaper than conventional
means of money transfer. Furthermore, important outlays made by diaspora members on behalf
of people at home, such as payment for overseas education or for migration abroad, are not
technically recorded as remittances since they are not actually transferred to Sri Lanka. Like
remittances proper, these may have significant impacts on the people left at home.
A similar pattern can be discerned for Somali remittances. As the forms and destinations of
Somali migration have diversified, so too have the sources of remittances. While figures are
only rough estimates, in the 1980s between USD300 million and USD400 million were remitted
annually, and currently between USD500 million and USD1 billion may be remitted to Somalia
and Somaliland each year (Ahmed 2000, EIU 2001). Much of this money is transferred through
hawilaad remittance companies operating between Somalia and the countries in which the
diaspora live (see Horst and Van Hear 2002). Remittances from both labour migrants and
refugees in the wider diaspora have become essential components of the economies of Somalia
and Somaliland. For 2000, it has been estimated that that aid totalled USD115 million and
livestock exports USD125 million, both of which were eclipsed by remittance inflows. While
they can only be guesstimates, statistics for earlier years show that remittances have almost
always exceeded other financial inflows since the 1980s (Gundel 2003). In the 1990s, the wider
diaspora, partly formed by refugee outflows, appears to have accounted for an increasing
proportion of remittances (Ahmed 2000). As in the case of Sri Lanka, refugees in neighbouring
countries - the `near diaspora' - do not have the capacity to remit to the homeland.
Remittances can help individuals and families to survive during conflict and to sustain
communities in crisis. They do so both in countries of origin and in countries of first asylum.
The limited evidence available suggests that these transfers are used in ways similar to those
sent by economic migrants to people at home in more stable societies -- for daily subsistence
needs, health care, housing and sometimes education. Paying off debt may also be prominent,
especially when there have been substantial outlays to send asylum migrants abroad, or when
assets have been destroyed, sold off or lost during conflict or internal displacement (Van Hear
2002). Expatriates may also fund the flight abroad of other vulnerable family members; this
may not necessarily involve transfers of money home, but rather payments for tickets, to
migration agents, for documents, for accommodation and to meet other costs incurred during
and after travel.
There has long been debate about the impact of remittances (Massey et al 1998; Taylor 1999).
The pessimistic view is that they are `wasted' on consumption, on luxuries, on social activities,
or on housing, rather than being `usefully' invested in productive enterprises. A more optimistic
perspective is that investment of remittances in housing, health, education and social activities
contributes to and in fact constitutes `development'. Moreover, satisfying `non-productive'
demands may free up other surpluses for investment in more directly productive enterprises.
`Non-productive' use of remittances may also help to build the social capital on which
productive activities are based. In conflict-torn societies and regions, the scope for investment in
directly `productive' enterprises may be very limited in conditions of great insecurity. Spending
remittances on subsistence, housing, health, education and reducing debt take higher priority.
But as in more stable societies, investment of remittances in social activities may be seen as the
reconstruction of the social fabric, in which `productive' activities are embedded. By facilitating
the accumulation or repair of social capital, such investment may lay the foundation for later
reconstruction and development (Goodhand et al. 2000; Van Hear 2002).
Other aspects of remittance transfers attenuate their beneficial influence on the countries from
which refugees come. First, the distribution of remittances is uneven: not all households receive
them. Though not exclusively, remittances from economic migrants tend to go to the better-off
households within the better-off communities in the better-off countries of the developing world,
since these households, communities and countries tend to be the source of migrants. In the case
of remittances from refugees in the wider diaspora, the benefits are also selective, because such
refugees also tend to come from the better-off households among those displaced. Furthermore,
the distribution is likely to have become still more skewed in recent years because of the rising
costs associated with migration: long distance mobility is increasingly the preserve of those who
can afford to pay migration agents' inflated fees. A second tendency attenuating the benefits of
remittances in the country of origin is that instead of contributing the local economy, the
beneficiaries of remittances may well be absentee landlords and traders who siphon off a portion
of them, and invest the proceeds elsewhere. Other leakages - notably payments to migration
agents - also mean that a substantial part of remittances filter out elsewhere. Such leakages are
magnified in the case of societies in conflict.
But perhaps the most serious charge is that remittances and other transfers from refugees and
others in the diaspora may help perpetuate conflict by providing support for warring parties.
This negative view of diasporas, and by implication refugees within them, has been advanced by
several writers on the `new wars' that have blighted many parts of the developing world in the
1990s. For Collier (2000), an influential voice in the research department of the World Bank, the
existence of a large diaspora is a powerful risk factor predisposing a country to civil war, or to
its resumption. He notes:
Diasporas sometimes harbour rather romanticised attachments to their group of origin
and may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging. They are much
richer than the people in their country of origin and so can afford to finance vengeance.
Above all, they do not have to suffer any of the awful consequences of renewed conflict
because they are not living in the country. Hence, they are a ready market for rebel
groups touting vengeance and so are a source of finance for renewed conflict (2000: 14).
Other influential writers on the political economy of war, such as Anderson (1999), Kaldor
(2001) and Duffield (2001), hold similar views. Kaldor makes the distinction between the near
diaspora and the wider diaspora referred to earlier in this paper:
There are two types of diaspora. On the one hand there are minorities living in the near
abroad, fearful of their vulnerability to local nationalisms and often more extreme than
those living on home territory.On the other hand, there are disaffected groups living far
away, often in the new melting pot nations, who find solace in fantasies about their
origins which are often far removed from reality (Kaldor 2001: 85).
On the whole it is the wealthier members of the wider diaspora who are the sources of the
resources and connections that fuel conflict, just as they are also the sources of relief and
welfare for those at home.
Scrutiny of particular cases bears out some of these general observations about the ambivalent
and differential impact of remittances in societies in or emerging from conflict. In Sri Lanka,
many households in the conflict areas have been sustained by remittances from those abroad,
and could not have survived without them. As has already been observed, these funds are
largely from labour migrants in the Middle East or from Tamils in the wider diaspora using the
hundiyal system, rather than from refugees in India. On the other hand, resources from the
diaspora have been extracted by the LTTE, through various forms of taxation and extortion
(Davis 1996, McDowell 1996, Gunaratna 1999). Furthermore, investment of transfers from
abroad in productive activities in the conflict-affected areas has been minimal, given the
destruction of much of the infrastructure during nearly two decades of conflict. Remittances in
these areas have been mostly used to meet living costs, sometimes to fund education, and
sometimes to finance migration for family members (Van Hear 2002). This may change if the
ceasefire signed early in 2002 between the government and the LTTE holds and consolidates
into lasting peace. Indeed, the freezing of LTTE accounts and assets, part fed by diaspora
contributions, has been an important factor in drawing them to the negotiating table. This
process was under way before September 11, and was intensified after it.
Consolidation of peace will hopefully redirect diaspora resources to reconstruction and
recovery.
Similar ambivalence is observable for Somali remittances. As elsewhere, the benefits of
remittances in Somalia and Somaliland are uneven. Substantial sums of money are received by
a relatively small proportion of households, largely because migrant workers and refugees
generally come from better off families who can afford to invest in sending someone abroad.
Furthermore, the recipients of remittances are concentrated in urban areas (Ahmed 2000). The
differential impact of remittances in Somalia has been underlined by a recent UNDP report,
which notes how remittance flows both reflect and serve to increase economic differentiation.
The main beneficiaries tend to be urban households with educated and skilled members in the
diaspora. As a result of a history of better education or political privilege, some social groups
and clans have a greater proportion of members in the diaspora. The rural poor with fewer
relatives abroad and who are less well served by telecommunications receive less remittances
(UNDP 2001: 104-6). This bias is partly ameliorated by redistribution of resources through
clan and other social networks. But differentiation is still observable, indeed more so in small
rural communities where the beneficiaries of remittances stand out in terms of better housing
and the ability to set up small businesses. In sum, `Those Somali households that receive
remittances from relatives abroad have greater economic security and thus enjoy privileged
access to privately run services (UNDP 2001: 49).
The Sri Lankan and Somali cases bear out some of the general observations made earlier in this
section. First, they confirm that it is very difficult from the current data to disaggregate the
influence and contribution of different kinds of migrants. Second, remittances are nevertheless
substantial, and the share that refugees and others in the wider diaspora contribute is almost
certainly increasing. Third, remittances form significant inflows into these conflict-torn
societies, and they significantly exceed aid and other inflows. Fourth, the impact of remittances
is ambivalent. On one hand, they have been essential for the survival of many households
during conflict, and can help them to re-build their lives and livelihoods when conflict abates.
On the other hand, the beneficial impact of remittances is often attenuated in these societies.
Their distribution is skewed, since refugees, like other migrants, tend to come from and
therefore remit to better off families. Significant proportions of remittances are appropriated by
other parties - migration agents, traders, absentee landlords, insurgents and warlords. Most
seriously, remittances have directly and indirectly fuelled conflict, as well as ameliorating its
consequences.
Class, return and reintegration
As is the case with influence while abroad, socio-economic status shapes the influence returnees
can have on the homeland. This is evident both in `post conflict, pre-peace' Sri Lanka, as the
current transition has awkwardly been described, and in post-conflict Somaliland.
