In a written press statement which was availed to Radio Hargeysa, he said Sool Region, which had been enjoying peace and stability for a long time, was today on the verge of being plunged into war because troops from the Majeertenia administration (Puntland administration) had invaded Laas Caanood town 10 days ago.

The tension caused by the Puntland troop's aggression may lead to military confrontations between Somaliland and Majeertenia. This, he said, would definitely lead to destruction and displacement of area residents.

The Speaker, therefore, appealed to the Majeertenia administration to pull out its soldiers from Laas Caanood with a view to maintaining calm.

The Speaker also appealed to the traditional leaders and intellectuals from the Sool Region to remain united and bolster security and stability in the region.

Source: Radio Hargeysa in Somali 1700 gmt 30 Dec 03

Arab League delegation says Somaliland stable, peaceful

A delegation comprising Arab League members, who visited the self-declared state of Somaliland, have said in communique they recently released that recent killings of foreign aid workers in Somaliland, do not have an impact on its security and said the state is stable and peaceful. They also said Somaliland had made good progress particularly in social affairs and cooperation between its communities.

Somalia: Puntland minister disowned for comments on dispute with Somaliland

The vice-president of the Puntland regional administration northeastern Somalia has issued a press statement in which he said the recent interview given by Puntland's state minister for interior Warsame Abdi Shire to the BBC Somali Service , to the effect that the Puntland administration is unaware of what is happening in Sool Region claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland , is a personal view.

"The political activities in Sool Region are part of Puntland politics and Sool Region is one of the affiliate zones of the Puntland regional administration," the vice-president said.

Meanwhile, the Puntland parliament held an extraordinary session yesterday afternoon in which it reiterated that the interview was a personal one and that Shire's views did not reflect the official views of Puntland. Passage omitted

Somaliland, Puntland continue troop build-up in disputed area

The reports further say the 600 soldiers are natives of the area, but loyal to President Dahir Riyale Kahin of Somaliland. The soldiers are being lead by a Somaliland minister, Yasin Mahmud Fartooyo. Our reporter in Laas Caanood confirmed to us this report.

The Somaliland minister of rural development, Fuad Adan Ade, also arrived in Laas Caanood town at about 3 a.m.

Latest reports from Laas Caanood say Puntland police are on a state of high alert and are advancing towards the base of the Somaliland troops in the area.

The Somaliland soldiers reportedly pulled out of their base when the Puntland police advanced on their base. The Puntland forces are being lead by Col Abdirizaq Afgaduud. The two rival forces are reportedly facing each other at Hargago Bridge, about eight kilometres out of the town. Passage omitted

Somaliland has begun operations "to defend itself" against Puntland - minister

Somaliland Speaker calls on Puntland to pull out troops from disputed town

The Speaker of the Republic of Somaliland's House of Representatives, Ahmad Muhammad, aka Adan Qaybe, has appealed to the Garoowe administration Puntland administration to pull out its aggression forces from Laas Caanood town Somaliland and Puntland disputed areas in order to avert any confrontations.

In a written press statement which was availed to Radio Hargeysa, he said Sool Region, which had been enjoying peace and stability for a long time, was today on the verge of being plunged into war because troops from the Majeertenia administration Puntland administration had invaded Laas Caanood town 10 days ago.

The tension caused by the Puntland troop's aggression may lead to military confrontations between Somaliland and Majeertenia. This, he said, would definitely lead to destruction and displacement of area residents.

The Speaker, therefore, appealed to the Majeertenia administration to pull out its soldiers from Laas Caanood with a view to maintaining calm.

The Speaker also appealed to the traditional leaders and intellectuals from the Sool Region to remain united and bolster security and stability in the region.

INDIAN POLICE IMPOUND "BILLIONS" OF COUNTERFEIT SOMALI CURRENCY

A police spokesman in Hyderabad told an Indian newspaper, The Electric Press, that the police had impounded billions of Somali counterfeit currency printed in India.

The money was stored in two huge stores, adding that they had also arrested some Indian men suspected of printing the money.

The police also impounded counterfeit Brazilian currency, which was also printed in India. Somalia's ambassador to India has said he was unaware of the matter but would soon contact the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for further information. (Passage omitted).

According to other reports, the impounded counterfeit money included Somaliland currency which was reportedly much more than the (southern) Somali counterfeit money.

PUNTLAND LEADER RULES OUT TALKS, DARES SOMALILAND TO ATTACK

Col Abdullahi said that the disputed regions are dominated by the Harti clan, which does not want to secede from Somalia. "I don't want to listen to an individual (presumably Somaliland President Riyale) who wants to divide the country into fiefdoms, and if he wants to launch an attack let him launch it," said Col Abdullahi Yusuf. (Passage omitted).

ARAB LEAGUE CHIEF HEARS FROM SOMALI FACT-FINDING PANEL

A statement by the Arab League media department said the committee urged the international community to achieve a comprehensive Somali reconciliation based on justice and equality. The committee's delegation reiterated during their meetings with the various Somali sides the Arab League's readiness to back development efforts in Somaliland.

The delegation delivered a shipment of medicines to Hargeisa hospitals offered by the Arab League. The Arab League has been exerting tireless efforts with the sides concerned, especially the UN Development Programme (UNDP), to lift the ban on exporting Somali livestock.

Somalia; WFP Delivers Desperately Needed Food in North

Humanitarian access to the region was guaranteed following extensive discussions on security issues between the WFP and the administrations of the self-declared republic Somaliland and the neighbouring self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, both of which claim the area. The Sool Plateau falls geographically within Somaliland, but most of the clans who live there are associated with neighbouring Puntland.

These negotiations had also opened up access to other humanitarian agencies, the statement added. WFP said it required 14,912 mt of food, worth about US $11.5 million, for the drought emergency operation and other projects in Somalia until the end of 2004.

SOMALIA'S PUNTLAND FORCES TAKE CONTROL OF SOMALILAND POLICE HQ IN DISPUTED AREA

The police never met any resistance during their operation and they arrested five people who were opposed to their operation.

Most of the local people welcomed the operation by the police inside the town, but many people are asking themselves how long they would stay, remembering earlier operations during which they (Puntland police) carried out similar operations in the region and then pulled out. (Passage omitted: background)

Somalia; WFP Food Aid Reaches Thousands of Drought-Affected Somalis in Sool Plateau

"We have managed to reach nearly 77,000 people affected by the most severe drought in the region for more than twenty years," said Robert Hauser, the WFP Country Director for Somalia. "We targeted those least able to cope ' malnourished children, the destitute, the disabled and the aged." In this first round of emergency food distributions WFP has delivered 732 tonnes of mixed food commodities to 39 villages in Somaliland, 15 of them through the Puntland port of Bossaso. It is enough to last the people about a month.

Humanitarian access to the region has been guaranteed following extensive discussions between WFP and the administrations of Somaliland and Puntland. These negotiations have also opened up access for other humanitarian agencies.

"We appreciate the security promises made by the two administrations," said Hauser, "They were essential for the peaceful and efficient completion of the distribution process."

Ironically, WFP's operation was hampered by very unusual rains that fell on Somalia at the beginning of December. Small delays were experienced as the trucks delivering the food were stuck in the mud.

"Thirty-two of the 39 villages we assisted were hit by the rain, but it was too late to relieve the food situation," said Hauser. "The downpour brought temporary relief to the water shortages, but 80 per-cent of the livestock the people here depend on have already died."

Capitalizing on this opportunity of safe access, a team from the United Nations Children's Fund is now carrying out a nutritional screening exercise. There are indications that the population's nutritional status is deteriorating. WFP is monitoring the situation very closely.

The operation in the Sool region could last up to six months and will cost an estimated US $ 7.8 million. Due to the urgency of the relief intervention on the Sool plateau, WFP Somalia has to use resources from other programmes.

"WFP is appealing to the international community for additional resources to compensate for spending on drought relief," said Hauser. "These other programmes - to support tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS patients as well as work in the fields of education and water -- cannot be left unresourced without human cost."

Overall, WFP requires 14,912 tonnes of food, worth about US $ 11.5 million, for the drought emergency and other projects in Somalia until the end of 2004. It has already received about US $ 2.7 million from the US government.

SOMALIA: PUNTLAND DEPLOYS TROOPS IN DISPUTED REGION TO FOIL SOMALILAND OFFENSIVE

Puntland soldiers armed with four armoured vehicles have left Garoowe (central Somalia, Puntland administrative HQ) and have reportedly arrived in Laas Caanood District, Sool region, to ward off Somaliland's military actions against Puntland administration in the region.

The move by the (Puntland) soldiers was said to be in response to a decision reached last night by the Somaliland administration to take new measures in regards to Sool and Sanaag (regions). Forty-two members Somaliland's House of Representatives reportedly voted for that decision which immediately sparked off the military activity of the Puntland soldiers. Puntland administration aims to repel Somaliland soldiers if Somaliland government fulfils its decision against the regions of Sool and Sanaag regions.

(The Somaliland House of Representatives voted on 21 December in favour of taking military action against Puntland militia recently deployed in Sool and Sanaag regions. The two regions in northeastern Somalia were part of former Somaliland British Protectorate but have been claimed by Puntland leader Col Abdullahi Yusuf on the basis of clan affiliations between the inhabitants of the regions and those in Puntland. The Somaliland president Dahir Riyale Kahin has been accused in the past of being soft on Puntland).

SOMALILAND POLICE INTERCEPT ETHIOPIAN REBELS REPORTEDLY TRAINED IN ERITREA

According to police sources, a number of suspects have already confessed that all members of their group belonged to the Ogaden National Liberation Movement, an armed militia group fighting the Ethiopian government in areas inhabited by the Ogaden clan in the Somali (Regional) State of Ethiopia known as Zone 5. Though police investigations are still under way, all those who had been interrogated, so far, confessed that they underwent military training in Eritrea and came to Somaliland via Djibouti.

According to sources close to the police, the suspects were among the first batch of ONLF combatants to graduate from Kalena and Addis Maskal (names as published) training camps in Eritrea. Between 700 and 1,200 ONLF recruits were receiving training at the two camps. The batch consisting of 100 men divided into three sub-groups had planned to infiltrate into Ethiopia through Djibouti and then Somaliland. At least one of the remaining two sub-groups, made up of 33 men each, was confirmed to have left Hargeysa for the Ethiopian border by end of last month.

However, shortly after crossing into Ethiopia on the night of 27 November, this sub-group was intercepted within the vicinity of Bali-Gubadle village, about 80 km south of Hargeysa. In the ensuing fighting, two ONLF insurgents were reportedly killed while another two were taken prisoner. A group of nomads from the area were believed to have joined the fighting along side the Ethiopian security forces. One of the nomads was confirmed dead while another was wounded.

It was not yet known whether the Ethiopian regular security forces had taken any casualties as a result of the clash. The remaining ONLF fighters (30) managed to escape by going south into Zone Five's hinterland. They were again intercepted at Dusmo, about 200 km south of Hargeysa, located between Aware and Dega Bur. The Ethiopians were reported to have lost six men in this clash. Dusmo is located in an area inhabited by members of the Ogaden clan.

Ordinary Somalilanders were shocked by the news that the ONLF was using Somaliland territories for staging infiltration operations. They were also angered by the ONLF chairman's statement on Tuesday (9 December) that his group will respond to the Hargeysa arrests by taking reprisals against Somaliland nomads in Zone 5. Though the Ogaden co-inhabit Zone 5 with other Somali groups, the ONLF chairman claimed that the whole territory belonged only to members of his clan.

Already a number of Isaq men were reported to have been killed by Ogadeni insurgents in various parts of Zone 5. The ONLF chairman (Mr Muhammad Umar Uthman) who lives in London, was interviewed by the BBC Somali Service on Tuesday. He served under the regime of Somalia's former dictator, Siyad Barre, in the position of admiral of the Somali navy.

Weekly says Somaliland-Ethiopia security pact serving latter's interests only

Somaliland getting hostile treatment owing to ties with Ethiopia

Because of its genuine desire to have peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with Ethiopia, Somaliland has earned the animosity of certain quarters, inside and outside this region, that furiously oppose Ethiopia. The Al-Ittihad Somali Islamist group -Ogaden National Liberation Front ONLF alliance, nurtured and supported by the forces of international terror, is one good example of such quarters. This alliance, as the ONLF chairman, Mr Muhammad Umar Uthman, pointed out during an interview with the BBC Somali Service on Tuesday 6 December , has always viewed Somaliland's cooperation with Ethiopia on security matters as constituting a major stumbling block against their plans.

Somaliland is also being victimized by totalitarian Arab regimes, particularly those of Egypt, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Syria, not only for having withdrawn from the 1960 union with Somalia, but also for taking a pro-Ethiopian stance since declaring independence in 1991. Driven by extremist ideologies, greed and the desire to exercise hegemony over others, the above Arab governments are working overtime on various schemes to force Somaliland to rejoin Somalia.

For Egypt, the re-emergence of a strong Somalia state (to be made up of Somaliland and Somalia) would give Egypt an ally on the eastern border of Ethiopia, in case of a conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt over the waters of the Nile. The Saudi involvement serves to deflect criticism that the kingdom's wealthy rulers do not care about poor Arabs. It is also an opportunity for Saudi Arabia not to cede Arab leadership to Egypt, with the added advantage that there are no real costs to be paid.

For Djibouti, opposing Somaliland's independence means getting more money from Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf states. The Ba'athist regime in Syria supports the concept of greater Somalia because paying lip service to Arab unity is part of its strategy of survival. For Libyan leader Mu'ammar al- Qadhafi, recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state would seem a bad omen for starting his grand project of seeking the creation of the union of African states.

Somalilanders torn between gratitude and resentment of Ethiopia

Most of Somaliland's people harbour feelings of gratitude towards Ethiopia because of the support it gave to Somaliland's liberation struggle during the 80s, when other Somalis were trying to slaughter as many Somalilanders as possible. Ethiopia hosted hundreds of thousands of Somaliland refugees who lived there after fleeing genocide. The present Ethiopian government, which has been in power since 1991, has shown sympathy and understanding towards Somaliland's quest for recognition.

But despite all of these positive factors, there is growing disappointment among Somalilanders about the Ethiopian government's reluctance to widen the scope of relations between the two countries beyond the current level that is largely confined to cooperation on security matters. Somalilanders cannot understand why the same Ethiopian government, which allowed Eritrea to secede and become independent, is not forthcoming when it comes to recognizing Somaliland, which from a strictly legal standpoint has a stronger case for being recognized as a sovereign state.

There is no doubt that Ethiopia itself has frequently come under external pressure to persuade it against going ahead with Somaliland's recognition. Somalia's warlords such as Abdiqasim Salad Hasan president, Transitional National Government, TNG never seem to tire of accusing Ethiopia of trying to dismember the non-existent state of Somalia. But while Somaliland has not relented in the face of external pressure, the Ethiopian side has comparatively shown a tendency of yielding to blackmail at the expense of its long-term strategic interests in the region. Hence the new argument now that Somaliland could perhaps be better off if it took a neutral position with regard to regional affairs.

Proponents of this argument view the Somaliland-Ethiopian security cooperation as an arrangement that tends to serve one side's interests - Ethiopia's. They cite the assassination attempt carried out in Laascaanood by Abdullahi Yusuf Puntland leader against Somaliland's president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, as a typical example of the Ethiopian government's insensitivity towards Somaliland's concerns. They argue that Abdullahi Yusuf who is fed, clothed and armed by Ethiopia, should have received a harsh response from the Ethiopian government.

The Ethiopian government's decision to close informal trading activities at the border towards the end of last year has also made many Somalilanders even more confused as to the real intentions of the Ethiopian side. And in the aftermath of the recent arrests of ONLF fighters in Hargeysa, the question being widely asked these days is why should Somaliland bother itself with the security of anyone when everyone else, especially its neighbours, are unwilling to recognize and respect the basic aspirations of Somaliland's people to be the masters of their destiny and live in peace in their own independent country.

It is in Ethiopia's interests that this new argument does not become the dominant one in Somaliland; and the best way to ensure that it does not is to start addressing Somaliland's concerns.

Looming Crisis As Drought Hits Parts of Northern Somalia

"All berkads (water reservoirs) are dry and many bore-holes are inoperable. Pasture is extremely poor in almost all areas," says the report, which is an assessment of the Sool Plateau and Gebi Valley, in the Sool and Sanaag regions.

The report, made available to AANA by the UN-OCHA-Somalia Mission, says that cumulative livestock losses have decimated herds and rendered them unproductive.

Camels, which are used in this region for mobility as well as for milk supply, are particularly affected.

Herds have been reduced by about 60-70 percent, reducing the chances of survival of the nomadic pastoral populations to a critical point.

In a telephone interview with AANA after his arrival from a mission in Somalia, the head of UN-OCHA-Somalia Mission, Calum McLean, revealed that "an estimated 93,000 people are currently affected by the drought."

"Their animals are fast being wiped out, and UN agencies have already sent out food appeals," he added.

The UN official added that both the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), were already delivering humanitarian aid.

Somaliland: Finance minister said paid "secret" trip to Djibouti

The Somaliland government did not issue any official communique on the minister's visit but there is a strong suspicion that the minister was bearing some special errand for the President Dahir Riyale. As is known, the minister was a member of the delegation which accompanied Riyale to Djibouti. The report stipulates that the minister of finance routinely is engaged in "foreign affairs" diplomacy work, if prove of this can be his recent participation of the IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Conference in Uganda. While his dispatch to Uganda arguably is justified by the fact that the foreign minister was then out of the country, Awil's secret slip into Djibouti is seen to be very odd given the fact that the foreign minister, Edna Adan Ismail, is in the country.

In a recent talk with Sub-Saharan Informer of Addis Ababa, the minister advised that the Somali so-called reconciliation meetings be held in Somaliland. In this talk, the minister emphasized benefits for Somaliland in bettering relations with neighbouring countries, especially Djibouti. The minister's "advice" was echoed by an obscure Somaliland parliamentarian (Abdi Si'id Fahiye) who also was part of the President's delegation to Djibouti. This MP, who hails from the same tribe as that of the Djibouti President, attacked Ethiopia which he accused of hijacking the Somali conference in Nairobi. He argued that the meetings of Somali groups would be successful if they take place under the auspices of Djibouti and Somaliland.

Earlier, upon their return from a visit to the USA, South Korea and Britain, Somaliland Foreign Minister Edna Adan Isma'il and Commerce and Industry Minister Muhammad Hashi Elmi denied rumours to the effect of planned resignation from President Dahir Riyale's cabinet. The two ministers also refuted allegations that they were unhappy with President Riyale's administration and that policy differences existed.

Ms Edna was the loudest in her denial saying that she will never resign. Many people, who are proud of Edna's achievements and are aware of her special position in Riyale's otherwise mostly mediocre cabinet, were somehow taken aback by the foreign minister's caustic remarks. While in London, the foreign minister issued a statement with regard to the killings of the foreign aid workers in Somaliland. The minister's statements were later rudely rebuffed by Somaliland's outlandish interior minister who almost called her a liar. Now, if the emerging diplomatic activities of Awil gather momentum, there will be less and less for Marwo Edna to handle in the annals of Somaliland's foreign policy.

Whether the proud Edna Adan Dhakhtar will put up with more humiliation will have to be seen.

Somaliland Government Watch, Oslo.

Alarming drought in Somalia

Four years of failing rain have resulted in the worst drought since 1974 in the Sool region, reports Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) representatives' in Somalia. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently granted USD 450 000 to NPA's relief work in the Somalian Sool region.

The Sool Plateau has been badly affected by the drought through several years. The local pastoralists are totally dependent on their livestock to survive. They move with their animals to wherever they can find water and pasture. The situation is now alarming.

NPA has received unconfirmed reports of the first human deaths. The hospital in Los Anod reports that the patients are weak and malnourished. Most of the livestock have perished as a result of dry pastures and water shortage, or they have been sold in distress. The short rains have failed again this fall like it has for four years now. Consequently the water reservoirs have dried out. The few boreholes in the area are operating day and night unable to meet the demand of water. As a result the water price has increased by 600 per cent, a price totally out of range for the local pastoralists.

The grant from The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps facilitating water transportation into the affected areas. NPA also builds boreholes and rehabilitates wells by digging deeper and securing them from contamination.

For more information contact: Oystein Botillen, Advisor Horn of Africa Programme, telephone: + 00 47 22 03 77 93

SOMALIA: Money transfer companies form association

According to a UN Development Programme (UNDP) press statement, the two-day conference was an opportunity for both international regulators and the remittance companies to discuss obstacles facing the sector.

The new body, which is supported by UNDP, brings together 14 money transfer companies "and aims to provide both advocacy and technical support to the industry while also serving as a conduit between members and authorities in foreign countries on issues such as legislation".

"Remittance companies are the largest employers in Somalia," SFSA Secretary General Muhammed Jirdeh Hussein was quoted as saying. "They also handle millions of dollars belonging to the Somali people. We thought it important to set up a supervisory and accountable authority which would also develop a code of conduct and best practices for the industry."

After the 11 September terror attacks, Somali money transfer companies came under international scrutiny and the biggest company Barakat was shut down after the US government accused it of links with terror groups - a charge vehemently denied by the company.

According to the UN, money transfer companies remit approximately US $750 million annually into the country from Somalis living in the Diaspora.

In a recent interview, Abdirashid M Duale, head of Dahab Shiil, currently the largest money transfer company, told IRIN, a significant number of the transactions relate to investments, commerce and social development projects initiated in the region. For the Somali business sector, remittance companies are the main gateway to the rest of the world.

"Remittances into Somalia help to avert humanitarian crises," said UNDP Somalia Resident Representative Maxwell Gaylard. "The Association will help safeguard this lifeline into Somalia and contribute to the development of the economy and the capacity of those who drive it."

Somaliland: People in drought-stricken regions said on verge of starvation

Frustrated by the lack of an early response to its repeated appeals for humanitarian aid, the Somaliland government has taken some practical steps towards assisting the drought victims in the worst affected areas. An initial fund of 160 million shillings (roughly 20,000 dollars) was made available by the authorities to cover fuel purchases for the bore-hole generators and tankers needed to transport water and other relief aid supplies, such as food and medicine. This is not a mean feat for an administration whose annual national budget stands at around 20m dollars. The Somaliland Civic Forum for Peace, which brings together a diverse group of organizations and individuals, has also raised 10,000 dollars in support of emergency aid for the worst hit victims. Efforts are also under way to tap both the public and private sectors for more resources in the next few days, not to mention the Diaspora as a potential source of support.

Despite the significance of these local initiatives in combating the drought, it has been obvious from the beginning that it was beyond the capacity of Somaliland alone to deal with a humanitarian crisis of such a devastating magnitude. That is why Somaliland has issued four different appeals in the course of this year alone for urgent international assistance for drought victims.

Had there been a much earlier response to the crisis on the part of both the government and aid organizations, the present catastrophic situation could have been averted to a considerable extent. The humanitarian situation is so bad that there is no room for arguments as to who really should bear the blame for the lack of a quick response to the drought. What is needed now is for the international community to act by providing an urgent humanitarian assistance for saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of women, children, and men who are on the verge of starvation.

Priority should be given to meeting the needs of the currently worst affected areas, but the situation in other parts of the country must be closely monitored with the aim of reducing the vulnerability of people there before it becomes too late.

The Somaliland society has never been dependent on foreign aid and it certainly does not intend to become so. Somalilanders have always helped one another in times of hardship. The present drought is yet another trying challenge that they must overcome through solidarity, the sharing of resources, and helping each other. The international community should also do its part.

SOMALILAND POLICE INTERCEPT ETHIOPIAN REBELS REPORTEDLY TRAINED IN ERITREA

According to police sources, a number of suspects have already confessed that all members of their group belonged to the Ogaden National Liberation Movement, an armed militia group fighting the Ethiopian government in areas inhabited by the Ogaden clan in the Somali (Regional) State of Ethiopia known as Zone 5. Though police investigations are still under way, all those who had been interrogated, so far, confessed that they underwent military training in Eritrea and came to Somaliland via Djibouti.

According to sources close to the police, the suspects were among the first batch of ONLF combatants to graduate from Kalena and Addis Maskal (names as published) training camps in Eritrea. Between 700 and 1,200 ONLF recruits were receiving training at the two camps. The batch consisting of 100 men divided into three sub-groups had planned to infiltrate into Ethiopia through Djibouti and then Somaliland. At least one of the remaining two sub-groups, made up of 33 men each, was confirmed to have left Hargeysa for the Ethiopian border by end of last month.

However, shortly after crossing into Ethiopia on the night of 27 November, this sub-group was intercepted within the vicinity of Bali-Gubadle village, about 80 km south of Hargeysa. In the ensuing fighting, two ONLF insurgents were reportedly killed while another two were taken prisoner. A group of nomads from the area were believed to have joined the fighting along side the Ethiopian security forces. One of the nomads was confirmed dead while another was wounded.

It was not yet known whether the Ethiopian regular security forces had taken any casualties as a result of the clash. The remaining ONLF fighters (30) managed to escape by going south into Zone Five's hinterland. They were again intercepted at Dusmo, about 200 km south of Hargeysa, located between Aware and Dega Bur. The Ethiopians were reported to have lost six men in this clash. Dusmo is located in an area inhabited by members of the Ogaden clan.

Ordinary Somalilanders were shocked by the news that the ONLF was using Somaliland territories for staging infiltration operations. They were also angered by the ONLF chairman's statement on Tuesday (9 December) that his group will respond to the Hargeysa arrests by taking reprisals against Somaliland nomads in Zone 5. Though the Ogaden co-inhabit Zone 5 with other Somali groups, the ONLF chairman claimed that the whole territory belonged only to members of his clan.

Already a number of Isaq men were reported to have been killed by Ogadeni insurgents in various parts of Zone 5. The ONLF chairman (Mr Muhammad Umar Uthman) who lives in London, was interviewed by the BBC Somali Service on Tuesday. He served under the regime of Somalia's former dictator, Siyad Barre, in the position of admiral of the Somali navy.

Moving stories: Ayaan Hirsi Ali

Ayaan Hirsi Ali is an MP for the Liberal Party in the Netherlands, with a brief on immigration. Originally from Somalia, she fled to Holland after her father attempted to arrange a marriage for her.

I left Somalia when I six-years-old. I lived in Saudi Arabia for one year, in Ethiopia for one and a half years, in Kenya for 11 years, and I live in the Netherlands now.

If I were to say the things that I say now in the Dutch Parliament in Somalia, I would be killed I left Kenya because my father had chosen someone for me to marry. He wanted me to go to Canada, where this man lived. On my way to Canada I made a stop in Germany. I didn't agree with this marriage, so I didn't take the plane - I took the train to Holland. You can say I ran away. When I had finished learning the Dutch language, I thought I would like to go and study. I came from a continent which is torn apart by civil war, and I wanted to understand that.

I took political science in college, and that's how I got involved with learning about power, about governments, about institutions, about citizenship - what makes Europe Europe, and what makes developing countries what they are now. I wanted to understand - I came from a country in civil war, and I really wanted to understand why we had civil war and why it was peaceful and prosperous here. I am now a member of parliament for the Liberal Party. My subjects - my portfolio - include the migration of non-Western migrants to the Netherlands, the emancipation of women, and development aid to developing countries. Unfortunately I cannot do this line of work in my country of birth.

Somalia is made up of a population which is 100% Muslim. The radical leanings of a huge number of the population is unfortunately growing, and the position of the Somali woman has never been worse than it is now. If I were to say the things that I say now in the Dutch Parliament in Somalia, I would be killed. I wish I could go back, and I would love to go back, even if it's just to see my parents and brother. But I can't go back, because the situation is that I have said things about the Islamic religion, I have said things about my past, I have said things about the Prophet Mohammed and his message about women. By saying these things, I think I would be seeking danger if I went back to Somalia. I'm not intimidated by the threats and the attempts to make me shut my mouth, because living in a rich western European country like this one, I have protection that I otherwise would not have in Somalia or in Africa or in any other Islamic country. So I am going to make use of this huge opportunity - that I am protected and I can say what I want, that it gets published and spread, and that I am a voice in parliament for these women. That's something that people forget, because that means you change the rights of women here. They have these rights, but you make sure they are implemented. I would not change that. I think I wouldn't be able to do that in another country, and I'm not going to allow people to intimidate me. I have memories - my parents lived there, and I have good memories of the weather, of food, of how as a child I played. In a way I identify my childhood with my place of birth. I think that's just about it.

Somaliland traffic police commandant shot dead in Hargeysa

SOMALILAND: SOME 4,660 ILLEGAL ALIENS LEAVE IN 10 DAYS

Mr Muhammad Usman Dayib also said the people departed from Burco, Tog Wajaale (on southwestern Somaliland-Ethiopia border), and Hargeysa airport.

The immigration official asked the remaining (illegal) foreigners to quickly leave the country before the expiry of the stipulated period.

Somaliland extends deadline for illegal immigrants to leave

Reports say the extension follows a request from those affected by the order who sought to have more time to facilitate their departure.

It is worth recalling that on 13 October the Somaliland government gave foreigners living illegaly in the country 45 days to leave. This deadline would have expired on 8 December.

Somaliland minister opens BBC training course for journalists in Hargeysa

The BBC training course will run for two word indistinct. The aim of the course is to improve the journalistic standards of the media.

In his opening remarks, Abdullahi Muhammad Du'ale, the information minister, urged the participants, including those from Somalia, to benefit from the course.

Among the participants at the two-day course are directors of media outlets.

The head of the BBC World Service Trust, Mr Chris Greene, said the project would run for two years as heard and would be held in various other places. He said the course was designed for journalists with a higher level of training.

The function was attended by the ministers of interior, justice, the Somaliland envoy to South Africa, some members of parliament and officials of other organs of the state.

SOMALILAND: MINISTER DENIES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZING PEACE CONFERENCE FOR SOMALIA

Mr Awil was reported to have said the Somaliland government was involved in plans to organize a peace conference for warring Somali factions. The newspaper report said the minister had said his government had the blessings of the President of Djibouti Isma'il Omar Guelleh with whom they had discussed the matter.

Mr Awil who is on a working visit to Burco, Toghdeer Regional HQ, spoke with Jamhuuriya and vehemently refuted Al-Khalij's story which has been widely reported on some Internet websites. The story has generated distrust and debate in Somaliland.

He said he had not had an interview with Al-Khalij and the report was a fabrication by enemies of Somaliland on a smear campaign against Somaliland. He pointed an accusing finger at Puntland (passage omitted).

SOMALILAND: MILITARY COMMANDERS RESHUFFLED

SOMALILAND TRAFFIC POLICE COMMANDANT SHOT DEAD IN HARGEYSA

Somaliland: President, cabinet discuss recent attacks on foreign workers

At least two Somaliland MPs seek political asylum in UK

BBC TRAINING TO CONDUCT COURSE FOR SOMALI JOURNALISTS IN HARGEYSA

Thirteen journalists, among them radio directors and editors of the independent newspapers will begin a training course in Hargeysa (Somaliland) on 8 December. The journalists and the head of BBC Training held a discussion which went well about how the course will be conducted, the subjects to be taught and the benefits of the course. The two sides reached an agreement on how the course will be conducted.

Meanwhile, a separate meeting took place between the deputy minister and director-general of the Ministry of Information, Abdishakur Adan Mire and the head of BBC Training and the two agreed that another course for Puntland journalists should be held in Boosaaso after the one in Hargeysa.

Cabinda & Somaliland - A Comparative Study for Statehood & Independence

There are no serious wars afoot in Somalia and those humanitarian crises which arise from time to time are manageable. There is, however, a hidden factor known to those who have experienced it - the impact on the mind of statelessness. (Drysdale 2000: 175) [Cabinda's politicians] cite the historical and geographical arguments for independence - but at heart, their complaints are about poverty and deprivation. (Pearce 2002: 4)

Introduction

On opposite sides of the African continent, two nations are striving to be recognized by the international community as independent states. The Cabindan enclave, a former Portuguese colony, now a geographically detached northern province belonging to Angola, has been involved in an armed struggle for secession from Angola for decades through its rebel group, FLEC. Somaliland, the north-west region of Somalia, known until 1960 as British Somaliland, declared its own independence in 1991, but is yet to be recognized by anyone other than its own citizens. This paper compares the respective claims of Cabinda and Somaliland for official independent status.

For the purposes of comparison, I will use as a starting point Somaliland's claim. It provides a solid foundation for evaluation in that its secessionist movement is wellmanaged, relatively peaceful and, in a sense, complete. All that is lacking is international recognition of the self-declared republic: the movement is so advanced and credible that the question to be confronted now is whether or not there actually remain any viable alternatives to Somaliland's being recognized as an independent state. Cabinda, about which much less has been written or researched, and whose movement for independence is both less well-organized and less advanced, though I would argue no less credible, will in effect constitute the focus of what follows. Its claim remains far more ambiguous.

Somaliland: a history

Today's Somaliland was first established as a territory by the British towards the end of the nineteenth century. From 1884 until 1960, it was a British protectorate in which the British took very little interest and whose administration of it could better be described as `benign neglect' (ICG 2003, 3), showing little interest in the territory's economic development. The British system of indirect rule, which kept the number of British colonial officials to a minimum, allowed the traditional clan-based systems of authority to remain effectively unaltered. Importantly, British Somaliland was throughout this period a clearly separate entity to the Italian-administered Somaliland (Somalia) to the south (see Figure 1), except for a brief seven-month period from August 1940, when British Somaliland fell into Italian hands and was for that brief period incorporated into the Italian East African Empire (ICG 2003).

The United Nations General Assembly had set 1960 as the date for Somalia's independence, to follow a ten-year period of Italian Trusteeship, but no thought had been given to Somaliland's decolonization. It was more by accident and convenience, as well as in response to some Somali pressure, that the British came to coordinate the schedule for Somaliland's independence with that of Somalia. Thus, in 1960, on the condition that the traditional clan leaders convey their support, the British officially agreed to grant Somaliland its independence (ICG 2003).