Returnees in Sri Lanka
In the Sri Lanka case, there is some evidence that since the ceasefire of early 2002, Tamils
exiled in western countries have been investigating the possibilities of reviving or investing in
businesses in Jaffna and elsewhere in the conflict zones of the north and east. But mainly they
have been returning to inspect their properties, to throw a party in Jaffna's ice cream parlour for
their relatives who have remained behind, and to give their property to those relatives to repair
and rent out. However, while they may only come back to look and see, the money and
resources they bring with them to give to relatives to repair houses and recover properties
probably represent a significant injection of funds and a significant boost to the local economy.
As for internally displaced people, those that have resources and/or have property to return to
have largely done so. Some 240,000 of the total displaced population estimated at 800,000 have
moved back to their districts since early 2002. This figure is based on local authorities' records
of registrations and de-registrations within districts; since many have not de- and re-registered,
but have just gone to look and see if they can return, the real figure for returns will be greater.
Others will not return until physical and social infrastructure (especially schools and health care)
are restored to a reasonable level, and houses have been rebuilt, which will need the government
assistance package and much more. There will be a residual population in the displaced persons
camps or `welfare centres', who cannot return because they have no land, houses or resources
(many of these will be Hill or Estate Tamils). The economic situation of displaced households
thus profoundly influences their capacity to return.
Competing claims on property by displaced people and returnees are forming a prominent issue
in which class differences are manifested. Property disputes are boiling up in places where
people are coming back from the wider diaspora, from India or from displacement in other parts
of Sri Lanka to reclaim land and houses - only to find them occupied by poor internally
displaced people who themselves cannot return to their homes because they are destroyed, in
areas infested by mines, or in areas occupied by the army. Such cases involve both Tamils and
displaced Muslims.
One example of the latter encountered in 2002 involved a relatively wealthy Muslim who was
away working in Saudi Arabia when the LTTE expelled the Muslim population from the north
in 1990. He, or rather his family, was displaced to the south: he was internally displaced while
abroad, if that is not a contradiction in terms. He returned from Saudi Arabia to a displaced
persons camp in Puttalam in 1993, and the family managed to buy land in this area; they were
thereafter regarded as having `relocated' in Puttalam, in government parlance. Following the
peace agreement he went to Jaffna to try to recover his property only to find it occupied by five
poor Tamil families whose own land was occupied by the military. Manically pointing out the
damage to his house, he ranted and raved about these squatters, his views supported by his well-
to-do Tamil neighbours who did not want the `slum dwellers' in their neighbourhood: the
tension here was thus class-based, rather than ethnically rooted.
Such issues are particularly acute in Jaffna, and in Mannar where there is the further
complication of the prospect of the return of tens of thousands of refugees in India next year,
also seeking to reclaim their land. This will make for a heady cocktail of locally displaced
people, internally displaced people returning from other districts, and returning refugees from
India -- all looking to occupy or recover land for housing and cultivation.
An example in microcosm of how people's living conditions are affected by this volatile mix of
displacement and return is provided by one displaced Tamil extended family interviewed late in
2002 that had returned from a displaced persons camp (Pesalai) in Mannar to a fishing village
(Velanai) in Jaffna district. This extended family had some land in Velanai on which they could
resettle but no resources to do so; to qualify for government assistance they had to show
ownership of the land, and the deed was in a brother's name, and he was a refugee in India. It
was impossible for them to secure the deed. The intricate connections between external and
internal displacement were further illustrated by a household in the same extended family whose
relatives in London paid for their return from exile in India; they could no longer tolerate living
in exile in India, but `returned' to internal displacement in north-western Sri Lanka and from
there to the home area in Jaffna district, though not to their own home. In a variation on this
theme in another district, 32 displaced families who have been relocated by UNHCR and a local
non-governmental organisation in a well-laid out site on privately land leased by the local
government in the northern town of Vavuniya face uprooting once again if the land owner,
himself a relatively wealthy refugee in India, returns as expected to reclaim his land in 2003.
Returnees in Somaliland
Similar dimensions of class play out in the case of Somaliland where there is a sharp divide
between those who have returned from neighbouring Ethiopia and Djibouti, and those who have
come back from the wider diaspora. The remainder of this section looks at these differences in
some detail.
Since 1991, with the exception of a destructive period of inter-clan fighting in the mid 1990s,
Somaliland has been at peace, and efforts at reconstruction have been under way. Returnees
from the diaspora have been significant in these developments. However, as with the influence
of remittances, the impacts of this diaspora influence on reconstruction has been uneven. As
the recent UNDP report cited above puts it,
The impressive generation of wealth by entrepreneurs in the transit trade, remittance
companies, or the telecommunications sector, for instance, masks declines in living
conditions for the majority of Somali households who are unable to participate in these
parts of the economy (UNDP 2001: 91).
In Somaliland's capital such differentiation is particularly apparent:
There has been an obvious increase in affluence in Hargeisa over the past three years,
with money to invest in hotels, fitness centres and cyber cafes, while on the outskirts of
Hargeisa the numbers of destitute returning refugees, displaced persons and economic
migrants have increased (ibid).
Similar effects can be observed in Bosasso and Mogadishu, notes the report. The following
sections highlight these contrasts in wealth between returnees from Ethiopia and those coming
back from the wider diaspora.
Returnees from Ethiopia
The great majority of returnees to Somaliland have come back from camps in Ethiopia, where
they fled when the Barre regime bombed Hargeisa and other parts of the country in 1988. Most
of these returnees have gravitated to Hargeisa since around 1991, when the Barre regime fell
and Somaliland was declared independent. The returnees either moved to Hargeisa directly or
drifted there from other locations after return to Somaliland. Since 1997, when UNHCR began
its voluntary repatriation programmes, more than 80,000 officially registered returnees have
made for the capital, and many others have gone there independently. Eight main returnee
settlement areas have grown up on the edges of Hargeisa in the later 1990s as a result of the
influx.
A survey conducted in 2002 by an interagency grouping concerned with these resettlement areas
estimated that their total population stood at 8,600 households, or 57,000 people (Clark 2002).
The population is youthful: half of the population were under 15 years old, and almost two
thirds under 20 years. Twenty percent of the households were said to be female headed. Sixty
percent of the households came directly from refugee camps in Ethiopia, 16 percent moved from
elsewhere in Hargeisa, and eight percent came from southern Somalia. Eighty percent of the
residents claimed to come from Somaliland before the wars, with others from southern Somalia
and Ethiopia, including ethnic Somalis.
Thirty per cent of the residents said they owned property before the war, and had no access to it
now. Half currently owned their land. The remainder lived on land owned by the government or
by private individuals. Three quarters of the households owning land had been allocated it by
the government. Squatting on government land is common.
Provision of water supply, sanitation, education and health services varied from basic in some of
the settlement areas to non-existent in others; the settlement areas have become or are becoming
neighbourhoods like many others found in third world cities. Income derives mostly from
market activities and casual employment, with occupations varying from hammering out old tin
cans for use as building material to more stable activities such as running small shops, selling
milk or tailoring.
Diaspora `returnees': the case of Somscan
The living conditions in these settlements contrast strongly with those of most returnees from
the wider diaspora, quite substantial numbers of whom have been coming back over the last
couple of years to see if they can live in Somaliland again. Only a minority, usually those
motivated by the idea of rebuilding the nation, have made a long term commitment (Hansen
2002). These have taken up roles in government, aid agencies, non-government organisations,
health care, education and in business (notably money transfer), and are putting energy and
resources into real reconstruction. The most striking and poignant example is the Edna Adan
maternity hospital, set up by the widow of a former prime minister, and built with the help of
diaspora and local resources on a site that has been successively a cemetery, a military parade
ground and execution ground, and then a rubbish dump that nobody wanted to use (Fredericksen
and Van Hear 2003).
Others coming back from the diaspora understandably wish to retain their connection to the
country of asylum and their aspirations are more privately focused. The case of a grouping of
the latter category of returnees is instructive.
In 1999-2000 a group of Somali refugees living in Scandinavia and the UK formed the
Somaliland Scandinavian Cooperative Association, now known as Somscan UK, reflecting the
Somali, Scandinavian and British identity of the membership. Many if not most of the grouping
came from Somaliland's second city of Burao, and expressed interest in returning to the area.
Like Hargeisa, Burao was ravaged by the conflict of 1988-1991 and by the internal conflict of
the mid 1990s, but since then has undergone a modest recovery. However living conditions
were still very difficult and there remained substantial constraints on return, including disputes
over land, insufficient education and health facilities, and, perhaps most important, inadequate
supply of drinking water. Education and water supply were uppermost among the returnees'
concerns, as among the general populace. The Burao municipality rightly feared that a
substantial return of people from the diaspora would put great strain on the current inadequate
infrastructure of the town.
The land issue was resolved so far as the group was concerned by the acquisition of 5.4 square
km to the north east of Burao. By 2002 the group had sold more than 400 housing plots to
interested expatriate Somalis. There were some 500 families in the grouping in all. The plots
seem to have been sold in blocs to groups within the Somscan grouping. Membership of the
subsidiary groups appears to have been based on the country of asylum - thus there were several
groups with members living in Denmark, the UK, Norway and Sweden -- though some were
more mixed and based on kinship ties. The grouping was well organised and retained an agent
who acted on behalf of the Somscan executive committee in its dealings with local government
and the agencies.
In 2002, Somscan members and the Danish Refugee Council, an non-governmental organisation
already working in Burao, jointly put forward a proposal to the European Union for a project to
rehabilitate elements of Burao's infrastructure, so that return could take place without placing
undue strain on the city's resources. The main elements were an upgrade of the city's water
supply and increasing the capacity of primary, intermediate and secondary schooling.
The water supply upgrade involved supplementing the existing ring main system and taking a
branch line to the Somscan land. It was argued that this would both increase the city's overall
supply, as well as supplying water to the Somscan site, helping to allay the (justified) concerns
of the municipal authority that demand for water by the Somscan site inhabitants would be many
times the Burao per capita norm. The plan involved an upgrade of primary/intermediate and
secondary schools, proving sheltered facilities for girls as well as boys. This would involve the
relocation of a large number of squatters currently on the school sites; that many of these
squatters were returnees were from Ethiopian camps rather vividly underlines the point being
made in this section on the class divide between former refugees in neighbouring countries and
those from the wider diaspora. Later there was violence and killings in the course of this
relocation.
The project proposal was submitted to the European Commission with a request for a grant of
nearly 600,000 Euro (Sorensen 2003). It fell under the aegis of the EU High Level Working
Group on Migration and Asylum (HLWG), and money was allocated for the project in 2003. A
few houses have since been built on the Somscan plot.
The case raises a number of thorny issues. The most obvious is the use of aid in the service of
promoting repatriation under the aegis of the EU High Level Working Group, whose purpose is
to develop policies towards countries of origin that prevent or at least contain migration (Van
Selm 2002). Somalia was one of six priority countries targeted by the HLWG, and so the
Somscan case can be seen as one where new trends in the unfolding migration regime are set to
play out at the local level. A second, related issue is the use of aid for the benefit of those
already better off than the local populace. While not necessarily rich by international standards,
the Somscan membership were certainly wealthier than the Burao norm.
There were indeed substantial potential benefits for Somscan members.
Buying land collectively outside Burao is much cheaper than acquiring land individually. We were told that
0.5 hectare plots bought as part of a bloc cost 5-10 percent of the amount land would fetch
within Burao town bought on an individual basis. There is the prospect for Somscan members
of a relatively well serviced township that should generate its own economy and community.
Indeed, several Somscan members voiced concerns that they would `stick together' particularly
for the sake of their children who would need special school facilities because they did not
speak Somali: some spoke of importing teachers to maintain the use of Scandinavian languages
among their children (an interesting indication of the durability of transnational consciousness).
More prosaically, some members have bought land to sell on, or intend to build houses and rent
them out.
These aspects do raise questions about the desirability of using aid to build a privileged enclave
surrounded by a poorer general populace. On the other hand, it might be argued pragmatically
that overall, while some resources would indeed be used to promote EU repatriation or
migration containment imperatives, and for the benefit of better off migrants, greater resources
at the same time would be made available for the wider community, in the form of better water
supply and schools, through this funding mechanism. If this is the outcome, some of the
concerns the scheme raises may be allayed, on the basis of the benefits for the wider
community.
This section has drawn attention to significant divisions in the case of Somaliland in terms of
class and wealth between those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries and those who
sought asylum further afield. But this is not to suggest there is no interaction across these socio-
economic divides: such interaction follows other social cleavages, notably clan. Indeed, it is
tempting to see Somaliland in terms of a vast transnational welfare/social security system,
spread across the neighbouring territories of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen, and further afield in
the Gulf and the wider diaspora in western countries. The clan system is an integral element in
this set-up. The transnational welfare system involves the international humanitarian and aid
regime, including UNHCR and UNDP, which subcontract international and local ngos. The
other main element of the transnational welfare system involves huge transfers of remittances
from the diaspora. All this is supplemented/opiated by the chewing of the narcotic qat on a
massive scale, again funded largely by remittances. It is the diaspora that substantially
underwrites this transnational welfare system, which cuts across the class divisions highlighted
in this paper. This issue is pursued further in the conclusion.
The tension between repatriation and remittances
Despite the issues raised by the Somscan and other cases, the return of refugees can be a
substantial force for development and reconstruction of the home country, not least in terms of
the financial, human and social capital they may bring home with them (Stepputat 1999).
Governments of countries producing refugees have traditionally been suspicious of the loyalties
of those who flee, for obvious reasons. However, governments of countries emerging from
conflict are now increasingly coming to appreciate the potential that refugee diasporas hold,
particularly in terms of the remittances they can send. This applies in particular to those in the
wider diaspora. The Eritrean government was among the first to recognize this potential. After
initial disappointment that Eritreans in the wider diaspora had decided not to return after
Independence, the government turned its attention to mobilizing - some might say exploiting -
their potential (Koser 2002). Since Independence, for example, every Eritrean in the wider
diaspora has been asked by the government to pay two per cent of their income to the state, as a
`healing tax'. During the recent conflict with Ethiopia even greater demands were made of the
diaspora, and there can be little doubt that their contributions paid for the lion's share of the
conflict's costs.
More recently, the Afghan government has made similar overtures to the Afghan diaspora.
Opening a seminar on trade and investment in July 2002, President Hamid Karzai appealed to
`all Afghans who are currently investing in other countries to come and invest inside the
country, which is of national and personal benefit' (Fox 2002). More than 1.8 million refugees
have returned under assisted repatriation programmes (BAAG 2002, Turton and Marsden 2003),
and others under their own steam since the fall of the Taliban late in 2001, but it is unclear how
many have gone back from the wider diaspora beyond Pakistan and Iran, and still less clear how
many are prepared to invest in a country still beset by insecurity, although the Afghan
government has gone to some lengths to woo expatriate Afghan businessmen to invest back
home (BBC News 2002).
At the same time, mass return presents the dilemma that the flow of remittances to the home
country will reduce. If the resolution of conflict or crisis is accompanied by large scale
repatriation, the source of remittances will obviously diminish, raising potential perhaps for
instability and further conflict. There may even be an argument against repatriation on these
grounds. Such was the thrust of a series of appeals in the 1990s by the government of El
Salvador for the US authorities to refrain from repatriating Salvadorans whose temporary
protection in the US was imminently expiring (Mahler 2001).
Remittances to El Salvador grew from US$11 million in 1980 to US$1.34 billion in 1998. This
huge increase was largely a consequence of El Salvador's civil war from 1979-92, which
displaced hundreds of thousands of people within the country and drove one million people
abroad, mostly to the US. Many of those in the US sent money to support those left at home, so
that by the end of the 1990s remittances were thought to sustain at least 15 per cent of
Salvadoran households. Successive Salvadoran governments have pursued a number of
strategies to maintain this important flow of income - from the very people its past actions have
forced to flee. Perhaps the most bizarre of these interventions was the provision by the El
Salvador authorities of legal assistance in the US for Salvadorans to pursue or prolong asylum
claims (Mahler 2001).
The El Salvador and other similar cases highlight potentially damaging consequences for
countries of origin if asylum migrants and refugees are repatriated en masse. The consequences
include the possibility that a diminution of remittances may lead to hardship, instability, socio-
economic or political upheaval, and even the resumption or provocation of conflict - and then
quite likely renewed out-migration. Repatriation of refugees may therefore imperil the very
economic and political security - in broader terms the human security - that the international
community claims to want to foster. It follows that policies that purport to be oriented to
migrants' countries of origin cannot afford to leave those abroad, especially those asylum-
seekers and refugees hosted by relatively affluent countries, out of consideration.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that forms of migration vary greatly in cost, and therefore access to
resources - principally money and social capital - shape the migration strategies that can be
pursued. This has disturbing implications because it means that for those trying to escape
conflict or persecution, the better endowed can buy a better quality of asylum. Others have to
settle for less attractive and less secure forms of migration and destinations, notably internal
displacement. This inflation in the cost of asylum is largely a result of the constellation of
restrictive measures controlling movement that have been put in place by the world's richer
countries over recent years. Migration has always entailed costs for the households involved,
but these have been greatly driven up: not so much the cost of travel, which if anything has
come down in relative terms, but rather the costs of negotiating the migration regime. Shifts in
the political economy of the migration regime thus play out differentially in the lives of potential
migrants.
As the second section showed, class differences also play out in terms of the influence by
expatriates on the homeland once they are established abroad. In terms of the transfer of
resources, those in neighbouring countries of first asylum exert less influence than their better
endowed compatriots - refugees, labour migrants and professional migrants -- in the wider
diaspora: both the Tamil and the Somali cases illustrate this. Such divisions are played out in
migrants' countries of origin where there is a divide between those households which have
relatives abroad and receive remittances, and those who do not have such relatives to call upon.
To some extent such divisions are ameliorated by redistribution of remittance income through
kin and other social networks, but such redistribution is not all-pervasive and has its limits.
As the last section showed, class differences are maintained after return. There is a world of
difference between those returning to Somaliland from camps in Ethiopia and those who have
come back from the wider diaspora: the living conditions and influence of these two categories
diverge profoundly. Likewise, there are profound differences between those Tamil refugees
who may return from Tamil Nadu and those who may come back from prosperous western
countries if peace in Sri Lanka is consolidated. However, such class or socio-economic
differences do not mean that interaction along the lines of other social cleavages is absent, as the
Somaliland case shows. Moreover, mass return can mean a reduction in the flow of transfers that
sustain societies in or emerging from conflict, raising the possibility of hardship, instability and
even renewed conflict.
The notion of `class' and its connection with forced migration introduced at the beginning of
this paper need to be refined. It is not being suggested that there is a straightforward
correspondence between class and the capacity to migrate, and thereafter the influence of
migrants on the homeland. Still less is it being suggested that better endowed refugees/migrants
do not have a case for protection and assistance in western states. Moreover, the less well
endowed are sometimes able to mobilise resources for migration through social networks such
as extended families, clans or religious groupings. What they lack in financial capital or wealth
they must find in social capital. The capacity of poorer people to mobilise resources in this way
to pursue migration strategies would seem to undermine the central argument of this paper.