Somaliland's sovereignty was immediately recognized by a number of foreign governments; however, its freedom as a state in its own right was short-lived. Five days after Somaliland's incarnation, Somalia received its independence also, and, "in a spirit of pan-Somali nationalism" (BBC 2001a), the two former Somali colonies merged to form the United Republic of Somalia. With one swift stroke, through a meeting of the legislatures of the two territories in a joint session in Mogadishu, Somaliland was erased from the international map (ICG 2003).

The spirit of harmony and Somali nation-building zeal, which had created the new Somalia, did not last long. The north soon became frustrated by what they perceived as a southern domination of the new government. There is no doubt that the new unification was an iniquitous one, with the rapid establishment of a core-periphery relationship between the south and the north; Mogadishu, as the capital, in the south, assumed the role of centre, consigning Somaliland to an existence as a distant northern province (BBC 2001a). The Somaliland region therefore received a disproportionately small representation in the new parliament, while the posts of President and Prime Minister and the main ministerial portfolios of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior were all held by southerners (ICG 2003). Thus, "the unhappy marriage of north and south. soured from the very moment of its consummation" (Bryden 1994, 36).

Here, then, we have a very clear picture of two separate entities, thrust together in an optimistic attempt to build a nation - an "imagined political community", as Benedict Anderson (1991) would articulate it. Anderson cites Gellner, who, in his Thought and Change, states that "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (Anderson 1991, 6). A broad Somali nation never existed prior to decolonization; the United Republic of Somalia falls directly into Anderson's `imagined' category. Furthermore, the project of building the new nation - of consolidating the invention - did not last long before imagination, at least in the north, began to fail. By 1961, "the dream of Somali unity was already losing its sheen" (Bryden 1994, 36). In June, a national referendum on the new unitary constitution failed to gain majority support in the north, but was carried by greater numbers in the more denselypopulated south (Bryden 1994). Whatever enthusiasm for unity may have existed in the north had lasted no longer than a year.

In 1969, General Mohamed Siyaad Barre, with the aid of the military, staged a coup d'etat and seized power. Initial optimism that a military takeover would improve what was an ailing and corrupt civilian administration, was soon replaced by public disillusionment of the increasingly brutal nature of the regime (ICG 2003). It was in the former British Somaliland that this disaffection was most keenly felt - in its peripheral location (both geographically and politically), the region was economically neglected under Barre (as it was under British administration). The ICG (2003) suggests that the discriminatory economic policies might have been aimed at restricting the influence of the wealthy Isaaq (clan) trading community.

In the early 1980s, opposition to Siyaad Barre's military regime began to emerge, with the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the north. The SNM was a guerilla group consisting of members of the Isaaq clan whose aim was to fight southern rule generally and Barre's exclusionary rule in particular. Government forces responded brutally to offensives launched by SNM in the late 1980s, in an attempt to crush the separatist rebel movement - the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burco were bombarded and virtually razed to the ground. Schools were targeted and essential services rendered inaccessible. 50,000 died as a result of the attempted suppression of the SNM and more than half a million northerners were forced to flee across the border into Ethiopia (BBC 2001a).

In 1989, the SNM gained allies with the formation of southern Somali factions opposed to the Barre regime. Their advances in and around Mogadishu in early 1991 forced Barre to flee the capital, enabling the SNM to stage a successful offensive in the northwest that reclaimed Hargeisa, brought an end to the regime and provided the opportunity and momentum for the northwest to break away from Somalia (ICG 2003). In order to chart a course for the future, the SNM met in Burco in April of 1991, it having been already agreed by elders from clans across the northwest that the 1960 unification with the south should come under review. Radio reports broadcast during the meeting, however, suggested that the SNM were prepared to attempt reconciliation with southern leaders. Upon hearing these reports, crowds of civilians and soldiers surrounded the congress hall where the SNM meeting was being held to demand secession. Thus it was that on May 18th 1991 the northwest assembly unanimously passed a declaration of independence, reclaiming the sovereignty it had held so briefly then surrendered over thirty years before (Bryden 1994).

In the years that followed its self-declaration of independence, Somaliland overcame an initial period of internal clan-based violence to reach power-sharing treaties between rival clan members. In 1993, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal was elected president by a council of elders (BBC 2001a). Since Egal's election, and following his endorsement of a liberal economic regime, Somaliland has managed to achieve a level of stability not seen in the rest of Somalia. John Drysdale, a former adviser to the UN operation in Somalia in 1992-93, claimed in 1995 that Somaliland "is the only country in this region [the Horn of Africa] that really works" (The Economist 1995), and Hargeisa is said to be one of the safest cities on the continent (BBC 2001c). Yet for all its democratic and economic progress, and despite a well-run independence referendum in 2001, in which Somaliland voters overwhelmingly supported secession from Somalia (BBC 2001b), the international community still refuses to recognize Somaliland's independent status. The Somali government was strongly opposed to the referendum, while the African Union and UN have thrown their support behind Somalia's new administration, even though its control spreads barely beyond a few areas of the capital Mogadishu (BBC 2001c). It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that Somaliland is worth doing business with and that its considerable economic and political progress as a `new state' is being held back by its lack of official status and its attachment to the conflict-torn and economic shell of a state that is Somalia in the south, which has been without a functioning central government since the downfall of Barre's regime in 1991 (WSP 2001).

Somaliland: an increasingly credible claim for international recognition

The African Union's opposition to Somaliland's independence is founded on the belief that the unity and territorial integrity of its member states is sacrosanct, in accordance with the 1963 charter of the Organization for African Unity - Article II, 1c (African Union 2003). The unity and territorial integrity of the unified Somali Republic, however, is "an increasingly abstract notion" (ICG 2003, i). When the world speaks of the `Somalia Crisis', it refers to the inability of Somalia to form a government acceptable to the international community (Drysdale 2000). This can not be said of Somaliland.

Drysdale cites an independent observer quoted in The Economist who claims that "the country [Somaliland] has an administration that is certainly no worse than that of many African countries" (2000, 163). It has a president, a vice-president, a bicameral parliament and constitution, ministries, a structured and functioning civil service, a judiciary separate from the executive, hard currency and no chronic balance-of-payment problems. The real measure of a country's suitability for recognition, however, appears to be whether or not it is able to satisfy the world community that the state's official representatives truly represent the will of their constituents (Drysdale 2000). While Somaliland's democratization process is not yet complete, significant progress has been made, and there is more to come. Between December 2002 and April 2003, the people voted in local elections and again in a presidential poll, both of which were widely described as open and transparent. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place by early 2005, where opposition parties will be able to contest parliamentary seats. It is this phase of Somaliland's democratization that may prove to be most critical (ICG 2003).

As far is John Drysdale is concerned "it is not fair nor reasonable that a decision on Somaliland's relations with the world community should be deferred indefinitely until Somalia has put its own house in order" (2000, 183). While the international community has been waiting in vain for Somalia to meet its obligation to form a government that is acceptable to the UN and with which Somaliland could reasonably enter into negotiations, he argues, Somaliland has been penalized for far too long. Drysdale is in a position to know. In the latter half of the 1990s, following his stint as an adviser to the UN in Somalia, he had considerable influence with Somaliland's president, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal. Drysdale split with the UN as a result of its inability to understand the political, clan-based complexities of Somalia (The Economist 1995).

The ways in which Somaliland has been penalized through its lack of status are many and varied. They range from its citizens being unable to obtain travel documents (such as passports), to the acute anguish of statelessness - the feeling of rejection which erodes national self-esteem and challenges national consciousness (Drysdale 2000). In 1998, Somaliland endured a 16-month ban on the import of its livestock by Saudi Arabia, its chief market. The ban was imposed because Somaliland's vet certificates, giving animals a clean bill of health, are not internationally recognized (The Economist 1999). The export of livestock forms the backbone of the Somaliland economy, providing about 90% of its export earnings - nearly US$175 million per year (ICG 2003); however, Somaliland was in no position to argue with its biggest importer, given that Saudi Arabia is firm friends with the transitional government in Somalia (The Economist 2001), which of course opposes official recognition of Somaliland's independence.

Somaliland is unable to attract foreign investment without recognition, and so its rich seams of coal (and, in all likelihood, the vast reserves of oil beneath its desert) can not be brought to the surface. The nation is largely reliant on the goodwill of neighbours and of aid donors who provide it with money unofficially, bypassing the usual host-donor government contracts (The Economist 2001). Somaliland is therefore a nation with very little control over its own destiny and well-being, susceptible to sudden debilitating collapses in government revenue and consequent widespread poverty.

With administrative and democratic structures in place that, although not perfect, appear to justify Somaliland's being granted sovereign independence, perhaps the last remaining obstacle is its cross-border security issue, security being of prime concern to the donor community (Drysdale 2000). Both Puntland, the northeast region of Somalia, and Djibouti to the west, have in recent times made claims to bordering regions of Somaliland. But as Drysdale (2000) explains, neither claim has historical justification - both reflect the joint opposition by Puntland and Djibouti to diplomatic recognition of Somaliland. In a sense, this is the price Somaliland is paying for its success. If Somaliland were to become a sovereign independent state, its port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, which is in competition with Djibouti and Puntland's Bosaso (see Figure 1), would become progressively more competitive. It is therefore not in the interest of either Djibouti or Puntland to make Somaliland's transition into full statehood a smooth one (Drysdale 2003). While Djibouti's reassertion of political interest in the western region of Awdal was hardly direct, the transgression in 1999 of armed police from Puntland into Sanaag, an eastern region of Somaliland that Puntland had laid claim to in the past (Drysdale 2000), is a reassertion that should be taken more seriously. The International Crisis Group's July 2003 Report, "Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents", identifies the problem of how to deal with the Sool and eastern Sanaag regions (see Figure 1) as the last serious stumbling block beyond successful parliamentary multi-party elections. Overall, however, the report recommends that the international community must "develop pragmatic responses to Somaliland's demand for self-determination or continue to focus exclusively on the unity of the Somali Republic - a course of action almost certain to open a new chapter in the Somali civil war" (IRIN 2003).

An ignored people

Preventing the continuation of a thirty-year long war is at the core of a series of recommendations to emerge from an unprecedented conference on `A Common Vision for Cabinda', organized by the Open Society Foundation from 8th-9th July, 2003, in Cabinda, in which over 1500 people took part. Cabinda is the northernmost province of Angola, separated by a tiny slither of the DRC where it meets the South Atlantic coastline.

Cabinda's claim for independence is based upon the 1885 Treaty of Simulambaco, which first linked Cabinda to Angola while recognizing Cabinda's special status. The treaty between the Portuguese and local Cabindan chiefs was an attempt by Portugal to resist encroachment upon its African empire by the French, Belgian, and British, during the `Scramble for Africa', and was a bid by the Cabindans to resist demands for forced labour by King Leopold's Belgian Congo. It was ratified by the Portuguese Parliament and the Berlin Conference in 1885 (where the terms upon which present-day Africa's borders were drawn were established), thus recognizing Cabinda as a separate and Portuguese protectorate (Maier 1996).

It was not until 1956 that Portugal joined the administration of its protectorate of Cabinda to that of its colony of Angola - no treaty was negotiated with Cabinda in doing so. The Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC) was created in 1963 by a merger of the main three independence movements in Cabinda, born of the frustration felt by Cabindans that they were being increasingly incorporated into the very distinct colony of Angola (CAARC 2003). Then, in 1974, the collapse of the fascist government in Portugal paved the way for negotiations between the new communist colonial authorities and the independence movements in their colonies. Talks were held in the southern Portuguese town of Alvor, leading eventually to the independence of Angola. FLEC, however, was not allowed to participate in these talks, the Portuguese believing that FLEC's interests were represented by the three independence movement groups from Angola in attendance (the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA). Thus it was that Article Three of the Alvor Accords effectively annexed Cabinda to Angola - a decision made without the involvement of one Cabindan citizen (Washington Post) In 1977, FLEC announced the establishment of a provisional government of the Republic of Cabinda, with Henriques Tiago Nzita declared president of what FLEC claimed was a liberated zone (Henderson 1979). Needless to say, the Republic of Cabinda has never been recognized as an independent state, and as current affairs stand, it does not appear likely that it will be granted sovereignty any time soon. The case for an independent Cabinda, however, is a legitimate one. Further to their separate pre-colonial histories, most telling is the fact that Angola and Cabinda were designated two separate numbers of affiliation and membership of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in 1964 - Angola, 35, and Cabinda, 39 (CAARC 2003).

The fact that Angola and Cabinda were granted separate schedules for decolonization by the OAU, however, does not enhance their chances of gaining a proper independence. At the heart of the matter is oil - The discovery of petroleum in coastal waters by Gulf Oil in 1966 changed Cabindan history for ever and meant that first the Portuguese and then the independent Angolan government could never let go of the enclave. (Maier 1996, 62) Angola is the sixth largest source of US crude oil imports, thanks largely to Cabinda, where Chevron Corp is the operator (Benedict 1994) - Cabindan crude provides Angola with more than half of its foreign exchange earnings (Maier 1996). Taxes and royalties on Cabinda's production provide Angola with approximately US$3 billion per year (Benedict 1994). Cabinda has been described as `the African Kuwait', producing close to one million barrels a day (CAARC 2003). It is very little wonder, then, that the Angolan government will neither cut the country's ties with Cabinda nor even relax its grip on the enclave's oil - it can not afford to.

President dos Santos of Angola has at various times offered to grant autonomy in an attempt to appease rebel groups (Benedict 1994; Maier 1996) and even went so far as to announce to US President Bush his support for the idea of holding a referendum on the self-determination of Cabinda. It is a token gesture, however: of Angola's population of twelve million, Cabinda constitutes only 230,000, and the referendum would never be carried. FLEC will only accept an East Timor-type referendum, supervised by the UN (Washington Post 2003). The `Committee for Action and Aid to Cabindan Refugees' (CAARC) make the claim on their rather subjective website that Cabindans are among Angola's poorest people, with only 1% of oil revenues being spent on Cabinda (perhaps a rather skewed figure). While there is little doubt that Cabindans suffer great economic injustices at the hands of a very wealthy Angolan ruling elite and, for the most part, live in unacceptable poverty (Pearce 2002), there is considerable evidence to suggest that Cabindans are no worse off than the population of any other Angolan province. Hughes (2004) reveals recent figures that show that Cabinda received 14% of budgetary resources transferred to the 18 Angolan provinces, despite having one of the smallest populations; on a per capita basis, transfers to Cabinda in 2001 were 115 times higher than the average for all provinces. This increased level of government spending in Cabinda is quite clearly an attempt to ease separatist feelings in Cabinda.

If Cabinda were somehow to secede, the material benefits for Cabindans would be huge. Hughes (2004) calculates that the net annual earnings from oil at levels of production and prices recorded in 2000 would have been about US$11,000 per capita. "This dazzling prospect is almost certainly a far more powerful motive for secession than any sense of ethnic identity or economic injustice," Hughes (2004, 159) asserts, adding that Cabindans are in fact related to other Bakongo peoples of north-western Angola.

A way forward

Given Angola's administrative dominance over Cabinda, a referendum on selfdetermination for the province looks extremely unlikely. Unlike in Somaliland, where the picture commonly given is that of a progressing, viable state being hindered in its development by a failed state clinging desperately to its peripheral, more successful regions, Cabinda is one of the poorest regions of Angola. At least this is how it looks on the surface. When you scratch beneath, the differences with Somaliland are not as pronounced. The leader of Cabinda's push for independence, Tiago Nzita, claims that generalized corruption and a lack of democracy in Angola are the reasons why Cabinda will not integrate into the same territory (Pravda 2001). Furthermore, Recommendation 1.2 emerging from the conference on `A Common Vision for Cabinda' states that "the status of the Republic of Cabinda should be the object of negotiations only when Angola has a government that has been legitimized by its people; a government established through elections that are truly free and fair" (Open Society Foundation 2003). In this respect, Cabinda's intention to wait until Angola has its own house in order is different from Somaliland's willingness to do so for Somalia, but the perspective coming out of Cabinda forces us to review which of Angola and Cabinda is in fact reliant on the other. Indeed, if Angola were to lose Cabinda, it could well spell disaster for it economically.

If Cabinda is to have any chance of being granted an East Timor-type referendum, it is going to have to convince the international community that it has the political and administrative structures in place to achieve a fair and democratic level of governance. John Drysdale (2000) gave Somaliland his seal of approval in this respect based on the successful fulfillment of eleven criteria assessed by the London School of Economic and Political Science in a study of Somaliland - civil order, defence, fiscal policy, the judiciary, public service management, external representation, posts and telegraphs, major public works, levels of education, health, and a national constitution. Whether these structures exist, and if so, in what sort of state they are, is a matter for further examination. From what I have been able to ascertain, albeit with fairly modest research, little has been examined in this area. There is certainly an opening for an in-depth assessment.

For both Somaliland and Cabinda, what I think is clear is that the African Union's stubborn position on the inviolability of colonial borders, as enshrined in the OAU charter, requires reassessment on a case-by-case basis. The obvious danger is that any relaxation of the principle of territorial integrity could `open the floodgates' to a proliferation of mini-states and endless border disputes (BBC 2001c). In the case of Cabinda and Somaliland, there is a very legitimate claim for exception. Somaliland was granted sovereign independence in 1960, even though it lasted only five days; Cabinda was endorsed initially by the OAU as the 39th African colony to be decolonized, and only failed to gain its independence due to an Angolan-Portuguese conspiracy, rather than any sort of unsuitability. Tony Hughes' realistic contention that Cabinda's motive for separatism is almost certainly its strategic importance as the source of more than twothirds of Angola's current oil production, should not diminish the historical justification for its claim. Any further refusal by the AU to support the independence claims of Cabinda or Somaliland on the grounds that borders are sacrosanct, is nothing but arbitrary, requires immediate reconsideration, and if anything, in the case of Cabinda, would demand support for their existence as a sovereign independent state, as initially scheduled by the OAU.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

African Union (2003) OAU Charter, 1963, website of the African Union (AU) [found online at http://www.africaunion.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf] Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, London & New York: Verso

BBC Africa World Service (2003a) Somaliland: Ten Years On, BBC Africa World Service, [found online at www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/010430_somaliland.shtml, posted 30/4/01, 4 pages] BBC Africa World Service (2003b) Somaliland: No Way Back, BBC Africa World Service, [found online at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1367554.stm, posted 4/6/01, 1 page] BBC Africa World Service (2003b) Somaliland votes on independence, BBC Africa World Service, [found online at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1361394.stm, posted 31/5/01, 3 pages]

Benedict, R. (1994) Embattled Angolan officials offer autonomy to oil-rich Cabinda in bid to divide rebels, The Oil Daily, v44 n39, pp2-3

Bryden, M. (1994) Fiercely Independent, Africa Report, v39 n6, pp35-40

CAARC (2003) Cabinda: The Tragedy of its People, in website of Committee for Action and Aid to Cabindan Refugees (CAARC), [found online at www.cabinda.net/Cabinda2.html]

Drysdale, J. (2000) Stoics Without Pillows: A Way Forward for the Somalilands, London: HAAN Associates

Henderson, L. (1979) Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press

Hughes, T. (2004) Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, Oxford: James Currey, and Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press

ICG (2003) International Crisis Group Africa report No 66 - Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents, Nairobi & Brussels: ICG

IRIN (2003) Somaliland: Alternatives to Independence, Africa News Service, 29/3/03, 6 pages

Maier, K. (1996) Angola: Promises and Lies, Rivonia NSW: William Waterman Publications

Open Society Foundation (2003) Conference on `A Common Vision for Cabinda': Recommendations, [found online at www.cabinda.net/conferencia2.htm, posted 9/7/03, 3 pages]

Pearce, J. (2002) Poverty and war in Cabinda, BBC Africa World Service, [found online at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/from_our_own_correspondent/2361143.stm, posted 27/10/02, 5 pages]

Pravda (2001) Cabinda: Portugal held responsible by resistance leader, Pravda Online, [found online at english.pravda.ru/portugal/2001/03/26/3152.html, posted 26/3/01, 1 page]

The Economist, US (1995) Somaliland they call it: Somalia, Economist Newspaper, v335 n7909, pp40-41, The Economist, US (1999) A nomad's life is hard, Economist Newspaper, v352 n8131, p35, The Economist, US (2001) The nation nobody knows, Economist Newspaper, 14/4/01, p2

Washington Post (2003) Cabinda: Politics - Let the People Decide, Washington Post Online, [found online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article10.html, 3 pages]

WSP Somali Programme (2001) Rebuilding Somalia: issues and possibilities for Puntland, London: WSP International, London

Somaliland, Landmine Monitor Report 2003

Somaliland

Key developments since May 2002: A Landmine Impact Survey was completed in March 2003, which identified 357 affected communities, including 45 high impact and 102 medium impact. UNICEF and Handicap International conducted a Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices survey on landmines and UXO in Somaliland in September and October 2002. Three NGOs carried out demining activities in 2002, clearing 1.5 million square meters of mined land, and 20 million square meters of battle area. A total of 2,372 stockpiled antipersonnel mines and 18 antivehicle mines were destroyed in November 2002. Mine action coordination in Somaliland was seriously disrupted in 2002. Eight donors reported providing about US$5.55 million for mine action in Somaliland in 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Somaliland is not recognized by the international community as an independent state, and therefore cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.[1] As early as 1997, Somaliland authorities expressed their commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty and on 1 March 1999, its House of Representatives passed a resolution in favor of a total ban of landmines. No legally binding measures to prohibit use, production, trade or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines have been taken.

On 14 November 2002, during a ceremony marking the handover of military landmine stocks to the Danish Demining Group for destruction, the Commander of the Somaliland Armed Forces said, "The army's move was a practical testimony to the willingness of Somaliland to implement international standards for mine action and the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty."[2]

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Somaliland does not produce landmines and there have been no indications that it has exported or acquired new landmine stocks. Somalia's Transitional National Government in Mogadishu has accused Ethiopia of supplying weapons including landmines to one of the Puntland factions that use bases in Somaliland.[3]

On 14 November 2002, the Ministry of Defense of Somaliland handed over 2,382 antipersonnel landmines and 16 antivehicle mines from central military stores to the Danish Demining Group (DDG), which publicly destroyed the mines on 17 November 2002.[4] In 2001, DDG had already destroyed 5,115 landmines Somaliland armed forces and police had confiscated from militias.[5] Ministry of Defense officials indicate that they have plans for the destruction of all stockpiles, although accurate data on stockpiles is not available and the timetable for further stockpile destruction has not been announced.[6]

Mine Action Coordination

In 2002, mine action coordination in Somaliland was seriously disrupted.[7] Since 1996, humanitarian mine action has been nominally coordinated by the National Demining Agency (NDA) established under the Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (MRR&R). For the past three years, the autonomous Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC)--established and supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP)--has been helping coordinate all humanitarian mine action in Somaliland. The relationship between SMAC and NDA was never clearly defined and claims of overlapping responsibilities have been a major source of friction.

In the wake of repeated disagreements between MRR&R and UNDP, SMAC's contract with UNDP was not renewed after it expired on 28 February 2002. SMAC has now become a unit within MRR&R responsible for mine action coordination and NDA is being reformed as a mine clearance unit. With the expiration of SMAC's contract, regional mine action officers lost their contracts and all their positions were vacant as of mid-2003.[8]

Senior UN and international agencies officials are concerned that the lack of a clear coordination mechanism and the lack of agencies with defined legal mandates will seriously hamper mine action, and donor interest, in Somaliland.

Mine Action Funding

In 2002, eight donors reported providing about US$5.55 million for mine action in Somaliland.[9] The UN Mine Action Investments database identifies the following funding for "Somalia" in 2002: Germany, $714,086 (mostly to SBF); Netherlands, $535,000 (to HALO); France, $68,719 (to HI); and Switzerland, $35,000 (to UNDP).[10] In addition, the European Community donated $1,425,000 for mine clearance, capacity building and the Landmine Impact Survey; the United States provided $1.2 million to HALO;[11] Sweden contributed $833,000 to DDG; and Denmark provided $735,000 to DDG.[12] Donors generally report funding simply to "Somalia," but nearly all mine action activities are taking place in Somaliland, and thus Landmine Monitor is reporting the funding here.

UNICEF and Handicap International have become active in Mine Risk Reduction projects in Somaliland, but Landmine Monitor is not aware of the funding levels.

Landmine Problem, Survey and Assessment

A major problem that hampered mine action in Somaliland over the years has been the lack of accurate information on the impact in the contaminated areas. A number of surveys have been conducted, but their scope has been limited and the information obtained has been generally considered inconclusive.

To remedy this problem, the Danish Demining Group (DDG), under contract to the Survey Action Center (SAC), began a comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey throughout Somaliland on 23 March 2002. The survey was completed in March 2003. The final report is expected in July 2003. Three hundred and fifty-seven impact surveys were conducted in Awdal, Galbeed, Togdheer, Sahil and parts of Sanag. Eastern Sanag and Sool were not surveyed due to security considerations. Survey teams visited 563 communities and identified 357 affected ones, of which 45 were high impact, 102 were medium impact and 210 were low impact communities.[13]

Mine Clearance

In 2002, three international NGOs remained active in Somaliland: DDG, the HALO Trust and the Santa Barbara Foundation (SBF).[14] They cleared a total of nearly 1.7 million square meters of mined land, and 20 million square meters of battle area.

In 2002, HALO cleared a total of 19,856,500 square meters of battle area and 175,265 square meters of land through manual clearance. It destroyed 90 antipersonnel mines, 384 antivehicle mines and 998 UXO. From January-May 2003, it cleared a total of 23,377,500 square meters of battle area and 61,658 square meters of land through manual clearance.[15]

DDG conducted clearance operations with approximately 67 deminers, as well as mine detection dogs. In 2002, DDG cleared a total of 747,984 square meters of land and destroyed 37,890 items (including UXO and mines). In 2003, as of May, it had cleared a total of 857,094 square meters and destroyed 1,161 items.[16]

DDG decided to reorganize its demining teams from the traditional Two Man/One Lane System to a One Man/One Lane System, with the rationale that in Somaliland, smaller mine clearance teams could respond more efficiently to smaller tasks, especially to instances of UXO and mines denying access to water or blocking roads. The Landmine Impact Survey showed an acute need for clearance around water reservoirs.[17]

SBF cleared 756,800 square meters of land and destroyed 298 antipersonnel mines, 27 antivehicle mines, 776 UXO and 283 other items in 2002.[18] Although Santa Barbara's funding expired on 31 December 2002, it was awarded a contract by the Somaliland Road Authority for clearance operations around eight bridges along the road between Burao and Las Anod.[19] These operations were to start in March 2003, but had not as of the end of June 2003.[20]

According to the UN, between 1999 and 2002, demining organizations in Somaliland destroyed 14,596 landmines and 220,874 pieces of UXO, and cleared 92,735,677 square meters of land.[21]

Mine Risk Education

In 2002, Landmine Monitor reported that UNICEF had produced a draft policy on mine risk education (MRE) in Somaliland, which it presented to MRR&R for approval.[22] As of mid-2003, the policy still had not been adopted, pending resolution of issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of Somaliland authorities on mine action. According to UNICEF, a draft mine action policy for Somaliland is being discussed and efforts are being made to link it with the policy framework suggested on MRE.[23]

In September and October 2002, UNICEF and Handicap International (HI) conducted a "Knowledge, Attitude, and Practices" (KAP) survey in three regions of Somaliland: Awdal, Galbeed and Toghdheer. The budget for the KAP survey was US$13,088.[24] The survey covered 634 households, collecting information on the knowledge of the public concerning landmine risk, their attitudes towards the problems posed by landmines and their practices when confronted with landmine threats. The survey found that 29 percent of the population was not able to identify the potential risk.[25] UNICEF noted, "An overwhelming percentage of people expressed the desire to receive information on landmines/UXO, in particular on how communities live safely in their mine-contaminated area and how, and to whom, landmines/UXO should be reported."[26]

Depending on funding, UNICEF and HI plan is to develop MRE in Somaliland and then to extend it to Somalia.[27] UNICEF received in 2002 a capacity building grant of $20,000 from the United Kingdom, which is being used for a consultant to help implement their MRE strategy.[28]

SBF ran a mine/UXO awareness program in August 2002 that reached 2,204 pupils in Burao. SBF reported that after the training, reporting of hidden landmines and UXO increased significantly.[29]

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2002, landmines continued to claim new casualties in Somaliland. In one reported incident in November 2002, two people were killed and another three injured in the Hargeisa area.[30] Complete and accurate data on new landmine and UXO casualties was not available. Although the SMAC was collecting and recording casualty data using IMSMA, after losing UNDP funding this activity was severely limited after 2001.

In 2001, 33 people were killed and 70 injured, including 44 children, in 98 reported landmine/UXO incidents.[31] The rate of casualties declined substantially from two to three casualties a day in Hargeisa alone in 1992 to around nine casualties per month throughout Somaliland in 2001. However, it is believed that the number of landmine casualties is under-reported as many incidents take place in remote areas. There is no requirement or procedure for reporting incidents to the police or to mine action officers.

The Landmine Impact Survey identified 276 mine/UXO casualties in the last two years, of which 92 were killed and 184 injured. Children under the age of 14 years accounted for over half (147) of the casualties. The majority of casualties, 77 percent, were male. The fatality rate was higher for males (35 percent) than for females (27 percent). Of the 184 survivors, 47 required an amputation, 18 were fully or partially blind, and the remaining 119 suffered other injuries. Most of the survivors received emergency medical care soon after being injured, but very few received rehabilitation or vocational training.[32] The Somaliland Mine Action Center database contains an additional 2,651 mine casualties from before 2000 which were identified by the Landmine Impact Survey; 1,114 people were killed and 1,537 injured.[33]

The Survey covered four of the six Administrative Regions of Somaliland. However, the highly mine-affected region of Sool has not been surveyed and the number of mine casualties is not known.[34]

Survivor Assistance

Public health facilities with the capacity to assist landmine casualties in Somaliland are reportedly minimal. Hospitals are poorly equipped and poorly staffed. Mine casualties are often treated at the Hargeisa General Hospital or at the ICRC-equipped surgical hospital in Berbera. The Berbera hospital, however, is on the northern coast of Somaliland and is far from regions where landmines are most prevalent. First aid is available and there is transport to take casualties to the nearest medical facility. However, the average travel time to a suitably equipped hospital is over six hours.[35]

Mine clearance organizations (HALO, DDG and SBF) train paramedics to work with their mine clearance teams and have medical equipment and ambulances for use in emergencies. In 2002, SBF held a 3-week training program for paramedics.[36]

The majority of people in Somaliland are nomads and mobility is essential for their livelihood, but there are reportedly no vocational training or economic reintegration programs for landmine survivors.

The Somaliland Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and Action NordSud/Handicap International continue to provide survivor assistance in Somaliland. SRCS runs a lower limb prosthetic and component manufacturing center in Hargeisa, funded principally by the Norwegian Red Cross. The center has the capacity to make 26 devices a month. Since 1999, the center has operated a mobile clinic that makes periodic visits to regions outside of Hargeisa. Between 1994 and July 2002, the center provided 1,246 mobility devices, of which 448 were for landmine survivors. In 2002, the SRCS center assisted 291 new patients with mobility devices, including 93 mine survivors. The center produced 165 prostheses, 50 orthoses, and repaired 109 prostheses.[37]

Action NordSud/Handicap International (AN/HI) runs a physiotherapy center and a low cost prostheses workshop that also makes crutches and wheelchairs. In 2002, the center assisted five landmine and eight UXO survivors with physiotherapy treatments.[38] AN/HI requires that patients pay a small fee and most amputees reportedly prefer to go to SRCS center, which does not charge a fee.[39]

[1] Because Somaliland considers itself to be a state, authorities are reluctant to sign the Geneva Call "Deed of Commitment" for non-state actors, pledging commitment to a total prohibition on antipersonnel mines.
[2] UNDP/OPS, "Annual Report: Achievements of the Mine Action Program in Somaliland," Hargeisa, December 2002.
[[3] Militia loyal to Jama Ali Jama and led by Cadde Muse Boqor are camped at El-Afweyne in Sanaag region, Somaliland. For the Somalia TNG allegations, see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 743.
[[4] UNDP/OPS, "Annual Report: Mine Action Program in Somaliland," December 2002.
[[5] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 852.
[[6] Interviews with military officers and Ministry of Defense officials, Hargeisa, January and February 2003.
[[7] Interviews with various Somaliland and international officials concerned with mine action between 23 January and 10 February 2003.
[[8] Interview with John Dingley, Chief Technical Advisor for Mine Action, UNDP, Hargeisa, 10 February 2003.
[[9] Landmine Monitor identified $4.3 million in mine action funding for 2001. See individual donor country reports in this Landmine Monitor Report for funding details and sources.
[[10] UNMAS Mine Action Investment database.
[[11] US State Department, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," September 2002.
[[12] Email from Ulrik Enemark Petersen, Head of Foreign and Security Policy Department, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2003. The amount in DKK is 5.8 million.
[[13] Memo from Mike Kendellen, Director for Surveys, Survey Action Center, 27 May 2003.
[[14] In 2001, these three groups demined 387,944 square meters of land, plus an additional 21,172,500 square meters surface battle area cleared.
[[15] Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Neil Ferrao, HALO Trust Horn of Africa Desk, 5 August 2003.
[[16] Email from Danish Demining Group, 19 May 2003.
[[17] Ibid.
[[18] Document provided by Burkhard Von Buttlar, Somaliland Program Manager, SBF, 10 February 2003.
[[19] Interview with Burkhard Von Buttlar, Somaliland Program Manager, SBF, 10 February 2003. According to von Buttlar, the bridge clearance activity will be funded by the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief.
[[20] Interview with Mohamed Osman, SMAC Manager, Hargeisa, 7 February 2003.
[[21] "UNDP/OPS Annual Report," December 2002. The data reported here does not include clearance activities by Rimfire (before 1999), Greenfield Associates and Mine Tech.
[[22] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 855.
[[23] Email from Silvia Danailov, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF Somalia Support Center, 16 June 2003.
[[24] Email from Silvia Danailov, UNICEF, 20 June 2003; telephone interview with Nathalie Martin, MRE Coordinator, HI, Lyon, 17 June 2003.
[[25] UNICEF/Handicap International, "Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices Related to Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance," November 2002.
[[26] UNICEF Somalia Support Center, "Mines Awareness, Funding Proposal June 2003-December 2004," undated, p. 4.
[[27] Email from Silvia Danailov, UNICEF, 16 June 2003; telephone interview with Nathalie Martin, HI, 10 June 2003.
[[28] Email from Silvia Danailov, UNICEF, 20 June 2003; funding is from the UK's Department for International Development, see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/.
[[29] Interview with Burkhard Von Buttlar, SBF, 10 February 2003.
[[30] "Two killed by landmine in Hargeysa District," Radio Hargeysa, 1 November 2002.
[[31] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 855-856.
[[32] Memo from Mike Kendellen, Survey Action Center, 27 May 2003; email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Mohamed Osman Ahmed, Somaliland Mine Action Center, 1 July 2003.
[[33] Email from Mohamed Osman Ahmed, Somaliland Mine Action Center, 1 July 2003.
[[34] Ibid.
[[35] Ibid.
[[36] Interview with Burkhard Von Buttlar, SBF, 10 February 2003.
[[37] Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the Somaliland Red Crescent Society, Hargeisa, February 2003.
[[38] Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Handicap International, Hargeisa, February 2003.
[[39] Interview with Florence Thun, Handicap International, 3 March 2002.