However, it might be argued, following Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986, Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992), that the poor are here converting social capital into financial capital or wealth, and
thereby clawing themselves up the social scale. Such possibilities are not feasible for all.
A further caveat is that the alignment of migration strategies with class to such an extent is a
relatively recent phenomenon, essentially since constraints on immigration to the west bit in the
1990s. Before the 1990s, less well endowed households (though not the poorest) could raise the
resources to send family members abroad to seek asylum in western states (on migration by
Tamils of modest socio-economic background in the 1980s, see McDowell 1996). The shift to
such asylum migration becoming the preserve of the privileged occurred in the 1990s as
restrictive immigration measures began to bite deeply, and the premium on such migration, seen
in inflated agents' fees, began to manifest itself.
Finally, there are a number of levelling tendencies that help to mitigate the emergence of
inequality and thus the influence of class. The conversion of social and/or symbolic capital into
economic capital has already been discussed as a means for poorer families, or the poorer scions
of extended families, to migrate. The circulation and redistribution of resources, transnational
and local, among extended families, clans, religious groupings and other networks, not just at
home but in other destination, transit and neighbouring countries is a related manifestation.
Indeed it is tempting to see migration orders as part of gigantic transnational social security
systems, potentially comprising a range of elements (Horst 2003, Jacobsen 2003). The main
elements are:
- Remittances and other help from the diaspora (including collective remittances, relief,
charity, interventions by home town associations and similar organisations and so on),
from a range of relatives in different countries (the near diaspora or neighbouring
countries, the Gulf, transit countries and the wider diaspora)
- Humanitarian assistance: from home governments (rations, housing, shelter, education),
bilateral and multilateral agencies, ngos etc
- Post-conflict/Development assistance: from home governments, bilataeral and
multilateral agencies, ngos etc
- Resources that returnees bring back with them, including subsidies for returnees (eg the
Somscan case)
- Trading networks (into which refugees and those back home may be plugged)
These combine with:
- Assets and livelihoods at home (or in the refugee hosting area): land and property to rent,
common property, farming, livestock, labouring, businesses, some of which may be
`translocal' (ie away from the home area in more peaceful zones) and osme of which
may be subsidised by the diaspora
- Mechanisms of redistribution within the home country (or in the refugee-hosting area):
eg urban households sending on a portion of remittances to their kin in rural areas
Households in conflict and post conflict areas need to balance these different transnational and
local sources. Class and identity politics are involved in gaining access to these different
resources: they require the mobilisation of different forms of capital (Bourdieu) to generate an
adequate portfolio of resources. As Jonathan Goodhand and others (2003) have shown for `war
economies', mobilisation of such resources may enable households just to survive (by
combining such receipts with selling off assets), to cope (combining such receipts to maintain
themselves, and avoiding disposing of assets), or to prosper (to cope, and beyond that to profit
and accumulate further assets). This can apply in post conflict conditions as much as during
conflict.
Refugee and migrant households abroad have to balance the demands of their own livelihoods
and futures (such as education of their children), those in other destination and transit countries,
and those left at home, or in neighbouring countries of first refuge. There is thus a portfolio of
obligations (which might be termed `forced transnationalism', Al Ali 2002), as well as a
portfolio of resources. That portfolio of obligations may become unsustainable and debilitating
(eg tertiary education of children in host countries may have to be forgone). Obviously,
differences of wealth, resources, social capital and class, as discussed earlier in this paper, shape
the capacity and level of support than can be offered and thus the circulation of resources among
these different sites.
Class is not the only dimension that shapes patterns of migration and the influence of migrants.
It may not be the most important. But I do think that this dimension has been neglected in
forced migration research. This is partly because we rarely look at the whole of a given
migration order. Thus we pursue studies of internally displaced people, of refugees in
neighbouring countries of first asylum, of labour migration, and of asylum seekers in more
affluent countries. But there are important connections between internal and external
displacement, as this paper has attempted to demonstrate. This is seen not least in the access to
or recovery of land and houses, as the Sri Lanka case shows.
All this demonstrates that we need to look at how these forms of migration are combined for a
given country or region in conflict, and at how changes in the migration regime affect relations
between different forms of migration - what could be called the political economy of a given
migration order. If we did so we would find the class dimensions of forced migration thrown
into sharper relief. We also need to acknowledge the unavoidably transnational character of
refugee issues and to recognise the links among different domains. Indeed, perhaps it is time to
go one step further and acknowledge that transnationalism may in itself be a `durable solution'
for conditions of displacement - or at least an `enduring' solution. This might mean considering
the encouragement or promotion of transnationalism (Van Hear 2003).
The cases presented above suggest a number of arguments in support of such an approach. First
`transnationalism' is arguably a `solution' favoured by the displaced, since it is the practice
often pursued by them in everyday life (although of course, just because something is popular
does not mean that it is right). Second, remittances and other transfers tend to be an effective
means of reaching people in need, since they are often one-to-one flows, rather than the more
generalised distributions implemented through aid or welfare -- although there are obvious
issues of equity here, not least between those households with migrants abroad and those
without. As the cases reviewed above and others show, diaspora connections may be vital in
sustaining societies in upheaval or conflict, and have the potential for assisting such societies
once conflict lessens. Building on such potential involves understanding that the return of some
members of a household or community to a `post-conflict' society may be predicated on others
staying abroad. That way the viability or durability of the return would be enhanced: by sending
money home for example, those abroad may help to set up or sustain livelihoods established by
returnees during start-up periods or during hard times. A sustainable livelihood may then be
established as the basis for subsequent returns of the displaced. At the same time, as has been
suggested above, the deployment of transnational connections in such ways is predicated on
some elements of the diaspora attaining reasonably secure residence in the place of exile.
There are, of course, problems with such an approach. Not least of these are questions of equity,
already referred to, for as was shown in the Sri Lankan case in particular, it tends to be those
who are already better off who take prime positions in the transnational arena: encouragement of
transnationalism may therefore reinforce inequalities. Another issue is commitment to place,
also just referred to, for if people are really as footloose as some proponents of transnationalism
imply, why should they look after or contribute to the places they find themselves in? This may
indeed be problematic for host countries where migrants' or newcomers' loyalties lie elsewhere.
A third issue is the ambiguity of transnational connections, since they can contribute to conflicts
as well as ameliorating their effects, as is illustrated by the cases considered above. Can (or
should) policies be devised which enhance the positive outcomes of transnational networks,
while discouraging transnational activities which fuel or sustain conflicts?
These problematic areas notwithstanding, the implications of transnationalism deserve greater
attention among policy makers and practitioners concerned with displacement and its resolution.
There are signs that this is happening: for example, recent discussion among the multilateral
agencies and among numerous governments explores ways of encouraging diasporas to become
engaged in positive development roles in their countries of origin (World Bank 2000,
OECD/DAC 2001, Van Hear and Sorensen 2003, DfID 2004). Transnational connections and
practices can provide important means for sustaining people caught up in conflict. Moreover,
`reconstruction' after conflict will not only involve the homeland or the actual arena of conflict;
transnational links and diaspora connections that develop to sustain societies in conflict are
likely to be irrevocably integral parts of the `post-conflict' society to be reconstructed. Taking
advantage of transnational connections and practices requires taking account of the links among
different domains of diaspora: this paper has offered the beginnings of a simple framework for
considering the relations among these different domains.
More broadly, it may be heretical to say so, particularly in the Palestinian context, but footloose
populations with multifarious links, of which refugee diasporas like the Palestinians are a prime
example, ultimately may well be better placed than people with more conventional roots in the
face of globalisation, of world economic and geo-political restructuring, and of nation-state
disintegration and reconstitution. In other words, such populations might be well advised to
maintain or extend their diaspora or transnational character than to diminish it by commitment
or return to a single homeland, however appealing the notion of such a `home' may seem (Van
Hear 1998). Such footloose people and those with whom they are connected at home may well
find themselves to be advantaged over those with a single affiliation as globalisation accelerates.
References
Ahmed, L. 2000. Remittances and their impact in postwar Somaliland. Disasters, 2000, 24, 2,
380-389.
[Rambo] High ranking officials from the Somaliland immigration department, who did not want to be identified, told HornAfrik that the minister of housing and public works of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Usman Hasan Ali [alias] Usman Ato was yesterday afternoon stopped from going to Hargeysa town and returned to his plane at the airport.
The Somaliland officers also said Ato, who had come from Mogadishu's K50 Airport, was accompanied by an unidentified person and alighted from the plane seeking to visit the town. They said Ato was later on told he could not leave the airport and ordered to return to the plane belonging to Dallo Airlines which then headed for Djibouti.
The Somaliland officers said Ato indicated he did not want to go to Djibouti and that he was visiting Hargeysa for business and not political reasons. His request was rejected and he was asked to return to the plane. Somaliland officers said Ato returned to the aircraft which then departed for Djibouti.
Neither the government of Somaliland, nor the police, have commented on the reason as to why Ato was turned away. However, this is not the first, or second time, a politician who is opposed to the independence of Somaliland has been turned away from the airport. [Passage omitted]
It is a practice that involves cutting away a girl's inner labia and clitoris, and sewing the wound together, leaving a tiny hole for passing urine and menstrual blood.
Siti Robitu, 21, describes a recent argument she had with her family over the circumcision of her four-year old daughter. "My father, my mother - they all cried," she said. "They wanted my daughter to be circumcised. I was against it."
Siti, a nursing aid in a local clinic, belongs to a small number of mothers in Djibouti who are trying to protect their daughters from the circumciser's knife.
Despite medical evidence that genital mutilation puts women at risk of infection, pain and complications during childbirth, social pressure is such that most mothers opt to circumcise their daughters.
"At first, I asked the doctor to do it, but he refused," Siti said. "My mother was furious. When you are not circumcised, the whole neighbourhood talks behind your back. They say she [my daughter] is like a white woman."
Djibouti's health ministry estimates that 98 percent of all Djiboutian women are circumcised - the highest rate of any country in the world.
"Mothers have their daughters infibulated to make sure that they get a husband and a secure future. Otherwise they get loose and become prostitutes, people believe here," Fatuma Abdi, from the Djibouti National Women's Union (UNDF) explained.
"It is the women not the men who insist on circumcision," she added. "The weird thing is that my mother believes she has benefited from it. How, she can't tell me."
Siti is encouraged by activists like Fatuma Abdi not to follow age-old tradition.
Door to door campaigns, programmes on government radio and roundtable television shows bring the new message into every home.
Teachers are obliged to talk about the issue for at least five minutes a day, so girls do not perpetuate in adulthood what may have already been done to them.
It has been a long, hard struggle for Djiboutian women activists to get this far.
QUARTER CENTURY OF STRUGGLE
Twenty-six years ago, members of the women's union started the fight against female genital mutilation (FGM). The breakthrough came only early this year after a decade-long series of conferences and meetings with religious leaders.
Safia Elmi, technical advisor to the Ministry of Health, recalls the outcry of more than 200 women in a conference hall on 2 February, when Muslim Imams conceded that female circumcision was not required by the Koran.
Nonetheless, they demanded that women still have at least their clitoris cut.
"That was the best thing that happened to us," Safia says. "We all stood up and shouted - 'don't touch our girls'."
The Minister of Health was forced to call another closed session with clergymen. They finally declared female circumcision a thing of the past.
This, however, was just on paper.
FGM was made a criminal offence in Djibouti as far back as 1994, incurring a penalty of one million Djbouti francs (US $5,500), or up to two years imprisonment.
"But until now, nobody was jailed or fined because it is difficult to fine someone for a cultural practice that is very widespread," said Ayanne Hassan Omar, spokeswoman for Djibouti's president, Omar Guelleh.
FIGHT ACROSS BORDERS
Safia Elmi is establishing an organisation of midwives who oppose FGM. She wants to track down those who carry out female circumcisions and have them prosecuted.
Increased public censure in Djibouti, she says, means more Djiboutian mothers are taking their daughters to Ethiopia or Somaliland to be circumcised. To prevent this, she wants to create a regional anti-FGM committee.
The UNDF's Fatuma Abdi says circumcision is primarily cultural, not religious: "It is not just the Muslims who are practicing infibulation. It is the Catholics as well."
In December 2003, Djibouti signed the Maputo Protocol of the African Charter of Rights, which stipulates that FGM must be forbidden and condemned.
This did not so the average mother from subjecting her daughter to it.
"The real reason why nobody was punished, is that nobody complained," Safia Elmi said. "In Djibouti, everybody is a cousin of someone."
PAIN AND SUFFERING
Madina Mohammed, a mother of five, lives in a very poor Djibouti neighbourhood. She proudly describes how her daughter was circumcised shortly after birth. The girl is now three years old.
"It needs three women to do the procedure. One closes the eyes of the girl. One spreads the legs and one does the cutting. Then we tie the legs together for seven days. I spent DF50 (30 US Cents) for Afar medicine to help the healing."
The women of the Afar ethnic group circumcise girls in the first week after birth. The Somali Issa girls are circumcised between five and nine years of age.
An expert circumcision costs to DF5,000 ($30). People often save for years to get the money together for the practitioner.
MEDICAL PROBLEMS
Many circumcisions are badly carried out.
Fatma Hatchi, one of just two local gynaecologists in Djibouti, is confronted daily with women who suffer complications stemming from infibulation. Girls bleeding profusely are regularly admitted to the hospital where she works.
There are other complications too. "Sometimes girls take half an hour to urinate," she says. The urethra is closed-up during infibulation, forcing urine inside the vagina, before it finds it way out through the tiny hole left after circumcision.
"Today, we had a patient who could not pee anymore. When we opened her up, we found lots of blood. The woman must have had menstruation for a year, but it could not get out. She had pharaonic circumcision," Hatchi explained.
"During my time, it was important that five women from the family inspected whether the hole was small enough," Hatchi said. "If it was too big, even if the woman had had no contact with a man, she was sent home and could never get married."
Siti, the health worker who refuses to circumcise her daughter, remembers her wedding night was not what she had dreamt of. "We tried for a whole week, but my husband could not penetrate," she says. "It was very painful. Then he sent me to the hospital, to open the hole."
SEE RELATED STORIES: "Razor's Edge - The Controversy of Female Genital Mutilation IRIN Web Special"
After all, the cowardly act had targeted the lives of innocent people who were commuting to their places of work in a city that is home to a half of the estimated 300,000 Somaliland-born population currently living in Britain. These were mostly people who, during the 1980s, had been forced to flee their homes to escape persecution and genocide in the hands of Gen Siyad Barre, Somalia's former dictator.
Since liberation from Somalia and its declaration of independence as a sovereign state in 1991, unrecognized Somaliland has crucially depended for its reconstruction on the half a billion dollars that its Diaspora in the West, particularly in Britain, send annually back home. With Saudi Arabia's decision to ban import of Somaliland livestock (this country's only hard-currency earning export) entering the seventh year in a row, at least one-third of Somaliland's households rely on the income support money they regularly receive from relatives living in the West, particularly Britain.
For the above reasons and others, it was not a surprise at all to notice how the impact of the explosions in London was widely felt by Somalilanders here.There is no doubt that the terrorists who were behind the carnage wanted to disrupt the G8 Summit in Scotland where Tony Blair is trying to persuade the leaders of the richest nations in the world to commit substantial resources for the eradication of poverty in Africa! The terror strike also came in the aftermath of the Live 8 concerts that Bob Geldof and his friends had recently organized in order to make the citizens and leaders of rich countries aware about the extent of human suffering taking place in Africa. It is not yet clear whether the blasts were also designed to sabotage London's bid for holding the 2012 Olympic Games.
But why anyone should be so inhuman as to want to undermine an international gathering, such as the one held in Gleneagles whose prime purpose is to help Africa salvage itself from the misery of poverty and underdevelopment? Neither is there any sense in depriving London of the opportunity not only to host the 2012 Olympic Games but also to earmark close to 2bn dollars for developing some of the predominantly Muslim rundown boroughs in east London, the site where most of the games were planned to be staged.We consider the explosions that ripped through London during rush hour on Thursday morning an attack on all human beings irrespective of their colour, race and religion. It would be foolish to see it otherwise.
While our sympathy goes to the families, relatives and friends of the victims, we express our solidarity with the people and government of Britain. It is to be hoped that people in the UK will emerge from Thursday's terror attacks as more united and resolved in not allowing the terrorists to change British values of tolerance, democracy and compassion.
The President message: "On behalf of myself, the government and the people of Somaliland allow me to convey to you, that we were completely shocked with the terrorist act carried in London, on Thursday and the death and destruction they left behind. "The people of Somaliland condemn the heinous and barbaric act and convey that they share the shock and grief with the people of the United Kingdom and the relatives of the victims in London.Somaliland is against all kinds of terrorist acts".
"The reconstruction and rehabilitation of these bridges between Sheekh and Caynabo on the road linking the port of Berbera going through Burco and Laas Caanood were destroyed during the 1988-91 war" this was said by minister of public works who spoke at the ceremony.
The minister also added that the reconstruction of the bridges that cost 1.1m dollars (One Million one hundred thousand dollars) is part of the EU programme to rehabilitate roads and bridges in Somaliland. [Passage omitted]
The president said in his condolence message: On my own behalf and that of the administration, the government, and the people of Somaliland, I would like to tell you that we were deeply shocked about the terrorist acts that occurred in London and the deaths and injuries they caused.
The people of Somaliland share with you the shock the acts caused and are sympathetic to the pain inflicted upon your people by the acts.The president added that according to Somaliland's constitution, Somaliland is always opposed to any terrorist act in the world.
The 1st SSE International Conference
1ST - 2ND SEPTEMBER 2005.
The Royal Institute of International Affairs
10 St James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE
A. Background
Somaliland Societies in Europe (SSE) is primarily a network for Somaliland communities and organisations in Europe. SSE is a non-political but charitable organisation. It is in its formative years and its vision is "to bring together and utilise the skills and resources of its members, Somaliland organisations and communities in Europe for the benefit of Somalilanders in Europe and back home - Somaliland".
SSE's Main Strategic Objectives include:
1. To promote the development and empowerment of Somaliland communities in Europe and Somaliland
2. To link and liaise with indigenous and International and Somaliland NGOs and Institutions
3. To promote, publicise and market the achievement of Somaliland, its people and institutions in the International Community
4. To lobby for more resources and development grants for Somaliland Communities in Europe and those in Somaliland
5. To be vigilant about the on going Somaliland democratisation process and challenge any undemocratic obstruction and hindrance instigated by individual (s) and or groups in this democratisation process.