Copyright c August 2003 by Human Rights Watch

Somaliland independence on everybody's lips

The people have spoken, says one 'Elias' from Washington DC on BBC's weekly Internet debate forum, titled "Somaliland: A nation in its own right'". He concludes: "Let's respect their will and support their effort to make peace and stability."

Non-Somalis following the recent referendum, which was carried out in an "impressive" democratic way (international observers), have problems understanding why the international community should not recognise the will of the Somaliland people. Somalis are against secession while Somalilanders enjoying the taste of patriotism for a new state in their arguments. The debate attracts a wide audience.

- These people deserve nothing less than their own independence and to lead their own country with pride, Mehari from neighbouring Ethiopia concludes. Cabdi Gahayr from Djibouti - a country whose government strongly opposed Somaliland independence- agrees: "The time has come when we as Africans must be honest enough to praise the few success stories on our burdened continent. An independent Somaliland will benefit the Horn of Africa including my beloved but mismanaged country Djibouti."

The BBC debate confirms the recent trends in the discussion over Somaliland, an issue that can hardly be overlooked nowadays. Most non-Somali Africans agree, although some think within the lines of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), condemning separatism in general.

The debate has mostly left radical lines, discussing the more profound problems such a secession raise. Can one allow Somaliland to split off, but deny other parts of Somalia to do the same' Did the separation of Ethiopia and Eritrea bring peace and development to the region' Can one disregard the demand of an almost totally united people' Can you force genocide victims to reconcile with their perpetuators' Would not Somalis stand stronger in its search for peace and democracy if united' These questions currently without doubt also are raised in several foreign ministries.

While the Somaliland referendum was a brilliant PR event to remind the international community of this issue, public discussion however does not produce a strong pressure on governments to make the first step in recognising Somaliland's independence. Even trade and communication links (there are now direct flights between Hargeysa and Nairobi and British Airways is inspecting Hargeysa airport as a possible destination), in practical terms meaning recognition of Somaliland, have not led to a formal recognition. Diplomatic pressure from the Somaliland government, following the attention the referendum has given, seems crucial to achieve results.

On the diplomatic stage, however, Somaliland has few means of pressure. Ethiopia, which is getting more hostile towards the Mogadishu government, is getting more dependent of the Berbera harbour in Somaliland. It can however not be blackmailed, as the striving Berbera harbour is a main source of income for the Somaliland government. Ethiopia, a key member of the OAU, would hardly be willing to become the first country to recognise Somaliland without a united OAU backing it.

An OAU recognition probably depends on the total discredit of the Mogadishu government, recognised as representing all Somalia. As the Mogadishu government is at the fringe of collapse - only Thursday at least 17 people were killed in a shoot-out between two clans at a market in central Mogadishu - this constitutes the best hope for Somalilanders.

Somaliland's best cards of gaining recognition from outside the African continent has so far been the Israel-Arab conflict. While hoping for recognition from Arab brother nations that never came, the Somaliland government has openly flirted with Israel, probably willing to take the first step. Fears are however that this would be contra-productive.

While the recognition by one African or European nation could mean the beginning of a landslide, recognition by pariah nation Israel could mean that Somaliland ends up in the same permanent diplomatic isolation as Taiwan, especially if a new central government in Somalia was established shortly after the expected fall of the Mogadishu government.

Most Western and developing countries, remembering their close ties to all or several African nations, will not take the first step in recognising Somaliland, being an "inter-African affair". Not even former colonial power Britain will jeopardise its relation to other Commonwealth nations, many of them OAU members. Popular pressure within Britain, although there have been demonstrations by Somalilanders, will never reach that amount.

Somaliland's recognition thus still depends on the discredit of the Mogadishu government or the buy-off of small, poor nations (probably beyond Somaliland's efforts). The more open and profound public debate about its recognition - as most debates, it will return to its closet of internality within short - will not change that fact. When the political constellations change, however, it might become a useful experience to fall back on.

Analysis by afrol News editor Rainer Chr. Hennig. c afrol.com.

Somalia/Somaliland: Human Rights Defenders issue Declaration

Somali human rights defenders from 23 organizations, meeting in Hargeisa from 10 to 18 February 2002, declared that they will "increase the struggle against human rights abuses, such as arbitrary killings, torture, arbitrary detention and kidnapping, and work for the equal rights of all, with full protection for vulnerable groups such as women and minorities". They affirmed support for women human rights defenders campaigning for the eradication of violence against women and for women's full political participation in building democratic governance.

In addition, they called on all Somali political authorities to "publicly recognize the legitimate role of human rights defenders in the protection and promotion of human rights, as set out in the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders", and that "human rights defenders will not be subject to reprisals for these activities".

They also called on the international community to protect human rights defenders at risk, and assist them to build up the capacities of their organizations. The declaration was adopted in the presence of the UN Independent Expert for Somalia, Dr. Ghanim Alnajjar.

Human rights defenders in conflict-riven central and southern Somalia face daily dangers of arbitrary killing or detention by faction militias or ransom kidnapping by gunmen whom faction leaders have done little or nothing to suppress in the areas they claim to control. In Puntland, civil society organizations documenting abuses receive little tolerance from the political authorities and are at risk as a result of the unresolved armed conflict. In Somaliland in contrast, where there is a long-established peace, general respect for human rights, a largely free press and a multi-party election process, activists are concerned mainly about a very poor justice system and declining political representation for women and minorities.

In November 2002, Amnesty International's Open Letter to the Somalia Peace Conference supported the demands of civil society groups attending it for greater priority for human rights and not just a sharing-out of violently-acquired power and its gains between armed faction leaders. The Somali Human Rights Defenders Declaration took up the concerns of other Somali activists at the peace talks and reiterated that there should be "no impunity granted to those who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity .. .if they were allowed to hold government office they could commit such crimes again".

"The outcome of the peace talks should not be a government of warring faction-leaders giving themselves total impunity for their gross violations of human rights", said Amnesty International. "Somali political leaders who believe in peace and human rights must unite now to stop the cease-fire violations, arbitrary killings, rape, kidnapping and financial extortion." So far there is little indication from the armed faction leaders that they are committed to rescue Somalia from a seemingly endless crisis threatening regional peace and security.

"The regional and international sponsors of the peace talks must strive harder to secure this commitment and see it in action as a basic pre-requisite for any new transitional government," they said

Background

Meeting in Somaliland at a workshop organised by Amnesty International, Novib and International Cooperation for Development in the only safe area of the former state of Somalia which disintegrated in 1991, the participants included human rights defenders from Mogadishu, such as the Peace and Human Rights Network, Coalition of Grassroots Womens' Organizations and Dr Ismail Jumale Human Rights Organization; Dulmidiid Centre for Human Rights from Puntland regional state; Isha Human Rights Organization from Baidoa; Kisima Peace and Human Rights Organization from Kismayu; and Nagaad Women's Coalition, Hornwatch and several others from Somaliland.

Somaliland's 12-year government is still campaigning for international recognition. The UN-supported Transitional National Government (TNG) holds little power even in Mogadishu as it approaches the end of its three-year term. Two rival coalitions of over a dozen armed clan-based factions - one linked to the TNG and the other backed by Ethiopia - continue to struggle for power. Violations of the October 2002 cease-fire persist unpunished.

Somalia

Up north in breakaway Somaliland things have been pretty calm, save for the fallout from the Ethiopia/Eritrea war. The eastern half of this tiny area is called Sanaag and is controlled by a clan that does not agree with Mohammed Ibrahim Egal's presidential ambitions. Self-elected Egal has put the lid on his half of Somalia-called Somaliland. The country of Somaliland (not to be confused with Somalia or Disneyland) prints its own money in Britain, has a funky homemade flag (it may humor our readers to know that the Somali flag is based on the blue UN flag) and is protected by a ragtag army of about 15,000 kids and unemployed qat junkies. The main airport is closed (so what'), and its ill-defined border with Ethiopia to the south is a free-fire zone ruled by reject extras from a Mad Max movie.

Heavily armed clans dodge land mines in the rocky wastelands in their technicals, rusty tanks and camels. Its main exports are goats, sheep and camels to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Oh, I suppose we should mention that Somalia's 1700-mile coast has great beaches. Foreign yachtsmen from Europe are occasionally invited for a little beach blanket bingo as they putter on by off the coast.

Somalia (like most blown-to-hell countries) was actually a pretty cool place about 1,000 years ago. Known in ancient times as Punt (an appropriate political strategy these days), it was the home of the Queen of Sheba, spices, and traded with China and other Arab nations. Today Somalia is an arid, high-speed cross between Sergio Leone's Once Upon a Time in the West, Mad Max and a '60s drugs 'n' biker movie, or maybe more like Star Wars' wasted brown planet of Tatooine without the colorful bar scene. If you like looking on the sunny side, there is a web site titled "Visit the Somali Republic, the Jewel of the Indian Ocean. The Cross Roads of Africa . . . The Gum of the Sea Ways, The Real Paradise for the Hunter, The Country of Peace, Culture and Stability." The site lures tourists with phrases like "Mogadiscio, with its stable climate, is a paradise for the tourist." A quick peek at the airlines, however, lists a subsidiary of BOAC, an airline name that has been defunct for about 20 years. Oh well, maybe you should postpone your trip for the next century when they have the annual clan get-togethers on the streets of Mog.

The syrupy home-spun web hype forgets to mention that Somalia's clans have been drilling holes in each other ever since the first Somalis decided to marry someone other than their sister. How long will this clan-banging go on' Well, until they run out of bullets and somebody ties down every rock in this parched, godforsaken country. Recently, the clans have cloaked themselves with high-falutin political names so that it sounds more like a church gathering than a street fight. Names such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front or the Somalia National Alliance may conjure up visions of crew-cutted, white-shirted, apple-cheeked kids riding around tree-lined neighborhoods with Korans, but that is far from accurate. These clans are more likely to be scrawny, bug-eyed (from chewing qat), flip-flopped kids who charge around the shattered 100-degree-plus streets in smashed-up Toyota pickup trucks featuring jury-rigged, welded .50-caliber or anti-tank guns stolen from Uncle Sam's cache. Since a good living in Somalia is $3 a day, we figure the kids are allowed to roar around drunk or stoned and shoot off a few armor-piecing rounds at each other. To be fair, some Somali sources describe the young drug-whacked kids as militiamen, "unpaid volunteers who fight, not on orders but out of desire to defend their communities." They conclude by saying, "A well-organized civilian militia, protected by the right to keep and bear arms, is still the most effective protection for the security of a free state." Uh, yeah, and I'll take that shiny new watch you're wearing in the name of freedom and security. But before we dive into the players, you must know that there are really three equally lawless Somalias.

The dodgy Republic of Somaliland in the northwest with the capital of Hargeisa; Somali, the land that makes up the long southern coastal section and the home of the Digila and more agrarian Rahanweyne clans; and the northeast with Bosaso as its hub. The capital of the south is the hotly contested city of Mogadishu. To further complicate the divisions, Djibouti is actually half-Somali. Beirut was easy to figure out compared to Somalia. The breakaway republics are not recognized by any international body, although perhaps they should be.

Only the southern part makes the news-that section of Siad Barre's defunct Somali Republic which was formerly Italian Somaliland. The south is simply lawless territory inhabited by nomadic Somalis and ruled by clans. The northern part, formerly British Somaliland, misses the headlines and is sometimes portrayed as considerably more peaceful. Unlike the south, the north has had something of a government-the government of Somaliland-since the fall of Barre's republic, and even, at times, a head-of-state.

Yet overall, it's been an orgy of blood feuds in Somalia. After the rebel United Somali Congress (USC) captured Mogadishu during the last week of 1990 and toppled Barre's despotic regime (although it at least was a regime), Somalia watched its last government-or anything resembling it-go down the drain. Siad fled and the USC installed Ali Mahdi Mohamed as temporary president. But the USC was marred by internal bickering and bloodshed within its ranks, and from them rose General Mohamed Farah Aideed. Aideed and Ali Mahdi signed a UN-bullied peace agreement in March 1992, but it broke down as perhaps a million Somalis fled the country's famine and clan warfare. Soldiers looted UN food supplies the world body was unable to protect.

Enter the United States and Operation Restore Hope. Eighteen hundred American marines landed in Mogadishu on December 9, 1992, the first of nearly 30,000 troops to arrive here with the mission of restoring some semblance of order. (Hussein Aideed, the general's son, was one of the U.S. Marines.) Aideed and Ali Mahdi grudgingly shook hands.

On January 11, 1993, a general cease-fire was agreed to. But it, like the dozens before it, hadn't a prayer. After Somalis became accustomed to the strange aliens called Americans, they decided to off a couple and even dragged one corpse through the streets of Mogadishu. CNN got it all on tape and the Pentagon, not wanting any more bad publicity and angry mothers, brought the boys home. U.S. efforts to bring Aideed down were like a Philadelphia SWAT team attack: they kept turning the wrong house into Swiss cheese. So Uncle Sammy washed his hands of the whole Somali affair in November 1993. With the Americans gone, Somalis were again permitted to resume killing, raping and maiming each other. Only this time they had more UN leftover toys to play with.

The only bright spot was the May '97 peace accord between Aideed (currently the self-proclaimed president of Somalia) and his chief rival, Ossan Hassan Ali Ato's Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA). Fighting still goes on between other clans.

Sylvester and Elvis

The Islamic Court in north Mogadishu, the closest thing resembling an administrative body since the overthrow of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, has warned that clean-shaven men had better grow beards-in the Islamic tradition-or suffer the consequences. The court's leader, Sheikh Ali Sheikh Mohamed, brought a clean-shaven youngster before a gathering of faithful and ordered the crowd to boo at the kid. "Those who shave like Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone and the U.S. Marines will not go unpunished," Ali Sheikh proclaimed.

The youngster was decidedly sans Elvis' sideburns, being barely old enough to sport a tuft of pubic hair, much less a cascade of ZZ Top whiskers. But prepubescent teenagers and secular governments aside, it's Gillette and Schick that have to be worried the most about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

Somalia - The Scoop

The 26 factions of the National Salvation Council (NSC) are trying to get a central government together in the south but have been stymied by Hussein Farah Aideed-an ex-U.S. Marine with a disdain of idle rifles-whose trumped-up charges of "foreign intervention" have served as an excuse to keep the bullets whistling. As many as 60,000 Somalis have been killed since 1991-300,000 have died due to war-induced starvation. There has been no central government since 1991. Some semblance of order has returned to north Mogadishu, if only because folks there want to hang on to their limbs. The Islamic shari'a courts are the law here (you know, the folks who cut off hands for stealing)-the Jenny Craig of criminal justice. You, too, can lose weight fast. Meanwhile, Somalia has become the Ho Chi Minh Trail of the Ethiopian/Eritrean war. Hussein Aideed's forces are being beleaguered by the Ethiopian-backed Rahanwein Resistance Army as the Eritreans and Ethiopia duke out their own border war in Somalia's front yard. Aideed and the Somali National Front have enlisted the Eritreans' help, turning Somalia into a Rent-A-Battlefield for foreign armies. The Ethiopians have sent at least 5,000 soldiers into Somalia to ostensibly swap lead with the Ethiopian resistance group, the Oromo Liberation Front, who are trained by Aideed. The Eritreans have been sending arms to Aideed, who's been training the OLF at Coriolei, about 45 miles southwest of Mogadishu. The loser' The Somalis: a million people face serious food shortages and 400,000 are on the brink of starvation.

Somalia - The Players

Al Hahad, or Al-Ittahad: The Saudis are backing a small group of Islamic fundamentalists based along the Juba River on the Ethiopia border. They have also been attacking Ethiopia which simply sends in troops to the lawless area of Somalia and kills as many as they can.

Ali Mahdi Mohamed: Ali Mahdi Mohamed controls the relatively sedate northern area of Mogadishu. He is allied with Osman Ali Atto, who formerly bankrolled Aideed's fight for power. Atto and Aideed battled it out in the south, with casualties per day between 60-100 people killed and 10 times as many wounded. Ali Mahdi, the other "president" of Somalia, is backed by the Somali Salvation Alliance and supported by the Saad and Abgal clans. Ali Mahdi presents himself as a moderate and is in favor of alignment with the West. His brand of Islamic justice has led to amputations, stonings and floggings in the northern Mogadishu areas he controls. In the last year, the SSA has judged at least 500 cases and ordered five executions, 21 amputations and 421 floggings. In one case, a court of 12 religious leaders sentenced a man to stoning for rape. He was shackled to the ground and stoned to death with cinder blocks hurled by an enthusiastic crowd. Naturally, the media was invited to film the festivities.

Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Ethiopians, allied with the Somali People's Democratic Party, have at least 5,000 troops inside Somalia battling Aideed's forces, the Eritreans, Al-Ittihad (an armed Islamic Group based in Somalia) and the insurgent Ethiopian group, the Oromo Liberation Front. For a little R&R from their mega-border war with Ethiopia, Eritrean soldiers spend their holidays from the front in Somalia helping Aideed, the Somali National Front and the OLF. This has become a regular terrorist all-star game. Or a "technical" demolition derby. Ethiopia and Eritrea have been trying to outflank each other since squabbles over their common 1,000-mile-long border erupted into the world's largest ground war in May 1998. The folks in Cape Town are no longer safe. Ethiopian advances have brought much of southern Somalia under their control. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997135.htm

Hussein Mohammed Aidid: "Aideed" means "rejector of insults." In Hussein's case, it also means "AWOL." Ironically, Somalia's newest warlord, Hussein Mohammed Aideed, is a corporal in the United States Marine Reserve who served as a translator for the Marines in Somalia in 1992-93, and who has been conspicuously absent from his Pico Rivera, California, artillery unit since 1995. Hussein Aideed is the son of the slain General Mohammed Farah Aideed, and once worked as a $9-an-hour municipal clerk for the city of West Covina, California, and graduated from high school there. He joined the Marine Corps Reserves in 1987, last reporting for duty in July 1995. He moved back to Somalia shortly afterwards. Aideed was first brought to the United States as a teenager by his mother, Asli Dhubat, Gen. Aideed's first wife. Interviewed by the Associated Press in Somalia, Aideed said he valued his Marine experience: "I'm proud of my background and military discipline," he said. "Once a Marine, always a Marine." His CO isn't in complete agreement, however. Aideed's top foreign policy advisor also spent time in the United States; he was a Washington cab driver for three years-making him overly qualified in this "regime." When DP's Rob Krott hired about 100 U.S. Somalis for a Department of the Army project, about 10 percent were Washington area cab drivers. If you want to shoot the breeze on your next trip you can find Aideed in his headquarters in Southern Mogadishu.

Mohamed Farah Aidid and the Somalia National Alliance: "President" Mohamed Farah Aideed was killed in factional fighting in late July 1996. According to his enemies, he died "while killing people." Aideed liked the old school form of kritarchy, or traditional government, while his opponent Ali Mahdi wanted to be a Western puppet. Aideed led troops that killed 18 U.S. soldiers in 1993. That action resulted in the United States withdrawing its forces and blocking the UN effort to reconstruct the country. His Somalia National Alliance had been duking it out with Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance. In reality, the chance of either side actually controlling all of Somalia is nonexistent. Aideed collected taxes from-or shot-anyone who crossed his "green line." His son has now taken on the mantle of being self-proclaimed president.

Aideed spent the end of the 1960s and early 1970s in prison for planning a coup against Barre. Barre for some reason freed Aideed and made him ambassador to India, Sri Lanka and Singapore to get him out of town. Aideed repaid him by forming the United Somali Congress (USC) which deposed Barre. Despite a lack of popular support, Ali Mahdi proclaimed himself President of the Republic of Somalia. In June 1991, Aideed was elected chairman of the United Somali Congress by a two-thirds vote, but Ali Mahdi refused to step down. By October 1991, Ali Mahdi had formed a government of eight ministers with the support of Italy. Naturally things went to hell very quickly and the fighting started. Ali Mahdi started it but Aideed had almost won when the UN stepped in. Mahdi was surrounded in Mogadishu allowing Aideed to go after Barre in the south. Siad Barre's army in southern Somalia had been looting food stores causing much of the famine. Mohamed Siad Barre, the ex-president of the Somali Republic, whose excesses finally undid him, was cozy with Egypt and a buddy of Boutros-Ghali's when Boutros-Ghali was with Egypt's Foreign Ministry. When Barre's man Aideed became Barre's enemy Aideed, Boutros-Ghali, understanding the exercise of power, targeted Aideed. He worked against him before the UN intervention, and it was during his tenure as secretary general, with his men ensconced in Mogadishu, that he allowed the U.S. functionaries to get so worked up over Aideed that they shifted the focus of the UN mission there. As Boutros-Ghali looked on, the United States went after Aideed.

The UN Security Council issued an arrest warrant for Aideed but he managed to elude both UN forces and U.S. troops. The United States never got Aideed. (Strangely enough while all this was going on DP saw Aideed attending a rubber chicken dinner in Nairobi on the front page of the local newspaper.) Despite the price on his head and the number of spooks who we assume can read a newspaper, nothing ever happened and the military continued its search-and-destroy mission at great cost in both money and, later on, lives. Between 6,000 and 10,000 Somalis were killed and 18 U.S. soldiers died.

Aideed was weakened by the defection of his sugar daddy, the wealthy Osman Ali Atto. Atto stepped on a land mine, and he lost most of his left foot. His dissatisfaction with Aideed split the Haber Gedirs.

The Clans & Everybody Else: In this clan war, if your mama's from a different family tree than Aideed's, you are the enemy. There are more than 500 clans and 20 political groups in Somalia. The Lisan subclan clashes with Aideed as do the forces of Ali Atto and Ali Mahdi. The Yaalahow militia controls the Mecca and Medina districts of Mogadishu, depending on what day it is. Break out those phonebooks and history books if you want to figure this one out. If you can figure out the backgrounds and shifting alliances between the Habr Gedir, Marehan, Abgal, Majertein, Murusades drop us a line.

The Habr Gedir Clan: Mohamed Farah Aideed's Habr Gedir clan (actually a subclan of the Hawiye) comes from the Mudug region. The hot, dry and destitute condition of the Mudug region ensures that only the strong survive. Aideed's driving ambition was to forge a Somali state. When his U.S. pursuers boasted of getting so close to catching him that his bed was still warm, reporters invited into that "still warm" sanctum found a book on Thomas Jefferson on the bedside table. But this was not merely a man who, as head of the Habr Gedir clan, was unable to accommodate other clans. Within his own Habr Gedir, vicious infighting has erupted between extended families.

The Crusaders: Not the guys that went to the holy land, the United Nations, the United States and the rest of the aid organizations that try to do something meaningful. It goes something like this. Aideed Sr. (who was elected by the Somali Congress with 66 percent of the vote) had just about whupped the other factions when the United Nations stepped in and decided that it was going to run Somalia. Naturally, Aideed declared war on the United Nations and the United States. Millions were spent on aid infrastructure in Somalia and most of it was destroyed or pillaged. As one Somali UN employee said to DP in Somalia, looting is "a more efficient form of aid distribution." United States and United Nations troops killed between 8,000 and 10,000 Somalis while in-country.

Somalia - Getting In: Visas are not available at either the airport in Mogadishu nor at any of the border crossings. From the United States, unless you're an aid worker or have been specifically invited by whomever's in charge at the time, forget it. However, it may be possible to obtain a visa from Somalia's embassies maintained in Kenya, Egypt, Djibouti and Tanzania. In Nairobi, try the International House (Mama Ngina Street). For a three-month visa, you'll need three photographs and a letter of introduction, preferably from your embassy. You should be able to pick up your visa the next day. In Cairo, try the Somali mission on Dokki Street. Here, you'll definitely need a letter from your embassy stating the purpose of your journey, as well as proof of onward travel by air. There are no land-crossing visas issued. Here, you'll also need three photos. Processing takes a day. In Tanzania, Somali visas are issued at the Italian embassy:

Italian Embassy: Lugalo Road, P.O. Box 2106, Tel.: 46352/4

Somalia has a consulate in Djibouti and this may be the easiest place to get a Somali visa: Somalia Consulate, Boulevard del Republique, BP 549, Tel.: 353521, U.K.: Embassy of the Somali Democratic Republic,60 Portland Place London, England, W1N 3DG, Tel.: [171] 580-7148,United States: Somali Permanent Mission to the United Nations 425 East 61st Street, Suite 703, New York, NY 10021,Tel.: (212) 688-9410,Fax: (212) 759-0651

Somalia - Getting Around: The road network in Somalia is thoroughly dilapidated. About a tenth of the 27,000 miles are paved. Well actually 600 miles used to be paved. There are surfaced roads between Mogadishu, Kisimayo and Baidoa in the south, and between Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao in the north. There is the skeleton of a bus network in the south and no public transportation in the north. Fifty percent of the Somali people are nomads, and the camel is the principal form of transportation in the country. The IDA agreed to repair the road network in Somalia but has yet to get started on the work, for obvious reasons. It seems the Somalis like to steal every ADI vehicle they can get, chop the roof and slap a stolen .50-caliber machine gun on the back. The only way to get around, at present, is to hitch a ride with one of the few aid agencies remaining in the country. In the past, lifts have been available with United Nations High Commission for Refugees vehicles in Mogadishu and other areas. In Mogadishu, you can try hiring a cab or motorbike driver, but you'll probably be abducted or shot, or both. The twice-weekly Somali Airlines flights between Mogadishu and Berbera and the weekly flights to Hargeisa and Kisimayo from Mogadishu have been suspended.

If you do attempt to travel by road, make sure you bring along some friends. Technicals (ideally, with .50-caliber guns) come in very handy at the many roadblocks, which are just a way for the locals to make money. A show of force or a short burst above their heads will force them to ponder the relative value of dying for a few dollars. There are no fixed prices for renting a technical with mooryaan, or teenage gunmen, but there will be plenty of offers. It is estimated by the United Nations that there are 2 million assault rifles in Mogadishu alone.

Dangerous Places

The Green Line: Nope, this ain't a Los Angeles rapid transit line, but the front line in Somalia's civil war. It runs in Mogadishu on a southeast axis down Afgoye Road with Atto controlling the area around the former U.S. embassy and Somali National University and Aideed Jr. controlling the south and the port of Merca. Atto's area borders on the Medina district, where he is backed up by Mussa Sudi, an ally of Mahdi.

The North/Somaliland: In October 1994, fighting broke out between President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who is supported by the Habir Awal, Gadabursi and Saad Musi clans, and the Idegale militia, who are aligned with the Habir Younis. Normally, a peaceful area, the fighting quickly sent 150,000 refugees fleeing from the capital of Hargeisa. The Idegale make a little folding money by controlling the airport and charging a tax on all who use it. The government muscled in, and that's when the fighting started.

The Habir Younis (now remember, they support the Idegale Militia) appealed to Aideed and were sent a plane full of rifles and ammo. Egal (the guy who runs the country) called Ali Mahdi Mohamed (Aideed's enemy in the south) and received a nice letter in return but no guns. So Egal hit up his buddies, the North Koreans, and then got busy fighting. The fighting spread to the Garhadjis (a subclan of the Idegale and Egal in Burca, Sheikh and Burao). The government forces didn't do so well, so now the Garhadji militias have most of the government weapons in their possession. To make things more complicated, Egal does not have support from the majority of people but is pushing for an independent Somaliland. His opponents want to join up with Somalia. His predecessor, President Abdurahman Tur of the Habir Younis clan, was voted out and is now hanging out in Mogadishu under the protection of Aideed Jr.

Even though Egal has done a good job of whipping Somaliland (not Somalia) into fiscal and governmental shape, not one Western country will recognize its sovereignty. Go figure. Okay, now who's ready for a pop quiz on Somalia politics'

Somalia: The South: The guerrilla force that overthrew Siad Barre in Mogadishu-the Somali National Movement-got its start in the north, and having seen to Barre's overthrow, it has long since gone back to the north. The problem in the north is that the victorious guerrillas turned the government over to an interim president-Abdirahman Tour-who at worst was bent on destroying his own government because he wanted to see a reunited Somali Republic (he has ties to the old Barre regime and to Egypt, which supported Barre) and at best was simply unable to contain clan warfare. In fact, clan warfare began in the north when the president sent armed men from his own clan, the Habre Younis, to seize Berbera, the north's chief port and the turf of the Issa Musa. Already ensconced in the capital at Hargeisa, it now appeared as if he were set. At least for a few months.

Along came an old man now commonly acknowledged to be brilliant, Ibrahim Dhega Weyne. Under his direction, the Issa regrouped and took Berbera back. With that, the two clans repaired to a mountain village, where for 17 days they argued fiercely.

Xeer: The traditional Somali constitution is called the Xeer. Pronounced like hair with a lougee. The main reason Somalia is a DP is because the factions just can't get it together long enough to form a cohesive government.

Kidnapping/Attacks: Aid workers run the risk of being kidnapped. The good news is that ransoms are relatively low-$100,000 per person for 10 aid workers kidnapped in April 1998. Somali gunmen also shot up a chartered UN plane a month earlier as it tried to land at Sakoweyne. A UN doctor was ambushed and murdered.

Piracy: A backpacker crewing his way to Egypt is just the latest victim for Somali pirates. He was shot dead wrestling with his attackers on a yacht. Yachts are the Somalis' favorite target but they will also go after rusting freighters being towed. Why is piracy getting big' Well, duh, there's no one left on land to kidnap. So the clans set their sights at sea. Somali pirates nabbed two Finnish pleasure craft sailors in April 1999 off the coast of the country, and in June, four German yachtsmen were seized by high-seas kidnappers operating under the umbrella of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front faction. All the sailors were later released after intervention from clan elders. Pirates in Somalia fancy speedboats and will pretend they are officials on official business. Who would know the difference' If you're skippering anything more luxurious than an inner tube, make a wide tack from the Horn. Or you could end with more than a three-hour tour.

The Northeast/Punt: Breaking up is not that hard to do in Somalia. Instead of outside forces trying to create a unified nation based on colonial principles, individual regions like Somaliland have simply ignored Mogadishu and gone on with their lives. "Puntland" has been established in the Northeast, and "Hiranland" and "Jubbaland" are being suggested (along the lines of Disneyland with their own separate worlds)' Although the UN poo-poos these microkingdoms, Somaliland has a government, stamps, money, a police force, safe streets, education and healthcare.

Dangerous Things

Bananas: Ali Mahdi's men have fired at banana boats trying to dock in the ports of Mog. You see Aideed is Ali Mahdi's mortal enemy and Aideed controls the banana trade. Now we don't know what happens if you are carrying a banana through customs, but we should warn DP readers that a customs inspector might ask, "Is that a banana in your pocket or are you just showing your support for Aideed'" Money raised from the sale of bananas by the Sombana and Somalfruit companies is used by Aideed's clan to buy weapons and fuel.

Bandits and Clans: All Somalis can trace their ancestry back to six clans. Back then, Sir Richard Burton (who got a spear through the cheek as a souvenir of his visit) called them "a fierce and turbulent race of republicans." Today there are 26 main factions broken into sub-clan groups, and in a big powwow its not unusual to see 500 or so leaders show up. Most of the factions are simply extended families engaged in blood feuds. They take no prisoners, and if you stumble onto anybody's turf, expect to be treated accordingly (i.e., shot or macheted). Where clans don't rule, bandits do. Bandits control large rural areas and snipe around in the cities, as well. Police forces are present in some cities, but are essentially impotent and refuse to stand up to the clans and bands of thugs. They have few resources and are as likely to be targeted for death as anyone else. Muslim shari'a law, which has replaced any form of institutional legal system in Somalia, is enforced in a noncohesive fashion by clan elders.

Journalists: No need for nasty letters to the editor here. The Somali warlords are a well-read bunch, and if they take issue with something you've written, they send a mooryaan to knock on your door and deliver their response. Four Somali journalists were executed by followers of Aideed for offending him in an article they wrote in a UN-sponsored paper. An Italian journalist was executed after being mistaken for an executive of an Italian banana exporter. Most journalists do not sign their name on local articles for fear of reprisals.