The idea to form SSE as an organisation took place in May 2003 in Holland (Utrecht), but it was formalised and structured in May 2004 in London. All the EC that Somaliland communities reside are represented at SSE. The Somaliland community in UK holds the chairmanship and Secretariat and SSE address is: Phoenix House, 389 Newport Road, Cardiff CF24 1TP.
B. SSE International Conference
B.1 Introduction
SSE will hold an International Conference and a Grand Exhibition in London on 1st and 2nd September 2005. Our choice of London is strategic as UK holds the Presidency of G8 this year, UK is chairing the EC as of July and the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Tony Blair, has created a flagship for Africa democratisation and development: Commission for Africa. This year (2005) is a very exciting one that holds opportunities and prosperity. It will hopefully be the year Somaliland people succeeds to become part of the International Community. We believe that every human being is entitled to "a life of dignity and opportunity".
Against all odds Somaliland has successful managed to overcome the destruction carried out by the military dictatorship. Now Somaliland is a country of peace, freedom, equality and enterprise. On 15th August 2000 The Financial Times reported, "It (Somaliland) could serve as a model for Africa: peaceful, stable, little crime, no debt, a liberal economic regime as of this month, a multi-part electoral system".
Since then a new constitution establishing a multi-part electoral system was approved in 31st May 2001, Local Government elections followed in December 2002 and peacefully contested presidential election was held in April 2003. With only parliamentary election scheduled for 15th September 2005 remaining, Somaliland's multi-party democratisation process is complete.
Many distinguished politicians, academicians, researchers and commentators across the world are calling the international community to be realistic about the permanent and drastic shift and change of the paradigm that the so-called "Pan Somalism " was based. They are relentlessly calling the International Community to recognise the unprecedented achievements of Somaliland people in terms of peace, reconciliation, democracy and governance and development. They argue that Somaliland, without the help of the International Community, managed to rise from the ashes and destruction of the unjust war and has achieved most of the goals, targets and milestones the Commission for Africa, chaired by The Rt. Hon Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is asking the African Countries to attain.
There is over a century of connection between Somaliland and United Kingdom as Somaliland was part of the British Empire and as a result many Somalis settled in this country. This conference is paramount and a unique event, the first of its kind. It will highlight the background and profile of the British Somali Community and their country of origin. This is the year for Africa, as Rt. Hon Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said on Sunday 24th April 2005, and this event is very relevant and on time.
The British people and Her Majesty Government were very supportive and sympathetic to Somaliland people during the terrible years of war in Somaliland. This country had welcomed many Somaliland refugees. The British Media, Politicians, Human Rights Organisations particularly Amnesty International were relentlessly and fully engaged in unmasking the Hidden War in Somaliland and the atrocities committed against Somaliland people by the military dictator, General Siad Barre.
The British people showed solidarity with Somaliland people during the 10 (1981-1991) years Hidden War as a result of which many Somalilanders have received sanctuary and safety in this country. This conference makes tribute to the British people for their generosity and unprecedented support in those dark years.
B.2 Strategic Objectives of the Conference
1. To raise the profile of the Somaliland Communities in Europe
2. To demonstrate Somaliland achievements and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead
3. To explore the role Diaspora plays and could play in the Development of Somaliland
4. Learning about the fascinating history and culture of Somaliland people - past and present
B.3 Speakers, Presenters and Panel Members
Following internationally renowned and distinguished experts (including Somalilanders) are invited:
B.4 Presentations, Seminars and Panel Discussions
Main topics and issues to be addressed include:
- Survival, Peace and Reconciliation
B.5 Grand Exhibition
History, Culture, Photos, Folklore, Art etc.
B.6 Who Should Attend?
B.7 Among Others Benefits of Attending Include
B. 8 Fees
B. 9 Registration
Make sure you are part of it and make your booking now! Further information and conference detailed programme will be issued with the delegate packs for those who registered and paid fees. This is a very popular conference and places are limited. Therefore, registration will be served on first come first basis. No tickets will be sold at the door of the conference. Don't miss it and register now to reserve your place!
B.10 For further information please contact:
Abdulkadir Maacalesh, Secretary,
Email: info@sse4.com,
Tel: + 44 (0) 120 453 5093,
Mobile: 07984142942
Eid Ali Ahmed, Chair,
Email: info@sse4.com,
Tel: + 44 (0) 29 2043 2972 ,
Mobile: 07971531761
A few years ago, the port of Berbera contributed with an estimated 60 percent to Somaliland's GDP and government revenues. According to non-confirmed figures, revenues from the non-recognised country's main port however have dropped by around 30 percent during the last two or three years. Berbera Port is definitively losing out in the regional competition over the lucrative foreign trade of Ethiopia.
According to several sources, the main reason for the decline of the Berbera Port has been years of mismanagement and a culture of corruption and extortion. Due to ineffective standards, unloading at Berber Port takes two to three times longer than in the competing ports of Bossaso (in Somalia's Puntland region), Djibouti and Port Sudan.
While time spent at Berbera Port is growing longer each time, the unwanted stay also gets expensive. Somaliland authorities in 2002 increased tariffs and taxes for vessels unloading and uploading in Berbera. At the same time, the modernised port of Djibouti lowered taxes and the Bo
Army Offials Arrested in Burao
Burao (The Rep) - Four army officers have been arrested for misappropriation of the salary of June for the handicapped and orphans in Burao on Monday.
President awards..
Borama (The Rep) - President Dahir Rayale Kahin awarded degrees and diplomas to 118 graduates from the faculties of Education and that of Administration and Management in Amoud University.
Lawyers begin Presenting Case
Hargiesa (The Rep) - The defence in the trial case of the 10 terrorists accused of killing 4 humanitarian workers and wounding another between 2002 - 2004 began presenting their case in the regional court of Hargeisa, after the prosecution completed their case, by bringing 33 witnesses.
Source: http://www.akaademiga.org/details.asp?id=50&page=NEWS.
Cod e of Conduct for the Political Parties
Republic of Somaliland
National Electoral Commission
Hargeisa July 2005
Compiled/Written By: Academy For peace And Development
Fully aware of the importance of the parliamentary elections to the people of Somaliland;
Mindful that successful completion of the democratic process will further advance the cause of Somaliland;
Recognizing that free and fair elections will enhance the prospect for enlarged freedom and justice in Somaliland;
Cognizant of the inherent risks and threats in transitional democracy and the prevailing climate of mistrust among the parties;
Fully aware of the urgent need to create an environment that is conducive to holding free and fair elections;
Mindful of the gaps/deficiencies in the electoral law that need to be addressed in order to ensure smooth elections;
a) tolerance of democratic political activity;
b) free political campaigning and open public debate; and
c) respect for human rights.
Compliance with the Code
1. Every Party and every candidate:
b) will take decisive steps to prohibit leaders, officials, candidates and members from infringing the code.
c) will take all reasonable steps to discourage any type of conduct by their supporters which would, if undertaken by party official, candidate, or member be in breach of this code.
d) will not abuse the right to complain about violation of the code, nor make false, or frivolous complaints.
e) agrees to publicly condemn any action that undermines the free and fair conduct of election.
f) must accept the results of the election or challenge the results in the Supreme Court.
b) Take all necessary steps to ensure compliance.
a) That the party, its candidates, persons who hold political office in the party, members, activitists, and supporters, comply with the Code and the electoral law.
b) That representatives and supporters of the party candidates comply with the Code and the Electoral law.
a) respect the rights and freedom of all other parties to campaign, and to disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear.
b) respect the rights and freedom of all other parties to lawfully erect banners, billboards, placards, and posters.
c) conduct itself in a manner that respects the rights of other parties, and respects the rights of voters and other members of the community.
d) respect the rights of the press, election monitors and observers.
e) use its good offices to seek to ensure freedom of access by all parties to potential voters.
b. use language or defamatory act in a way that may provoke violence during election.
c. intimidate candidates and/or members of other parties, representatives or supporters of other parties.
d. disrupt, destroy or frustrate the campaign efforts of any other party.
e. prevent the distribution of handbills and leaflets, and the display of posters of other parties or candidates.
f. deface or destroy the posters of other parties or candidates.
g. prevent any other party from holding rallies, meetings, marches or demonstrations.
h. prevent any other party from canvassing support for the a party or candidate.
i. seek to prevent any person from attending the political rallies of
another party.
j. permit it's supporters to do anything prohibited by this code, or
k. carry or display arms or weapons at a political meeting, in a march, demonstration, rally or other public events.
1. recognize the full authority of the Commission in the conduct of the election.
2. cooperate with election officials in order to ensure peaceful and orderly polling, and complete freedom for voters to exercise their franchise without being subjected to any annoyance or obstructions.
3. give effect to any lawful direction, instruction or order of the Commission.
4. establish and maintain effective lines of communication with the Commission and other political parties.
5. ensure the safety and security of electoral officials before, during and after the polls.
6. not interfere unjustifiably or in bad faith with the duties of the election officials.
7. respect and cooperate with officials or accredited election observers or monitors.
8. maintain and aid, where possible, in maintaining secrecy of the voting, and
9. not Procure votes by forcible occupation of polling stations or through illegal activities in the polling stations.