Khat (Qat): Although technically not dangerous by itself, most of the gunmen cruising around the country have that tweaky, faraway look that sends chills down the spine of visitors. Khat is also one of the underpinnings of the economy here resulting in the occasional shootout over territory or delivery routes. Those who don't fight battles or raise camels grow khat, an amphetamine-like stimulant that, when chewed, provides a mild high. Khat is preferred fresh, and Federal Express would be green with envy to watch the bundles of khat being airfreighted out of Mogadishu to Yemen and the Gulf States. Khat can also be used as a form of currency. http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Hornet/qat.html

Kidnapping: Kidnapping of whatever foreign-aid workers are left is on the rise. The good news here is that hostages are rarely harmed and often released quickly. The bad news is that more of them are being taken, as they make convenient political bargaining chips. On December 18, 1995, Italian aid worker Marco Lorenzetti was taken hostage by a gang loyal to Aidid. On December 26, Aidid ordered the man turned over to his own custody, after which he "arrested" and "deported" the Italian for entering Somalia without a valid visa issued by the "legitimate" government (Aidid's). By releasing the hostage, Aidid was seeking to be seen in a good light by the Italians. On March 23, 1996, an American aid worker was kidnapped but released the next day. On March 21, five U.N. workers were abducted from Balidogle airport by gunmen and rescued on the 22nd by a Somali militia that recognized them on a BBC broadcast.

Killing People: With all these guns and hair-trigger tempers, it doesn't take more than a few minutes for a clan fight to break out and people to get killed. The only consolation we can offer you if you are convicted of killing someone is that the shari'a, or Islamic law, mandates that you must pay 100 camels. If you are a woman, the penalty is 50 camels. Meanwhile our government does a study looking into human rights with such meaningful topics as "The right to organize and bargain collectively." Obviously they have never been stopped at a Somali roadblock.

Technicals: Every American teenage kid's fantasy is to drop a big 454 into an old Chevy Nova and terrorize the neighborhood. Here every Somali's fantasy is to drop an antiaircraft gun onto the back of a Toyota pickup truck and terrorize the country. Actually, a technical might be a great way to get through the morning commute. Technicals are essentially anything with wheels to which Somalis can bolt a belt-fed machine gun. Homemade technicals were invented in Lebanon in the '80s when warring groups wanted to hit and run (and make a lot of noise). Technicals became the ride of choice when the locals found out that the UN workers would hire them as security. Needless to say, it was harder to find a Toyota Land Cruiser with a roof after that. Thank goodness it only rains bullets here.

Food: As of mid-1999, 1.2 million people were facing serious food shortages in Somalia, with 400,000 on the brink of starvation. With the Ethiopians and the Eritreans using Somalia to try and outflank each other (which they'll probably do down to Antarctica), uncontrolled crop pests, its own messy civil war and no rain for two years, Somalia is on the abyss. Of the total emergency food aid requirements for 1998/1999, only about a quarter-52,000 tons-was delivered. Somalians have been dining on a cuisine of dried leaves, roots and the shells of coffee beans-an entree that might cost 50 bucks at Spago's, but in Somalia is a better bet than Jenny Craig at losing weight real fast. Naturally there are frequent attacks on food convoys by bandits.

Monopoly Money: Hussein Aideed's idea of prosperity for all is simple: just print more money-a shitload of it. He's obviously earned a degree from the Milton Bradley Institute of Micro(scopic) Economics. Somalians have been rioting over hikes in transport, food and other commodities as the presses at Aideed's mint churn out Somali shillings overtime-millions of dollars worth in 1999. Dozens have been killed and an untallied amount injured by armed guards firing on mobs trying to bust into businesses where the bogus bucks are being hoarded. "Go to jail" isn't on the Somali game board.

Foreign Trade Department, Mogadiscio, Somalia, Postal Address: PO Box 928, Mogadiscio, Somalia, Tel.: +2521 21453 Telex: 3143 mincom sm. The World Bank actually did a study on Somalia. You can download or they can send it to you printed on a single Post-it. http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/som_aag.pdf

Stuff You Never Wanted to Know Except under "I'll Try Somali Trivia for $500, Alex": The Cushitic language wasn't written until 1973. Feuding is a principal pasttime of the Somalis. Principally, they feud over the control of barkados, water for hire stations. Frankincense from the Boswellia tree is among the country's most prized exports. There are two rainy seasons, the gu and the dayr. And you better cough up the diya or the abbaan will lay down the shari'a, baaby. http://meltingpot.fortunecity.com/lebanon/254/marchal.htm

Getting Sick: The state-run medical system has collapsed in Somalia, and only rudimentary care is available through NGOs (when they aren't being shot or kidnapped). Statistically there is supposed to be one doctor for every 4,640 people in Somalia. Good Luck. Diarrhea, communicable and parasitic diseases are rampant in the country. Chloroquine-resistant malaria is present in all parts of the country. Larium should be used for chemical prophylaxis. Cholera, dracunculiasis (Guinea worm), cutaneous and visceral leishmaniasis, rabies, relapsing fever and typhus (endemic flea-borne, epidemic louse-borne and scrub) are prevalent. Somalia is also receptive to dengue fever, as there have been intermittent epidemics in the past. Meningitis is a risk during the dry season in the savanna portion of the country, from December through March. Schistosomiasis may also be found in the country and contracted through contact with contaminated freshwater lakes, streams or ponds. A yellow fever vaccination certificate is required for all travelers coming from infected areas.

There's also a pesky little problem with Tumbu Fly, a local maggot that burrows into human skin, munching on flesh all the way. The larvae grows big enough to rip out flesh before it turns into a fly. You don't see a lot of horror movies in Somalia because real life beats David Cronenberg every time. The best place to be evacuated to is Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Nuts and Bolts

Somalia is flat hot place wrapped around Ethiopia like a bandage. The north has hills 3,000-7,000 feet (900-2,100 meters). The rest is a wasteland of dirt. Located in the Horn of Africa, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland formed independent Somalia in 1960. The population is 9.3 million with a 12 percent mortality rate. Somalia covers 637,655 square kilometers (246,199 square miles). Best time to go' Well the term hot as hell would be the phrase of choice describing the climate most of the year. June-September is hot with cool evenings. October-May hot enough to give cockroach heatstroke. If you like your heat wet, head to Mog, where the humidity is a constant 80 percent, with the occasional breeze.

Somalia is not really set up to be the next big tourist attraction in Africa. Its long coastline has some of the nicest sand beaches on the continent, but the waters are infested with sharks and there is little shade. Believe it or not, there is a tourist office in Mogadishu. Let the phone ring a long time (if you can get through). Most journos stay at the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu.

March to June and September to December are the rainy seasons. Nomadic grazing is the name of the game here, with temperatures hot and landscape arid. The country is 100 percent Sunni Muslim; the entire population is ethnic Somali. English is widely spoken, and Italian is popular in the south. Somali is a difficult language and uses the Roman alphabet. Somali has been a written language only since 1972 so understandably just 24 percent of the country is literate. Things like telephones (country code 252) electricity (220), gas or food are in short supply, so look for a hotel with a roof and a generator.

Money is the Somali shilling broken down into 100 centesimi. The money is a little funky since Aideed reprints new money with the old 1996 date. The new Somali shilling is worth less than Old Somali shillings. Hotels run about 45 shillings a day. Depending on which region you are in most of the city folk speak Arabic, Italian or English. For the latest in Africa currency exchange rates check out: http://www.mbendi.co.za/cyexch.htm. Somalis like to be called by their nicknames. The slender Somali frame creates a lot of nicknames like Ato (thin) or Dheere (tall).

Somali has some very benign pockets where you can find pay satphones ($1 a minute outside the country, free inside), banks and other niceties.

Somalia; Senior Police Officer Shot Dead in Somaliland

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Into Somaliland: An Obscure Route into An Obscure Country

2003

IT IS ELEVEN years on, over a decade since the collapse of government. Over five years since all attempts at reconciliation from international organizations failed: Somalia. The country, and people, have been abandoned by the world. Our headlines have moved on to other things, as if perhaps by ignoring the problem would make it go away. For the most part it hasn't. And yet, in the north of the country, something odd has occurred: a government has formed.

A meager infrastructure has begun to take shape. It's being created under the guise of a new country, a place called Somaliland. I had heard rumours that it was reasonably safe to visit this new republic, which no one will admit exists - and which no country will formally recognize. This place in the "black hole" that Kofi Annan called Somalia is a calm bastion in the factional anarchic storm - the only way which the world has known Somalia for over a decade.

I HAD BEEN told that to enter Somaliland by vehicle, a town called Jijiga in northeastern Ethiopia was the entry point. Hargeisa is the capital of this self-declared state, and Boorama is a larger town just near the border. Reaching one or the other would be my goal.

Desperately early in the morning we took off from Addis Ababa to Dire Dawa, a reasonably busy Ethiopian town graced with a paved runway and new terminal. We were asked to deplane while they refuelled. A curious middle-aged British woman approached me.

"Hi. Who are you working with'"

She was nearly flabbergasted to hear that I was a tourist: a tourist out here, heading for Jijiga, the apparent aid coordination centre of Ethiopia.

Upon arrival in Jijiga: no paved runway. Two tin shacks. Many military men standing around. She offered to get me a lift into town with the people she was meeting.

Jijjga is a reasonably large town for this part of the world, although camels wandering through the town centre are common, and much of the place is made up of dirt road and shacks. The entire area was surprisingly green. "We have been getting rain for the past few weeks," one of the local aid workers told me.

I was taken back to their office with the lady and three local workers. "Only a tourist," I said, as we sat, drinking soda water, chatting; them wondering what I was doing in Jijiga, sort of curious but very friendly.

I was assigned not one but two locals to deal with my itinerary: to the immigration office and get stamped out, but only if I can get back in. And then find a bus to Boorama or Hargeisa. Whisked away in their spiffy Land Rover to the immigration office, I got to talking with one of the men. "This town is where all of the aid groups are centred," he said, "and also where the people come to get food."

"Is there enough for everyone'" I asked, expecting the usual African optimism.

"I don't know."

And I still wonder.

THE BUS TO Boorama had left an hour ago; the only one of the day, which I found quite odd. We went back to their office. "So, I guess you're in Jijiga for today'" one of the men asked.

"Well, perhaps. Let's wait and see if there is another way to get to Boorama or Hargeisa today." And the thought must have clicked in his head, because he suggested that I go to Hartishek, where it was easy to connect to Hargeisa. Before I knew it, I was in a tiny bus screaming across the muddy road to the halfway point between Jijiga and Hargeisa: Hartishek.

Rolling across green fields, it was easy to see that many nomads were going back out to the countryside with their herds and beginning life again. The desert here swallows rain fast and graciously; the plains around Jijiga are rolling green now, when only a few years ago they were fodder for the news as endless tracts of dust.

Before Hartishek, still deep in Ethiopian territory, the bus passed through the first Somali roadblock. Of course, it does not actually block the road: it is merely two sticks on either side of the dirt road with a string hooked across. No one paid any attention to me. But I knew from the features of the people in the bus that I was far from Ethiopia already: these people were almost all Somali.

Hartishek is a refugee camp, surrounded by mounds of garbage. In that garbage children play, and African vultures twice the size of the children scavenge. Thousands of plastic bags have been tied onto the whithered bushes; the dirt road turns into deep mud ruts, and crowds of women sit on the side clutching large tin cans bearing the EU symbol. The dirt, the dust, the garbage, and the multitudes of people in such a tiny, desperate town; thousands upon thousands of little white huts that look like bubbles across the rolling plains: this is Hartishek.

A small boy, the conductor for the bus I was on, led me to a Land Cruiser that was loading up for Hargeisa. I met an older African man there: A bit tired in the eyes, with white hair and beard, he spoke with honest-sounding English. He said he was a refugee. "I don't know why God created the black man," he confided in me, "all he does is suffer. And they are rude. How many African countries have you visited' Are any of them without suffering'"

He was certainly pessimistic. He also offered the idea that I pay for all of the seats on the vehicle so it could go immediately. Usually, I don't do this; and the price was high. However, I only had a few days at the most to see Somaliland, and every minute counts at this point. Unfortunately. I have often said to myself that a little time in a place is far better than no time at all, and have had many great experiences this way. So with scant regard for budget I paid the high price - although for the simple fact that it was better security as I was about to enter what is essentially a rogue state, I think it was a smart move.

Another roadblock was not far from the town and a Somali with an AK-47 slung behind him disappeared with my passport and driver into a shed. The old man was still in the Land Cruiser with me. "Perhaps you need a translator," he said. "I could translate for you."

I offered him a modest sum in Ethiopian currency to come with me. "But I will return immediately, and I need to buy the bus back."

"As you like," I said with a friendly smile. He quietly slipped out the back door and disappeared.

The Somali with the gun came out of the shed and up to my window, one hand holding the end of his AK-47 behind his neck, and grunted at me. He didn't make eye contact, but merely looked in the truck quickly to see if there was anything illegal or valuable he might want. And then, we were on our way.

THERE IS NO road from Ethiopia into Somaliland; in fact, there is no formal land connection whatsoever. In Djibouti you have dirt tracks impressed by determined four-wheel-drive vehicles, and in Ethiopia you have the same. Except this time the rains came.

Three years of rain began to fall, and the dry green of this semi-arid land turned into a mudstorm of water and dust. The haze of the raindrops was blasted by the wind, and the ruts cut deep by Land Rovers were turning into rivers. We began sliding, spinning slightly, and eventually - of course - got stuck.

One half hour lost. One mud-drenched driver. But we persisted, and I saw massive turtles crawling across the dirt. They were the only ones who didn't seem to mind, although I am sure the nomads were not complaining too much either.

It was here, moving toward the Somali frontier, that the mood truly changed. There was nothing but us and a general direction. And about two hours later, we reached the real border of Somaliland, another stick-and-string checkpoint. The driver stopped. We stared at the old man who sauntered towards us.

His face was nearly a skull: an older man, decked out in a beige uniform, his AK-47 slung over a shoulder and a hat to die for - a tall and official looking cowboy hat with faded letters on the front that spelled RANGER. The driver explained the usual story of the tourist and the destination, and the string dropped.

Somaliland. Somalia. Whatever you call it, this was not Ethiopia. It hadn't been for over seventy-five kilometres. The landscape became different: more barren, dry, and somehow surreal. The flat grass shifted into rocky scrub and rolling hills. A dirt track to an ignored republic. An obscure way to an obscure country.

Slowly the nomads began to appear, and then we went through the first town with brick buildings. All were destroyed. The nomads persisted in their tents, though. Their sheep, all with white bodies and black above their neck, wandered and ate the sparse foliage. Old military vehicles, rusted and burned, littered the countryside. And suddenly, two hours after crossing the border: pavement.

A road - and another checkpoint. Four boys dressed as soldiers hopped in the back of our vehicle. The story was told again. We drove in silence to the police station, where we were directed into the city and into immigration. And behold, after a smooth half hour ride, the land dipped into a valley and there lay a large looking town:

Hargeisa. Capital of the country that no one will admit exists. Multitudes of coloured cement houses. Arabic and Somali signs dot the bright yellow and blue buildings. New cars roll by. It is wet, quiet, but it's a city. And the capital of this odd, odd country - Somaliland.

SOMALILAND HAD NEVER really been a fluid part of colonial Somalia - before 1960 it was its own country, a territory of Britain, while Somalia was a territory of Italy. British Somaliland became independent in 1960 - for four days. After that, it was decided by the European powers-that-be that the two Somalias should become one country, and the capital should be Mogadishu. And of course since it came from the mouth of a white man, it was so.

When the government of Mogadishu collapsed in 1991, Somaliland used the opportunity to declare independence. By no means were things rosy for the new country from the beginning - civil war raged until 1995, but hostilities continued until 1998, and now things are just tense between the west and the east of the country. Those that know the country know that it's safe right now. But so few know the country; no one in Ethiopia really seemed to know anything about it.

A guide in Djibouti was certain that I would be killed if I tried to enter Somaliland via their border - but after he had talked to some of his friends he found out otherwise. Advisories across the world send conflicting reports about the state of the country, not only because they don't want their citizens to go there, but also because no one has an embassy in the country to confirm what's going on. One fellow I spoke to on the internet actually said it was safer than Ethiopia - and yet the Canadian embassy in Addis Ababa insisted that I come down to their office outside of their usual opening hours to get their advisories about the two countries.

Immigration looked at my passport, and told me to come back at nine in the morning when they were open, and could get the stamps out. Taken to a hotel room for the night, I unloaded my bag and a Somali-Ethiopian who was born in Somalia but had lived in Ethiopia but pretty much the Somali region of Ethiopia (get that') took me to change money. One US Dollar = 3000 Somaliland Shillings. The largest note is 500 shillings - I was given a fat clump of bills that landed on the moneychanger's table with a thump.

Cafeterias lined this road in Hargeisa, and all eyes were on me as throngs of Somalis sat in their plastic chairs and listened to the radios. There were no televisions around. Dinner was three samosas and a Fanta for a whopping US dollar's worth of Shillings. The Somali who led me around, surprisingly, didn't ask for a tip. Just by that gesture I knew he wasn't Ethiopian.

We walked back to the hotel. "May I ask you a question'" he said, and then without waiting for my response, proceeded: "What do you think of Somali people'"

I never had the chance to answer him as we walked to the reception in the hotel and I handed over a wad of money to pay for my room.

But if I had answered his question... The Somalis: physically, they are often rather tall, skinny, with slightly distorted facial features like an overbite, long chins, and deep set eyes. My instincts tell me they are odd; more unpredictable than other African societies, more in tune with ancient associations to clan and tribe than other Africans who have accepted the westernization of their societies. I will go out on a limb here and say they rely more on their instincts than the other, more colonialized, African ethnic groups.

The Somalis are the people in Africa who have most abruptly rejected any colonial influence, with the anarchy in the east a sort of return to ancient tribal warfare. They are a devoutly Muslim people. They are African, and harbour no outsider's interference in their destiny.

Crazy' Perhaps. But the Somalis are Africans at their most base. They want to do things their way. They will learn through their own mistakes. And they will find a purely African solution to their problems.

HARGEISA IS A busy town when it's not raining, with a few of those Arabesque attractions a tourist brochure might put in when there isn't really anything of interest: a few mosques, a market, a main street. Buildings appropriated by government. But like most of Africa, it's far more interesting than it looks.

On my way to immigration a babbling man on the street began to follow me, holding his arms out. "Five hundred years ago the slave ships began their way across the ocean," he shouted, "and the chains of west Africa still burn on my wrist." I gave him a curious look, and he was eventually called aside by some older men, who probably told him not to bug the white man like that. A few minutes later a group of women began to follow me; I felt a pinch on my shoulder. They had thrown a rock at me.

"Have you ever been in a war?" the officer at immigration asked me. His boss wasn't there yet to stamp me in; he was supposed to arrive at nine, and now it's ten thirty. I told the officer I was talking to that I had never been in a war, or at least, not my own. And I've certainly never fought in one.

"It's not good," he replied. "But in 1988 - we had to fight."

Tensions were escalating in 1988 - the regime down in Mogadishu had ordered several thousand people killed in Hargeisa. Even now war damage is one of the most prevalent sights in the city.

The officers were all decked out in army uniforms, nicely pressed, with clean black berets on their scalps. The officer I had been speaking to grinned. I asked him about the fact that no country recognized Somaliland. He grinned again.

"It makes no difference to us. If they want to recognize us, then let them recognize us. If they don't want to recognize us, then they don't recognize us."

He continued. "We are nomads, you know' Life is simple here. You wake up, eat, chew Qat, tend the animals, eat, and sleep. Political things matter little. If people want to fight us, then they will lose, because we have nothing to lose."

I finally received my entry stamp, and departed the office. I had met a doctor earlier in the day who was looking for a western reference, as Africans often are (no matter that they're also looking to make some cash by helping out foreigners). He invited me for tea after I ran into him a few hours later, and we chatted. He was very interested in studying his PhD abroad, so I offered to mail him a university catalog. He gave me a tour of his hospital: clean but bare, and no sign of any patients or medical supplies. He then offered to arrange me a private car to Boorama, for cheap. But first, there was the matter of lunch.

The doctor, a friend of his and I wandered over to a large open restaurant, with dirt floors and a dingy, dark indoor room. We sat outside. Mango juice, water, a dish of spaghetti with sauce, and a large dish with rice and two loins of goat meat; and also some very awful tasting "animal" soup. All fine and dandy you say. And yes, it was all fine, except that you have to eat all of this with your fingers. And yes, people wash their hands before and after meals. He and his friend directed me toward the private taxi stand after our lunch.

Soon we became surrounded by men - shouting, pulling, pushing, surrounding us. I was asked to sit down while he negotiated. Five minutes later I got up and moved through the throng into a taxi, shrugging off hands pulling at me, always mindful of my bag. The taxi was stuck, we locked the doors as the crowd persisted. One man reached through an open window and tried to unlock my door; I pressed against the lock quickly as the taxi finally sped off. We stopped several blocks away to negotiate a price.

We settled on a sum that was extremely expensive for the region, but my time constraints forced me to accept it. The doctor took down his car number, his name, his tribe's name, his grandfather's name, and the make of his car and threatened to throw him in jail if anything happened to me. Yet another example of how an African does not trust his fellow African.

Off I went to Boorama. I gave the doctor some cash for his help. The taxi driver's cut was such a large amount of bills that he had to stuff several stacks of them in his glove compartment - here, people have an incredible skill which is flipping through dozens upon dozens of bills very quickly using their thumb and forefinger. I never did get the hang of it.

Copyright 2003 Sobaka and Diacritica Press. All Rights Reserved.

Somaliland

At a new teaching/maternity hospital in Hargeisa, donated computers now help to train students-most of them female-in internationally-accredited nursing and midwifery. Educated women, along with the donation of millions of dollars in medicine, will hopefully help to better Somalia's bleak history of healthcare.

For more information about how to donate or volunteer, please contact project manager Marvin Bozard at Marvin Bozard (marvin.bozard@globalhopenetwork.org).

WOMANKIND and Women's Rights in Somaliland

The Republic of Somaliland was known as the Somaliland Protectorate under British rule from 1884 until June 26th 1960 when Somaliland gained independence from Britain. On July 1st 1960, Somaliland and the former Italian colony of Somalia were joined to form the Somali Republic. By the early 1980s, Siad Barre's regime was spending three quarters of Somalia's budget on security, and in 1977 he had used this huge force to attack Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. Defeat in 1978 led to a deluge of Ethiopian Somali refugees - 1.5 million people, or 40% of Somalia's population - and the turning point for the Barre regime. Internal dissent intensified, with the Isaaq of the Somaliland region forming the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, and the political and economic crisis led to a civil war from the mid-1980s onwards.

The bombardment of Hargeisa by Barre's forces in 1988 led to three years of bitter civil war. It resulted in massive displacement both internal and external, including some 300,000 refugees who fled to Ethiopia, (Waldron & Hasci, 1995), in the deaths of nearly 60,000 people, an exodus of intellectuals and key workers such as teachers and doctors, and a near total destruction of infrastructure, communications systems, banking and all public services. Following the collapse of the military regime in Mogadishu in May 1991, the people of Somaliland held a congress in which it was decided to withdraw from the Union with Somalia and to reinstate Somaliland's sovereignty. The country is not internationally recognised as an independent state, which has a negative impact on international and national government relations, aid and trade policies. Following a period of inter-clan conflict, from 1994-6, the people of Somaliland have settled internal disputes using traditional peace-building methods, and they have started to rehabilitate and reconstruct their damaged country.

Women's position in society

Traditionally Somali culture is patriarchal and women's inferior status is seen as been sanctioned by religion. The end of the civil war has produce profound social change in Somaliland, with a clear impact on women. In particular, the situation of urban women is undergoing significant change, with the high turnout of women voters during the 2002 elections bearing witness to their enthusiasm to exercise their democratic and political rights.

Men do still overwhelmingly hold the balance of power in the country and make the decisions in the important areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance, political concerns, and relationships with other communities and government. While urban women may have increasingly more influence in family affairs, participation of women in political life is negligible. In rural areas, the roles and responsibilities of women have changed little, and traditional culture and beliefs remain well defined.

Both men and women have largely accepted the important economic role of women as petty traders, although some resist this change in gender relations. In Burco, Togdheer region, women taking part in discussion groups initiated by the World Bank estimated that women are the breadwinners in almost 70% of households.

The practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is estimated as 90-98% prevalent in Somalia as whole. A 1999 CARE International survey estimates 100% prevalence in Somaliland. (U.S. Department of State, 2001) The overwhelming majority practice Type III, or infibulation. This is the most severe type of FGM and involves cutting off all the external genitalia and sewing up the vagina almost entirely, allowing a tiny hole for the passing of urine and menstrual blood. Some analysts have suggested that the disruption of the war years caused an increase in the practice of FGM, as traditional culture became an important source of stability for a beleaguered population.

Somaliland

The self-declared republic came into being in 1993, within the boundaries of the pre-1960 British protectorate. Somalia itself fell apart at the seams in 1991 after a spate of clan-based rebellions against the genocidal dictatorship of President Siad Barre. The wars were chaotic, an impenetrable series of vicious contests between shifting clan alliances. Somalia became, and remains, a classic `failed state' where warlords dispute resources and territory. Somaliland, whose 1988 rebellion sparked the process of national disintegration, resolved to go it alone.

The choice of Egal as President in 1993 helped to provide the fledgling mini-republic with international respect and internal solidarity even if its existence was formally rejected. Egal was one of Africa's first generation of leaders: he had briefly been President of Somaliland in 1960 before its unification with the south. He restored security, introduced a currency and administration, and attracted vital investment from northern Somalis in the diaspora: they provide 70 per cent of the budget. He presided over the return of thousands of refugees and a constitutional referendum in 2001.

President Egal was temporarily succeeded by his deputy, Dahir Riyale Kahin. Far from collapsing, Somaliland has since consolidated its institutional progress. In April 2003, presidential elections were held. The party of President Dahir won by only 80 votes in a ballot of 488,543. Everyone held their breath until the main opposition party publicly accepted the result - an act of political maturity whose significance cannot be exaggerated.

The administration appointed as its Minister of Foreign Affairs Edna Aden Ismail, widow of President Egal and a prominent leader in her own right, and has since renewed its campaign for international recognition. It refuses to participate in peace talks between leaders from the rest of Somalia held in Nairobi. Reunification with its chaotic neighbours, including self-declared Puntland to the east, is rejected despite the international fixation with `national integrity' and `previous boundaries'.

Meanwhile, Somaliland does receive assistance from international, bilateral and NGO donors: UN organizations refer to Somalia's `Northwest Zone', preserving the fiction that it is a part of a larger country, but deal directly with its authorities. An airline operates to Ethiopia and Europe, and commercial relations with the rest of the world are increasing.

But `development' is still a distant aspiration. Even without the war, this is one of the most resource-poor countries in the world. Apart from its strategic position, which it traded on successfully during the Cold War, the mainstays of its economy are camels and frankincense. Its scrubland has the romantic aura of all desert landscapes but not much else to recommend it. Until not long ago, 90 per cent of the people were nomadic, herding their livestock in search of seasonal pasture and defending them from marauders.

Today, only around 50 per cent of people still make a living even partially from their herds. And although civil society shows extraordinary ebullience, this figure also reflects the social dislocation and losses of recent times. Cash-based poverty and its associated misery has entered a world where wealth and status used to be very differently assessed. Squatter settlements have sprung up, even as towns such as Hargeisa and Burao rise like phoenixes from their rubble. The availability of schooling, healthcare and basic services remains very low. In every single way - not just in political terms - Somaliland is a society in transition.

Maggie Black

NI Assessment

A seemingly genuine attempt to move away from clan-based power as the underpinning of political and administrative life, but a long way to go - especially to get more women into leadership positions. Elections for the House of Representatives will soon be held; the other legislative chamber is a House of Elders from which women are automatically excluded. And it could yet go terribly wrong: there are ructions on the eastern border where elders threaten to ally with neighbouring Puntland.

Facts: Leader: President Dahir Riyale Kahin.

Economy: Gross national income (GNI) per capita $120 estimated for Somalia by the World Bank (Ethiopia $190, Britain $24,230).

Monetary unit: Somali shilling.

Main exports: Livestock (camels, sheep, goats); the Gulf States have banned livestock imports from the Horn since outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever in 1998, decimating export earnings.

People: 3.5 million. People per square kilometre 25 (US 31) - Somaliland is about the size of England and Wales.

Health: (Statistics for Somalia; separate Somaliland data unavailable)

Infant mortality: 133 per 1,000 live births (Eritrea 72, Britain 6). 71% of people are undernourished. 95% of girls suffer genital mutilation. 34% of births are attended by skilled personnel.

Environment: The desert landscape is among the harshest in the world. Temperatures in the coastal belt are extremely high; the inland escarpment and plains, while cooler, are notoriously drought-prone. Around 50% of the population are pastoralist or semi-pastoralist.

Culture: Somalis have a rich oral culture, with songs and poems deriving from the heroic desert life. Social structure is provided by the clan; extreme hardship traditionally led clans to contest water and pasture and raid each other's herds. Authority was wielded by elders and sheikhs. Somalis are successful herders, truckers, sailors and traders. Interaction with modern lifestyles is sporadic and selective.

Religion: Islam; women are semi-secluded.

Language: Somali.

Sources: allAfrica.com, Somalilandgov.com, Somaliland online; UNDP and UNICEF country programme data; HDR 2003; State of the World's Children 2003.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION: There has always been a Somali ?lite, many in the diaspora. But the strong tradition of upholding the clan makes for mutual support and a sharing and egalitarian instinct.

SELF-RELIANCE: No other option in a world which refuses to recognize the country's existence. Remittances from Somalis abroad, and aid, are nevertheless important resources.

POSITION OF WOMEN: Women are traditionally regarded as inferior beings, their status derived only from their fathers, husbands and sons. But they are playing a key part in the rebuilding of post-war civil society, and this is being recognized.

LITERACY: The literacy rate is only 24%; among women it is lower. Primary enrolment is even lower at 12% (Somalia figures).

FREEDOM: Political debate and information exchange are encouraged; but wariness accompanies the process, due to the inheritance of clan rivalry and the recent troubled past.

LIFE EXPECTANCY: 48 years (Somalia figure) - compare Eritrea 53 and Britain 78 years.

Somaliland chewers' street march;Chewing is popular across the region

"If the resources were available, we would expand assistance beyond the 64,000 people to an additional 41,200 needy people in 18 villages," he said.

Hauser noted that the area had been devoid of rain for a long time and groundwater reserves were drying up and the WFP was expanding its operations to respond to "the worst drought to hit the region since 1981." "We need to intervene immediately to prevent wide scale malnutrition and stave off a humanitarian disaster," Hauser warned.

The WFP noted that the Sool Plateau, which covers parts of Sool and Sanaag districts in Somaliland as well as parts of Bari district in Puntland, had suffered three consecutive years of drought.

The Sool Plateau region is claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland and has seen intense fighting in the past few months.

The Somali Transitional National Government, which was established by a Somali peace conference in Djibouti in 2000, has only managed to control a small part in the capital.

Somalia; UN Warns of Humanitarian Disaster in Sool Plateau

WFP noted that the Sool Plateau - covering parts of Sool and Sanaag districts in Somaliland, as well as parts of Bari district in Puntland - had suffered three consecutive years of drought. "WFP urgently needs more funds if we're to continue our planned assistance over the next five months," Hauser said. "We need some US $6.5 million to buy about 8,600 tonnes of food aid." WFP added that the Sool plateau region is claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland and has seen intense fighting in the past few months.

Somaliland tries to get some respect

Flexible rods form a semi-spherical skeletal structure that is then covered with old bits of clothing, plastic sheeting and old sacks.

In Somaliland, the breakaway republic in the north of Somalia, these patchwork huts stand right next door to the concrete houses of the better off and the white-washed buildings put up by the international aid organizations.

Somaliland is poor but proud. Twelve years ago the former British colony declared itself independent from Somalia, although no one has yet recognized it as an independent country.

Undeterred by their lack of success on the international stage, the inhabitants of Somaliland hoist their own national flag, use their own registration numbers on their vehicles and print their own money.

The currency's value is so degraded that exchanging a US$10 note leaves the visitor with more cash than can comfortably fit into a normal wallet.

Money changers in the nominal capital of Hargeisa sit surrounded by knee-high piles of bank notes, which provide a handy footrest when they take their midday siesta.

"This is a peaceful and stable country. You can travel around without being stopped by armed militias," says Jesper Morch, the representative of the UN children's organization UNICEF in Somalia. He believes it is time that the international community acknowledges the political achievements of the small republic.

And the International Crisis Group, a group of independent political experts, is even more explicit in the way it sees the situation.

"International recognition would establish Somaliland as one of the few truly democratic states in the region," they say in a report.

In April Somaliland conducted a tense presidential election, in which President Dahir Rayala Kahin was confirmed in office against all expectations with a majority of just 80 votes.

Foreign Minister Edna Adan, a former midwife and the founder of a women's clinic in Hargeisa, has acquired the status of a resolute mother figure in this small country with an estimated population of some 3.5 million.

She represents Somaliland on the international stage with a mixture of charm and determination to see it granted recognition as a full member of the family of nations.

Somaliland cannot survive without international aid. Income from the trade in livestock has declined dramatically after the outbreak of disease in the national herd.

And a large part of the national income is consumed in the form of khat, a leaf imported from Kenya and Ethiopia that the residents chew. The habit, which provides the consumer with a mild high after hours of chewing, can cost up to five dollars a day.

Only 17 percent of the children of school-going age actually attend school, and more than 90 percent of the women are believed to undergo a form of circumcision in childhood that is often so radical that they suffer severe health problems in later life, especially when they give birth.

"There is simply no family planning here," says Dahir Mohammed Yusuf, the deputy director of the Edna Adan Clinic in Hargeisa.

Despite all the country's problems, however, life is better here for ordinary people than in the rest of Somalia. Somalia is rated the fifth poorest country in the world, and for the past 12 years it has had no effective central government.

During the civil war, many of the country's educated elite simply left, and in the capital Mogadishu the warring clans continue to battle for turf and abduct anyone they believe can provide ransom money.

A UN security official, returning after a two year tour of duty in Mogadishu, said recently: "In this place, all hope is in vain."

Somaliland to get a GSM network

"By meeting the specific cost, coverage and capacity needs in the first phase of Telsom Mobile's deployment, Tecore was able to rapidly deliver a high-capacity MSC to serve more subscribers than any other operator in Mogadishu," said Jay Salkini, Tecore's chairman and CEO. "Telsom Mobile has placed this order with us to expand their system coverage and open up lucrative roaming opportunities." "We are delighted with the success of the first wireless network deployment from Tecore and AirNet," said M. A. Jama, CEO of Telsom Mobile. "We awarded them the expansion of our system because we knew they could quickly provide an integrated software-based, feature rich solution. With its all-in-one MSC and broadband base stations, Tecore was an obvious choice to dramatically reduce our total cost of ownership and maximize our return-on-investment."

SOPRI's mission

SOPRI Promote and cultivate the building of Democratic institutions and representative decentralized government and respect for human rights in Somaliland.

Solicit technical, material, manpower and monitory reconstruction aid from the international donor community for rehabilitating and rebuilding Somaliland's devastated physical infrastructure. In addition, foster long-term economic development of Somaliland through the development and exploitation of its indigenous natural and human resources and international trade.

Build and strengthen sustainable capacity building for Public Sector, Private Sector and Civil Society with enabling emphasis on the relationship and interface between sectors. As one of its key missions SOPRI INSTITUTE will focus in assisting these key sectors in their capacity building in formulation and implementation of sustainable economic development, good governance and poverty reduction policies.

The common principals that guide SOPRI INSTITUTE

Recognition and respect for the right of the people of Somaliland to have political and economic self-determination. Support all genuine efforts by Somalilanders at home and abroad to rebuild their country and Commitment to advocate the respect for human rights and the establishment of democratic institutions in Somaliland.

Advocate decentralization of government policies and strengthening regional and local development sustainable development policies. Commitment to undertake rigorous analysis, advice and action that will enhance the different development phases for the country.

Cooperation with all local and international non-governmental agencies and institutions for working with SOPRI INSTITUTE for its commitment towards the local capacity building advancement and progress of Somaliland's economic recovery. Enhancement of framework for advocacy consultation and stakeholder participation for sustainable policy analysis, design and implementation of monitoring process.

SOPRI INSTITUTE Programs & Projects

(a) Good Governance & Transparency (b) Conflict Prevention: how is it historically managed (c) Reconstruction of Somaliland's infrastructure (d) Creation of knowledge-based center for documentation, data and socio-economic research (e) Capacity building center for private sector and NGO's for trade and regional cooperation.

History

SOPRI's mission and purpose are predicated upon four main objectives namely: (a)To advocate, promote and support the desires of the people of Somaliland to have full rights of economic self-determination and to articulate their aspirations to gain independent statehood and recognition by the international community as a sovereign and independent state. (b)SOPRI Promote and cultivate the building of Democratic institutions and representative decentralized government and respect for human rights in Somaliland. (c)Solicit technical, material, manpower and monitory reconstruction aid from the international donor community for rehabilitating and rebuilding Somaliland's devastated physical infrastructure. In addition, foster long-term economic development of Somaliland through the development and exploitation of its indigenous natural and human resources and international trade. (d) Build and strengthen sustainable capacity building for Public Sector, Private Sector and Civil Society with enabling emphasis on the relationship and interface between sectors. As one of its key missions SOPRI INSTITUTE will focus in assisting these key sectors in their capacity building in formulation and implementation of sustainable economic development, good governance and poverty reduction policies.

Somaliland: Was it a sovereign nation'

In order for one to understand the validity of Somaliland's assertion to political self-determination and its quest for statehood one has to put it in a historical perspective. The Republic of Somaliland is currently a de facto independent and sovereign state, reasserting its sovereignty by withdrawing from the union with rest of Somalia on May 18, 1991. The state of former Somalia came to existence by the merger of two independent states in 1960 when Somaliland, a British Protectorate united with Southern Somalia, an Italian Trust territory. Somaliland itself occupies the same territorial area of British Somaliland Protectorate.

Center to the cataclysmic events which have precipitated the breakup of this union between the North and the South is a twenty one year political and economic domination and disenfranchisement which was imposed on the people of the North by one of Africa's most notorious and ruthless dictotor, General Mohamed Siyad Barre who was from the South. Somalilanders have nightmarish memories of the past and cannot therefore return to the status quo of a Somali Unitary State. The Barre regime before its overthrow has waged a relentless campaign of pillage, blunder prosecution and gross human violations against the people of Somaliland who succeeded in ridding themselves from the yoke of his repressive regime through a ten year war of liberation. In 1988 nearly 50,000 people were killed and 600,000 fled as refugees from the northern cities such as Hargeisa, Buroa and Berbera to refugee camps in northerwestern Ethiopia when the forces of the Barre regime waged an all out air/ground military campaign against the people in the North as a last ditch effort to quench their uprising.

The Northern Capital city of Hargeisa for example was literally levelled to the ground in 1988 by constant air strikes and heavy artillery shelling and nearly 2 million land mines which continue to claim lives every day were planted around major northern cities and country side. While Siyad Barre's regime were being defeated in the North, his regime was crumbling from under him in the South. In January 1991 the militry dictator was deposed by the combined efforts of several liberation movements in the country...

On May 18, 1991 after driving out the remnants of the dictator's occupying forces which have waged an all out genocide and destruction, former Northern Somalia seperated from the rest of Somalia and was proclaimed an independent and sovereign state by its people. Meanwhile, in the South, when the Barre regime was toppled from its seat of power in Mogadishu and was forced to flee the country it was replaced by several warring factions who could not agree on any power sharing formula to govern what was left of Somalia. Hostilities in the South escalated while the rest of the world stood by, what had happened to the innocent and powerless who got caught in the middle of these warring factions in Southern Somalia needs no elaboration.

Having inherited a scorched earth environment, the people of Somaliland continue to appeal to the international community to lend them a helping hand in rebuilding their devastated land. Although Somaliland have been experiencing relative calm and stability compared to the chaos and anarchy in Somalia, no measurable efforts was made by the international community thus far to recognize it and provide any any meaningful reconstruction or development aid to this fledging country that is rising from the ashes of a decade long brutal civil war.

The lack of recognition of Somaliland by the international community as an independent and sovereign state is a major impediment to its economic survival and development. Any meaningful reconstruction and development aid that may be available from other nations, international organizations and financial institutions will not be feasible without recognition. SOPRI Insitute's efforts are dedicated to help Somaliland in its quest for recognition as an independent state and to find it rightful place among the family of nations.

Somalia/Somaliland

Fact:

(1) Population: 7 million (2) Capital: Mogadishu (3) Major languages: Somali, Arabic, Italian, English (4) Major religion: Islam (5) Life expectancy: 45 years (men), 48 years (women) (6) Monetary unit: 1 Somali shilling = 100 cents (7) Main exports: Livestock, bananas, hides, fish (8) Average annual income: Not available (9)Internet domain: .so (10) International dialling code: +252

Ongoing/Recent Activities

(a)Time frame: Nov 2001 - Nov 2004 (b)Funder: Baring Foundation (c)Name of project: Baring Foundation Project (d)The aim of the 3-year project is to: (1) establish and train pastoralist NGOs and CBOs (2) build the capacity of the emerging pastoralist CBOs and NGOs working at grassroot level to develop pastoralist capacities to participate in their own development (3) promote debate within Somaliland on the role of pastoralist economy (to acknowledge pastoralists as important stakeholders of the national and regional economies).

The Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa (PENHA) is an African initiative, registered as a UK charity in 1989 by a group of researchers and development workers from the Horn of Africa. c2001 PENHA. All rights reserved

Forestry and Woodland Management in Somaliland.

Background: Environmental, social and political structures.

Martin Herzog (hewww@brainworker.ch)

Introduction and Summary of Recommendations

"Descriptions and photographs of the northern part of the Republic at the end of the 19th century, such as those of Major H.G.C. Swayne, record that the country was then park like with anbundant trees and grass. Herds of elephants could be seen roaming or resting in the shade of large trees and the wild ass was then so common and tame that shooting it was no sport. Today (1973, the auth.) the country between Berbera and Hargeisa to which these reports applied is one of the most degraded in the Republic. ... The last elephant died at Hargeisa in 1953 The rhinoceros, lion, greater and lesser Kudu and Swayne's Hartbeest are now extinct, or nearly so, in the region." [1])

This degradation is not only a problem in what concerns wildlife and biodiversity - it is first and above all a threat to the whole nation and its pastoral lifestyle. "The rangelands of Somalia constitute one of the most valuable natural resources of the country. They cover 80% of the land area and the livestock production based upon them provided, in 1978, 80% of the foreign trade earnings." [2])

This problem is understood by the government and many local and international NGOs. CARITAS Somalia took the decision to investigate the problem and have a look at potential solutions. The focus should have been on sustainable (= "commercial") plantations, e.g. fast growing species, alternative resources, methods and ways to plant trees, supporting local NGOs with advice. Potential cooperation with and relations to Ethiopia ("south-south transfer")should be taken into consideration. In addition there was a special mandate on the improvement of the carpentry section (VTC, Hargeisa).

This report will give some more details on above mentioned problems, present the natural and social factors of importance for activities in forestry and present the major topics with proposals for solutions.

The following part summarises the major points concerning each one of the modules. For each module here the main Problem, Recommendation and Comments are summarised:

1: (Fuel-)Wood and Charcoal

Wood is harvested without any restrictions on common lands, that means without any costs for reestablishment. Any plantation will produce wood that is more expensive than wood from common lands that has only to cover costs of harvest, processing (of charcoal), transport and marketing.

A rotation-system for wood harvest, replantation (nursery needed.) and charcoal production has to be developed with the participation of the ministry, the local charcoal associations, committees and elders. Charcoal production areas should be set up in blocks and delimited. Producers should be obliged to use the woodlands carefully, sustainably, that means, to take care for the natural regeneration or for replantations.

Nurseries:

The recommended fast growing species need water... That means, they compete with the crops on the farm, with the fodder on the range and with the people for the scarce water. Eucalypts, Prosopis and Parkinsonia, are not estimated at all by the farmers. Proper testing of species has to be done, not only taking into account the ecological adaptability, but as well the socio-economic acceptability. "Experimental nurseries" should be established doing species trials - as well as extension. This type of nurseries should be established close to water sources as dams, "balows" and wells (COOPI).

At any rate, forestry projects would have to look at things in a holistic manner, integrating production, distribution, plantation and protection of woodlands. The MLFR should play a coordinating and leading role in this field. especially the collection and import of seeds should be control by a seed-center.

To improve productivity of the nurseries a different approach should be used. Instead of assisting each one of those nurseries with their ridiculously low productivity, the result, the product, the seedlings should/might be contracted, but that again needs plantation projects.

The saving substitution of charcoal is very important and wanted. There are mainly three possibilities to do that: (a) improve charcoal making / improve the kilns (b) improve availability of kerosene stoves and fuel (c) develop alternative fuels as coal and solar energy

The main steps or the improvement of stoves and ovens would be: (a) compare models and their efficiency (b) check the local market on available materials and skills for local production (c) produce a set of models (d) test the models in the households (cooking process, handling, quality of food, acceptance ... (e) coordinate with other WID programmes (f) start awareness raising and distribution campaign with the women in the markets.

2: Water, Runoff, Erosion: Watershed Management

For Somalia - RUNOFF - as a loss of water, and the erosion connected to it, is the main problem. Connected to it: Fodder production is one of the highest priorities in Somaliland. To approach those closely related problems, several activities, in addition to seedlings production and woodland protection, will be needed. Gullies and small rivers have to be managed to prevent: a) the waste of water by runoff, and b) the erosion caused by runoff.

Small dams (baleys and birkas) could produce the water needed for fodder production and tree plantation. To avoid environmental degradation around water points, the construction of new water points, either surface or borehole, should strictly and only be done in association with grazing management plans for the areas. The watershed management model COOPI is using at Boroma, is very developed, but as well quite expensive ($ 10,000/ha). As enormous areas have to be treated in Somaliland, some cheaper model will have to be developed.

3: Natural Forests Protection and Management

The traditional idea of drought reserves or the like would have to be expanded, the neglected drought and other reserves will have to be reestablished. The most important one for forestry is the Golis range at Erigavo, the Daloo forest. So far no recommendation can be given on the management or the possibility to reestablish the sawmill, as the area could not be visited. The following questions would have to be checked: (a) The regeneration of Junipers and Boswellia. (b) The productivity, increase rates. (c) The shape and development potential of the sawmill at Erigavo.

The relevant literature to be consulted on the subject of Erigavo is: 1. Bergstrom, T [1975]: Trials with cuttings from francincense trees in Debbis.
2. " : 1975 Forest Resources of Gaanlibah
3. " : 1975 Forest Resources of Daloh
4. Flamwell, C: Improved methods of production at Erigavo sawmill.
5. Lawrie [1958]: Forests of the Somaliland Protectorate
6. Lessau, J. [1975]: Report on Al Mado Forest Reserve
7. " [1976]: Forestry Development in N. Somalia FAO SOM/72/012 Field Doc. No. 2

Moreover the "Somalia Ecological Society" might have some interesting information as well and should be contacted: Mr John D. Leefe OBE. The Spinney, Clipsham Road, Stretton, Oakham, LEIC 15 7QS. And: Mr. A.S. Hassan, 31 Flyfield, Six Acres Estate, London N4 3PJ, England. FAX 0171 263 3658. As well as: Dr Mats Thulin, working on the "Flora of Somalia". Uppsala University, Dept. of Syst. Botany, Villavagen 6, S-75236, Uppsala, Sweden.

Cooperation is advisable, is the management of the natural forests of Midagdu (Ethiopia) and of the Golis mountains in Somaliland. Unluckily neither of the two countries does have experience in the management of natural forests.

4: The development of an Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Culture:

COOPI, at Boroma, is already active in the fields of tree plantation on bounds and dams, live fencing and erosion control. Wider activities in agro-forestry should be started in the agricultural expansion zones of Hargeisa-Boroma and Erigavo. Before - and better than - tackling large scale projects, grass, hay and silage production should first be tried on a small scale, on farms - together with water harvesting and storing. Water catchment and production have to be improved. Along wadis a lot of the tall grasses are growing that might be replaced by bamboo, e.g. for roof construction.

Comments on the Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Culture:

The potential south-south exchange between Ethiopia and Somaliland is limited, as Ethiopia has a long standing tradition in agriculture, while Somaliland is a country of pastoralism, where agriculture is only slowly developing. Moreover, the efforts undertaken in Ethiopia have the aim to introduce soil stabilisation by terracing, contour bounds, plantations, watershed management and more. Those activities are not really part of traditional land use in Ethiopia. A cooperation with Yemeni farmers might be more advisable.

5: Extension:

So far there is no teaching material available for environmental awareness raising or education. For this kind of training the Ministry of planning should be leading, as different Ministries, as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, education and interior are involved.

Recommendations on extension: (1) The strong tradition in oral knowledge-exchange will have to be taken into account for any training and extension activities. (2) The possibility of working with and through the awqaf has to be tested. Extension materials and curricula should be done in cooperation with them.

The recommendations the National Range Agency made in 1980 are still valuable and should be followed: a) initiating dialogue with the pastoral community whilst collecting sociological data in the area b) continuing the dialogue by explaining the objectives of the range development plan c) producing visual aids and educational material applicable to the range development plan and easily followed by the nomadic communities d) conducting seminars and workshops in the regions specifically prepared for the conditions of those regions. d) carrying out regular programmes with mobile cinemas using films, slides, film strips or even video tapes.

To get a better idea on the real needs of women in Somaliland and on their influence on the environment, to enable us to make some reasonable project proposals, including the women, some PRA would be needed as a first approach. For this EC and Oxfam (Environmental Advisor Rosalind David) might - hopefully - cooperate.

6 Data:

Data and libraries are lacking. It is very difficult, for foreign experts as well as for locals, to get information. Any assistance in this field would not only help Somaliland, but very much the donor countries themselves when in search of data needed for development projects.

Final recommendations - The need for a systems approach

The major problem for projects in Somaliland will be the needed "systems orientation" as well as the time frame. The National Range Agency put it clearly, already in 1980: "I should like to conclude this introduction by pointing out that range development is, of necessity, a long term exercise dealing with people's traditional ways and the growth of natural vegetation both of which may be extremely slow to change. ... Traditional ways are hard to change and to raise the educational standards takes generations."

This does not mean, that CARITAS or other involved agencies will have to run projects that cover the whole country and all the fields of activities mentioned in the report, and it does not mean, that projects have to commit themselves for 6-10 years - but it means that any project working in this field will have to be aware of the facts, that forest and range need long term commitments, that "punctual" approaches have little chance. Cooperation with other organisations and projects has to be established - because water, range, woodlands and the communities are strongly interlinked and "interactive". It all happens on the same two-dimensional space -and possibilities for "exclosures" are very limited, because they are themselves disruptive in what concerns the traditional, the nomadic, land-use. Forest, range and water can't be separated - and they are all common.

And it means that agencies have to assist with funds. Pure "advice" is not much valued, neither by government nor by the local NGOs: "We have the expertise, what we need are the funds."

1 Problems

1.1 Charcoal

Charcoal production is a major problem. Most of the energy is derived from charcoal. Some 13 lorries (80 tons) are coming into Hargeisa each day. No wood is used for cooking - "charcoal is better". Only bakers and Bedouins use wood. The problem has been addressed in the FAO project-proposal of 1993 (p 63):"It is reported that about 92% of domestic energy requirements in Somalia are dependant upon wood and charcoal fuel source. The impact of the overcutting of desired species for the production of charcoal and harvest of fuelwood has become a very serious issue. While the demand for fuelwood and charcoal on a national basis does not exceed the overall forest increment, its distribution largely concentrated around urban areas, rural settlements, refugee camps, etc., has resulted in complete removal of forest cover from over extensive areas. The situation is aggravated by the use of energy material provided by a very specific number of species The end result is a sharp dwindling of supply sources, and spiraling cost."

Acacia bussei and A. nilotica are the preferred species. Preferably large diameters are cut or often set on fire even while standing. Charcoal production in pits and simple kilns is rather inefficient. Charcoal producers should officially get a license. Often charcoal is produced by "outsiders", and the locals do not have the power (and guards) to protect the forest. Still, a positive aspect is that the charcoal producers are often organised in co-operatives.

1.2 Water points and Pasture

Somaliland is semi-arid. Water has a high priority. Especially during the dry season water supplies are the major problem for people as well as for livestock. On the other hand - where there is water - the vegetation is dwindling.

For this reason, normally, a permission of the forest and range department would be needed for the establishment of birkas. Nowadays, most often the permits are given by the water department alone, without any consultation of the range department. The birkas are not checked, the environmental situation is not being assessed, water is not managed.Wells in the tugs (water courses) seem not to be a problem, but the birkas (cisterns and tanks) are, as they are refilled by tankers.

1.3 Degradation / erosion / extension of farms / refugee camps

The National Range Agency indicated as major causes leading to range degradation: (A) ever increasing livestock: Its number is now estimated as some 25 millions for Somaliland. (B) concentration of livestock in certain areas (C) added climatic effects of prolonged periods of below average rainfall.

The stages of degradation that can be identified [identical with the stages observed in Yemen] Stage 1. Palatable herbs are killed out and the grass is reduced in quantity.

Stage 2. Most of the grass is eaten off, shrubs are thinned out and much of the remaining grasses and herbs are found in the shelter of the bushes. Felling of trees for fuel and lopping for fodder contribute to the degradation. Trampling by sheep goats and cattle loosens the soil, which is blown away by the wind or washed away by storms.

Stage 3. Remaning grasses are killed off and in many areas unpalatable Aloes colonize the bare ground among scattered bushes. Stage 4 The last bushes die of browsing and erosion and the Aloes die from trampling and erosion, leaving behind a bare stony desert. In 1980, when that report was written, there were small areas of stage one, large areas of stage 2, where regeneration is still possible if grazing is prohibited. Stage 3 was frequent in towns, while stage 4 was already widespread in the north of Somalia - in today's Somaliland.

This degradation is the main cause of erosion, an other major problem. The water problem has two "ends". On the one side there is the lack of water - on the other side there is an enhanced erosion due to increased runoff that again is due to soil compaction by trampling and the removal of vegetation.

A network of range and forest reserves has been set up in Somaliland during the colonial time. It was quite extensive and helped the range to recover from overuse. During the last years of civil unrest many of those reserves have been neglected and being destroyed. Even inside the reserves (e.g. the Qadow, Daloo ...) nowadays (illegal) charcoal production is going on. In the Qadow reserve farmland is rapidly expanding and many trees are cut for fencing, the forest is dwindling.

While the encroachment of agriculture onto the woodlands may be lamented, there is the fact, that the land can't be expanded. Only its use, its productivity can be "improved". The changing land-use, from range to agriculture, from an extensive to an intensive cultivation, embodies the chance for an improved soil protection. As there is much more work invested the land gets more valuable and so more "protectworthy". But it is a cultural innovation and will need some time and learning.

Some concentrated destruction happened around the refugee camps. Somalia and its neighbouring countries have an extended history of wars and civil unrest. Many camps sprouted as a result of the Ogaden war, others during the Ethiopian civil strive and later on during the secession of Somaliland. FAO (p 39) reports: "There have been a number of subjective reports of a rapid depletion in tree cover in Somalia. Refugees were said to have resorted to charcoal burning as an income earning activity, and to have cut trees for fuel."

The result is, that nowadays there is an extensive list of sites of ex-refugee camps to be replanted: (a) Boromo Region: Daray Marane / Derbihore, (b)Gabileh District: Ha Shaley / Idenka / Arapsio / Agabir / Wajaale (c) Hargeisa: Damka (Halaya. visited) / Aw Barkadle (Sabarad) / Adhiadis / Las Dure (d)Berbera: Batalale / Bihin / Biyoole

1.4 A "Weak" Government

To control those destructive processes seems impossible at the time, it would need a powerful and active organisation - But - there is none. There is at present a common disregard for traditional as well as for legal rules.

What would be needed to re-establish some order'

Caritas, as probably other development agencies, might think about "transfer of knowledge and expertise", while for the Somali-Landers the case is quite clear and can be expressed by the following two topics: (a) SL has been neglected by the south. (b) People we have, we need resources.

UNESCO summarizes as base of the problems women and children encounter: "... the environment, with its fragile base for agriculture, subject to recurrent drought: they are linked to the economy, burdened by insufficiency of public revenues, crippling external dept, and donor dependency; finally - the most significant - they are linked to the general weakness of the social sector, which is underfinanced in physical infrastructure, and limited by a reduced institutional capacity for management, planning, or research, particularly across sectoral domains."

So we find all the three: Lack of structures and funds - what is no wonder, due to the recent development and the actual political situation, and lack of capacity in several fields, what again is often not a lack of capacity, but rather a different way of thinking originating from a different environmental (highly insecure), social ("pastoral democracy" [3]) and political (dictatorial communism) background.

[1]) Bally/Melville. 1973: p. 2 [2]) National Range Agency. 1980 [3]) Lewis

2 Background: Environment, Social and Governmental Structures

2.1 The Natural Environment

2.1.1 Climate

Rainfall [1]) The highest rainfall zones of Somaliland are along the northern escarpment, the Golis range. And that is the area where the forest remnants are found. The coastal, inland and especially the eastern areas are much drier.

An additional problem to the generally semiarid climate is the seasonality: jilal: dry season, december-january, northeastern winds qu: april-may, heavy rains, later in the south. xagaa: dry season. deyr: intermittent rains during october in the north - november Mogadishu, december in the south.

The most important rains fall during the qu, the driest, the longest and so, for men and livestock the most critical season is the jilal, during which people and livestock move to the southern range reserves, now in Ethiopia. It is this drought that lets the nomads move between coastal and inland areas, following the monsoon rains.

2.1.2 Flora, Woodlands, Forests; Zones and Tree Species.

The Somali Flora is, after Bally-Melville, related to the rest of Africa and Arabia, the eastern Mediterranean, the Canary Islands and Madagascar. The percentage (30%) of endemics is as high as for Socotra Island. "Whilst more than 50% of the country is covered by wooded savanna composed of tree species (mainly Acacia) in varying densities, the true forest areas of Somalia constitute less than 4% of the land area and the actual exploitable timber in these forests is limited due mainly to the unreliable rainfall in most parts of the country. The forests of any reasonable magnitude are found either along the northern range of hills or to the south of the country." [2])

After UNESCO (the whole of) Somalia has 14% of woodlands, only one percent of that "mature" forests. Its xerophilos woodlands cover some 10-40 million ha. From southwest to north-east height and density is diminishing, while the floristic composition becomes richer. The rather dense, wooded bushland has an average height of 3.5m with scattered emergent trees up to 9m heigh. In the north-eastern regions with less than 200mm, there are some 17 million ha of semidesert grassland and shrubbland.

Zones and species:

The major forest areas are, due to the rainfall and the accessibility, on the Golis Range. This is the only area receiving up to and over 20 inches of rainfall. The main tree species (alphabetically) are: (1) Acacia arabica ("Marah") 3-5000 ft (2) Acacia bussei ("Galol") is probably the most important tree for the Somalis. From its roots, which extend to considerable distances just below the surface, are made the framework of movable houses. From its bark are woven camel mats (Kibit), water vessels and ropes. It is used in tanning is an excellent hardwood, and is employed as firewood and as well for charcoal. The young green, and ripened red bean fruit (Dimbil) is used to some extent as fodder and the leaves and young branches are browsed by lifestock. It grows at an altitude of 3000 to 5000 ft. Acacia bussei is growing in the zone of 900- 1200m, with 2-300mm of rainfall. It is associated there with Boscia, Grewia, Cadaba, A. mellifera ... (3) Acacia ethbaica ("Sugsug"), 4000-7000 ft, 12 to 20 inches of rainfall. Acacia ethbaica grows in the zone between 1250 and 1500m, receiving 350 - 550 mm. It is associated with Balanites aegyptiaca, Cadaba farinosa ... Due to charcoal production it is increasingly exploited between Hargeisa and Boroma. (4) Acacia spirocarpa ("Qoda"). 1 subspecies. Grows 40 ft high. Around seasonal pools and intermittent river courses (Tugs). (5) Albizzia anthelmintica ("Redap"). Abundant in the Haud. (6) Balanites orbicularis ("Kulan"). Lowland, Golf of Aden. Fruit edible. (7) Boswellia spp ("Mohor"), B. freereana ("Maidi"). Growing on cliffs of limestone. (8) Buxus hildebrantii ("Dosok") (9) Conocarpus lancifolius ("Damas"): This wood is excellent for Dow building and has been exported to Arabia before. It is used as well for charcoal. (10) Cordiauxia edulis ("Ye'eb") 2000 ft. Eastern Ethiopia. A very useful nut (s. FAO projects.). (11) Delonix elata ("Lebi") < 2500ft (12) Hyphaena thebaica ("Au"): In permanent water. Used for mat making. (13) Juniperus procera ("Daib"), growing up to 70 ft tall, is used for timber, some cut as "christmas trees" and burned "to frighten lions". In spite of the information that it is not used as charcoal because of its smell, nowadays sometimes it is mis-used for charcoal (export to Yemen and Saudi). Some parts in this area (Erigavo, NE) are being cleared for gardens and farms as in the NW, between Hargeisa and Boroma. It is the main species of the Northern Escarpment, in the zone above the A. ethbaica zone, higher than 1650m, receiving 5-600mm of rainfall. It associates with Buxus hildebrandtii, Dodonea viscosa, Terminalia brownii (the most valuable community/farm forestry tree in Yemen.), ... (14) Phoenix reclinata ("Maido"): In permanent water. Used for mat making. (15)Ziziphus mauritiana ("Gob"). Stream banks

Wagar Mountains above Sheikh in the Golis Range

The Wagar mountain forest is a dense shrubland with Buxus hildebrantii and Juniperus excelsa (as Jebel Lawz in Yemen, Jibouti, ...) The junipers seen reached maximum 35 to 40 cm in diameter and a height of 10m. In this part of the forest no regeneration could be seen. The nomads told us later on that the forest is much denser eastwards and that it regenerates naturally. An other forest of this type is nearer to Hargeisa near Gebileh, but it is mined. Boswellia can be found from the next hill eastwards on, down to Erigawo.

Golis, Daloo Forest, above Erigavo

This is the main area for Junipers, growing on 7000 ft altitude, reaching a height of 80 ft and for the famous frankincense trees. Those seem still to be owned privately, as Plini reported already for South Arabia. The theft or destruction of a tree is punished by 1 camel.

2.1.3 List of the Nature Reserves in Northern Somalia [4]):

(1) Wildlife has practically been destroyed by drought and carelessness. Activities would be urgent (wild ass ...) but difficult and in many cases too late (Elephant, Rino, Lion... / s. introduction). The protection of the following reserves would have to be included in a project concerning natural forests protection and management: (2) Ga'an: Berbera-Hargeisa. Juniperus, Libah, (3) Surud: Erigawo. Juniperus (4) Las Anod; 6-12 km south of Las Anod (towards Baran). (5) Geldora Pass, Al Mado range. Las Kioran - Buran (6) Molidera hill reserve, 60 km SW of Erigavo on the road to El Dab (Dracaena ombet) (7) South Carin: 6-11 km, 60 km from Busaso (8) Bihen Dulla reserve, Berbera (9) Baran district, 18 km S of Las Anod, 12 km NE of Baran: Commiphora, Acacia (10) Hadaftimo, Erigavo (11) Sheikh pass, Waggar range

2.2 The Social Environment: Clans and Nomadism

2.2.1 History and Population Data

Somalia, and with it Somaliland, are creations of the colonial powers. British Somaliland received its independence on June 26, 1960 and merged with the Trust Territory to form the independent Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960. The new government had to reconcile two administrations having different political, legal and fiscal systems, and it failed.

The country (176,000 km2) is divided into 5 regions: Awdal (Boroma), Waqooyi Galbeed (Hargeisa), Togdeer (Burao), Sool (Las Anod) and Sanag (Erigavo).

The population of Somaliland is estimated as 1.8 to 3.1 million. The capital Hargeisa had some 350,000 inhabitants before the war, some 150,000 after 1991. The population grows at a rate of 3%. The age at marriage for women is in the average 18-19 years in rural, 21 in urban areas, for men 25 - 30. The fertility rate is 8.2 within the nomadic population, 6.3 for the rural areas. Infant mortality is 152/1000. The medical services are anyhow precarious, there is only 1 doctor available for 30000 patients. The literacy rate in 1987 was 19% for males and 6% for females.

The family law of 1975, on the legal side, guaranteed basic equality between women and men, granted women the right to hold political office, equal right to inheritance, and legal land right with access to credit and training. The new laws are under process, at the time being the constitution is still under discussion.

In 1986 44% of the population were nomadic, 31% settled rural, 24% settled urban. The 44% nomads generate 80% of the foreign currency revenues, through livestock export. And this in spite of the very poor lifestyle of the nomads. A sheep values some 15$, a fat cow 100 $ Livestock, bananas, hides and skins, incense and myrrh - produce over twice as much income as is expended on agricultural imports. Still, the total imports exceed exports by about four to one.

2.2.2 Nomads and the "Local Leadership Stile"

There is a recent tendency towards "semi-permanent" settlements around berkeds south and west of Hargeisa. The semi-nomadic population has a farm where some cows and the milk-lambs are kept - while the herds are moving during the dry season towards the Houd, the drought reserves in Ethiopia.

Those villages are generally self-sufficient - and largely self-ruled. Some "authority", based on respect and the "power of persuasion" - but not authority of command - is vested in the elders. "Social organisation among nomadic men is strikingly egalitarian and democratic. Leaders are chosen for their intelligence, management skills, and their command of poetry and oratory. The nomadic lifestyle is characterised by great individuality and independence; for, in this difficult environment people must respond first to the commands of nature and second to those of men or women." [5])

External assistance and development has to take into account those traditions and to proceed through those existing structures that are still very much related to the nomadic ones: "Overall, the social organisation of these northern cultivating families remains similar to that of purely nomadic pastoral groups. Among riverine populations, village settlements have developed a more complex political and social organisation, and tends to a territorial arrangement under community leaders or headmen. Along with government representatives, the headmen undertake responsibility for maintaining justice, order, and political administration. A more hierarchical order with clearer class distinctions typifies these groups." [6]) The nomads do not respect a law - except their own. Due to the risky and unreliable environment, large parts of the population will always have to rely on "low input - low output systems". The Common wisdom on farming is: "It is said that one cannot pierce the sky to get rain for one's garden, nor can one drive the farm as one drives animals to the place where rain is falling. Worst of all one cannot abandon one's farm even though barren, because one's efforts are invested in it." [7])

This nomadic lifestyle is not only a problem for the adminstration, but as well for education and extension. Those problems are common to the fields of human and animal health, agriculture and forestry. The nomads do not have schools and formal education- but they are very much interested in any knowledge - as much as the villages.

The nomadic lifestyle and traditions pose an other problem, he one of land ownership and free access to range. Somaliland is an enormous country - with a small, scattered population. The effects on the range is everywhere visible, so at different levels of impact. Any activity in this field has to cover large areas and has to deal with uncountable small settlements. Virtually no land is owned by the government or by the waqf, privates or cooperatives. All rangelands are considered common. The nomads won't accept any restrictions of their free movement. Exclosures are damaging for the range.

The traditional idea of drought reserves or the like would have to be expanded.