The following section of the Code of Conduct deals with the gaps and deficiencies in the electoral law and the solutions devised by the NEC and the political parties to remedy such deficiencies.
a). Radio Hargeisa Broadcast During the Campaign Period
- Stages one: Monitoring
- Stage two: Allocation of equal air time to the Political parties
1. Monitoring, on a daily basis, the content of Maandeeq and Horn Tribune news papers
2. Allocation of equal space in Maandeeq and Horn Tribune to the parties
- Presidential decree directing government officers to cooperate fully with NEC and any other body established by NEC to assist it in carrying out its national duties.
- Presidential decree officially prohibiting the use of government vehicles, etc for use of campaigning and affixing of party emblem, logos, slogan, etc on government offices, premises and vehicles
1. Establishment of Election Board of Monitors (EBM)
2. Regular Board meetings:
KULMIYE, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, Chairman, Signature_________, Date: __________
UDUB, Ahmed Yussuf Yasin, Vice President, Signature_________, Date: __________
Witnessed By: National Electoral Commission, Ahmed Haji Ali Adami, Chairman, Signature:_________, Date____________
Source: http://www.akaademiga.org/details.asp?id=38&page=NEWS
APD Statement on the Murder of Abdulkadir Yahye
Academy For Peace And Development condemns in the strongest terms the barbaric and senseless murder of Abdulqader Yahya Ali --founder and director of the Center for Research and Dialogue in Mogadishu, Somalia. Brother Abdulqader Yahye was a most visible symbol of the tiny, but vibrant civil society sector of war-ravaged Somalia. Over the past decade, he became renowned for his commitment to peace and his highly-principled dedication to the cause of reconciliation.APD pays tribute to brother Yahye's tireless humanitarian campaign on behalf of those who have been disenfranchised and dispossessed by the prolonged lawlessness that has characterized much of Somalia during the last 15 years. His murder robs Somalia and her people of a highly experienced peace broker whose service is most needed at this critical hour in the Somali reconciliation process.The horrendous murder of Somali intellectuals and experts inside Somalia has lately become a systematic trend. The Somali people, in their tireless search for peace and stability, must strife to safeguard its sons and daughters who, through selfless patriotism and foresight, are the target of the ruthless murders.Academy For Peace And Development wishes to express its deepest sorrow at his loss and sends its condolences to the family of brother Abdulqader Yahye Ali and to all peace loving Somalis everywhere.
Compiled/Written By: Editor Of APD Abdiaziz A Musa, Abdiaziz2@gmail.com
Source: Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) Date: 31 Jul 2005
Monthly nutrition update for Somalia - Jul 2005
OVERVIEW
Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Date: 31 Jul 2005
UNDP Somalia Quarterly Update - Jul 2005
Duduble Canal inaugurated - first development project in the south for 20 years
President Rayale's Credibility Gap
Somaliland Times, Issue 184, July 30, 2005. EDITORIAL
Ex-Aviation Minister Accuses Rayale Of Poor Leadership
Somaliland Times, Issue 184, July 30, 2005
Somaliland Civil Society Visit to South Africa 20-26 July 2005
Somaliland Times, Issue 184, July 30, 2005
BBC Monitoring/BBC. July 25 2005
President accepts aviation minister's resignation
News we have received from the president's spokesman, Abdi Idris Du'ale, indicate that the president of the Republic of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kahin, has accepted the resignation of Abib Diriye Nuh, minister for aviation and air transport, who announced his resignation yesterday.
Jamhuuriya Online (The Republican) Jul 24 2005
USAID Finances CARE SSIP Project
Hargiesa (The Rep) - "To increase girls enrollment in schools, CARE International implemented Somaliland School Improvement Project (SSIP) in 15 schools in Awdal, Sahil and Togdher regions," this was stated by CARE team leaders in Hargeisa, Somaliland.
Jamhuuriya Online (The Republican) Jul 24 2005
Burao Local Government Fails to pay Fee
Burao (The Rep) - 13 Students in the faculty of Administration and Business Management were stopped from sitting for their first year exam on Tuesday.
Jamhuuriya Online (The Republican) Jul 24 2005
Berbera's economy on Decline
Berbera (The Rep) - Business at the main port of Berbera has been declining in the last 2 months. This has affected not only the economy, but caused unemployment and affected all activities in the town.
Jamhuuriya Online (The Republican) Jul 24 2005
National TV station launched in Somaliland
Hargeisa (The Rep) - Eng Selgio Carl [phonetic], accompanied by Eng Mahmud Nasir and Eng Ali Mire, who in the recent past have been busy working on the installation of Somaliland national TV station, have handed over the station to the minister of Information and Guidance, Hon. Abdullahi Muhammad Du'ale, at the ministry's HQ on Thursday.
Jamhuuriya Online (The Republican) Jul 24 2005
NEC: The choice is yours
The 3 political parties after a strenuous, exhausting, difficult lobbying at 2 levels - community and party - had finally submitted the list of 246 candidates for the 82 House of Representatives seats to the National Electoral Commission.
Editorial: Rayale's Double Dealing
Somaliland Times, Issue 183, July 23, 2005
Confusion Over Selection And Screening Of Candidates
Somaliland Times, Issue 183, July 23, 2005
Col. Abdillahi Yusuf Receives Another Blow
EDITORIAL. Somaliland Times, Issue 182, July 16, 2005
Source: http://www.radiosomaliland.com/index.php?itemid=87
IS PRIVATISATION THE ANSWER?
Berbera port has been and still is Somaliland's main strategic infrastructural asset.
Source: http://insidesomaliland.blogtales.com/ Posted by Yvette Lopez, July 13, 2005
I Walk Alone
I walk on empty, alone every morn
Of my wealth there are but,
A curd of milk and few kernels of corn
Alone in silence my heart sinks
Of my orchid there are but,
Wild cactus and a shrub of brittle sticks
Alone at the wayside I wonder and wait
With heart stirred that refuses to be reined
Will the world listen?
Does the world care?
Wither away in solitude, he cried
Over at the ivory tower the high strolled
Oblivious
Hamming the virtue of freedom he rolled
Shunned from the community of men
To no! I became a weary friend
For a bright tomorrow and beautiful dawn
I sing my heart and trot with joy
Cause this dreadful night shall come to pass
The dark curtain, surely will rise
Splendidly bold and not a bit coy
Maandeeq draped in a flowing gown
Will stand equal among her peers
To bring countenance and much deserve cheers
Walk steady and walk strong
Maandeeq our grace - Maandeeq our calling
Soar free into the open sky
Maandeeq our sword - Maandeeq our pen
Bring meaning and honor to our fallen men
Maandeeq the way - Maandeeq the promise
Stay deaf to the doubter's cry
Till in earnest from dawn to dusk
For time to plant tears are long gone
Undo the ill of our broken bond
Undo the burden of broth and bread
Break the chain and never look back
Give back yourself - Your old self again
Embrace the gift - The gift of life
The smile - The laughter, the sweet sob again
Sing with joy - Sing with pride
For Maandeeq is here - Our precious dear
Source: http://www.kulmiye.com/lausa24-26-06-2005.html
Statement of Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo
At the opening ceremony of the International Somaliland Diaspora Convention on June
23rd-26th, 2005 in Los Angeles, California
2) Somaliland and Somalia's governments should both be given observer status in UN, AU, Arab League and other international forums.
3) The issue of full sovereignty should await future talks and discussions between the two sides at the appropriate time under the auspices of the international community.
2) Suppression of civil liberties, freedom of press and the mass media.
3) Ban on the right of parties to address the public at officially designated places (kheyriyadaha).
4) Denial of the use of the state-owned radio and publicly owned newspaper by the opposition, while utilizing them fully for government propaganda and vilification of the opposition
5) Utilization of the special Police units (SPU) funded by UNDP for the illegal invasion and breakdown of KULMIYE party offices and for the harassment of SNM widows and other poor families. This is completely against the agreement reached between UNDP and Somaliland government-which restricts the use of these forces to the protection of foreign aid personnel only.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 18, 2005/SOURCE: Radio Hargeysa in Somali 18:50 GMT, 18 Jul 05
Somaliland foreign minister "warmly" received in USA
The minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Somaliland, Edna Adan Isma'il, today held a news conference at the ministerial HQ on her recent overseas trip and talks held with various heads of state.
http://www.sopri.org/archive.aspx?doc=pressrelease_050711
Communiqu, on the Working Visit of the Somaliland
Foreign Minister to South Africa,
from 6 July 2005 to 8 July 2005
Somaliland Liaison Office, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa
+ 27 82 880 8603 E-mail: iqbal@unisa.ac.za
Issued by : The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Hargeisa, Republic of Somaliland, 8 July 2005
Source: http://www.jamhuuriya.info/ Jul 14, 2005
Amoud University, Faculty of Agriculture takes your career to new heights
Faculty of agriculture of Amoud University has already been opened and new courses will start in September, 2005. The University is situated 5 kilometer North East of Borama town. It composes of departments covering all aspects of agriculture for instance department of animal husbandry, department of agronomy, department of Agricultural Economics & Rural Sociology, department of Horticulture, department of crop protection, Department of Agricultural Engineering and Technology and Department of aquatic development.
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 182, July 16, 2005
Col. Abdillahi Yusuf Receives Another Blow
EDITORIAL
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 182, July 16, 2005
WE STAND WITH BRITAIN
EDITORIAL
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 182, July 16, 2005
President Rayale Condemns London Blasts
Hargeysa, July 9, 2005 (SL Times) - President, Dahir Rayale Kahin, yesterday sent a message of condolences to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the British government and people, following Thursday's blasts in London.