The demarcation of agricultural, range and forest areas (reserves) would be required. Land use planning and mapping was in fact a priority of the NRA and is still one for the Ministry of Livestock, Forest and Range (MLFR). But there are certain problems with the "feasibility". On one side the need is clearly understood from the point of view of planners and managers. The public opinion is even in favour of such measures: "The people would listen to that and respect it - it was done in such an orderly way in the past (British time)- at present the people are abusing." On the other side, application would have to be secured on the local level through and by villages. But in addition governmental assistance would need, as well as some heavy extension work with the nomads.

2.2.3 Clans

The Somalis are, as the Yemeni tribesmen, very independent minded, "freedom worshipping" people. They do only aggregate into larger institutions (village, tribe, clan, nation ...) in case of need. Here again an important principle that is constantly breached by international agencies:

Projects have to rely on the most stable social group available in the area - and neither in Yemen nor in Somaliland that is the government. As I.M.Lewis claims: "The two most stable elements in Somali society are: 1) the 'dia paying group': the contractually defined kinship group within clans or subclans, which acts as a unit in paying and receiving damages for injury and death; and 2) the clan: a grouping of several related 'dia paying groups'" [8])Unluckily the clans are many. The six Somali clan-families are the Dir, Darod, Isaq, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyn (Digil-Mirifle). The following map (from EC/UNDP) gives an impression of the complexity: Clan-settings in the northern part of the Horn of Africa:

2.3 Economy

Agriculture employs three quarters of the population and contributes two thirds to the GDP: (a) nomadic pastoralism 44%, (b) crops 13%, (c) forestry 6%, (d) fisheries 2%.

The estimates of UNESCO (p 154) do roughly confirm that: (a) agriculture 60 % of GDP, (b) livestock 39, (c) crops 12, (d) forestry and fishery 6.

Land is classified by FAO (p 21) (for the whole of Somalia) as: (a) 8 million ha (= 13%) available for cultivation (b) 1 million ha (1.5%) actually cropped (c) 28 million ha (50%) rangelands (d) 8.6 million ha are forests and woodlands

In the northern areas (Somaliland), the 13% of arable surface are situated in a few areas only, receiving more than 500mm of rainfall, that means Hargeisa-Boroma and Erigavo.

From 1969 to 1991 Somalia was ruled by the "Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)", led by the President Major General Mohammed Siad Barre. This body served until 1976 as the supreme legislation and executive body. The little economic activities have been disrupted by the Ogaden war 1977/78 and the reliance on foreign aid was definitely not improving the economic performance. Privates, companies and associations can lease land for certain time spans, up to 99 years. Land tenure under those historical and traditional (nomads, s. previous chapter) settings is a problem. Officially the state still claims ownership of range and forests. As long as the constitution is still under discussion and as Somaliland is anyhow not politically recognised, it does not make much sense to discuss the issue.

At any rate, it has been said about Somalia, that "the government is poor and (some) privates are rich". As I.M. Lewis [9]) expresses it: "Only the pastoral livestock industry managed to survive the destructive economic effects of the Siad Barre regime, which officially suppressed private enterprise, although thereby stimulating an extensive informal and black market economy. In the late 1980s, a structural adjustment programme was attempted but not properly implemented, leaving Somalis with little experience of successful economic policy. Once the state collapsed, the country was left with many small traders and producers lacking public services and regulation." "Monopolies were used to maximise personal gains, and resources were allocated on the basis of personal and clan ties." [10])

This is again a warning for development agencies [11]): Do not expect any economy that follows 'our' market rules.

The fact that some 300,000 Somali workers abroad increased the GNP from 273 to 370$ is the base for an other problem Somalia has in common with Yemen: the extremely high labour costs.

2.3.1 Livestock Markets, Holding Grounds.

(a) Human and Livestock [12]): (b)humans 3.8 million [13]), (c) camels 5.3, (d)cattle 3.7, (e) sheep 9.4, (f)goats 15.3

Regional Estimates of Human and Livestock Population in 1000 [14]):

The last line shows, that the estimates are not quite reliable. Somaliland's surface is only 40% of Somalia. Probably the total livestock of Somaliland is underestimated with 11 million (Sool region is missing in this table). More recent estimates are 20-25 million. It would be astonishing that Somaliland has only for sheep a proportionally higher quote than the rest of Somalia - while being the center of pastoralism.

The map from Aves/Bechtold (abb. 3, p. 38)shows that the major livestock producer and the dominant livestock exporter is Somaliland.

An other problem where no information is available is the shape of the grazing reserves in Ethiopia. They might be heavily overused or even largely destroyed'.

Scoones reports (p 87) that "despite becoming a major exporter of live animals to Gulf countries during the 1960s and 1970s, Somalia was never able to establish a functional, cost-effective and well-managed set of export marketing facilities. Holding grounds were invariably poorly designed, constructed and maintained. Forage production was typically inadequate and water sources were not always reliable. Furthermore, livestock traders never accepted that they had to put their animals in holding grounds for quarantine. Some traders feared mixing their healthy stock with other traders' diseased stock; others preferred simply to graze and water their export herds on the open range. In addition, temporary holding facilities are usually required near ports. At Berbera in northern Somalia, the port, through which the largest numbers of export passed, the temporary veterinary holding facility was never large enough or well enough managed to accommodate trade herds, particularly during the pre-hadj period of maximum export volumes. A major logistical problem is moving herds from distant holding grounds to temporary holding facilities at ports." This led to substantial losses and to the need for reconditioning in Saudi.

Large livestock markets are at Tog Wajale and Alleybadey (north of Gebile). After the war the bulk of the animal trade moved to Hartisheikh. A major problem is the fodder, this area here is producing and exporting such. The export from Ethiopia is forbidden. For 12 tons of hay some 250-300'000 Ssh are payed. Before there were holding grounds at Darborough and Lafarroug. It really seems to be one of the most urgent problems to rehabilitate such fodder producing and holding grounds.

2.3.2 Agricultural Production

Somaliland is able to produce maize, sorghum, millet, sesame, cowpea, sunflower, peanut and all subtropical fruits, as oranges, mandarins, pomegrenade, guava, papaya and mango. An important cash crop is qat/chat (Catha edulis). The main agricultural areas are in the north-western area of Hargeisa-Boroma. At Gedebile e.g. are the gardens and fruit orchards of Hargeisa, often belong to rich landlords (or land-ladies) living in the capital. The main products are fruits: Mango, Papaya, Guava, Oranges, Dates; and Vegetables: Carrots, Tomatoes, Onions.

This area has a high potential for agroforestry, but so far no activities in this field have been started.

An other farming model are the large army or ex-soldiers farms as e.g. Booc between Sheikh and Borao. This is a 200 ha farm with 22 people, mainly ex-soldiers (60 before), growing cattle, sheep and goats, sorghum, cowpeas, mugpeas, water-melons (that are exported to Jibouti and Aden), tomatoes and fodder crops. The animals with their guards are kept at the corners of the plot to guard the area from the intrusion of nomads.

There would be a chance for a cattle fattening project, but the major problem is fodder supplies (no molasses or the like as in the southern part of Somali or in Ethiopia)

Fodder production is of a very high priority in Somaliland.

Fisheries is an other field with an extremely high potential for increased production. So far only some 10% of the sustainable harvest are caught. The fishstocks are still very healthy, there is only little pollution around the port of Berbera.

Per month some 4 tons are caught for local consumption. Every Monday 1 ton is sent to Abu Dabi and since shortly to Ethiopia and Jibouti. Almost no fish is available at Hargeisa.

Licenses are given to the Arabs (UAE) and Russians. The waters are controlled by gunboats.

2.3.3 Wood Imports and Charcoal Exports

The data available on wood import [15]): Jan. 1996: Value: 4,211,798 somali shillings / 80 ? 77,647,475 $
Quantity [16]): 8392 pieces of timber. 1440 " hard board
Feb. 1996: Value: 8,212,536 somali shillings / 80 = 102,656,70 $
Quantity:7908 p of timber, 553 p hard board
Mar. 1996: Value: 45,936,019 somali shillings / 400 = 114,840,03 $
Quantity: 25719 p hard wood, 2600 p hard board

The data are admittedly meagre. It looks that the total amount of foreign currency spent on (officially registered) wood import is not much more than 1 million US$ per year. Some more might come by counterband.

Data on charcoal export are totally lacking as charcoal export is forbidden. No export seems to be done through the port of Berbera, but rather, from hearsay, through Maydh and Heis.

2.4 Governmental Structures

2.4.1 Governing Tribes: An optimisation between centralism and indvidualism [1])- the squaring of the circle Somalia, in spite of its past dictatorial leadership, has no tradition of centralised government and powerful leaders. The present governmental structures, as well as the division of the population into five parts (french-Jibuti, British-Somaliland, Ethiopian-Ogaden, Italian-Southern Somalia and Kenya), are mainly a result of the European colonialisation. Somali pastoralists are individualists, discussing common matters in a "general assembly" (shir) on an equal base. Decisions are taken on the base of consensus - not as majority decisions and not as decisions of an elite. Even the elders do not have any power of command. They have authority - if they are able to convince - but their main function is to make consensus possible. Any member of the community has to have the right to participate in the decision making process. For Somalia (inclusive Somaliland) this means that each clan has to participate in project development.

I.M. Lewis proposes a consensus, not a majority oriented political model for Somaliland's government. His approach is close to (and based on) the Swiss model. The central power should be kept small. Only the functions that really need to be centralised, where coherence, consistency and continuity are unalienable should be allotted to it. Those are: (a) Law and order, peace, (b) "Common pastures, water supplies and fish stocks need to be protected from degradation, ..." [18]), (c) Even in the case of law, the need for centralisation is not absolute. Somalia has a longstanding experience with "Multiple Systems of Law" [19]): "The existence of multiple systems of law within a state does not complicate administration and implementation. Somalis, however, in common with people in many other African states, already have some considerable experience in multiple legal systems since customary law and Islamic law have co-existed alongside the received English and Italian law." (d) Defence / external representation, (e)Infrastructure: roads, ports, airports ... (f) Health, (g) Education / Research, (h)Public service management (i)Currency / collection, management and disbursement of central revenue

The administration of Somaliland has to deal with a disperse population. For that it needs widely spread offices. On the rural level we have districts, subdistricts (beel) and even sub-sub-districts (tuulo), the smallest unit of governmental administration with a council. It covers in the average some 10 km2 and is the critical link to the government. In metropolitan areas the corresponding structures are the "laan" (or "beel"), the "waax" and the "tabella" - the smallest unit with 50 to 100 households.

The maximum of possible functions should be handled in a decentralised way. This approach is hampered by the assumption of international agencies and bilateral foreign donors that those services would have to originate from the center. The case of Somaliland, still politically not recognised, substantiates this fact. World Bank, IMF and several UN agencies have "political-administrative" difficulties to work there.

The contact between central ministries and the rural areas are the regional coordinators, making up the Regional Development Council. They are guided by policies and technical instructions from the respective ministry. In their day to day activities they depend on the governor.

Financing of such institutions is still precarious. Where NGOs fulfill such functions (mainly in the south) they operate on payment-for-service base.

2.4.2 Governmental Institutions Concerning the Environment

The environmental section at the Ministry of Agriculture (DG Eng. Alie Abdi Odawa), is only developing. There are 4-5 persons employed, but no specialists, no resources, no activities.

What is of quite some interest is the agricultural extension. More cooperation with livestock and forestry might be an advantage. At Gebile e.g. the agricultural extension service gives advice on soil stabilisation and watershed management.

The priorities for Mayor Muhammed Hashi Elmi of Hargeisa municipality are actually more "market oriented". A total of some 999 small shops should be established until the end of the year. The needed licenses and fees will help the town administration and can be more easily collected.

For road construction and repair the surveying equipment, maps and plans and the building material will be needed, as well as office equipment, aerial photos (under process in Kenia). For this reason, the lack of planning, activities in town-environment and town-forestry are a bit too early.

2 hospitals do exist, 1 for TB, 1 general. So far only primary schools and coranic pre-schools are functioning, no secondary schools or adult education.

In the field of energy, the responsibility for charcoal is with the Ministry of Range and Forests. Electrification might be left to private initiative. Hargeisa has surely a potential as "economic motor" for its hinterland [20]) - but the hinterland will have to take care for the sustainability of its resources. Nothing of the large ecological program of UNCHS has been executed so far, especially not for the villages around Hargeisa.

The mayor says that seedlings should be provided for shops and roadside plantations. Spaces will be spared for green areas in the land reform law. this might and should be done in cooperation with the two already existing nurseries. (s. 2.4.2.3)

2.4.2.1 Forestry

Forestry exists since 1952, when 1 forestry officer was appointed by the British. After the 1991 revolution all laws dating from the S. Barre time (1969-1991 have been abolished. Laws from before can be considered as valuable, as e.g. the "Law on Fauna, Hunting and Forest Conservation" (s. Appendix A). Management plans existed, but nothing is left. Some information might probably be found with Mr. John J. Lorri who was the director of natural reserves, now working as consultant in England and being a member of the Anglo-Somali Society.

The actual structure of the Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range looks as follows: (a) Minister: Abdullahi Hassan, (b) Vice Minister, (c) Director General: Muhammed Abdullahi Ali, who has the following motto at his office: The guiding principles of the administrating agency should be: Go to the people, live with them learn from them, love them, serve them, plan with them, start with what they know, build on what they have.

The directorate is subdivided into 4 major departments and 9 subdepartmens: Administration + personnel and stores / Animal Health + Production / Forestry + Range (Abdul Hakim) / Planning + Research. Totally there are 26 employees (+ the regional coordinators).

2.4.2.2 Priorities, Plans and Strategies

In 1980 the National Range Authority [NRA] formulated the following objectives for the 10 year plan [21]): "Range survey and monitoring: potential land use map / meteorological stations / water sources map / fodder supplies / establishment of fixed monitoring sites / assessment of forest areas with potential use/evaluation of indigenous plants / of different ecological zones (carrying capacity) / grazing systems / exotic species / rehabilitation - reseeding combined with water conservation / conservation of fodder / bush control methods / economy of range development

Training at the: (A) national university of Somalia (B) livestock and range school (C) Burao range training school"

The present priorities, mainly of the MLFR, are here not ranked, as rankings differ from place to place, agency to agency, NGO to NGO and person to person. [An extensive list is to be found in Appendix A]: (a) Nurseries (b) Protection of natural forests (Golis, esp. Erigavo, Sheikh and Boroma). (c) utilisation of timber (d) Regeneration and plantations (e) Range and watershed protection (f) Rehabilitation of water points. (g) Rehabilitation of ex-refugee camps and surroundings: The situation has to be assessed, replantation should be done with natural species. The Eucalypts (e.g. at Gedebile) should be replaced by Tamarindus (fruits), Acacia cataba and Ziziphus maurit. (h) Windbreaks and shelterbelts (e.g. at Berbera) with Conocarpus and Balanites. (i) Sand dune fixation. (j) Species trials: locals, exotics amenity (k) Amenity trees for the city and the villages (l) Awareness raising / extension / especially at schools.

Appendix: Species - seeds, trials, preferences

Eucalyptus is not liked, as it uses too much water and is too competitive. At La Faroug an Eucalyptus plantation (with some Conocarpus) has been established in 1955 along the tug (wadi / seasonal water course). The plantation is some 6 km ong, 0 - 50 m large (? 15 ha). Many of the Eucalypts are inclined or toppled- most probably due to the strong winds. At Gedebile as well Eucalypts have been planted before 20 years along the river, but they are at present being cut down, as "nothing grows under them". Their heavy impact on the water table is being criticised. The farmers would be willing and interested to plant other tree species to protect the bounds, but so far no seedlings are available.

- Pinus radiata and halepensis have been tried. Due to the lack of mycorrhyza they are very slow growing.

- Prosopis is already a pest (s. Djibouti) - might be harvested for charcoal. After Basha Atilahi Yassin, e.g., the only Prosopis of some use in SL is P. cineraria (s. South-Yemen). Seeds can be procured through ICRAF.

- In the coastal plains Conocarpus and Parkinsonia do quite well. Parkinsonia being quite agressive and for that not very much estimated.

- Ziziphus mauritanica, Schinus molle and Azadirachta indica are preferred to Eucalypts and Parkinsonia aculeata.

Appendix: NURSERIES:

At present the forestry department has very limited activities. Before it was running some 18 nurseries and 47 range reserves have been functioning. Since 1995 only the nurseries at Hargeisa, Boroma, Gebile and Berbera are functional.

The Hargeisa nursery is in a big park in the center of the town. Assisted by the World Food Programme it produces some 12,000 seedlings per year of Schinus, Parkinsonia, Papaya and Prosopis, using pots of 8 x 18 cm. 25 workers are receiving food ratios (- present have been two persons only). The seedlings are given for free. During the heavy rains in may 1996 the nursery has been ruined and needs rehabilitation. Some species trials could be run there.

A second nursery is private, belonging to the MP and environmentalist Dr. Musa Awale. It is situated in the garden of the state guest house - a beautiful place. The size is some 10 x 35 m. The pot-size used 15 x 24 cm. Seedlings are irrigated daily - about 15 % are dead. The estimated total number is 3200 seedlings. The gardener claims 3000 trees + 3000 "small plants". Mango, pomegrenade, shinus, mango and ornamentals are produced. The fruit trees need 2 to 3 years. There is no need for a shading net, as there are old trees.

Gebile: The directorate (regional representation of the Ministry of Livestock, Forest and Range) is running a small nursery (in a big park) behind the building. 20 people produce some 6-8000 seedlings/y: Schinus, Tamarindus, Ziziphus and Eucalyptus. Bags are bought at Jibouti.

A problem is the salty water, leading to the killing of many seedlings. A birka would be needed. The seedlings are used for plantations at the village (truly - a very green, tree liking village).

The replantation of areas damaged (= cleared) during the war, by bulldozers, would be needed, as well as of areas cleared for charcoal production.

At Boroma the situation is less attractive. An old nursery, established by SORRA in 1993 has been abandoned - the 6 month contract being terminated (sustainability = contract duration). The seedlings are still there, the roots are growing through the bottom of the pots. As well the very old British nursery has been abandoned. It has a dam, used or the experimental agricultural farm. There are old Eucalypts, Flame Trees, Schinus, Oleander ... It might be developed into a park, including a new nursery - under shade-trees.

At Agamsa exists a nursery, assisted by IRC, producing some 3000 seedlings/y with 10 persons: Eucalyptus, Tamarindus, Ziziphus maur. ("Gob"). The production of lemon and guava is planned, as well as the establishment of windshelters. This nursery was established after the forestry nursery at Gebile (WFP) - what indicates a certain "tribalisme" (lack of coo?peration) between the different agencies.

At Daarburug Khadar Muh. Ali is running a private nursery, mainly for fruit trees (papaya, melon, pomegrenade). The whole town is planted with Schinus. 1986 some CARE assistance was given (seeds and pots). The nursery has been partly destroyed during the war.

At Lafaroug, Ahmed Shamoa, the chairman, shows us the nursery under the tree shade. They are helped by the WFP - but would need pots. This nursery is producing Conocarpus ("Damas") seedlings for Berbera. They claim that there is a large market for those seedlings - that are distributed for free.

At Berbera the Ministry of Livestock and Range has an other nursery, some 10 x 20 m. The species grown here are: Ziziphus mauritanica, Parkinsonia, Ac. albida, Tamarindus indica, Conocarpus lancifolius and Grevillea. Some 2800 seedlings are here. The nursery is working since half a year and is assisted with 20 ffw ratios (ridiculous productivity). There are no funds for the protection of the plants and there are no sites.

At Booc (between Sheikh and Bora'o) a birka has been built and a small nursery (7 x 7 m), where Tamarindus indica, Ziziphus mauritanica, Balanites aegyptiaca, Cordia somalensis & sinensis and Azadirachta indica are being produced. Hedges from sisal have been planted. The nursery should produce for Sheikh, Berbera and Bura'o. It was assisted by WFP - but lacks bags and fencing material for protection.

[1]) map from Hunt report [2]) National Range Authority. p 29: "6. Department of Forestry / 6.1 Background [3]) FAO, table 1: growing stock (all Somalia), p 24: [4]) Hunt Report on British Somalia: Appendix 1-4, p 17-25 [5]) UNICEF p 14: [6]) ibid p 15: [7]) ibid p 9: [8]) EC/UNDP, p. XV: [9]) EC/UNDP 1995, p XXI: [10]) ibid p 29: [11]) s. as well report on VTC, carpentry. [12]) National Range Agency: p 3: chapter 1.2.2: [13]) Three Year Dev. Plan 1979-1981 [14]) do, table 1, p 4: [15]) Ministry of Finance, Customs department, Muhammed Duali, Dir. of Customs. [16]) Not available as m3 [17]) based on I.M. Lewis, EC/UNDP [18]) ibid. p. 31 [19]) ibid p 56: [20]) Shaun McCarthy, HABITAT (UNHCS). priv. com. [21]) National Range Agency. Dev. Plan 1980. p 17: [22]) FAO 1993, p 96:

SOMALIA: UN OFFICIAL WARNS OF "DISASTER" IN NORTHERN REGION OVER FAMINE

In a press release on Tuesday (25 November), the WFP representative for Somalia, Robert Hauser, noted that the area had been devoid of rain for a long time and groundwater reserves were drying up. WFP was expanding its operations to respond to "the worst drought to hit the region since 1981". "We need to intervene immediately to prevent widescale malnutrition and stave off a humanitarian disaster," Hauser warned. Some 60,000 vulnerable people are facing severe food shortages in the region. WFP noted that the Sool Plateau - covering parts of Sool and Sanaag districts in Somaliland, as well as parts of Bari district in Puntland - had suffered three consecutive years of drought. "WFP urgently needs more funds if we're to continue our planned assistance over the next five months," Hauser said. "We need some 6.5m dollars to buy about 8,600 tonnes of food aid." WFP added that the Sool plateau region is claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland and has seen intense fighting in the past few months.

A Modular, Participatory and Iterative Development Programme

That means that Caritas is not going for large scale projects as e.g. the "Northern Range Development Project", where most the time and money was spent on establishing infrastructure. That means that Caritas does not want to start expensive, long term and large scale commitments (as e.g. the Batalala proposal - done by Caritas Egypt) - that have no local backing and will break down totally, as soon as the donor decides to move out.

That means, while looking at the whole problem in a systems oriented approach, we have to look out for possibilities to "break up" the all-embracing approach into smaller, locally mmanageable bits, into modules that have to be interrelated. To guarantee local participation, the only base for sustainability, the projects have to be developed out of the locally perceived problems and needs, in a participatory way.

Due to the lack of information and of experience (especially of some positive experience) on development projects in Somaliland, the approach will have to be carefully monitored, periodically evaluated and adapted - in an iterative way. [That to explain the lengthy title].

3.1 Water and/or Range'

Water in Somaliland is one of the major problems - as in any semiarid country. Either there is not enough and there is drought - or there is too much and we are having floods (both in May 1996). The scarcity of water is already critical at Hargeisa. Water, some 2-4000m3 daily, is pumped from Gedebile - 240m below Hargeisa. The water table is lowering. The irrigation of the fruit orchards at Gedebile has been stopped by the mayor of Hargeisa. Water harvesting, the replenishment of the water reserves will be needed sooner or later, as the alternative station is at Dibarawine, near Boroma. But this one is 420 m below the level of Hargeisa and at a distance of 400km - what makes this task quite costly. There was again a Chinese proposal to establish small earth dams inside the tugs to recharge the aquifers and to prevent erosion with contour bounds.

Webuser-Beitrag von Thomas Diettrich, Namibia, 10.11.03: Somalia Anti-Desertification: Artificial Ground-Water recharge by means of Subsurface Dams.

While in the valley of the Golis range water can be found almost all the year round at shallow wells (5-12m), more to the south, especially to the south-east, the water table is much deeper. Traditional water sources are springs, wells, wars (natural ponds), balleys (artificial ponds), and berkeds (large cementlined tanks). With the introduction of modern technology, the field has expanded to include deep drilled wells with motorized pumps. The economic handling of those is still "problematic":

At Ged Belad (meaning "big tree" - no such can be found anymore) a well has been established, some 180m deep. During the dry season it is overused, the pump is working 24 hours a day. There is no money available to make a larger tank, to buy a new generator or to replace the pump. The fees collected for the water are just sufficient to pay for diesel.

At Tog Wajale, on the border to Ethiopia, the water depth is only 70m, but for the 15000 people the 10 drums of water delivered per day by the pump are insufficient. On the other hand, the more water points are available, the more range is overgrazed. So for the Somalis - RUNOFF - as a loss of water and the erosion connected to it, are the main problems.

But those problems are interconnected. The range has been and is being neglected. Overgrazing, trampling and soil compaction increase the runoff. Soil and water conservation projects have priority. There is a need of transfer of technology knowledge to the Somali pastoralists [s. module EXTENSION].

Without range no livestock, without livestock no Somaliland.

So for the Somalis - RUNOFF - as a loss of water and the erosion connected only be done in association with grazing management plans for the areas. [This is a major part of the Forest and Range Law. s. App. A)

In fact the Ministry of Forestry (the former "National Range Agency") has wide environmental protection powers. It would have to license and register all boreholes, wars, balleys and berkeds, particularly for livestock watering, in rural areas.

Would have ... Unluckily the law is not ratified and the institution not really functional. Moreover the "National Water Committee" is composed of the Ministry of Planning, of Agriculture, of Livestock, Forest and Range, of Health, of the Interior - and chaired by the Ministry of Mineral and Water Resources. The latter one is at present distributing licenses without any checking of need and without an environmental impact assessment. For UNOPS-projects e.g. the use of its checklist (s. appendix) is compulsory. Effects of project activities on agriculture, soil, water and air, noise, aquatic and other habitats, endangered species have to be checked. The approach and results of Oxfam might be of some interest here as well.

3.1.1 Watershed Management Models for Somaliland

The care being taken for rangeland is minimal. The main - well, the only - principle applied so far are the range reserves, giving the range a rest-period, a chance to regenerate. There is no tradition of active measures to prevent erosion, to improve the range or the wood production. Economically this is very understandable, as a) the rangeland is common, b) range use and productivity is very marginal. Efforts would not be profitable for a private person - but probably for a village whose motto should be: common care for common lands.).

If the needed care is given depends not only on ownership and economy, but as well on traditions and education.

Agriculture is the field where private efforts in soil stabilisation are profitable. First the measures, as contour-bounds or terraces, allow the production of crops. Second, dams and terraces could be used for agroforestry plantation with fodder grasses, shrubs or trees.

But only care-full agriculture can control erosion. Care-less agriculture and range-use are enhancing it, what the case of Ethiopia shows. Terraces, as the other structures, need constant maintenance. If the economy of terrace farming is dwindling and terraces are neglected, the situation is worse than without terraces, as the case of Yemen shows.

Range-Woodland-Watershed-Management-Models

Dr. Awale proposes on the water sector to establish more rainwater catchments. At the time the cost of 200l water is 150 Somali Shillings. With a pond of 25m x 25m x 2m two families could survive for 1 year with their animals. An average family with 7 members might keep some 50 sheep and goat + 5 cows. Such storage facilities should be established above the farmland and would allow to irrigate some crops and as well fodder crops.

Projects as the planned one at Abdal with 4 x 4 km seem too big and will cause problems due to the heavy restriction imposed on livestock movement of the nomads and even more so of the villages in the area. Grass, hay and silage production should first be tried on a small scale, on farms - together with water harvesting and storing. Water catchment and production have to be improved.

Good grasses for fodder are: Alphalpha / Aristida spinosa ("Majeen") / Atriplex / Bermuda Grass (Cynodon), Cenchrus ciliaris / Chrysopogon ancheri "Dareemo" / "Dixi") / Eragrostis, Sudan Grass (Dactylodon). Mainly local species should be used... Many of such are threatened -but still growing under the protection of bushes and of Aloe. Unluckily recommendations can't be based on trials and scientific results. Even from the "Northern Range Improvement Project" only recommendations on "what should be tried" are available, but no results: "Annex I: Among the many species of native plants, those that have to be studied and tried on site are:

a) indigenous species (4): Grasses: Conchrus ciliaris, Dichanthirium sp, Sprorobolus sp 30), Andropogon anche, Cynodon dactylum, Panicum maximum, Panicum turgidum. Salt bush: Atriplex sp, Salsola Trees: Casuarina, Acacia cyanophylla, A. senegal, A. melifera, Opuntia (spineless), Grewia. Exotics: Setana, Medicago. The Badlands, south-east of Sheikh, are a heavily eroded patch of red soil, where no vegetation is left except some Acacias (A. horrida). Eucalypts have been successfully planted on contours. Microdams and microcatchments have been stabilised with Sisal. Natural reseeding and revegetation is expected (what has indeed happened with similar experiments in Yemen).

Sisal is a very useful plant for the production of fibre for ropes, mats and baskets. The flower pods are heavily used for roofs and houses. Due to that, the seeds are sometimes difficult to find. Sisal from Tanzania and Sambia is said to be better.

The watershed management model COOPI is using at Boroma, is very developed, but as well quite expensive ($ 10,000/ha). As enormous areas have to be treated in Somaliland, some cheaper model will have to be developed.

3.2 Natural Forests and Reserves

3.2.1 The Natural Forests of Somaliland at Daloh and Erigavo

The geographical situation of those forests and the species growing there have been mentioned in chapter 2.1.2.

The area is quite important on a national level, as it is the largest area of natural forests, it had a sawmill and was once able to supply wood to Mogadishu. It is important on the local level, as the forest might create jobs in the forest management and protection, as well as in wood harvesting and processing.

There is quite some interest of the local NGOs in its development (s. Appendix B):

ARDO, Forestry & Rural Development Organisation wants to develop Frankincense nurseries.

SOMTRAG, Somali Transformation Group, proposes a reforestation project at Erigavo, including a nursery, the rehabilitation of the sawmill and the improvement of charcoal kilns and stoves.

In spite of claims that the area is save, precisely during the days when the consultant wanted to fly to Erigavo, the representative of GTZ has been captured and taken hostage. So, unluckily, no first-hand data on the subject of natural forest management, on the question of natural regeneration, increase rate, sustainable productivity, transport needs and the shape of the saw-mill can be quoted here. But it seems that some work has been done beforehand. The relevant literature on the subject of Erigavo is:

(1) Bergstrom, T [1975]: Trials with cuttings from francincense trees in Debbis. (2) " : 1975 Forest Resources of Daloh (3) lamwell, C [']: Improved methods of production at Erigavo sawmill. (4) Lawrie [1958]: Forests of the Somaliland Protectorate (5) Lessau, J. [1975]: Report on Al Mado Forest Reserve (6) " [1976]: Forestry Development in N. Somalia FAO SOM/72/012 Field Doc. No. 2

Moreover the "Somalia Ecological Society" might have some interesting information as well and should be contacted: Mr John D. Leefe OBE. The Spinney, Clipsham Road, Stretton, Oakham, LEIC 15 7QS. And: - Mr. A.S. Hassan, 31 Flyfield, Six Acres Estate, London N4 3PJ, England. FAX 0171 263 3658. As well as: Dr Mats Thulin, working on the "Flora of Somalia., Uppsala University, Dept. of Syst. Botany, Villavagen 6, S-75236, Uppsala, Sweden.

Daloh forest, on the northern escarpment, is quite close to Erigavo (9 km). The forest of some (6 x 40=) 240 km-2 has been protected (gazetted) by the British. As it is the area with the highest mountains (7927 ft) it can be expected that the rainfall is quite high. There is a tourist lodge, but its actual shape is unknown.

The ministry does not have any experience and data on the management of natural forests and the productivity of such. Management of natural forests is new for all the neighbouring countries (Yemen, Ethiopia and Somalia) and needs a lot of fundamental work.

At Erigavo some 10,000 people live, in the whole district maximum 50,000 (what is a very "guessy" estimate). There is a primary school, the secondary school would need a roof. In the surrounding villages there are no schools. Most people here are herdsmen. Some farming has started and a few fruit trees have been planted. Some people are livestock traders and import food, clothes, biscuits from Yemen.

The sawmill is inside Erigavo, but has been destroyed during the war. (Gregory Fidel from CARITAS Somalia is sure that the sawmill at Erigavo was already destroyed in 1964 when he assisted in the construction of the runway.)

Before the logs were transported to the sawmill by truck. Nowadays there is no production of wood, but logs are turned into charcoal and illegally (against the orders of the elders as well) sold to Arabia. Some areas have been destroyed by fire. In the whole area there is at present only one (.) carpenter active.

The natural regeneration seems to be good - but there are different opinions - and still there are several proposals on Frankincense and Juniper nurseries claiming a lack of natural regeneration.

The regeneration of Boswellia seems to be a problem , only vegetative propagation is possible. Those trees are owned privately, highly estimated and well protected. It has to be checked if there is a real demand for seedlings.

Some Cypress trees have been imported by the British. If records of species trials are available has to be checked in Britain.

If either productivity and regeneration, or the amount of deadwood (used before) do allow sustainable harvest, the sawmill should be repaired to supply Somaliland (and the VTC) with wood. A nursery has been established in 1992. They would need some poliethen bags. At the time they use milk tins. Water is a problem as well. Mainly fruit trees are produced: grapes, peaches, mulberry ... Those seedlings need about 1.5 years in the nursery. The shade was a gift of ACTION AID.

Other NGOs and their activities: CARE (irrigation), COOPI (hospital), Vet.Aid., Health Unlimited (health posts), GTZ (agricultural development, fisheries, income generation)).

The local population is very mixed (well, somali mix). Erigavo is the meeting point of three larger and one smaller (Las Gored) tribal faction (clan). Still, in 1993 a peace meeting has been held and since that they look to keep quiet and even inter-clan marriages occur.

The Musa Ismail are the "woodcutter tribe" (unluckily not the treeplanter's). As the forests are in the hands of the two Isaak clans, it would be prudent to establish a sawmill or any connected activity not in Erigavo itself but fully on the land of that tribe.

Normally the "distribution of favours" (projects) has to be done in a very sensitive way, consulting at any rate the elders. In case of arising troubles that are "not unfrequent" (COOPI has to evacuate every 3 to 6 month.) the way over land (10 hours to Berbera- Hargeisa) or sea (Hays/Mayt) would be safe. For wood transport anyhow the overland road has an other risky point at Bura'o, where troubles about camels are rather common.

3.2.2 Traditional management methods - the Reserve System

Two traditional management methods that are of some help for forest and range improvement are known, as: Drought Reserves: between the wells, at a good distance, areas are reserved for the dry season, that means they will not be used for 4 to 6 months. School Grazing Reserves: For the pupils that bring along a cow or camel for the milk.

Wells should not be spaced closer than 30 km apart, otherwise it will be difficult to have those reserves respected. The establishment and protection of reserves is arranged through the elders of the village and the village associations. The function and the importance of the elders and the local acceptance is not verbally expressed in the forestry law (s. Appendix A), but is fully recognised by the executive agency, the forest and range department.

Gedebile (what means the "sycomore tree" [Ficus sycomorus] is a forest reserve some 30 km north of Hargeisa. It got some WFP assistance. Now there are only 4 guards, unpaid. Before 1988 there were some 20. With the drought of 1996 the nomads moved in and cut down lots of branches and whole trees. Before that the fruits of the trees have been used by the village as fodder. The village would like to protect the forest - "but the nomads have guns".

The cutting of branches for fodder purposes is done in a careless way. Lopping and pollarding are not properly established methods.

As the Gedebile forest, many dry reserves do not exist (or are not respected) anymore. Some other reserved areas of the Hargeisa area are at Qadow (Gedbalad, Aleibadei) and Salaan Yare. Those are two larger ones. Smaller ones are Dhan and Ceel Bardaleh.

The protection of the reserves should be reestablished. Some forest guards do this job already in the second generation (Abdu Awad at Gedebile e.g). Those reserves provide the rangeland with a rest from grazing for a certain period. Generally the best time to rest is during the rainy season - when regeneration sprouts and when the dry reserves are closed for livestock.

Forest by-products are here of not so much use an in other countries. Honey e.g, whose production has started, is valued at some 40,000 somali shillings the kg (hearsay), in the market it was found for 7000 / kg.

Frankincense has precisely the same price per kg - that means it is economically not very promising and will most probably not be of much help in the protection of the forests.

3.3 Charcoal use, production, substitution and saving

Wood cutting for charcoal is especially a problem in the North- West. A survey, made in 1994 by OXFAM America, is presented at the workshop by Muh. Haji of SORRA. At Boroma area the types of stoves were checked at 800 households. The main type is from metal, but often 3 stones are used, especially for the use of firewood.

At the average 4 kg per day and household are used, what makes 17000 tons/y for the 12000 households, with costs of 84000 Somali Shillings. Additional 131 teashops (31 have been checked) use at an average 8kg per day, totally 310 tons per year. The bakeries (10) use 2 camel loads of logs per day, the load ? 15-20 kg, 10-15,000 Ssh. The average transport distance is 34 km. Some charcoal is exported to Jibuti.

The total use at Boroma is some 18000 tons per year = 150000 trees. The distance at which to collect/find fuelwood is already some 3-5 km.

As an example for charcoal production the situation observed at Daweli, Gerevis is presented here. In this area (village would be an euphemism, its a few broken houses along the road), some 700 people live. The area has a radius of some 10 km (comp. chapter 2.4.1). For the production of charcoal that is locally only of secondary importance, a cooperative with 23 local members has been formed: LOLEIS.

For charcoal production the largest trees are burned at the bottom to ease felling. This procedure is probably being mistaken as a charcoal production method: the burning of standing trees. The logs are cut, stockpiled, covered with corrugated iron sheets, lit and later on covered with grass and mud. The burning process takes some 5 days, the cooling process again 5 days. There are surely ways to improve charcoal production by improved kilns and to save wood.

For the transport a lorry is rented from the city. 1 load equaling 6 tons, creates a net-income of 10,000 Somali Shillings. 3 lorries are filled per month (18 tons, = 30,000 ssh). On the retail market, sold in 20-25kg bags at 1500ssh, that lot (6 tons = 240 bags) will amount to 360,000 ssh. The major amount goes to the big merchants and the retailers.

No special selection is taken on species. Small branches are left, some of them are used for cooking in the village.

Fuelwood and charcoal is the business of the forestry department. They should monitor the tree use and the harvesting.

A rotational system for wood harvestt, replantation (nursery needed) and charcoal production has to be developed with the participation of the ministry and the charcoal associations. Registered are actually LOLEIS, IFTIN and ILEYS. Charcoal production areas should be set up in blocks and delimited. Producers should be obliged to use the woodlands carefully, sustainably, that means, to take care for the natural regeneration or for replantations. All this will need the acceptance and the commitment of the local elders. As pilot areas Paliegubedile and Damal, each some 15 to 25 km from Hargeisa, are proposed.

The price is not decisive, and it is not considered as too cheap by Somalis. Especially during the rainy season prices can raise from 1500 to 3600 Ssh a bag. So

There should be a chance to reduce charcoal consumption by improving stoves.

Recommendations on the improvement of stoves and ovens: (a) compare models and their efficiency (b) check the local market on available materials and skills for local production (c) produce a set of models (d) test the models in the households (cooking process, handling, quality of food, acceptance ... (e) coordinate with other WID programmes (f) start awareness raising and distribution campaign with the women in the markets.

The main recommendation on substitution of Moh. Sheikh Abdullahi is Kerosene, as there is no care for energy saving (cheap) and no acceptance for new stoves, especially the solar box (an experience that can be confirmed from trials made in Yemen). Dung is shameful to work with (says Awale). In Jibuti 99% of the population use kerosene, the average consumption is 22.5 l/month.

At the Ministry of Mineral and Water Resources, Muhammed Hassan Abdullahi (DG) and Omar Sudan (Dir, geologist) claim that studies on oil and gas reserves are kept back by the international organisations that have done it. Large parts of the existing documents have been lost. The size of the lignite deposits east of Berbera is estimated as 4 billion tons. It would be important to develop it, as the destruction of woodlands has been estimated as some 600ha/y in 1992. There are no ongoing or promising projects. UNDP, EC and WB did not respond on project proposals.

There are several individuals (Ing. A-Rashid Derie Farah) and NGOs (MUSTAQBAL Voluntary Organisation, Togdher Region, Burao, Nuradin JJJ. Samatar) that are interested in the development of coal reserves at Berbera. But this kind of business, gas (at present from Jibouti, very expensive. Possibly from Ethiopia) or coal development, should really be done as business by a private organisation that can be motivated (ev. by a tender.) to invest. The use of gas, as well as of more developed solar energy (parabola, solar cells ...) needs hard currency.

3.4 Community-Participation / Funding

Community participation and cost-recovery are very critical subjects in Somaliland. The fact is clear: "Popular participation in development is an appealing and indeed necessary goal if development efforts are to be sustained." That there is a certain "lack" is felt by the Somalis themselves. It is expressed in the proverb: "Ceel na uma, cidina uma maqna: The well is neglected and empty, and there is no one working on our behalf." Even Prof. Lewis, a longstanding expert on and friend of the Somalis indicates the problem of kickstarting development in Somalia: "... despite massive injections of foreign assistance which, particularly after the terrible 1975 drought, earned Somalia the reputation of being an aid grave-yard."

Nothing is known (well, not much has been studied, at least by Swissgroup) on traditional levels of participation, as the project was started as emergency assistance with little development orientation. For the contact with the villages (elders) the project often relies on local NGOs as intermediaries. The following text can be taken as an example on approaches to be avoided (Scoones: "In Somalia pastoralists have a tradition of co-operation in the management of rangelands. Successful co-operation takes place where there are groups of users without wide differences in wealth or in economic objectives, where customary contract law (xeer) is well developed and where functioning customary kin and clan structures facilitate co-operation on a wide range of issues. Co-operation is undermined where the government claims management sovereignty over the rangelands, where individual rich herders or merchants introduce different management objectives or where donor-assisted projects undermine customary decision-making and enforcement processes. The lessons drawn for a more successful rangeland development strategy include: strengthening the force of customary xeer contracts by putting them in written form and using them as a basis for formal laws, a closer and more symbiotic relationship in pastoral areas between customary authorities and locally elected officials and the bureaucracy and the alignment of development plans for range and water with customary common property resource boundaries and management rules."

The National Range Agency (p 26) had the following approach to funding: "The Range Fund referred to in the Act is intended to assist the NRA to obtain funds for carrying out conservation, management and development of the range resources. The funds may be received from government, foreign grants or levies and taxes imposed in Somalia. The act provides for levies to be imposed upon a) the construction and use of water storage facilities, b) the sale of fodder c) the illegal use of grazing reserves and d) the registration of cooperative ranches."

Other examples are e.g. fees for school education, fees for water, fees for medicaments, drugs - as well veterinary (covering drugs only).

The idea of a revival of the self-help-schemes might be useful. (UNESCO report, p 94): "The various regional and district development programmes initiated at the local level are usually funded through self-help mechanisms. This concept is based on Law No. 39 ratified in 1972, and updated through decree MG/1/4/,1422/86 issued by the Ministry of Interior in May 1986. Self-help schemes must be proposed with a comprehensive plan of action and budget. Plans are considered by the district self-help committee. If approved, funds are collected on a voluntary basis from the community, and these are jointly managed by the self-help scheme committee and the permanent committee of the Local People's Assembly. This scheme is utilized to give financial support to SHWs and TBAs in the WHO-supported PHC project in the Lower Shabelle."

3.5 Formal and Non-Formal Education, Training and Extension.

Even with a literacy rate between 10 and 20 %, the Somalis, as any nomads are eager for news and knowledge. There is a Somali proverb: "One lives on food and news." Richard Burton the explorer, scientist, geographer, artist and linguist wrote in the nineteenth century of Somalia: "The country teems with poets, poetasters, poetics, poetaccios". One hundred years later, B.W. Andrzejewski and I.M. Lewis noted that "the Somali are a nation of bards".

This strong tradition in oral knowledge exchange will have to be taken into account for any training and extension activities. The longing for information has been felt at several of the visited villages. Most of them would be happy for any advice (on improved charcoal making, ranch management and improvement ...). Some extension/education might be useful at refuge camps as well.

The emphasis on non-formal and "verbal" education has been expressed in the UNESCO-report (Chapter 3, Education): "In Somalia "learning" is an activity which occurs in a variety of milieus, among them the home, the family, the mosque, the farm, the factory, and the school. Learning situations can be classified as informal ..., non formal (e.g. Koranic school), clubs) and formal (government supported school systems). Somali society continues to rely predominantly on oral communication as the medium of instruction. For this reason, informal and semi formal contexts play a significant role in providing education to the community. These channels cannot be overlooked, particularly if improvements in health, nutrition and family well-being are to be maintained."

Already that time (1988) priority has been given to primary education while the need for secondary and especially adult education has been seen as conntected: "However, he added, as the experiences of nations throughout the world have shown, no programme of education for children can succeed without concomitant support for the development of literacy in the adult community. To this end the Ministry of Education will also stress the importance of nonformal education and wherever there is a primary school, there too will be evening classes for adults. In addition, Family Life Centres will teach women home based activities to support the welfare of the home and family"."

It will be wise, to take the recommendation of Scoones and to go first for human capacity building, instead of capital investment.

The UNESCO report, quoting "Two studies on educational wastage in Middle Shabeelle (1985) and Waqooyi Galbeed and Awdal Regions (1986)" found five main fields of problems in education: a) socio-ecological factors: drought, poverty, the production cycle clashes with the school cycle: during the peak agricultural season few children visit the school. They earn up to 100-200 Ssh per day, what in 1988 was equal to half a monthly wage of a teacher. b) socio-cultural factors: parental lack of confidence in quality of school, preference for Koranic schools, female retention for traditional household reasons; its inadequate services cannot persuade parents to sacrifice the time children normally spend in occupational labour (s. up). c) infrastuctural weakness: young, poorly paid teachers, poor school facilities, inaccessibility of schools. There is a crisis (already in 1988.) due to the government's inability to finance educational costs on a sustained basis due to the unavailability of fiscal resources. While a qualified, motivate, and well supported teacher is perhaps the single most important ingredient necessary for a sound educational process - teachers are 80% underqualified or undertrained. In the three northern regions there were 27 % qualified, 41 % national service, 32% Egyptians in 1988. 30% had a primary school background + 1 year training, 57 % two years training, 32 % of the teachers are female. The mean age is 20 years. d) goal-oriented factors: The educational system is not believed strong enough to lead to employment or economic survival, that means, there is no guarantee of employment after the school. The same problem is mentioned in the report on the carpentry section of VTC: "The trainees of the VTC will have to engage in private activities, to establish their own workshops - there are no jobs. So they should in fact be trained as private entrepreneurs, taught in economics, maintenance and management as well as in the technical fields." e) mobility of the population

3.6.1.1 The Situation in Formal education

At Hargeisa so far only primary and intermediate schools have been established. The first secondary schools (4 y) will open in august 1996 at Hargeisa, Gabileh and Boroma. In Somalia the formal educational system started (1988) with two years of kindergarten (optional), followed by a 4/4/4/4 structure for elementary, intermediate, secondary, and unversity respectively. Post-secondary courses have been offered by other technical ministries: Health (2 years' nursing), Livestock 9 2 years' veterinary science), Range and Forestry (2 years). The average class size was 26.8, national teacher/pupil ratio 1:19 (1:14 Sool, 1:33 Northwest).

Those days assistance is got from UNICEF, UNESCO and SCF. The government pays the salaries of 1425 teachers (some 10,000 Ssh per month). Some teachers do "voluntary work, as out of Gebileh and Boroma. (see chapter 3.6).

Recommendations : (1) local support has to be encouraged (2) textbooks have to be revised to reflect curriculae more responsive to the needs of the children and the community. [Precisely the same recommendation is the core of women's education (s. next chapter). So far there is no teaching material available for environmental awareness raising or education. For this kind of training the Ministry of planning should be leading, as different Ministries, as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, education and interior are involved. (3) method of improving the production and distribution of textbooks (4) improve technical and vocational schools by (5) revising and unifying curriculae of technical and vocational education (6) upgrading teacher quality (7) production and distribution of instructional materials; (8) improving the quality and quantity of equipment.

3.5.3 Non Formal education

The Ministry of Awqaf (DG Muh. Ahmed Ali) exists since 2-3 years. It has established pre-school curriculae, including environment (trees and animals) and it cooperates with the Ministry of Education and emits radio programs.

After the UNESCO report couranic schools are the most stable form of local, non-formal education. For this type of schools "the devout Muslim population showed a marked preference for training boys and girls through this mode of instruction. ... parents are the main source of income for over 93 percent of these teachers, and payments may be made in the form of money, food and other services."

The students are mostly aged from 5 to 9 (72%), although some continue until the age of 14. Girls account for 27 percent of the total number enrolled. Teaching last for 4 years - 10 hours a day, and is based on "rote memorization" of the quran, fiqhi (man's social affairs), towhid (man's relation with god), hadith (the sayings of the prophet), arabic and mathematics. "Few students leave Koranic schools genuinely literate in Arabic or fully numerate."

So on one side there is a clear an outspoken preference for this type of school, and: "Lessons can be learned form the continuity of the Koranic school which shows that parents and communities will support an educational structure responsive to their felt needs. These community-based institutions hold some potential for reaching nomadic students, as teachers are generally selected from the community and are willing to travel with them." But the limits are clear as well.

The following question might be taken as the programme to be followed, trying to establish environmental education: "The measure in which this time-honored practices, having a relatively fixed curriculum and organisation, can be opened to new subjects and methodologies is a question that deserves further exploration. ..."

3.5.4 Extension

The extension services are relatively strong in agriculture, but there are only limited activities in environment. Ever one of the 5 regions has an extension center, but not yet the districts. Trained and experienced professionals are (still) available, but no finances. Some extension is done through radio and television, weekly, on range and forests. The situation is serious, and that is explained to the population, 90% of which are living from livestock and range. The destruction of the range would be the destruction of the subsistence and of the nation.

But most of the villages have never been contacted by extensionists from NGOs or the government - while (s. introduction to the chapter) information and extension (and assistance.) would be welcome. The enormous area with scattered, small settlements makes extension difficult, especially what concerns transports. At Gebile e.g. 5 extensionists (trained agronomists) are working with 1 car that brings them each to a village in the morning and collects them in the afternoon. The main topics for extension are: (a) soil conservation: contour bounds, prevention of gully and splash erosion by the plantation of trees ("galool", "sugsug"), some by natural regeneration or seeds collected on the spot. (b) new farming techniques (c) plant protection (insecticides are not locally available, they have to be bought at Hargeisa. (d) production of "home made insecticides / biological protection

The National Range agency always gave a high priority to field-oriented extension: "Although it is essential to have a strong headquarters organisation the field workers are the key link between the policy, research and the pastoralists or farmers. A high standard of operation in the field is vital to the effectiveness of the range development plan." Its approach was (quite close to the one used by the "Natural Forests Section" in Yemen.) as a valuable.

Recommendation for Projects on Extension: a) initiating dialogue with the pastoral community whilst collecting sociological data in the area b) continuing the dialogue by explaining the objectives of the range development plan c) producing visual aids and educational material applicable to the range development plan and easily followed by the nomadic communities d) conducting seminars and workshops in the regions specifically prepared for the conditions of those regions. d) carrying out regular programmes with mobile cinemas using films, slides, film strips or even video tapes."

The foreign donor agency should take into account the recommendations of Scoones: (a) Long time frames are needed for iterative planning with the involvement of pastoralists. Successful planning and intervention may take 15 years or more. (b) Start small and build up, focusing on institutional capacity at a local level.

So far there is not even one agricultural and veterinary school open in Somaliland. Everything was in Mogadishu - but some potential teachers are available. There is some potential to involve NGOs into extension (s. app. B). Even on the education of extensionist proposals have been submitted: Ahmed Jama Sa'eed, Nolosan NGO, Bora'o: Rehabilitation of Wadaaamagoy Rural Development Institute (WRDI) for the training in range, livestock, forestry and charcoal. But before extension is started, assisting private organisations, the messages, ways and methods should be developed in strong cooperation with the MLFR. Monitoring and evaluation procedures have to be developed.

3.5.4.1 Extension Among Nomads

The problem to reach the disperse population is shared by other fields needing extension. The main areas being human and animal health. "Browsing" their experience we get a lot of valuable information for forestry extension. Planning for extension, forestry and environment should try to coordinate with those fields.

Nomads: "This group represents the greatest theoretical and practical challenge for access to vaccination service. In most nomadic families, however, part of all members are settled during the rains, when pasturage is abundant. Indeed, in the northwestern regions only 10 percent of the population is estimated to be exclusively nomadic, and a further 23 percent is only partially so, having a "base camp" from which treks are organised. ... Vaccination sessions would best be held during dry season, when watering points are few and mainly consist of chartered deep wells. Unfortunately, many of these are very isolated and difficult to reach by road. Success in the face of such constraints would require a motivated health team with the desire, organisational ability and initiative to make it work and the full cooperation of a community which believes in the benefits of the service being offered.

Communication is key to successful immunization programme among nomads. While a number of nomadic families have access to a radio, the most effective channels of communication - those which invite trust and belief - are informal and interpersonal."

The recommendation, to do extension at water points (and teashops and the like) has been largely and successfully used in Yemen as well.

For the training of the extensionists we will encounter the same problems as listed above for the teachers (point a) to e)). The educational background, the training of trainers, will be poor. "Courses will have to emphasise practical training, field work, and role playing in favour of normal lectures." There are still people available, trained and experienced, but due to the long period of professional inactivity during the civil war, they will need refresher courses (2 months, ev. WFP assisted. s. proposals of MLFR in App A.). Participants out of the strata of ex-soldiers should be selected carefully, taking into account their psychological fitness - and their origin (ideally from the place of work.). Many turned nuts ("trigger happy") during the war and might wreck havoc if sent to villages.

The economy and so the sustainability of such a service is a problem. But extension is a service of the government to the communities. A similar service had been created for health (COOPI's "mobile doctors"), animal health (NAHA: nomadic animal health auxiliaries), Vet Aid and UNHCR. Here the services could be charged and the income was used to procure the drugs.

Recommendations: For rehabilitation, replantation, reseeding and soil stabilisation a mobile extension and rangeland rehabilitation brigade should be created. In the same time creating jobs and saving the environment. Vet Aid is on mobile vets, forestry needs mobile rangers. The idea of the mobile rangers is not new, it was handled in such a way. Field work was the dominant part (s. up). Work had to be certified by the elders signing the weekly reports. The first thing to develop will be the extension message, then an action plan, a monitoring concept and evaluation criteria.

If range management literature in the Somali language has been prepared is doubtful. At any rate nothing could be found during the field work. There is some efforts needed in the creation of such material. Extension messages, strategies and material might be developed in cooperation with Caritas Jibouti and the awqaf.

A last valuable hint, given by Dr Awale concerns incentives. Incentives are important for the Somali society - but it does, opposite to expectations. - not need to be money. The issuing of diplomas and similar rewards/recognitions proofed very successful. It enhances competition between groups. A Somali saying is: "If I did something good for you - say it, let the people know it." That means that: Honour is (probably still) more important than money.

3.6 Women in environment

For this chapter again the main base is the UNESCO report on women and children in Somalia. In this field it is, due to the segregation of genders, impossible for males to get valuable information. So I was not able to do my own research. On the other side, what is being done by WID programmes is, unluckily, all very much top - down. Instead of doing first some basic research (PRA), of getting the local problems, priorities and ideas for solutions, ready-made projects are brought in. The present approaches are more based on "propaganda and training" than on enquiries, assessments and participation.

The women are trained in producing handicraft as waste paper baskets (90% analphabetic population.), batik (has a high standard in Kenya, none at all in Somaliland), table-linen (Somalis, as Arabs, eat on the floor) ... and more of the kind. Its the same products in Yemen and Kenya, all over the place. Rather useless and so, with a very limited potential for income generation. (UNESCO expressed the same critique.). It has to be admitted, that the women enjoy the courses, it is "a change" for them.

A similar problem are the solar cookers. A heavy propaganda is being undertaken - I myself have taken part in it for a year in Yemen. But in Yemen we tried the thing, ourselves and with the people. The only thing that really gets cooked is tomatoes. Rice, the staple food, never gets really cooked, and especially it is impossible to produce dry rice. The opinion of the women's expert was: "So the people have to adapt themselves." She means the people have to adapt to the cookers - not the cookers to the people's taste. [Bullshit - no further comments.].

In those nomadic and agricultural families the division of labour is gender-related. Women have to take care for the children, their education, the household, fetching water and fuel, to work on the farm, sow, look after the livestock, making household utensils, weaving the portable nomadic house (aqal), they preserve food and may also sell milk, ghee (clarified butter), mats and ropes, charcoal, and wild fruits to supplement the family income.

Among urban women the "poor women often gain less benefit from the amenities of city life. They are disadvantaged in measure of access to health and educational services and are often forced to turn to petty trading and domestic work, which offers a precarious income." The income generated by women is important for many families: "26 percent of home-based income-earners were women, while in Waaberi District almost one-third of households depended upon women's earnings. The largest number of working women were in the age group 30-34 years, with many widowed or divorced."

The problems in women's education after 1980 are the same as for the schools: "lack of operational funds, no guarantee of post- educational employment, shortage of educational material - and a poorly focused curriculum. Furthermore, the centres did not cater for rural women and concentrated skills training on nondevelopmental activities (s. up).

Here, as for forestry extension, we can largely rely on local knowledge and on locally developped programmes. Development work in Somalia is definitely not as difficult and cumbersome as one might think, relying on hearsay. There are an awful lot of god ideas and experiences available.

The approach of the ministry of education might be taken as recommendation for further development: The MOE "established in 1984 the Women's Education Department (WED) to provide educational opportunities for women who had little or no chance to attend formal schools. The main aim was to offer practical training which would improve their daily lives. .. including raising the level of female literacy and prepare women for leadership roles; forming groups of women to stimulate rural development activities emphasizing women's participation; and transmitting relevant information to women involved in rural development. This function includes training, research, material development, and evaluation of development projects. ... It is apparent that making female education more meaningful to life situations by including health, use of environmental resources, nutrition, and improve occupational skills would lead to greater support from the family and community for female education"

To get a better idea on the real needs of women in Somaliland and on their influence on the environment, to enable us to make some reasonable project proposals, including the women, some PRA would be needed as a first approach.

3.7 Research, Data, Documentation

To say that: "it is difficult to get data in Somaliland" would be almost euphemistic. Due to the different revolutions and unrest in Somalia lots of documents have been lost.

The major documentation center for Somaliland is now at - UNDOS, Centenary House, Off Ring Road, Westlands, Nairobi. Tel. 254-2 441.

Thank you. Mrs. Lulu Todd, Chairwoman of SIRAG, www.sirag.org.uk

In Somaliland, fresh start brings hope Expatriates return to bustling region once ravaged by war

HARGEISA, Somalia -- At first, Fatima Ibrahim thought she had blundered in 1999 by returning to her homeland in this breakaway region of northern Somalia known as Somaliland. After living in Wales for more than 20 years, she had grown accustomed to its sparkling shopping malls and smooth highways.

Even before her plane landed in this dusty city, "you could see people shooing goats and camels off the runway. I wanted to go back immediately," said Ibrahim, a human rights specialist for the UN Development Program in Somalia. "Hargeisa was nothing like what you see now. Everything's being rebuilt."

Ibrahim, who trains this region's police officers, lawyers, and judges to respect human rights, is part of a massive return of Somalilanders in recent years from such places as Britain, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. They are rebuilding this region shattered by war into what they hope will be the world's newest country: The Republic of Somaliland.

Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia in 1991 after the ouster of the country's longtime dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, has maintained a degree of stability that is lacking elsewhere in Somalia. About the size of Tennessee, Somaliland has a predominantly Muslim population of about 3.5 million, a functioning multiparty government, its own currency and license plates, a potentially lucrative export income from oil and livestock, and a deepwater port in Berbera that rivals the seaport of its northern neighbor, Djibouti.

Hargeisa, the regional capital, is bustling. Men gather at sidewalk tea shops to read the Haatuf, one of the city's two daily newspapers. Past the rows of shops selling electronics, construction workers install electrical wiring for the first two floors of a five-story World Trade Building of Somaliland, a symbol of Somalilanders' faith in their country's future.

Many Somalilanders, however, say their future hinges on international recognition as a nation. So far, clan leaders in Mogadishu, the seat of power for Somalia, are reluctant to grant Somaliland its independence. Legal advisers from South Africa's Foreign Affairs Ministry supported Somaliland's claim to statehood, but a spokesman for the ministry said that South Africa was "still investigating" the issue.

Some European countries have indicated a willingness to recognize Somaliland's independence but have held off. Earlier this year, Walter Kansteiner, assistant US secretary of state for African affairs, told Congress that the United States should try to build on Somaliland's successes, but stopped short of suggesting official recognition for fear it would undermine Somali peace talks.

The diplomatic purgatory threatens to stunt the region's growth. Without it, Somaliland cannot borrow money from international lenders, and many foreign donors wary of the region's status are reluctant to provide aid.

But analysts believe that Somaliland's case for recognition is strengthened by faltering peace talks in Nairobi, where clan leaders from central and southern Somalia have been trying to hammer out a national constitution.

"Most people don't like the idea of balkanizing Somalia, but there might not be a better solution," said Ross Herbert, a senior researcher for the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The biggest hurdle in the region's struggle for recognition is the African Union, a coalition of leaders from 53 nations, "We cannot stand for dismembering one of our countries," said Desmond Orjiako, a spokesman for the African Union. "We cannot talk about African unity and then accept Somaliland."

Somaliland has remained relatively peaceful for more than a decade. And with presidential elections last year deemed fair by international observers, many Somalilanders are now wondering what other credentials are needed for the world to recognize their nationhood.

Somaliland gained independence from Britain in 1960, and opted days later to join its southern neighbor Somalia, a former Italian colony. The two countries shared a vision of a Greater Somalia that included parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The partnership soured in the late 1970s when Somali forces failed to gain control of Ethiopia's Ogaden Basin, important grazing lands for Somaliland's goat, camel, and cattle herders and a region with strong Somali clan ties. The lasting resentment from the Ogaden War ended Mogadishu's dream of a Greater Somalia and prompted a rebel movement in Somaliland that eventually toppled Barre in 1991.

But the rebellion cost Somaliland more than 50,000 lives, mostly civilians killed during bombing raids, according to UN estimates. Government forces demolished Berbera and Hargeisa.

Mass graves near Hargeisa uncovered by heavy rains two years ago attest to the atrocities carried out by government soldiers under Barre.

Somaliland authorities say that the remains of more than 9,000 people in 116 mass graves have been unearthed. Meanwhile, the people depend heavily on the estimated $500 million sent every year from family members abroad. By comparison, the region's livestock exports to the Middle East bring in $120 million a year. "We've shown that we can be democratic and that we can respect human rights. We are setting an example for the rest of Africa," said Somaliland's foreign affairs minister, Edna Adan Ismail. "Where is our peace dividend'"

EYEWITNESS: Somaliland needs strong social services

Nick Sireau, the communications manager for the U.K.-based Catholic Institute for International Relations, visited Somaliland last month and found evidence that the territory - still not recognized as an independent state by any other country - needs help building strong institutions if it is to survive.

The people of Somaliland -- a breakaway region of north-west Somalia -- have suffered for years, first under colonialism, when Somalia was divided between the French, British and Italians, then under Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in the 1970s and 1980s.

They continued to suffer during the civil war that tore Somalia apart from 1988 to 1991, and just when they thought peace and freedom were theirs, after Somaliland declared independence in 1991, the new country descended into chaos in 1994 as opposing factions took up arms.

Today peace appears to be here to stay. The refugees are back from camps in Ethiopia. Land mines have been cleared from the most populated areas. Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, is once again a bustling city where business is thriving.

Two universities have been set up: one in Hargeisa and one near Borama, about 50 miles to the west.

Many local non-governmental organisations are working to promote development and human rights.

Crucially, municipal elections last December and presidential elections in May this year went ahead peacefully and were said to be free and fair by election observers.

Somaliland has achieved all this with little outside help.

The international community tends to ignore it -- it has not been recognised by any other country as an independent state -- although a recent visit by a delegation from the British government shows that interest is increasing.

In Somaliland, I visited partner projects and development workers of the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR).

CIIR has been working in Somaliland since 1995 through its skillshare programme, International Cooperation for Development.

Among the few international NGOs working in Somaliland, CIIR has one of the most developed programmes, thanks to support from two U.K.-based organisations, Comic Relief and the Community Fund.

But we realise that long-term development is only possible if civil society and government institutions are strong.

In order to achieve this four key areas of development need particular attention.

First, the capacity of local NGOs needs to be strengthened.

CIIR currently places development workers with local organisations to help them develop their resources and skills.

I had the opportunity to visit one such NGO, called Nagaad, which means "peaceful resting place" in Somali.

Nagaad is an umbrella organisation for the host of women's NGOs that provide services such as health care, education, environmental training, assistance to returnees, microcredit and food support.

It is based in a small building in Hargeisa that was built by the women themselves and testifies to the crucial role women are playing in rebuilding their country.

Second, the country needs to put in place an HIV/AIDS strategy. A survey carried out in 1999 estimated that the HIV/AIDS infection rate was around one percent of those surveyed. Yet HIV/AIDS remains a sensitive topic in Somaliland, where Islam and traditional values are strong. The HIV/AIDS workers I met try to work within the culture to promote education about the virus, particularly among young people. They meet religious leaders, teachers and parents first to ensure that everyone is working together before they start instructing youth about HIV/AIDS.

Third, the country needs a structured health system.

I was encouraged to find a development worker from Nepal, Ram Sedhain, had helped set up a health management information system to ensure information and figures about health flow from the community level to the top ministry level.

Finally, education needs to be improved.

Somaliland's youth have been called the "lost generation" because the wars have meant that many could not attend school, let alone university. I visited an institution four miles out from Borama, called Amoud University. It was set up in 1998 and teaches medicine, business administration and teacher training to 360 students. Unfortunately, many of the students plan to leave the country when they finish their course. There are just not enough jobs for them in Somaliland. Although the economy is doing better than it has for years, there's little major investment.

Everything in Somaliland is being rebuilt from scratch.

It is hard, but it means that with initiative, efficiency, skill and motivation, new structures can be put in place that are sustainable and help bring lasting peace to a nation that has suffered too long.

Report on the Somaliland Local Elections held on 15 December 2002

The primary objective of the EC's Somalia Country Strategy Paper (and Cotonou Agreement) is to support the move towards the establishment of democracy and good governance in Somalia. In much of the country this is still a long way off, however in Somaliland the period of transition and the movement towards elected administrations is now well under way.

Somaliland (SL) is in a process of transition from a traditional system of governance with a Parliament and executive being appointed by traditional leaders who represent clanic groupings to a more democratic system. The traditional system was centred on large clan conferences selecting leaders and providing the mandate for government. In early June 2001 the people of SL voted in a referendum on a new constitution. The constitution was overwhelmingly accepted, with the first public vote to have taken place in Somalia for 35 years, setting a valuable precedent.

The referendum was conducted almost entirely without external assistance and clearly had shortfalls. Elections are a much more complex, and within fragile post conflict societies, can result in renewed conflict. On this basis and in line with the July EU Council Conclusions on Somalia, the EC joined forces with other donors in order to initiate activities to assist this transition to democracy.

The EC fielded a short consultancy to look into the feasibility of electoral support, assisting the Somaliland Electoral Commission (SEC) in drawing up together a work plan to guide their future activities. The positive feedback from this initial consultancy highly encouraged the fielding of a project. At the same time many of the consultant's recommendations were adopted by the SEC and the election date notably changed from the 27th of October to the 15th December to accommodate the necessary work.

1.1 The process

The local elections would generate elected Councillors who in turn will appoint Mayors for the 23 districts. The importance of these elections is that the currently registered political organizations would compete at this level to become political parties. To do so, parties must solicit at least 20% of the votes in four of the six regions; the first three organizations with the highest percentages of votes would become parties eligible to contest presidential elections. These difficult selection criteria were designed to prevent clan-dominated parties. It can be assumed that any organisation meeting these criteria can be seen as cross-clan supported.

The most formidable challenge facing the electoral commission was the registration of voters. There was an absolute minimum chance to do this in time given the absence of any form of registration of citizens at regional level, the distribution of people over large rural areas and beyond the borders of Somaliland and indeed Somalia (criteria being born in Somaliland or of Somaliland parents).

In addition, there are various problems facing political organisations hoping to enter the competition where time was a crucial factor. Chief of these being little or no experience in setting-up parties, and more dangerously, no funds or guidance in fund raising, which expose the situation to possible external manipulation.

1.4 Profile of the Somaliland Electoral Commission (SEC).

Under the constitution of Somaliland and the electoral law for the presidential and District elections, the SEC is in theory an independent body, which is responsible for the organisation and running of elections.

The SEC comprises 7 members, selected in the following manner:3 by the President, 2 by the upper House of Elders (Gurti) and 2 by opposition parties.

The composition of the SEC was then authorised by a two-thirds majority in Parliament and the Gurti. The seven members are employed each with a salary of $300 per month. In addition there are five administrative staff, each of whom was selected by the civil service commission. None are former government employees. The team are all well motivated for the task, with one of the commission members being a woman.

1.5 Local elections

It was anticipated that counsellors for the 23 districts are elected (Mayors are subsequently elected by the counsellors), with the districts divided into five categories, depending on their populations. This has been done as follows:

In the capital Hargeisa, 25 individuals were to be elected; in category A (primary urban centres), 21 individuals; in category B, 17 individuals; in category C, 13; in category D, 9.

It became clear, given the prevailing security violations in Sool region (disputed with neighbouring Puntland) and the District of Buhodley that elections could not be conducted in all 23 districts. The decision to cancel elections in three districts was taken by SEC and is commendable.

2 Lead up to Election Day

Riyale (the current president of Somaliland) went out of his way in his pre-election speech, 13/12/02, to differentiate "parties from the nation", this in response to criticisms levelled against elements of his own party UDUB who continued to use the trappings of office to campaign. The vice president issued a directive at this time for all administration vehicles to be turned over to the electoral commission to further facilitate the running of the local elections.

2.1 Transparency of SEC accounting and government contribution.

The arrangements for accountability within the SEC were limited and accounting basic, yet donors required sound accounting practices and this requirement was considerably enhanced by the TAM.

Simple cash flow problems were encountered, particularly as the project worked on a reimbursable basis. This worked, but limited the ability of the project to become fully engaged to the level originally anticipated, resulting in an anticipated under spending (to be confirmed in detail in the final financial report by GTZ). In order to enable smooth running on election day and to ensure the project could remain engaged to the level anticipated, a 50% advance was agreed for election day costs. However the point was emphasized that these are their elections and it is the duty of the administration to ensure sufficient funds are available. In terms of management the SEC contracted an external auditor to perform a review of their accounts.

2.2 New management structure

The TAM had put in place a management structure, to take on the majority of work; this unit reported directly to the SEC, but worked under the guidance of the expatriate team. There were difficulties as SEC members did not respect the line of command and often dealt with the field directly, which at times caused misunderstandings. However, by being in place much of the day-to-day practical work was sufficiently covered.

The management unit gave a presentation on the preparations, which were in place, and the activity plans for the actual day of elections. The presentation was of good quality and clearly demonstrated that the TAM had been able to instil a decent level of understanding. It is worth mentioning that through the project 3,200 election workers have been trained, 400 domestic observers and basic but effective civic education has been conducted.

It is questionable if the unit will remain in place for the coming elections in 2003 as the SEC claim they do not have a sufficient budget for the work. The TAM strongly advised that this is addressed urgently.

2.3 Number of voting days

It was planned to conduct only one voting day, however, the TAM stated that statistically it was highly unlikely that all voters would be able to vote in such a limited time. The electoral law states that one-day only was possible. It was agreed in a meeting with all political parities that one-day would be maintained, despite the constraints.

2.4 Registration

Attempting registration showed the frailties of the voter card system. Registration was only done in urban areas, with around 330,000 people being registered. The figures are not yet compiled and there were clear irregularities in the process. These were recognized and lessons have been learnt from the process. On polling day all people were allowed to vote irrespective of whether they had a registration card or not (and then marked with indelible ink), this was the only feasible solution given the circumstances.

2.5 Security

It was recognised that security deteriorated in Sool region and as a result elections were cancelled in 2 of the 4 districts and Buhodley District. 2,283 police provided security on polling day and to escort and collect sensitive materials to all the voting locations (ballot boxes, sheets and indelible ink).

3 Election day

All polling stations opened at 7.00 am and were to close at 6.00 p.m. During the day it became apparent in the primary urban areas that closure at 6.00 would not be possible, leading to a decision for polling stations to remain open until 12.00 or until lines of voters were finished. However in reality most stations were closed by 8.00 pm as the voters were no longer lining up or ballot papers were completed (although in several cases re-supply was provided from strategic reserve stocks).

In no cases did any of the internationals that visited polling stations witness any violence, systematic fraud, open campaigning or blatant organizational and logistics failure. In total over 100 polling stations, in Burao, Sheik, Berbera, Hargeisa, Gabiley, Kalabyd, Erigavo, Boroma, Togwagale and many villages in-between were visited by internationals.

In all polling stations visited, police were present, orderly lines maintained, ballot papers, boxes and indelible ink were present. The atmosphere was highly positive and the majority of adults voted. Many interviews were conducted, and without exception voters were happy with the way they had been treated. Understanding of the process was relatively high in urban centres, reflecting the focus of the civic education activities, however in rural areas not all people actually understood why they were voting, with a number thinking it was the presidential elections.

3.1 Polling station staff.

Without exception every staff member interviewed had received two days training, allowing basic principles and mode of operation to be functional. There were some clear shortfalls, but in the opinion of all internationals present these were not manipulations of the process but a reflection of Somali culture and the limited knowledge within society of the democratic process. Only in one polling station visited was there any discontent of the process - a result of several voters attempting to vote twice. They were however discovered - in itself a reflection of the fact that the process was functional.

3.2 Observers

In every station visited the contesting parties had representatives observing the process. These representatives remained in place for the whole day. Again, when asked they all felt the process was functional and accountable.

In around 35 - 40% of stations domestic observers were present from COSONGO and NAGAD (the main local NGO umbrella agencies). These observers had received one day's training organised by the project. In a number of cases they were clearly well informed, in others not.

Cases of both the party and domestic observers becoming actively engaged in organising the election day were reported. This was, in all cases, harmless but is a contravention of normal election procedure.

3.3 Secrecy of the vote

The biggest weakness observed was the fact that secrecy of vote was not functional. This was clearly a reflection of reality. The majority of voters are illiterate. Political parties are known by their names, but not so much by their logo. This meant that people were totally confused by the ballot papers. People seemed more than willing to express who they were going to vote for if this was "required" to speed the process. This reflects on the general understanding of what the elections were all about but, as the results below illustrate, people did vote for all the parties running so overt coercion does not appear an issue. The ballot papers were then completed by the election staff or the representative of the selected party. If voters were literate they were permitted to vote behind curtains.

3.4 Eligibility to vote

As the registration process was only partially conducted cards were not utilised as the price of submission. Essentially everyone who wanted to vote was allowed. In no cases (except for the under age) was anyone turned back. In all cases those who had voted were marked with indelible ink, which was not possible to remove.

3.5 Role of Media

ICD/CIIR provided journalist training specifically in relation to the elections. The training was conducted in a 3 day workshop and was partially funded by the project as well as ActionAid and PENHA. Radio, TV and print journalists were given training, building on the journalist training conducted by the BBC in 2001 (EC funded).

It appears that the overall output was a success, with media of all types trying to present an unbiased view. The example of Radio Hargeisa on election day was outstanding with Journalists keeping a running commentary on the day's events, with constant reminders for people to be peaceful and calm. At many polling stations the radio was being broadcast to those waiting in line. All Somalis interviewed in Hargeisa were impressed by the radio coverage.

In addition, two documentaries for local consumption will be produced of the lead-up to the elections and the events of the day. These were partially funded by the project and will provide useful civic education tools in the future.

3.6 Participation of Women

Women's participation was impressive. At each polling station large numbers of women were present, while around 20% of staff working were women. The percentage of women voters was much higher in the afternoon (primarily reflecting women's higher work load and the fact that many men chew Quat after lunch). The number of women candidates does appear to be very limited, however hard facts on this are not available, with only single figures being reported to have been included on party lists of candidates.

3.7 Review of polling day

A meeting was conducted on the 17th in which all internationals who were directly or indirectly involved in the events of the day met. In all cases each group reported positively on the day's proceedings, being impressed with the level of organisation and commitment shown by all involved.

Those present in meeting:

Paul Simkin (Chair) EC Paul Crook EC, Manfret Gers TAM / GTZ Elis Suedjem TAM / GTZ. Emman Sandahl (Student) Nick Selsey TAM / GTZ. Adan Adoker ICD Steve Kibble CIIR London. Mark Bradbury ICD Hussein Bulhan APD. Hugh Fenton DRC Henrik Jespersen Danish Embassy, Nairobi. Mat Bryden War Torn Societies, Owen Richards British Embassy, Addis Ababa.

4 Election results

The results took longer than anticipated to be compiled. Counting was scheduled to take place at each polling station. This did not happen, partially due to security concerns and simple problems of no lighting. At the same time the counting process employed was painfully slow. There is a need to review the procedure and ensure that each polling station is of a sufficient size, in a safe area and has simple things such as lighting, water and toilets.

It is interesting to note UDUB, the party of the present regime, polled more than half the votes cast only in one region: Awdal, the home of current President Riyale. UDUB's showing in the Sahil region is a surprise to some since Kulmiye, the party of the the leading opposition candidate for the presidency Silanyo, was expected to have a stronger showing here as he brought back members of the (younger) diaspora to take on the incumbents.

There is an east-west drift with UDUB growing weaker as you move eastward. This was expected but is not so dramatic as to give cause for concern with power blocks opening along clanic lines.

During the referendum it is reported that 1.18 million votes were cast. These were at the time estimated to be highly inflated figures. The table below demonstrates a variance of over 700,000. It is true to say that an estimated 70% of eligible voters cast their vote during the local elections, which would give a voting population (all over 16) of around 628,000; even if 50% managed to vote (low estimate) the voting population would be in the region 880,000 or slightly higher since elections were not conducted in every district. Based on these figures Somaliland's population could be very vaguely estimated at around 1.7 - 1.8 million (taking 50% under the age of 16 and a voter turnout of 50% with some allowance for non voting districts).

5 Lessons learnt

How the political future of the three parties will go forward will be of note and requires further work on the development of party politics (something USAID started to develop through the International Republican Institute). In a more sophisticated system we could be looking at transferable voting or other such techniques. Presently we wait to see how personalities look to deliver what support they have to the surviving three parties. The system must look at whether the losing organisations can stay in existence and work in the local government systems.

Questions now have to be raised as to the ability of the newly incumbent local councils to take forward issues of local government. The understanding regarding the role of these elections is also reflected in people's ability to take forward local issues and develop the community/government linkages required to draw out issue-based politics in the future. There is a clear need for training so as those elected actually understand their own responsibilities.

The domestic observers group was a welcome addition, but as demonstrated by the report produced by COSONGO the product is of questionable quality. It would be unreasonable to expect a high quality result, given the fact that observers were only given one day's training and only very limited financial recourses were made available. There is clearly potential for much more comprehensive work in this area, building on the limited, but positive, success achieved to date.

A longer term problem remains in that district boundaries are not clearly demarcated resulting in the closure of one polling station. Although not a major problem at this moment, it will present difficulties, which will grow as the democratic system progresses.

There continues to be a need for voter and civic education, particularly in rural areas where radio coverage does not reach. This in conjunction with the high percentage of illiteracy needs to be taken into account for planning of future elections. Without tackling these problems it is unlikely voter secrecy will be achieved.

In urban areas it was clear that the number of polling stations or period of voting (only one day) was not sufficient, with significant voters turned away, while others were forced to stand in line for hours at a time. Since these were the first elections for the vast majority of the populace, they have not presented a disincentive to democracy, however it is highly unlikely that the same level of motivation will remain in place in the future unless the problems are tackled.

6 Conclusion

It is clear that the process was of as high a quality as is realistic within the prevailing environment. It is highly unlikely this would have been achieved without donor support and technical assistance.

The electoral commission released a communiqu? on 16/12/02 which is both bold and open - Item three, for example, states "The early realisation, by the Commission members, of their multiple shortcomings and their subsequent bold stance to seek advice......"Such an attitude is noteworthy as donors engaged to bring in the GTZ team.

It was emphasized that if the SEC expect to receive assistance for the next election phase they will need to clearly prepare requests and have them circulated in the near future. This is a priority. It was also made clear that the EC would not consider further funding beyond the existing project (a point made from the outset of EC dialogue with concerned parties).

The Government will provide a high level of resources to the presidential elections (now scheduled to be held on 30 March 2003) simply because they are considered more important and will be watched closely by the international community. These elections are constitutionally supposed to take place by February, however it is likely that March or April will be the date recommended by SEC and approved by Parliament.

Many of the lessons learnt and experience passed on by the TAM will provide a basis against which future elections can be organised. Sadly it is unlikely that the same level of discipline and organisation will be possible without external and impartial advice being on hand.

The combined support provided to the elections in many respects was the highest profile project undertaken to date in Somaliland, and yet the most risky. It is a commendable success to the project team and the Electoral Commission that the local elections passed off without incident (possibly one of the most peaceful elections in Africa for the past 20 years). The project has clearly paved the way to helping with the growth of democracy in Somalia. It is however only one small step and considerable support is required for the future, in terms of leaders training, civic education and continued advice and assistance.

SOMALILAND UK DEVELOPMENT & RETURNING HOME PROJECT

Identifying the priorities for Somaliland, what skills and resources will be required to assure the future good health of the country, and to allow those who wish to return home to do so with confidence and purpose.

Faculty: Health & Comunity Studies

Client: European Commission Task Force for Co-operation on Justice and Home Affairs.

Background: The Somali community in Britain can trace its roots back over 100 years, but it was the outbreak of civil war in 1988 that led to a sharp increase in the UK community, with the arrival of refugees on a large scale.

Client Problem: With the stabilisation of the situation in Somaliland, many refugees would return home given the opportunity. However, there are many obstacles, both in the UK and Somaliland which prevent this from happening. Solution Provided

Using Social Action methods, De Montfort University's Centre for Social Action explored what the real needs of the people wishing to return home to Somaliland were, and also of their home country. Training and guiding project workers from Somaliland, work with various community groups identified what issues and obstacles needed to be addressed to support anyone wishing to return home, including financial realities, legal, immigration and documentation concerns, children and schooling, etc. Three short visits were undertaken to Somaliland to explore in depth these issues for the benefit of the whole Somaliland community.

Client Benefits

The Centre is supporting the refugees in identifying their own agenda, needs and solutions, in addition to facilitating the process of learning development and change. The project has:

(1) Strengthened links with the community and government in Somaliland. (2) Identified business and economic regeneration opportunities. (3) Addressed housing, education, employment and legal issues. (4) Discussed the general needs of the Somaliland community in the UK.

The short visits showed: (1) Somaliland is perfectly safe, with the people working hard to rebuild their shattered economy and towns. (2) It is feasible for refugees to go back and settle. (3) Somalilanders in the UK would be welcomed back by their countrymen.

Somaliland

In 1960, Somaliland, which was a British Protectorate, united with Southern Somalia that had been under Italian rule, to make one independent nation of Somalia. This merger was premature and not well thought out, and it failed to work as a result. This led to the break away of the Somaliland Republic from Somalia in 1991. This was due to the dictatorial rule of Mohamed Siad Barre, who was the president of Somalia from 1969 to January 1991. His autocratic rule caused the formation of various clan-based militia fighters who collaborated to fight and oust him between 1988 and the beginning of 1991.

In 1991 the northwest regions broke away from the rest of Somalia to form an independent state called the Republic of Somaliland but up to today, it lacks international recognition. Consequently, it cannot benefit from bilateral aid and only benefits from humanitarian assistance. Traditional clan based institutions of elders, NGOs, and the government that is recognized locally, are the ones, responsible for spearheading development in Somaliland.

In 1993 a conference on National Reconciliation was organised and held in Borama city of Awdai Region of Somaliland and it defined a national charter and a traditional government. However, are problems of restoring peace and a functioning State with international recognition. There is a multiplicity of warring groups opposed to the existing governance. There is an agreed upon phased out plan to restore a democratically elected government.

The Somaliland Women's Development Association (SOWDA)

SOWDA is a non-political, humanitarian women's organization founded in 1988. This was during the civil war in the northern region of Somalia, now Somaliland, in which hundreds of thousands of civilians fled into exile in neighouring Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. These refugees have suffered a lot of atrocities, including murder, rape and banditry by southern military forces. An estimated half a million people were killed while 600,000 fled into exile to Ethiopia. SOWDA started working with refugees in the Harta-sheikh and Camp Abokor camps in the eastern region of Ethiopia. The organisation was responsible for health and sanitation, nutrition, education, and humanitarian assistance

SOWDA has played a crucial role in restoring peace and peaceful co-existence for women in the communities where they offer humanitarian assistance in the midst of the civil war in Somaliland. The organisation has organised and mobilized women's groups from different clans in Hargeisa City, to plan anti war campaigns through activities such as demonstrations; open protests in the battle zones, press conferences denouncing the evils of war; mass prayers; meetings with traditional government leaders and the leaders of the opposition groups. A group of 22 women submitted a petition to the government to stop outbreaks of violence and return to the negotiating table.

Women and Peace

Somaliland women had observer status at the peace conference of 1993, and recited poems, provided financial support, and mediated between the warring groups. Although women are never allowed to sit at the negotiating table with men in the conflicts in Somaliland, they are involved in resolving conflict in the traditional set up in society, in the family and the neighbourhoods.

Women's Rights in Somaliland

The issue of women's rights in Somaliland is deeply rooted in the culture and religion of the people. Gender discrimination is part of the traditional practice. The cultural belief is in male superiority and females are expected to accept subordinate positions. Women do not have equal rights with men in social, economic and political opportunities and they lack the opportunity to express their views and concerns in the public fora because they lack representation in public organs.

SOWDA campaigns to create awareness on women's rights and the right to participate in the decision making process in the country. This is because men wield all the power at all levels of society from the traditional to the public standpoint. Traditionally, men hold exclusive rights to clan positions and women are not allowed to represent their clans. This is extended into religious sentiments and hinders women from featuring anywhere or holding positions of leadership. Socialization is along gender-based roles shaped by the cultural beliefs of society. Unfortunately, women in Somaliland are not aware of their rights and the root cause of inequality is based on cultural inhibitions invented by men to protect their interests.

Documentation Issues

The existing women's organizations in Somaliland could facilitate documentation of the experiences on Human rights observance in Somaliland. But the process is hindered by: (a) Limited resources for research and documentation (b) Lack of organised research and involvement of women.

In Somaliland, gender violence is manifested in the following actions: (a) National courts which are unfair to women's needs (b) The Cultural practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) (c) Rampant rapes in the midst of the civil wars (d) Girl child marriages (e) High rates of divorce which are not beneficial to women.

Somaliland: Presidential Election 2003

Preface

NORDEM, The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, was asked by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2003, to identify a team of two experts who could carry out an assessment of the electoral processes in Somaliland in the spring of 2003. The election processes to be assessed would be the Presidential election scheduled for 14 April 2003 and the Parliamentary elections possibly taking place a month later.

NORDEM nominated jurist and election expert Ms. Berit Nising Lindeman and political scientist and Somaliland expert Mr. Stig Jarle Hansen for the assignment. As the parliamentary elections were postponed by two years following a decision by the House of Elders, the election observation covered the Presidential election, only.

The team stayed in Somaliland between April 4 and May 2, 2003, a period of time which allowed them to make a limited assessment before, during and after the election day. A limited geographical coverage and the size of the team did not allow for an encompassing evaluation of the elections. The objective of the mission has been to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the electoral process. The team was commissioned to assess the registration of candidates, the election campaign and the administrative preparations for the election day, and the following tabulation of the results, as well as making an assessment of the electoral framework, the democratic and human rights environment and monitoring the media coverage of the campaign. The team has followed the methodology outlined in the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Handbook.

The NORDEM team operated fully independently from other international observers. A co-ordinated international election observation mission was not present in Somaliland. However, observers from several countries like South Africa, Ethiopia, Great Britain, Sweden and Canada were observing on Election Day, as well as individuals from the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The conclusions on the Election Day observations overall reflect also the views of other international observers. The team would like to thank the Somaliland Government, the National Election Commission and electoral officeholders, politicians, NGO and media representatives and all others who willingly shared information and impressions during the course of our stay. Not the least, we would like to express thanks for the overwhelming hospitality of the Somaliland people. The report is based on the observations made by the Norwegian observers. All opinions expressed in the report are the author's responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights.

Introduction and Executive Summary

Somaliland, a war-torn nation that has yet to receive international recognition, has, with limited foreign assistance, managed to establish peace and stability over the last ten years. A system of governance has been adopted, and successful District Council elections were conducted in December 2002, the first election in modern Somaliland history. The Presidential election held in April 2003, has been a further test of how far Somaliland has reached in the direction of democracy. In spite of limited resources and experience, a comprehensive legislation has been adopted for the regulation of elections, and an independent electoral administration has been formed. The electoral campaign was peaceful, although allegations against the incumbent government for misuse of government funds and property for campaign purposes must be taken seriously. Somaliland has a well developed press, that overall covered the electoral campaign in a balanced manner, although government media favoured the coverage of the incumbent's campaign. The election day was conducted peacefully and orderly, but it was marred by lacking voters' registers, insufficient distribution of ballot papers and only limited secrecy of the vote. The irregularities observed during voting can to a large extent be explained by lacking resources or inexperience. The counting process was exceptionally transparent and well conducted. When the preliminary result was declared five days after the election, the difference between the two top candidates was as narrow as possible, as only 80 votes differed. A result like this would under any circumstances be contested. Unfortunately, however transparent the electoral process had been on election day itself, the tabulation process and the activities leading up to the announcement of the final result were significantly less transparent. This led to speculations of rigging by the two parties that were running neck to neck, and among the citizens in general. It was clearly revealed that the tabulation of votes had been following different standards for the assessment of the validity of single results, and that simple miscalculations had been made. These mistakes became ever so much more significant as the election was won by such a narrow margin. Overall, the administration of the elections was fairly successful when the resources and level of experience is taken into account. However, significantly increased transparency must be sought for the period after election day, regulations must be introduced to standardise the tabulation process, and the election administration needs additional training.

Political Background

If you ask an official from the present day Somaliland Administration, he or she would probably say that independent Somaliland was born on the 26th of June 1960. Indeed, at the time, many countries recognized the former British colony of Somaliland as a sovereign state. However, four days later the state voluntarily merged with the former Italian Somali colony, and the result became the state of Somalia. Many Somaliland politicians felt affronted by the rapid merger and problematic issues concerning the relationship between the two newly merged regions were left open, this in turn led to heavy critique against the practical arrangements of the Union. Nevertheless, such critique was mostly directed against the unfair practices of the constitution, not against the concept of Somalia. After a while the northern politicians became quite integrated in the political life of Somalia.[1]

The process that led to the formation of Somaliland seems to have been drastically accelerated by events taking place in Hargeysa in 1988, after a desperate offensive by a northern-based rebel organization, the Somali National Movement (SNM).[2] The Somali regime had to conduct military operations to counter this move, but they completely overreacted. Hargeysa was bombed indiscriminately by the Somali air force. The SNM swelled enormously when relatives of the 50.000 civilians killed during and just after this incident joined it en-mass.[3] SNM also changed completely, and a new bitterness towards the south surfaced and contributed to a notion of Somaliland identity. The final push came later in 1991 when the southerner Ali Mahdi, declared himself president of Somalia without consulting the SNM, a move that pushed many of the Northern leaders in the direction of independence. Characteristically, this independence was formalized by a decision made in the first of the large Shir beeleedyo, a type of traditional conferences attended by representatives of all the local clans in Somaliland and thus not only involving the Isaq clan family that had dominated the SNM, but also the other clans in the area. This first big clan gathering, named the Bur'ao Shir Beeleed after the place in which it was held, chose Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali "Tuur" as the first president of Somaliland.[4] Later, two other similar grand clan congresses, all named after the respective locations where they took place, were held. The second and more broadly based Borama Shir Beeleed, lasting from January to May 1993, elected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as President and replaced the old interim administration with a new one. Ibrahim Egal was the last prime minister of the Somali republic before the military coup in 1969, and an experienced politician able to play on patrimonial strings. The third Shir Beeleed in Hargeysa, from October 1996 to February 1997, re-elected President Egal and endorsed an interim constitution. Somaliland experienced two periods of Civil Wars, which occurred in 1991-1992 and 1994-1996, these conflicts were dealt with by using the traditional mechanisms of the clan system, harmonized with strategies of elite accommodation.[5]

The System of Governance of Somaliland

The Constitution

The Boroma conference (Shir beeleedyo) in 1993 adopted two charters; the National Charter and the Peace Charter. The National Charter outlined what was to become the first system of Government of a independent Somaliland. It was unique in the sense that it managed to acknowledge the traditional system of government through the clans (beel) and to combine it with governance after modern western principles. The National Charter established a Governmental system consisting of an Executive with a President, a Vice- President and a Council of Ministers, a Legislature, comprising a Parliament with an Upper House of Elders and a Lower House of Representatives as well as a Judiciary.

New conflicts and civil wars between 1994 and 1996 were ended by the Hargeisa conference in 1997 where a provisional Constitution was drafted. This Constitution was based on the National Charter, but also introduced a party system with a party-based elected Executive and a multi-party elected House of Representatives.

The formula for selecting the representatives in the House of Elders is not established in the Constitution, and has yet to be adopted. The Constitution also provided a decentralised local government of multi-party elected District Councils. The Constitution with later amendments was approved with an overwhelming majority in a referendum on May 31, 2001.

The Executive Power

The President and the Vice-President should be elected by direct vote every five years. Until the election of a President could take place, the President has been selected by the Boroma and Hargeisa conferences, and later the period was extended by the legislature. The President is Head of the Nation and has the leadership of the general policy of the Government. The main areas of the President's competence are to propose laws and budgets, national security (including the armed forces), and to appoint cabinet ministers and senior officers of the state.

The role of the Guurti

The House of the Elders, the Guurti, is a Constitutional formalisation of the traditional Council of Elders. Through Somali clan history, it was the Elders, ad-hoc representatives of the different clans and sub-clans who came together to discuss and agree solutions to important inter-clan relations in the pre-state Somaliland. As a national Guurti in Somaliland, however, the history does not go back further than to the war against Siad Barre and the SNM's policy to integrate traditional and modern systems of governance.

The Boroma conference adopted two charters: the Peace Charter and the National Charter, and the role of the Guurti was reaffirmed in both Charters. The current representatives of the House of Elders (HoE) were selected through negotiations among members of each clan. Formally, the role of the elders is to ratify, reject or propose amendments to laws passed by the House of Representatives(HoR). The HoE must approve all laws, except those on financial matters. The HoE will base their assessment in compliance with religion and tradition, bearing the security of the nation and population in mind. However, apart from the formal role of the Guurti in the legislative process, their role as a non-political mediator of conflict is still respected, although critical voices argue that the Guurti has not been able to maintain their political impartiality. When the President asked the Guurti to have the period of the transitional House of Representatives extended by 6 months in order to postpone the parliamentary elections, the Guurti decided to postpone the elections by two years. On the basis of the Constitution, the term of the HoE was subsequently extended by three years, as their term is one year longer than that of the House of Representatives. The decision was highly controversial and postponing the elections for such a long period has in fact been opposed by leaders of all political parties as well as by the NEC. Allegations have been made that the real motive behind the significant postponement of elections was an extension of the term of HoE per se. According to the HoE themselves, the reason for the decision was two-fold: Firstly, the holding of elections is expensive, and after having carried out two elections within a period of four months, the nation would not financially manage another already the following month. Secondly, a law on parliamentary elections has not yet been adopted although it is under preparation, and important issues are yet to be resolved. In particular, the issues of the borders between regions and districts (district demarcation), the creation of electoral districts and how many representatives should be elected from each electoral district, contain several seeds of controversy. The lack of a proper census makes it difficult to establish in a fair manner how many representatives should be representing each region, because the number of votes behind each seat could not be estimated beforehand. Also, the clan factor must be taken into consideration.[6]

The House of Representatives

The 82 members of the current House of Representatives were selected at the Hargeisa conference on the basis of clan representation, selected through negotiations among members of the clans, like the Guurti. A positive factor is that also minority clans have been secured representation in the House of Representatives. When the current House of Representatives was formed, it constituted a temporary, non-party representative legislature, awaiting the establishment of political parties and nationwide elections. The main area of authority of the House of Representatives is the legislative; it can propose, amend, reject and approve laws that in turn will be passed to the House of Elders. In addition, it can impeach the President or propose a vote of no confidence against the executive branch. The term of the House of Representatives has been extended several times, notably because of a wish to avoid stirring the existing stability by calling the elections too early. Most members of the House of Representatives have since the creation of political parties supported some of them, although they still do not represent any particular party. The support for a party is of a non-official character. According to - still non-official information - 45% to 60% of the members of the House of Representative support the UDUB party, some 20% KULMIYE and there is only very limited support to the UCID party. The rest are non-partisan or undecided.

The Judiciary

The Judiciary consists of a district court in each administrative district, a Regional Court in each of the six regions, Court of Appeals and a Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also functions as a Constitutional Court. The legal system of Somaliland is dual, combining the religious laws of Sharia and national laws, and the dual system is reflected in the judiciary: Here, the judges enjoy the same position within the courts, but in reality there are two categories of judges as approximately half of them have legal education, some of them being educated in Somalia before the collapse of the Barre regime, some are educated abroad. The other half are the Sharia judges who are trained in religious laws, whereas the completion of a formal legal education is not required.

The judiciary seems to be the weakest part of Somaliland governance, still considered to lack the necessary competence and experience. The article 23 of the National Charter adopted in Boroma in 1993, stressed the independence of the judiciary, and that its decision could not be subject to review by other than the higher courts. According to the current Constitution, the President appoints the judges of the Supreme Court. However, the appointment should take place on the basis of a consultation with a Judicial Commission[7], and be confirmed by a joint sitting of the Houses of Representatives and Elders. The President also has the authority to dismiss the judges of the Supreme Court, and only a dismissal of the Chairman of the Supreme Court would require approval from the two Chambers of the Parliament. Thus, in principle, the President has in fact the possibility of an unchecked influence over the judiciary. Indeed, the late President was subject to an attempt of impeachment by members of the House of Representatives in July 2001 partly because of an alleged interference in the judiciary. The basis cited in the House of Representatives motion was a case of overturning a Supreme Court decision and the removal from office of the Supreme Court chairman. The motion was defeated by one vote. [8]

Last spring 2002, after the death of President Egal, the new President Dahir Riyale Kahin dismissed all functioning judges at the Somaliland Courts by a presidential decree, allegedly because the judiciary had no confidence and for repeated allegations of corruption. New judges were appointed at all court levels. The move was considered necessary in order to restore confidence in the judiciary by the public, but it has also left the courts in a void as the members are seriously lacking training, experience and resources. The ability of the judiciary to make just and unbiased decisions is still questioned, although less so because of allegations of corruption than because of lacking competence, experience and confusing legislation.[9]

The Human Rights situation in Somaliland

The NORDEM team interviewed several representatives of Somaliland Human Rights NGOs, and according to the majority of them, no serious or systematic human rights abuses occur. The right to assembly and organisation are principles generally adhered to. However, the strict limitation of political parties to only three is also a limitation to the freedom of organisation, the NORDEM team recommends that the system should be reviewed. This issue will be commented on more closely below. According to representatives of the press, both the state and the private, there are in general few restrictions on press freedom. It is not unheard of, however, that journalists get detained after writing articles considered libellous by the government, or simply because the authorities do not like the content of an article. This also happened during the election period, even though after the NORDEM team left the country. This is a regrettable practice that must be stopped. Problems also exist in particular related to the penal system. The police forces and custodial courts are seriously lacking resources as well as being badly equipped for carrying out investigations; shortcomings that in some cases may cause badly founded prosecution, as well as inappropriate detention and conviction of individuals.

Close to 100% of the population[10] in Somaliland are Moslems, and the state has a clear Islamic base although it officially claims to be secular. The Islamic base is clearly reflected also in the legislation, although the Constitution, however protective and favourable to Islam, maintains freedom of religion. The NORDEM team is strongly critical towards the fact that only Moslems can hold any elected position, that being Presidency, Member of Parliament or a Local Government councillor, or be a member of an election commission/office in Somaliland. Such limitations run counter to international principles. As long as these limitations continue to exist, the Somaliland elections are not giving equal conditions to all citizens.

In connection with the announcement of the outcome of the elections, a certain anxiety existed among the nation's security forces. The country has only a few years ago lived through massive violence and civil wars, and the newly gained peace is precious to the population. Thus there existed a fear that the elections might lead to an outbreak of violence amongst defeated party supporters. The security was considerably increased, clearly visible through the presence of armed police forces in the streets of Hargeisa[11] and Buroa when points of demonstration took place the first few