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 180, July 2, 2005
Somalilanders Hold A Successful Convention In LA
EDITORIAL
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 180, July 2, 2005
Somaliland, Countdown To The July Summit Of The AU
The fact-finding mission undertaken by the Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Patrick Mizimhaka
An exclusive Interview - The Sub-Saharan Informer
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 178, June 18, 2005
Who is worse Col. Abdillahi Yusuf or his supporters?
Editorial
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 176, June 4, 2005
Total's Action Is An All-Out War Against Somaliland's Economy
Berbera, Somaliland, June 4, 2005 (SL Times) - TOTAL, the oil company that provides oil to Somaliland, suddenly stopped selling oil to its customers on June 2nd 2005. Gas stations in Berbera and around the country and individual customers complained about TOTAL's behavior, and the absence of any information to explain their sudden decision to selling oil to the public.
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 178, June 18, 2005
The disgraceful end of the Somali conference in Kenya
Editorial
Haatuf News, Somaliland Times, Issue 176, June 4, 2005
A Norwegian National Supports Somaliland's Struggle To Rebuild its Country
I have just visited Hargeisa again, and it's always a pleasure to come back. Since my first visit in 1991, when everything was destroyed, and Yusuf Gaboobe was my guide, much has been achieved and I see great improvements each time I return.
Somaliland Times, Issue 176, June 4, 2005
Somaliland's self-inflicted wounds
Editorial
African Union Discusses Somaliland's Independence
Addis Ababa, May 14, 2005 (SL Times) - Somaliland's Independence was brought to the table after a fact-finding mission came recently to Somaliland on an official trip that lasted one week. It has been reported that the fact-finding mission's report was given to the AU's Chairman, . Alpha Omar Konare.
Somaliland Times, Issue 176, June 4, 2005
Somaliland's Diplomatic Progress and the President's Speech
Editorial
Col. Abdillahi Yusuf Asks US To Terminate The Trial Of Ali Samater
And Others Accused of Crimes Against Humanity
Hargeisa, Somaliland, May 14, 2005 (SL Times) - In a letter to the U.S Foreign Secretary, Col. Abdillahi Yusuf's homeless government-in-exile requested from the United States government the termination of the legal proceedings against Ali Samater and others accused of war crimes against humanity.
Source: http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/politics/events/palestine/Workshop%20Van%20Hear%20draft%20paper.pdf
Refugee return and reconstruction
after war: class, conflict and forced
migration in Sri Lanka
and Somaliland.
9-12 th June 2004, University of Exeter, UK.
(Draft Paper)
Nicholas Van Hear, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society
University of Oxford
Nicholas.vanhear@compas.ox.ac.uk
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Turton and Marsden 2003 Taking refugees for a ride..
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BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 12, 2005/Source: Radio HornAfrik, Mogadishu, in Somali 0500 gmt 12 Jul 05
c BBC Monitoring
SOMALI MINISTER BARRED FROM VISITING SOMALILAND CAPITAL
[Presenter] Security officers of the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland have turned away the minister of housing and public works of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Usman Hasan Ali [alias] Usman Ato from the airport in Hargeysa. The minister, who arrived there yesterday wanted to visit the town. Our reporter in Hargeysa Muhammad Rambo sent us this report this morning.
DJIBOUTI: Women fight mutilation
DJIBOUTI CITY, 12 Jul 2005 (IRIN) - For thousands of years, girls in the area that is now the tiny African country of Djibouti, have been subjected to pharaonic circumcision.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 12, 2005/SOURCE: The Somaliland Times website, Hargeysa, in English 9 Jul 05
Somaliland paper expresses solidarity with Britain following London blasts
Somalilanders were shocked and disgusted by the news of Thursday's [7 July] terrorist strike against the people of London. Killing innocent people is so abhorrent and unjustifiable, most Somalilanders here felt as though they had been violated by the blasts as well.
Africa News, July 9, 2005/BYLINE: The Republican
Somalia;President's Message of Condolence to Blair
President Dahir Rayale Kahin sent a message of condolence to British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressing his sincerest condolence and solidarity with the people of Great Britain against the series of terrorist attack in London, on Thursday.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring
July 9, 2005/SOURCE: Jamhuuriya, Hargeysa, in English 8 Jul 05
Somaliland: EU reconstruct bridges at 1.1m dollars
Seven out of ten bridges destroyed during the war for the reclamation of independence were rehabilitated by the European Union at the cost of 1m dollars in 5 months.Seven bridges destroyed in the war between the regime of the former dictator of Somalia, President Mohammed Siyad Barre and the Somali National Movement (SNM) which was struggling for the liberation of the former northern regions of Somalia (Somaliland) were officially opened on Wednesday [6 July], at a special ceremony held on Qoryale bridge, which is 60km east of Burco.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring
July 8, 2005/SOURCE: Radio Hargeysa in Somali 17:00 GMT, 8 Jul
Somaliland leader condemns London blasts, sends condolence message to Blair
The president of the republic of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kahin, has sent a message of condolences to the British prime minister, Tony Blair, the United Kingdom and the British people following yesterday's blasts in London.
Somalilandnet, Jul 04 2005
The 1st SSE International Conference
- United in making a difference: Somaliland Communities in Europe (Diaspora) and Somaliland: SOMALILAND SOCIETIES IN EUROPE (SSE)
- History: Survival, Reconciliation and Peace
- Present: Re-construction and Democracy
- Tomorrow: Development and Prosperity
1. Dr Iqbal Jhazbhay, a Senior Lecturer at the University of South Africa & serves on the ANC's Commission for Religious Affairs (Confirmed)
2. Professor Ioan Lewis of London School of Economics in London
(confirmed)
3. The Rt Hon Tony Worthington former member of parliament who was the Chairman of the British Parliamentary Delegation that visited Somaliland last year and held a very positive debate in British Parliament on 4th Feb 2004 - historic debate. (confirmed)
4. John Drysdale, Consultant and Writer (confirmed)
5. Vaughan Jones, Director of Praxis, London (confirmed)
6. Dr Christopher McDowell, Director of Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK, International Policy Institute, King's College London (t.b.c)
7. MS Edna Adan Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs (confirmed)
8. Ms Fowzia Yusuf Haji Aden, Director of Refugee Aid and Development, London (confirmed)
9. Professor Abdi Ismail (Duse), Former Dean of Somali Lafoole University and Prisoner of Consciousness. He is currently education, training and employment advisor and community leader in Canada (Confirmed)
10. Suleiman Nouh, Distinguished Architect, Businessman, Community Activist and former Prisoner of Consciousness (t.b.c)
11. Dr Mohamed-Rashid Hassan Director of African Renaissance Centre (confirmed)
12. Dr Ahmed Hussein Essa Director of The Institute of Practical Research and Training in Somaliland (confirmed)
13. Dr Adan Yusuf Abokor, Country Representative of CIIR in Somaliland and former prisoner of consciousness (confirmed)
14. Professor Said Mohamed Geise, Director of Somaliland Academy of Peace and Development (confirmed)
15. Yusuf Abdi Gabobe, Somaliland Journalist and Chairman of Hatuuf Media Network (confirmed)
- Migration, Immigration & Refugee Issues
- Displacement, Re-settlement and Reconstruction
- Human Rights, Governance and democracy
- Integration, Inclusion and Community Cohesion
- Gender Issues
- Voluntary Repatriation
- Capacity Building and Empowerment
- Transfer of Skills, Know-how and Knowledge
- Economic and Sustainable Development and Prosperity
- Freedom of Speech, Responsible Media and Society
- UK Government Departments: Home Office, Foreign Office, Departments of International Development, Department of Education and Employment
- Welsh Assembly Government
- Scottish Executive
- Local Authority Social Services
- Local Education Authorities and Youth Services
- Universities, Colleges and Schools
- Health Authorities
- Local Authorities Housing Departments, Hosing Associations
- Employment Services, Job Centres
- Career Services and Skills and Training Councils
- Race Equality Organiations and Councils
- Refugee Councils and Agencies
- Neighborhood Regeneration Partnerships
- Police and Probation Services
- Trade Unions, Employers Federation, Chamber of Commerce
- Professional Organisations and Charitable Foundations
- Multinational Companies and Investors
- United Nations Agencies: UNHCR, UNDP, UNDO, UNESCO, WHO, UNICEIF, etc
- African Union, Arab League, European Commission
- World Bank: International Financing Corporation
- NGOs and Development Agencies
- Voluntary and Community Organisations & Communities' Members
- Diplomats and Politicians
- Academicians, Researchers and Practitioners
- Learning about the fascinating history and culture of Somaliland people - past and present
- Learning about the strength and weakness of Somaliland communities in Europe and how you can be helped and supported
- Exploring and discussing challenges and opportunities facing Somaliland Communities and Somaliland
- Discussing the role Somaliland Diaspora could play in the development of Somaliland
- Exploring and developing ideas and concepts to improve the status quo to make a difference
- Networking, sharing and exchanging information with colleagues in your area of interest.
- Statutory Bodies & Agencies: o125 Per Day
- Voluntary Organisations: o85 per day
- Community Groups: o35 per day
Afrol News - Somaliland - 26 June, 2005
Mismanagement Of Somaliland Port Hinders Development
Great opportunities were opened to the famed deepwater port of Berbera in non-recognised Somaliland as Ethiopia needed a new outlet in the 1990s. Somaliland's revenues and geopolitical importance were to increase. Mismanagement and alleged corruption however is leading to declining government revenues as shipping companies avoid Berbera in favour of ports in Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan.