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Africa News, July 29, 2003/BYLINE: International Crisis Group
Somalia; Somaliland: Alternatives to Independence
The question confronting the international community is no longer whether Somaliland should be recognised as an independent state, but whether there remain any viable alternatives.
A new report released today by the International Crisis Group (ICG), Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents*, says recent developments have made the choice considerably clearer: develop pragmatic responses to Somaliland's demand for self-determination or continue to focus exclusively on the unity of the Somali Republic - a course of action almost certain to open a new chapter in the Somali civil war.
Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and, although not recognised by any country, has followed an internally-driven process of political, economic and social reconstruction that sets it apart from the rest of the country. A plebiscite was held in May 2001 on a new constitution and local elections in December 2002. The closely contested April 2003 Presidential election was a milestone. While the electoral process has not been without problems, Somaliland can claim to be more democratic than any country in the region. ICG Senior Analyst Matt Bryden said: "Somaliland's increasingly credible claims to statehood present a diplomatic dilemma just as southern Somali leaders are meeting to establish a new Somalia government. But its creation would be likely to displace the locus of Somalia?s conflict, not resolve it. And a negotiated settlement is unlikely to bear fruit at this point".
"The solution for the time being may be to grant Somaliland some kind of increased international profile without formal recognition - such as observer status at the UN, African Union and the regional Inter-Governmental Authority in Development (IGAD)", said John Prendergast, ICG's Special Adviser on Africa. "This could help to prepare the ground for eventual negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia".
Meanwhile the Somaliland government should demonstrate a genuine commitment to pluralism by releasing political detainees, withdrawing a restrictive proposed media law, accelerating the timetable for parliamentary elections as a means of widening participation in government and ensuring a full transition to a multiparty system, and investigating human rights abuses.
Donor governments can help by providing training and financial assistance to political parties and exploring options for providing Somaliland with access to direct bilateral and multilateral financial assistance. The UN, African Union and IGAD should also adopt a more open-minded approach to the question of Somaliland?s ultimate status.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Recent developments have made the choice faced by the international community considerably clearer: develop pragmatic responses to Somaliland's demand for self-determination or continue to insist upon the increasingly abstract notion of the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic - a course of action almost certain to open a new chapter in the Somali civil war.
Somaliland's presidential election of 14 April 2003 was a milestone in the self-declared, unrecognised republic's process of democratisation. Nearly half a million voters cast ballots in one of the closest polls ever conducted in the region: when the last votes had been counted and the results announced on 19 April, the incumbent president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, had won by only 80 votes.
A former British protectorate in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland declared its independence from the rest of the Somali Republic in May 1991, following the collapse of the military regime in Mogadishu. Although unrecognised by any country, Somaliland has followed a very different trajectory from the rest of the 'failed state' of Somalia, embarking on a process of internally driven political, economic and social reconstruction. Somaliland?s democratic transition began in May 2001 with a plebiscite on a new constitution that introduced a multiparty electoral system, and continued in December 2002 with local elections that were widely described as open and transparent. The final stage of the process - legislative elections - is scheduled to take place by early 2005.
The electoral process has met with widespread approval from domestic and international observers alike, but has not been without problems. The enlistment of government resources and personnel in support of the ruling party's campaign, the disqualification of numerous ballot boxes due to procedural errors, reports of government harassment and intimidation of opposition supporters in the aftermath of the election, and the opposition?s initial refusal to accept defeat all marred an otherwise promising democratic exercise.
The next phase of the democratic transition will be the most critical: until opposition parties are able to contest parliamentary seats, Somaliland will function as a de facto one party state. Somaliland's international partners can play a key role in assisting the National Electoral Commission to convene legislative elections with the least possible delay, while ensuring a level playing field. Constitutional and judicial reforms may also be required to ensure the integrity of the democratic process over the long-term.
Somaliland's increasingly credible claims to statehood present the international community with a thorny diplomatic dilemma at a time when southern Somali leaders are meeting under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with the aim of establishing a new Somali government. Recognition of Somaliland, although under consideration by a growing number of African and Western governments, is still vigorously resisted by many members of both the African Union (AU) and the Arab League on the grounds that the unity and territorial integrity of member states is sacrosanct. Furthermore, the creation of a new Somali government emerging from the IGAD process that claims jurisdiction over Somaliland threatens to open a new phase in the Somali conflict.
Diplomatic hopes for a negotiated settlement between Somaliland and a future Somali government, however, are unlikely to bear fruit. A hypothetical dialogue on Somali unity would have to overcome mutually exclusive preconditions for talks, divergent visions of what a reunited Somali state might look like and incompatible institutional arrangements. Failing a negotiated settlement, any attempt to coerce Somaliland back to the Somali fold would entail a bitter and probably futile conflict. The question now confronting the international community is no longer whether Somaliland should be recognised as an independent state, but whether there remain any viable alternatives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Somaliland Government:
- Demonstrate a genuine commitment to pluralism by releasing remaining political detainees and reinstating any government employees dismissed from their jobs for political reasons.
- Withdraw the proposed press law and invite the independent media to assist in drafting legislation more conducive to the development of independent yet responsible media.
- Conclude the formal transition to a multiparty political system with the least possible delay, by setting the date of parliamentary elections within less than twelve months.
- Introduce legislation providing for reasonable subsidies to all official political parties on an equitable basis.
- Demonstrate a commitment to human rights by investigating past abuses, taking corrective action against those responsible and introducing new measures to strengthen the protection of human rights.
- Initiate an independent review of the constitution, with particular attention to the three-party ceiling.
- Undertake a comprehensive review of the electoral law, based on lessons learned.
- Introduce legislation to strengthen the electoral process, including penalties for infractions of the electoral law.
- Commission an independent judicial review, with a view to introducing reforms strengthening both the capacity of the judiciary and its independence from political influence.
To Donor Governments:
- Provide party building training and financial assistance to all three official parties in order to prepare them for legislative elections.
- Offer technical and financial assistance to the National Electoral Commission in order to remedy problems encountered during local and presidential elections, and to assist in the design and implementation of an appropriate voter registration system.
- Assist the government with other reforms intended to advance the process of democratisation.
- Increase support for social and economic development in order to enhance the 'peace dividend' and preclude public disillusionment with the democratisation process.
- Explore options for providing Somaliland with access to direct bilateral and multilateral financial assistance pending a resolution of the territory's legal status.
To the United Nations, African Union and IGAD:
Adopt a more open-minded approach to the question of Somaliland's ultimate status, in particular by:
- dispatching fact-finding missions to assess the current situation and to recommend policy options, with leadership taken by either the AU's Peace and Security Council or the presidential troika (currently South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia) in view of the serious divisions within IGAD;
- taking Somaliland's demands under formal consideration, including a legal review of the territory's case vis-a-vis the current AU charter; and
- granting Somaliland observer status pending a final decision on its international status.
Source: afrol News, 28 July -
Somaliland recognition finds enhanced support
The internationally renowned Brussels-based think-tank International Crisis Group (ICG) in a new report favours an international recognition of the self-declared republic Somaliland. Historic claims, twelve years of stability and a remarkable democratisation should favour Somaliland's bid for recognition.
Recent developments had made the choice faced by the international community considerably clearer, ICG held in its report. Other countries could now choose between developing "pragmatic responses to Somaliland's demand for self-determination" or continuing to "insist upon the increasingly abstract notion of the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic - a course of action almost certain to open a new chapter in the Somali civil war."
Somaliland's presidential election of 14 April this year had been a "milestone" in the self-declared, unrecognised republic's process of democratisation, the ICG pointed out in its thorough report, released today.
Nearly half a million voters cast ballots in one of the closest polls ever conducted in the region. When the last votes had been counted and the results announced on 19 April, the incumbent president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, had won by only 80 votes.
A former British protectorate in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland declared its independence from the rest of the Somali Republic in May 1991, following the collapse of the military regime in Mogadishu.
Although unrecognised by any country, Somaliland after that has followed a very different trajectory from the rest of the so-called "failed state" of Somalia, embarking on a process of internally driven political, economic and social reconstruction.
Somaliland's democratic transition began in May 2001 with a plebiscite on a new constitution that introduced a multiparty electoral system, and continued in December 2002 with local elections that were widely described as open and transparent. The final stage of the process - legislative elections - is scheduled to take place by early 2005.
- The electoral process has met with widespread approval from domestic and international observers alike, but has not been without problems, the ICG report noted. Several violations of democratic ground rules had been reported.
This had included the enlistment of government resources and personnel in support of the ruling party's campaign, the disqualification of numerous ballot boxes due to procedural errors, reports of government harassment and intimidation of opposition supporters in the aftermath of the election, and the opposition's initial refusal to accept defeat all marred an otherwise promising democratic exercise.
Thus, the ICH held, "the next phase of the democratic transition will be the most critical." Until opposition parties are able to contest parliamentary seats, Somaliland would function as a de facto one party state.
Somaliland's international partners could "play a key role in assisting the National Electoral Commission to convene legislative elections with the least possible delay, while ensuring a level playing field," ICG said. "Constitutional and judicial reforms may also be required to ensure the integrity of the democratic process over the long-term."
Somaliland's "increasingly credible claims to statehood" now were said to present the international community with "a thorny diplomatic dilemma" at a time when other (southern) Somali leaders are meeting under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with the aim of establishing a new Somali government.
Recognition of Somaliland, although under consideration by a growing number of African and Western governments, is still vigorously resisted by many members of both the African Union (AU) and the Arab League on the grounds that the unity and territorial integrity of member states is sacrosanct.
- Furthermore, the creation of a new Somali government emerging from the IGAD process that claims jurisdiction over Somaliland threatens to open a new phase in the Somali conflict, the ICG analysis says.
Diplomatic hopes for a negotiated settlement between Somaliland and a future Somali government, however, were seen as "unlikely to bear fruit." A hypothetical dialogue on Somali unity would have to overcome mutually exclusive preconditions for talks, divergent visions of what a reunited Somali state might look like and incompatible institutional arrangements.
- Failing a negotiated settlement, any attempt to coerce Somaliland back to the Somali fold would entail a bitter and probably futile conflict, ICG warned. "The question now confronting the international community is no longer whether Somaliland should be recognised as an independent state, but whether there remain any viable alternatives."
The report by the Brussels think-tank gave several recommendations. The Somaliland government was urged to "demonstrate a genuine commitment to pluralism by releasing remaining political detainees." Further, it should withdraw the proposed press law to create a basis for a free press and conclude the formal transition to a multiparty political system "with the least possible delay."
The UN and the African Union, on the other hand, were urged to "adopt a more open-minded approach to the question of Somaliland's ultimate status," in particular by dispatching fact-finding missions to assess the current situation and to recommend policy options.
The international community the should take Somaliland's demands under formal consideration, including a legal review of the territory's case vis-?-vis the current AU charter and grant Somaliland observer status pending a final decision on its international status, ICG urged.
The ICG is a renowned think-tank on international conflicts and has been seen to have large credibility within the UN, the European Union and the US. This is the first time any influential group has recommended the recognition of Somaliland's independence.
The Indian Ocean Newsletter, July 26, 2003, N. 1052 (www.africaintelligence.com)
Agreement on Immigration with Great Britain
The Somaliland authorities signed a memorandum of understanding with their British counterparts authorizing them to send back to Hargeisa Somaliland citizens whose requests for exile in Great Britain were rejected. The British ministry of home affairs and the head of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Colin Harbin, are working on this accord. Harbin was positively impressed by the Denmark government's capacity to reduce the number of immigrants from Somalia and wanted to do as much with those who settle in Great Britain. Many British delegations visited Hargeisa last year and the beginning of this year to negotiate this agreement, which was finally approved in early July by the Somaliland ministry of resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration, in the event of a visit by Harbin to Hargeisa with British diplomats in post in Nairobi (David Bell) and Addis Ababa (Owen Richards).
BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 22, 2003/Source: UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Nairobi, in English 21 Jul 03 ) BBC Monitoring
SOMALILAND SAYS IT HAS "NOTHING TO DO" WITH ONGOING SOMALIA TALKS IN KENYA
Nairobi, 21 July: The authorities in the self-declared republic of Somaliland have issued a warning against anyone trying to represent the region at the ongoing Somali peace talks in Kenya.
In a statement, received by IRIN on Monday (21 July), Somaliland warned Somali leaders and the international community to "abstain from any unfriendly declaration or acts against Somaliland".
"In the event that any person claims to be representing the government of Somaliland and/or its people in the ongoing Somalia peace conference, and in the event that such person or persons are accorded such status, the government of Somaliland hereby officially states that this will hinder any possible future dialogue between Somaliland and any future legitimate government of Somalia (former Italian Somalia) (brackets as received)", the statement said. The Somaliland minister of information, Abdillahi Muhammad Duale, added that Somaliland welcomed any peace deal between the parties "in the former Italian Somalia", but added "this has nothing to do with us".
Some Somali leaders attending the peace talks in Kenya have, in the past, proposed that extra delegates be allocated to represent Somaliland and have repeatedly called for the region to be brought into the process.
Duale told IRIN that Somaliland's position was well-known. "Our position has always been constant," he said. "We have never been part of previous processes and we will not be part of this one or future ones".
"Any claims or declarations of sovereignty over Somaliland by a future Somalia government will be viewed by Somaliland as an indication of hostile intent," he warned.
The Somaliland statement said the authorities were prepared to take part in a dialogue with Somalia "as equal partners, when and if a legitimate, democratically-elected government is established in Somalia (former Italian Somalia) with the full support and mandate of the people of Somalia".
Somaliland, a former British protectorate, declared unilateral independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991, but has received no international recognition.
Africa News, July 21, 2003/BYLINE: UN Integrated Regional Information Networks
Somalia; Somaliland Warns Against 'Declarations of Sovereignty'
The authorities in the self-declared republic of Somaliland have issued a warning against anyone trying to represent the region at the ongoing Somali peace talks in Kenya.
In a statement, received by IRIN on Monday, Somaliland warned Somali leaders and the international community to "abstain from any unfriendly declaration or acts against Somaliland".
"In the event that any person claims to be representing the government of Somaliland and/or its people in the ongoing Somalia Peace Conference, and in the event that such person or persons are accorded such status, the government of Somaliland hereby officially states that this will hinder any possible future dialogue between Somaliland and any future legitimate government of Somalia (former Italian Somalia) [brackets as received]", the statement said. The Somaliland minister of information, Abdillahi Muhammad Duale, added that Somaliland welcomed any peace deal between the parties "in the former Italian Somalia", but added "this has nothing to do with us".
Some Somali leaders attending the peace talks in Kenya have, in the past, proposed that extra delegates be allocated to represent Somaliland and have repeatedly called for the region to be brought into the process.
Duale told IRIN that Somaliland's position was well-known. "Our position has always been constant," he said. "We have never been part of previous processes and we will not be part of this one or future ones".
"Any claims or declarations of sovereignty over Somaliland by a future Somalia government will be viewed by Somaliland as an indication of hostile intent," he warned.
The Somaliland statement said the authorities were prepared to take part in a dialogue with Somalia "as equal partners, when and if a legitimate, democratically-elected government is established in Somalia (former Italian Somalia) with the full support and mandate of the people of Somalia".
Somaliland, a former British protectorate, declared unilateral independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991, but has received no international recognition.
Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire, July 21, 2003
TRADE FAIR OPENS IN SOMALILAND
Mogadishu, Somalia (PANA) - An 11-day international trade fair opened on Monday in Hargeysa, the capital of the self-declared republic of Somaliland. Somaliland chamber of commerce chairman Abdurahman Sugal, officially opening the fair, said that Somalis and Syrian businessmen collaborating with the Somaliland ministry of commerce organised the fair.
Products from Syrian companies like electronic goods, building materials, clothing and others were being exhibited at the fair, where visitors are expected to also buy cheaply priced items.
The Syrian businessmen said that they were very satisfied with the business atmosphere in Somaliland and promised that they would continue doing business with the "breakaway" Somali province.
BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 16, 2003/Source: Radio Hargeysa in Somali 1700 gmt 16 Jul 03
) BBC Monitoring
SOMALILAND POLITICAL PARTIES ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT ON SOMALI PEACE TALKS
The three main national political parties in Somaliland, UDUB (ruling United Democratic Party), Kulmiye (Solidarity Party) and UCID (Social Welfare Party) today at a joint meeting discussed issues concerning Somalia and issued the following resolutions:
- Somaliland is not a party to the Somali factions conference in Kenya and resolutions from the talks will not be binding on the Somaliland Republic since it is not participating in Mbagathi talks (Kenya).
- Only when Somalia achieves consensus and sets up a national Somali government will Somalia and the Republic of Somaliland be able to discuss their common interest.
- We urge the Italian government not to interfere with Somali peace talks in Mbagathi and not to cultivate enemity on the people of Somaliland who have decided their future.
- We also wish to inform the international community that the Republic of Somaliland will not accept anything imposed on it, which could bring about negative effects to the Horn of Africa and the rest of the world.
- We also appeal to the international community to recognize the peace, democracy and statehood which emerged in Somaliland.
- The three (Somaliland) national political parties will further call upon the Somali factions to reach consensus on Somali politics and set aside their differences for the interest of their people so that peace is achieved in their country.
The three Somaliland national political parties further agreed to have a joint strategy to counter these issues.
The statement was jointly signed by the secretary-general of the UDUB Party, Mr Muhammad Isma'il Bulale, the secretary-general of Kulmiye, Mr Daud Muhammad and the deputy secretary-general of Ucid Party, Mr Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Abdullahi.
BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 15, 2003/Source: Radio Hargeysa in Somali 1700 gmt 15 Jul 03) BBC Monitoring
SOMALILAND: MPS TO "COUNTER HOSTILITIES EMANATING FROM SOMALI PEACE TALKS"
Somaliland's House of Representatives has released a written statement in support of the recent stand taken by the Somaliland Council of Elders on the current peace talks for Somali faction leaders in Kenya.
The statement said following an assessment carried out by the House of Representatives on political trends, especially on the meeting which is being held in Kenya, there was need to circumvent designs targeting Somaliland and it has decided to support the statement made by the Council of Elders on 9 July (The statement released by the Council of Elders said Somaliland had joined The Somali Republic in 1960 on its own accord and had decided to secede from the union through consensus among its people, citing the peace conferences in Burco and Boorame in 1991 which culminated in the declaration of Somaliland, and the recent referendum approved by 97 per cent of its people. The statement said union with Somalia was a dream and was unattainable. The statement said Somaliland would only consider being a member of a federal republic for Somalis if all regions including Djibouti, Northeastern Kenya and Ethiopia's Ogaden region were members of that union. The statement accused the Italian ambassador to Somalia and the chief mediator at the talks of being antagonistic to Somaliland).
The statement by the House of Representatives said the house was ready to participate in any effort to counter hostilities emanating from the so-called Somali faction leaders.
Source: Jamhuuriya, July 12 2003
Elders warn of International conspiracy against Somaliland
The International Community at large, is technically culpable of remaining a silent accomplice to an international conspiracy hatching at Embagati, Kenya, aiming to pull Somaliland into the vortex of Somalia conflicts and a new chapter of hostilities and fresh blood-letting among ethnic Somalis everywhere, a House of Elders communiqu?? said Wednesday.
The International community, the communiqu? said; should be reminded once more that Somaliland was not at any occasion a party to, let alone an active participant in the reconciliation talks southern factions were holding among themselves in Eldoret, then Embagati, of Kenya. None of the resolutions, consequently, reached there, the statement said, were in no way applicable to Somaliland or of concern to its people. In contrast, it said, Somalilanders had, for the duration of the Kenya talks, been praying for the talks to end differently by bringing the protracted hostilities among southern factions, the death and destruction and the incalculable losses they caused over the years to a conclusive end.
If, the statement warned, the principal aim of the talks was to impose a new, more empowered, internationally sanctioned faction over the people of Somaliland and their government as is starkly evident at this stage, the international community may, then, be well advised to contemplate the dire consequences such a rash conclusion would introduce a fresh to the greater peace and stability of region, at large. More likely than not, the statement said pushing Somaliland under an alien, conspicuously inimical, ?foreign? power clique would, definitely, ?endorse an escalation of armed proxy conflicts?, thus preparing fresh ground for further genocides as well as unnecessary civil strife and disability to the peoples of the Horn.
To head off the adverse effects of the Embagati warlords attitude towards Somaliland and the self-determination its people adopted back in May 1991, the Honourable members of the Somaliland House of Elders strongly impress upon the international community to better start noting the Somaliland cause and its right to self determination. ?Or should it be understood?, the Elders said ?that the international community was, in fact, loathe to, and never supportive of the self-determination Somaliland had a right to demand, the self-reliance it had manifested and the peaceful co-existence it effected through years Somalia-South was embroiled in conflict and blood-shed? Or is it that the world would really have loved us in same predicament as Somalia?? ?If not for any of the above the world should find the right responses to Somaliland voices?, the statement said.
The Elders? communiqu?? closed with a short, powerful paragraph calling the government to devise and publish its strategy and policies regarding the on-going offensive against the afore-adopted resolutions on sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples of Somaliland.
The Elders Communiqu?? follows a statement the other half of Somaliland?s bi-cameral parliament - the representatives released a few days back lambasting derogatory, press statements Ambassador Carlo Ungaro, the Italian envoy to ?Somalia?, the so-called ?President? of the Mogadishu-based Arta group, Abdel Kassem Salad Hassan and the incumbent Kenyan Chairman of the Somalia talks, Ambassador Kiplagat for sometime in the recent past, been, apparently, increasingly growing fond of making. The representatives made clear; too, that Somaliland had a greater score to settle with Somalia (South) after they, hopefully, settled their own among themselves, first.
The KULMIYE and UCID opposition parties, however, co-released a joint response to the warlords; Kassem, Ungaro and Kiplagat et al conspired denunciations of Somaliland sovereignty.
The outside world, on the other hand, chose to remain a nerveless bystander, passively letting a Pandora?s Box the Ungaro Company ltd statements were forcing open proceed. Even the placards Mogadishu civil society actors were waving aloft for all the world to see, which blatantly compromised their non-political nature by stridently shouting on and on ?Somalia unity is sacrosanct!? has not awakened the world to a Somalia conspiracy against Somaliland.
Source: Jamhuuriya, July 12 2003
Library calls on Municipality, government to help in extending services
Mr. Abdi Nouh Abdullahi, Assisting Director of the Gandhi Public Library, here, called the Hargeisa City Council and the Central government to help in the extension of the voluntary initiatives of library founders reach more and more neighbourhoods in the capital, to begin with.
Mr. Nouh, also, the acting Director of the only public Library in Hargeisa, told The Republican, Friday, that the library had to extend its free lending and reference services to wider users in and around the city, and that this could only be achieved in partnership with public spirited stakeholders, the government and the newly elected Local Council of city.
?To date, the only input the central government has contributed towards the establishment of Library - the building which houses it - still remains its most valued asset?, Mr. Nouh said.
The offer of use of building was made them, he said, through the good offices of the late President of Somaliland, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal.
?The only other occasion assistance outside its founder Ahmed Yussuf Ismail Samatar and his contacts came the library was began with a visit a single user made to the library in November, 2002 - a visit that began innocuously enough but of which effect had done wonders for library while it lasted contribution Ms Mary Enright, Ireland, put into motion from then on began he said with an intervention she made on behalf of Library with the ICD office here which helped accomplish a measure of structural rehabilitation jobs, paid for a number of library book shelves, purchase of chairs and stationery and paid for bills settling technical repairs and updates made to the library computers and photocopier.
?The library is most grateful to these two personalities who initiated and delivered contributions that they could muster within their abilities for the use and benefit of all?, Mr. Nouh said.
The library has been gathering popularity since its inaugural opening date in June 2002.
?In May and June of this year, alone, the library lent out 556 books to users. For the same period, 1666 others have made use of its reading, reference facilities without taking out books?, he said.
The Gandhi Public Library is open from Saturday to Thursday.
Source: Jamhuuriya, July 12 2003
Girls take advantage of NOVIB, Oxfam Skill training packages
Two trainee groups of 35 and 40, respectively, were recently awarded certificates for successful passing skill training packages HAVOYOCO, a local non-governmental organization organized following a partnership agreements it entered with the Norwegian NOVIB and Oxfam GB offices provided the material and financial inputs required by the programs.
At a ceremony marking the occasion, held at Ming Sing, here, on July 3 the trainees - all of them girl, were given certificates detailing in what areas members of each group were being honoured for attending and completing the courses designed and delivered on the duration of training.
One of the two groups, numbering a total of 35, altogether, successfully completed the first phase of a 3-year program that NOVIB was supporting.
According to Ayan Omar Abdi, the project manager, the group have reached a stage where they could be honoured for taking full advantage of skill courses they have taken in food processing, tailoring, knitting, health, business management, Somali language and mathematics.
The girls in this group were selected from Family Life Education Centres (FLECS), which traditionally ran such courses, in the past, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.
The second group, 40 more, attended tailoring courses, and was sponsored by OXFAM GB.
Ms Edna Adan Ismail, the leading honorary guest at ceremony told the graduating trainees that what they have achieved and were being acknowledged for, was of no mean feat. ?My first footsteps into the path that led me away from the childhood comfort of home pointing out the way to where I stand today as Foreign Minister to this great nation was started by a training in knitting and food processing I signed for?, she said - she went on to regale her young fans with stories that highlighted how a combination of determination, motivation, hard work, singleness of purpose and a constant quest for further, higher goals were what made life worth living.
Ismail Mohamed Ahmed, Acting Executive Director of HAVOYOCO, officiating the award-giving occasion urged trainees to put what they have learnt to good use by providing for themselves and their families through the skills they have gained.
Ms Fatima Saeed Ibrahim and Ambassador Sa?ad Sheikh, present, also, added their views to how they saw the skill trainings the graduates just came through - and what and where this first step would potentially lead to those who kept their futures focused.
Source: Jamhuuriya, July 12 2003
Erigavo court flashes scene from government - proposed press law - SOLJA
The Somaliland Journalists Association (SOLJA) was very disturbed by the heavy-handedness of the Regional Court of Erigavo with which it handled the trial of Abdel Rashid Hassan Absiyeh, regional correspondent for the Jamhuria Media Group, at which conclusion the presiding judge handed down the reporter a stiff sentence on July 9, that, in reality, reflected not a just system going through a due process but was rather, a projection of a flash picture depicting a scene such as that exercised in ancient times when states were not accountable to any one for their actions, a SOLJA officer said Friday.
?Somaliland, surely, owes much to an independent press that considerately helped it across treacherous grounds to safety unruffled and a much better, stronger entity for the experience?, the officer, conveying the formal standpoint of the journalists association on the issue, said. ?No self-respecting court?, the officer said tapping a faxed report of the proceedings, ?can justify a sentence as severe or as disturbing as that it handed down the reporter last Wednesday, which seem to have been plucked off from an altogether different, more serious case?.
SOLJA, the officer said, sincerely hoped that the serious miscarriage of justice which, as reported, took aback the two sides in the case and the generally public alike, would adequately convince those honourable members of the Parliament who believed that freedom of expression as practised by an independent press and an intolerant, asphyxiating environment as that systems with more skeletons to keep hidden than transparent leaderships favoured.
The Association statement reached The Republican desk the same day another the Editor-In-chief of the 6-day Jamhuuriya newspaper, the oldest, most popular Somali paper in Somaliland, published on that Paper?s Friday edition.
The Editor, to whom regional bureaus directly reported, called the Erigavo trial of reporter Absiyeh ?unjust? and ?unjustified? in light of the relative substance of the light charges levelled against reporter
The Chief Editor, Hassan Saeed Yussuf, said his paper would appeal against the court decision and that the paper would, simultaneously, start a litigation process against the presiding judge to justify or flounder in his own interpretation of the law.
Publication of the Jamhuuriya report, also, coincided with a news despatch the BBC Somaliland Correspondent, Mr. Ahmed Saeed Egeh sent the service?s Somali section same day.
Together, the newspaper article and the BBC report, repeatedly broadcasted over all the Somali airtime slots, Friday, hammered the case of the independent press vs. ills inherent in a state controlled press effectively home, awakening many to how fast the flow of information was going to be shackled in irons if a press law such as that the incumbent government was trying to push, presently, through Parliament was passed.
The public, going by the spontaneous reactions people showed on reading or hearing about their case, seems to be just awakening to the fact that their first, democratically elected administration was seriously practising the art of state intimidation, and specially so soon after it was installed on their votes.
People kept reminding each other through out Thursday and Friday other indicators of a miscarried democracy and justice as manifested by administration.
Issues that recurred most often in conversations noted, relating to this latest case, were:
1) Another government instigated case designed to tie up a sister paper - Haatuf - in a lawsuit that charged it with - again - misrepresentation of facts.
2) The published insistence of Honourable speaker of the representatives Ahmed M. Adan ?Qaybeh?, to teach the independent media for, ostensibly, questioning the legitimacy extension of term the Elders of gave them; for publishing articles and documents detailing his opposition to the sovereignty of Somaliland in years not so distant, and by, allegedly, giving space to the views and programs of opposition elements.
Whatever course the government - proposed press law which Journalists Associations, other professional organizations, the Somaliland Forum and intellectuals all stand opposed to, the June 9 Erigavo court case which ruled that reporter had to be given a one-year prison term plus a six-month ban from earning his pay plus all the other government missteps which included imprisonment of people for their political views -definitely train brighter floodlights in government intentions and competence to govern.
Source: Jamhuuriya, July 12 2003
News release U.S. Government Announces $20,000 Donation for Refugee Returnee Assistance Project
Addis Ababa (U.S. Embassy) - The U.S. Regional Refugee Coordinator for the Horn of Africa announced a donation of $20,000 USD in assistance to the Somaliland Culture and Sports Association (SOCSA). The donation will be used for construction of a girls? recreation centre for use by former refugees and internally displaced persons residing in Hargeisa. Accepting the donation for SOCSA was Khadra Mohamed Abdi, SOCSA Chairperson.
The funds were provided under the auspices of the Ambassadors? Fund for Refugees in Africa, an initiative of the U.S. State Department?s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The Ambassadors? Fund help to fill gaps in on-going refugee support programs that are not already being addressed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in recipient countries.
Source: Jamhuuriya, July 12 2003
A Report on the recent Somaliland Presidential Election has just been released
by Berit Nising Lindeman and Stig Jarle Hansen who were commissioned by NORDEM (Norwegian Centre for Human Rights)
The report is mainly positive and praises Somaliland?s achievements and political maturity. It is relatively extensive and discusses many aspects of Somaliland?s system of governance, political background, Human Rights Situation and so on. In addition pointing out weaknesses in the Judiciary, the Nordem team is critical to certain clauses of the Constitution, the restriction of the press freedom and the practice of the police and custodial courts. They are particularly apprehensive of the shortcomings of the police and custodial courts and argue:
Quote: The police forces and custodial courts are seriously lacking resources as well as being badly equipped for carrying out investigations; shortcomings that in some cases may cause badly founded prosecution, as well as inappropriate detention and conviction of individuals. Unquote:
The report is quite comprehensive and contains in depth analysis of the election procedures and the political institutions of the country.
Full text of the report is available from: http://www.humanrights.uio.no/.Follow this link: Somaliland: Presidential Election 2003, on the left side of the page. The Institute told me that the report will always be available from their website. It may, however, after sometime, be moved from active pages and into the archives. Search then with: Presidential election or Somaliland and election or different combinations of Somaliland, presidential, election and so son.
Please disseminate
Ahmed H Nur, Wakiilka JSL EE Norway
Source: http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/08/nordem_report.html
Somaliland: Presidential Election 2003
NORDEM Report 08/2003
Preface
NORDEM, The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy
and Human Rights, was asked by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
March 2003, to identify a team of two experts who could carry out an assessment
of the electoral processes in Somaliland in the spring of 2003. The election
processes to be assessed would be the Presidential election scheduled for 14
April 2003 and the Parliamentary elections possibly taking place a month later.
44436811NORDEM nominated jurist and election expert Ms.
Berit Nising Lindeman and political scientist and Somaliland expert Mr. Stig
Jarle Hansen for the assignment. As the parliamentary elections were postponed
by two years following a decision by the House of Elders, the election
observation covered the Presidential election, only.
The team stayed in
Somaliland between April 4 and May 2, 2003, a period of time which allowed them
to make a limited assessment before, during and after the election day. A
limited geographical coverage and the size of the team did not allow for an
encompassing evaluation of the elections. The objective of the mission has been
to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the electoral process. The team was
commissioned to assess the registration of candidates, the election campaign and
the administrative preparations for the election day, and the following
tabulation of the results, as well as making an assessment of the electoral
framework, the democratic and human rights environment and monitoring the media
coverage of the campaign. The team has followed the methodology outlined in the
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Handbook.
The
NORDEM team operated fully independently from other international observers. A
co-ordinated international election observation mission was not present in
Somaliland. However, observers from several countries like South Africa,
Ethiopia, Great Britain, Sweden and Canada were observing on Election Day, as
well as individuals from the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The conclusions
on the Election Day observations overall reflect also the views of other
international observers.
The team would like to thank the Somaliland
Government, the National Election Commission and electoral officeholders,
politicians, NGO and media representatives and all others who willingly shared
information and impressions during the course of our stay. Not the least, we
would like to express thanks for the overwhelming hospitality of the Somaliland
people.
The report is based on the observations made by the Norwegian
observers. All opinions expressed in the report are the author’s
responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Centre
for Human Rights.
The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights /
NORDEM
University of Oslo
June 2003
Introduction and Executive Summary
Somaliland, a war-torn nation that has yet to
receive international recognition, has, with limited foreign assistance, managed
to establish peace and stability over the last ten years. A system of
governance has been adopted, and successful District Council elections were
conducted in December 2002, the first election in modern Somaliland history.
The Presidential election held in April 2003, has been a further test of how far
Somaliland has reached in the direction of democracy. In spite of limited
resources and experience, a comprehensive legislation has been adopted for the
regulation of elections, and an independent electoral administration has been
formed. The electoral campaign was peaceful, although allegations against the
incumbent government for misuse of government funds and property for campaign
purposes must be taken seriously. Somaliland has a well developed press, that
overall covered the electoral campaign in a balanced manner, although government
media favoured the coverage of the incumbent's campaign. The election day was
conducted peacefully and orderly, but it was marred by lacking voters'
registers, insufficient distribution of ballot papers and only limited secrecy
of the vote. The irregularities observed during voting can to a large extent be
explained by lacking resources or inexperience. The counting process was
exceptionally transparent and well conducted. When the preliminary result was
declared five days after the election, the difference between the two top
candidates was as narrow as possible, as only 80 votes differed. A result like
this would under any circumstances be contested. Unfortunately, however
transparent the electoral process had been on election day itself, the
tabulation process and the activities leading up to the announcement of the
final result were significantly less transparent. This led to speculations of
rigging by the two parties that were running neck to neck, and among the
citizens in general. It was clearly revealed that the tabulation of votes had
been following different standards for the assessment of the validity of single
results, and that simple miscalculations had been made. These mistakes became
ever so much more significant as the election was won by such a narrow margin.
Overall, the administration of the elections was fairly successful when the
resources and level of experience is taken into account. However, significantly
increased transparency must be sought for the period after election day,
regulations must be introduced to standardise the tabulation process, and the
election administration needs additional training.
Political Background
If you ask an official from the present day Somaliland Administration, he or
she would probably say that independent Somaliland was born on the 26th of June
1960. Indeed, at the time, many countries recognized the former British colony
of Somaliland as a sovereign state. However, four days later the state
voluntarily merged with the former Italian Somali colony, and the result became
the state of Somalia. Many Somaliland politicians felt affronted by the rapid
merger and problematic issues concerning the relationship between the two newly
merged regions were left open, this in turn led to heavy critique against the
practical arrangements of the Union. Nevertheless, such critique was mostly
directed against the unfair practices of the constitution, not against the
concept of Somalia. After a while the northern politicians became quite
integrated in the political life of
Somalia.[1]
The process that led
to the formation of Somaliland seems to have been drastically accelerated by
events taking place in Hargeysa in 1988, after a desperate offensive by a
northern-based rebel organization, the Somali National Movement
(SNM).[2] The Somali regime had to
conduct military operations to counter this move, but they completely
overreacted. Hargeysa was bombed indiscriminately by the Somali air force. The
SNM swelled enormously when relatives of the 50.000 civilians killed during and
just after this incident joined it
en-mass.[3] SNM also changed
completely, and a new bitterness towards the south surfaced and contributed to a
notion of Somaliland identity. The final push came later in 1991 when the
southerner Ali Mahdi, declared himself president of Somalia without consulting
the SNM, a move that pushed many of the Northern leaders in the direction of
independence. Characteristically, this independence was formalized by a decision
made in the first of the large Shir beeleedyo, a type of traditional conferences
attended by representatives of all the local clans in Somaliland and thus not
only involving the Isaq clan family that had dominated the SNM, but also the
other clans in the area. This first big clan gathering, named the Bur’ao
Shir Beeleed after the place in which it was held, chose Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali
“Tuur” as the first president of
Somaliland.[4] Later, two other
similar grand clan congresses, all named after the respective locations where
they took place, were held. The second and more broadly based Borama Shir
Beeleed, lasting from January to May 1993, elected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as
President and replaced the old interim administration with a new one. Ibrahim
Egal was the last prime minister of the Somali republic before the military coup
in 1969, and an experienced politician able to play on patrimonial strings. The
third Shir Beeleed in Hargeysa, from October 1996 to February 1997, re-elected
President Egal and endorsed an interim constitution. Somaliland experienced two
periods of Civil Wars, which occurred in 1991-1992 and 1994-1996, these
conflicts were dealt with by using the traditional mechanisms of the clan
system, harmonized with strategies of elite
accommodation.[5]
[1] Even when the rebellion started
in the North, the main target was to liberate the whole of Somalia; Interviews
with six former leaders of the SNM Conducted in Hargeysa October
1998.
[2] According to most sources
all Hawiyes left in 1986 after the showdown between Ali Wardigly and Silaaniyo.
Nevertheless, one of the observers met and interviewed exiled Hawiye leaders
that stayed in the organization until 1989, as Abdi Daher, youth leader of SNM
in Calcutta.
[3]An additional number of South
African mercenary pilots participated in the campaign. Government militia
recruited from the Ogadeeni clan “searched” the countryside for
rebels and killed randomly in the process. ;The estimate of the casualties is
taken from Ahmed, Ismail I and Green, Reginald H.(1999): “Heritage of war
and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland”, Third World
Quarterly 20:1, page 120
[4]
The singular form of Shir beeleedyo is Shir Beeled, Abdirahman
Ahmed Ali was chosen as the first President of Somaliland because he was at that
time the chairman of the SNM.
[5] The concept of Somaliland today
enjoys considerable support from the local population, as shown by the May 31,
2001 referendum over a constitution that stipulated independence , It was a
referendum where 1,148,940 of the 1,188,746 registered voters voted for the
constitution The Initiative and Referendum Institute, a non profit Washington
based organisation, monitored the election and found it to be free and fair. The
groups homepage is: http://www.iandrinstitute.org, the
report is still available on the internet.
The System of Governance of Somaliland
The Constitution
The Boroma conference (Shir beeleedyo) in 1993 adopted two charters; the
National Charter and the Peace Charter. The National Charter outlined what was
to become the first system of Government of a independent Somaliland. It was
unique in the sense that it managed to acknowledge the traditional system of
government through the clans (beel) and to combine it with governance
after modern western principles. The National Charter established a
Governmental system consisting of an Executive with a President, a
Vice- President and a Council of Ministers, a Legislature, comprising
a Parliament with an Upper House of Elders and a Lower House of Representatives
as well as a Judiciary.
New conflicts and civil wars between 1994
and 1996 were ended by the Hargeisa conference in 1997 where a provisional
Constitution was drafted. This Constitution was based on the National Charter,
but also introduced a party system with a party-based elected Executive and a
multi-party elected House of Representatives.
The formula for selecting the
representatives in the House of Elders is not established in the Constitution,
and has yet to be adopted. The Constitution also provided a decentralised local
government of multi-party elected District Councils.
The Constitution with
later amendments was approved with an overwhelming majority in a referendum on
May 31, 2001.
The Executive Power
The President and the Vice-President should be elected by direct vote every
five years. Until the election of a President could take place, the President
has been selected by the Boroma and Hargeisa conferences, and later the period
was extended by the legislature. The President is Head of the Nation and has
the leadership of the general policy of the Government. The main areas of the
President’s competence are to propose laws and budgets, national security
(including the armed forces), and to appoint cabinet ministers and senior
officers of the state.
The role of the Guurti
The House of the Elders, the Guurti, is a Constitutional
formalisation of the traditional Council of Elders. Through Somali clan
history, it was the Elders, ad-hoc representatives of the different clans and
sub-clans who came together to discuss and agree solutions to important
inter-clan relations in the pre-state Somaliland. As a national Guurti in
Somaliland, however, the history does not go back further than to the war
against Siad Barre and the SNM’s policy to integrate traditional and
modern systems of governance.
The Boroma conference adopted two charters:
the Peace Charter and the National Charter, and the role of the Guurti was
reaffirmed in both Charters. The current representatives of the House of Elders
(HoE) were selected through negotiations among members of each clan. Formally,
the role of the elders is to ratify, reject or propose amendments to laws passed
by the House of Representatives(HoR). The HoE must approve all laws, except
those on financial matters. The HoE will base their assessment in compliance
with religion and tradition, bearing the security of the nation and population
in mind. However, apart from the formal role of the Guurti in the legislative
process, their role as a non-political mediator of conflict is still respected,
although critical voices argue that the Guurti has not been able to maintain
their political impartiality. When the President asked the Guurti to have the
period of the transitional House of Representatives extended by 6 months in
order to postpone the parliamentary elections, the Guurti decided to postpone
the elections by two years. On the basis of the Constitution, the term of the
HoE was subsequently extended by three years, as their term is one year longer
than that of the House of Representatives. The decision was highly
controversial and postponing the elections for such a long period has in fact
been opposed by leaders of all political parties as well as by the NEC.
Allegations have been made that the real motive behind the significant
postponement of elections was an extension of the term of HoE per se.
According to the HoE themselves, the reason for the decision was two-fold:
Firstly, the holding of elections is expensive, and after having carried out two
elections within a period of four months, the nation would not financially
manage another already the following month. Secondly, a law on parliamentary
elections has not yet been adopted although it is under preparation, and
important issues are yet to be resolved. In particular, the issues of the
borders between regions and districts (district demarcation), the creation of
electoral districts and how many representatives should be elected from each
electoral district, contain several seeds of controversy. The lack of a proper
census makes it difficult to establish in a fair manner how many representatives
should be representing each region, because the number of votes behind each seat
could not be estimated beforehand. Also, the clan factor must be taken into
consideration.[6]
The House of Representatives
The 82 members of the current House of Representatives were selected
at the Hargeisa conference on the basis of clan representation, selected through
negotiations among members of the clans, like the Guurti. A positive factor is
that also minority clans have been secured representation in the House of
Representatives. When the current House of Representatives was formed, it
constituted a temporary, non-party representative legislature, awaiting the
establishment of political parties and nationwide elections. The main area of
authority of the House of Representatives is the legislative; it can propose,
amend, reject and approve laws that in turn will be passed to the House of
Elders. In addition, it can impeach the President or propose a vote of no
confidence against the executive branch. The term of the House of
Representatives has been extended several times, notably because of a wish to
avoid stirring the existing stability by calling the elections too early. Most
members of the House of Representatives have since the creation of political
parties supported some of them, although they still do not represent any
particular party. The support for a party is of a non-official character.
According to – still non-official information – 45% to 60% of the
members of the House of Representative support the UDUB party, some 20% KULMIYE
and there is only very limited support to the UCID party. The rest are
non-partisan or undecided.
The Judiciary
The Judiciary consists of a district court in each administrative district, a
Regional Court in each of the six regions, Court of Appeals and a Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court also functions as a Constitutional Court. The legal system of
Somaliland is dual, combining the religious laws of Sharia and national laws,
and the dual system is reflected in the judiciary: Here, the judges enjoy the
same position within the courts, but in reality there are two categories of
judges as approximately half of them have legal education, some of them being
educated in Somalia before the collapse of the Barre regime, some are educated
abroad. The other half are the Sharia judges who are trained in religious laws,
whereas the completion of a formal legal education is not required.
The
judiciary seems to be the weakest part of Somaliland governance, still
considered to lack the necessary competence and experience. The article 23 of
the National Charter adopted in Boroma in 1993, stressed the independence of the
judiciary, and that its decision could not be subject to review by other than
the higher courts. According to the current Constitution, the President
appoints the judges of the Supreme Court. However, the appointment should take
place on the basis of a consultation with a Judicial
Commission[7],and be
confirmed by a joint sitting of the Houses of Representatives and Elders. The
President also has the authority to dismiss the judges of the Supreme Court, and
only a dismissal of the Chairman of the Supreme Court would require approval
from the two Chambers of the Parliament. Thus, in principle, the President has
in fact the possibility of an unchecked influence over the judiciary. Indeed,
the late President was subject to an attempt of impeachment by members of the
House of Representatives in July 2001 partly because of an alleged interference
in the judiciary. The basis cited in the House of Representatives motion was a
case of overturning a Supreme Court decision and the removal from office of the
Supreme Court chairman. The motion was defeated by one vote.
[8]
Last spring 2002, after the
death of President Egal, the new President Dahir Riyale Kahin dismissed all
functioning judges at the Somaliland Courts by a presidential decree, allegedly
because the judiciary had no confidence and for repeated allegations of
corruption. New judges were appointed at all court levels. The move was
considered necessary in order to restore confidence in the judiciary by the
public, but it has also left the courts in a void as the members are seriously
lacking training, experience and resources. The ability of the judiciary to
make just and unbiased decisions is still questioned, although less so because
of allegations of corruption than because of lacking competence, experience and
confusing legislation.[9]
The Human Rights situation in Somaliland
The NORDEM team interviewed several representatives of Somaliland Human
Rights NGOs, and according to the majority of them, no serious or systematic
human rights abuses occur. The right to assembly and organisation are
principles generally adhered to. However, the strict limitation of political
parties to only three is also a limitation to the freedom of organisation, the
NORDEM team recommends that the system should be reviewed. This issue will be
commented on more closely below.
According to representatives of the press,
both the state and the private, there are in general few restrictions on press
freedom. It is not unheard of, however, that journalists get detained
after writing articles considered libellous by the government, or simply because
the authorities do not like the content of an article. This also happened
during the election period, even though after the NORDEM team left the country.
This is a regrettable practice that must be stopped.
Problems also exist in
particular related to the penal system. The police forces and custodial courts
are seriously lacking resources as well as being badly equipped for carrying out
investigations; shortcomings that in some cases may cause badly founded
prosecution, as well as inappropriate detention and conviction of individuals.
Close to 100% of the
population[10] in Somaliland are
Moslems, and the state has a clear Islamic base although it officially claims to
be secular. The Islamic base is clearly reflected also in the legislation,
although the Constitution, however protective and favourable to Islam, maintains
freedom of religion. The NORDEM team is strongly critical towards the fact that
only Moslems can hold any elected position, that being Presidency, Member of
Parliament or a Local Government councillor, or be a member of an election
commission/office in Somaliland. Such limitations run counter to international
principles. As long as these limitations continue to exist, the Somaliland
elections are not giving equal conditions to all citizens.
In connection
with the announcement of the outcome of the elections, a certain anxiety existed
among the nation’s security forces. The country has only a few years ago
lived through massive violence and civil wars, and the newly gained peace is
precious to the population. Thus there existed a fear that the elections might
lead to an outbreak of violence amongst defeated party supporters. The security
was considerably increased, clearly visible through the presence of armed police
forces in the streets of
Hargeisa[11] and Buroa when points
of demonstration took place the first few days after the preliminary results
were announced 19 April. Unfortunately, single incidents of unacceptable
overreaction from the police forces occurred in connection with the
demonstrations. Security measures were also the pretext of the Ministry of
Interior for refusing KULMIYE to hold demonstrations to protest the preliminary
result announced by the National Election Commission, and to introduce late
evening curfew in Hargeisa. Although it is understandable that the population
cherish peace in particular, the Somaliland Government and other authorities
have the clear responsibility not to use peace and order as a pretext for
universal human rights violations, that being freedom of gathering, freedom or
expression or other rights and liberties.
[6] The House of Elders’
failed attempt at mediation before the preliminary result of the elections was
announced by the National Election Commission April 19, 2003, was also widely
seen as an unasked for interference into the work of the independent electoral
commission, where the HoE did not fully understand their role. However, the
Guurti asserted that their only aim was to mediate in a situation that
potentially could lead to a post-election conflict.
[7] The Judicial Commission is
composed by 3 senior representatives of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General,
D.G of the Ministry of Justice, the Chairman of the Civil Service Agency, 2
members appointed by the HoE and two appointed by the HoR.
[8] Ibrahim Hashi Jama,
Somaliland Forum web-site “The Somaliland Supreme Court and the
Presidential Elections” May 2003
[9] Partly because of this lack of
confidence, the public still strongly supports the traditional means for
conflict solving, where the clans’ elders are called to mediate between
the parties to the conflict. Outside the cities, as many as 90% of conflicts of
both civil and criminal nature are solved outside the formal courts. In towns,
the existing hybrids between the traditional and state court systems create a
confusion that in the outcome might affect the final outcomes of conflicts. In
addition, a semi-recognized religious court system exists, where the religious
leaders, the Sheikhs, make decisions particularly in family matters such as
marriage, divorce and heritage covered by the Sharia. The religious courts are
in general considered highly skilled and they enjoy a high level of confidence.
[10] Before the war, four
Christian churches existed in Hargeisa. Currently, no churches are working and
only few Christian families remain, although Christians have previously held
central positions.
[11] The morning of April 20, a
group of Kulmiye supporters consisting of women and youngsters gathered in order
to protest the result in front of the NEC. The observers’ team has a
reliable witness report from one of the participants, a woman of 34 who
participated in the event. According to her statement, the group had first
turned up outside Silaanyo’s home to express their support. Silaanyo
himself had urged the supporters to be patient and go home, but angered, they
continued to the main street close to the NEC. There, they were met by police
forces that shot in the air to spread the crowd of approximately 60 people. The
woman ran together with the other demonstrators in the opposite direction, and
tried to hide in a yard. However, she was caught up by a uniformed member of
the police force who soon was accompanied by several of his colleagues. The
girl was badly beaten, and brought to the police station together with some 7
– 8 other protesters, a pregnant woman had also been beaten. The woman
was let out of prison shortly afterwards having pretended to be a relative of
the beaten pregnant woman who needed medical care.
Somaliland, Traditions and Demography
Nomadic emigrational patterns
Many inhabitants of Somaliland still live a traditional nomadic way of life.
Such nomadic lifestyle leads to large population movements that make it hard to
estimate the population of
Somaliland. Population movements
are often dictated by the season and the weather. Thus when the rainy season
starts, the population of certain areas could become more than halved. Such
population movements will create many problems for any government: a full
registration of voters become almost impossible, planning for the distribution
of ballot papers becomes difficult and information to the nomads usually has to
pass through the traditional clan structure, and even this channel is somewhat
unpredictable.
Traditional nomads probably make up a considerable part, if
not a majority of the total population. However, the mobility of the
Somalilenders is not only limited to the traditional nomads. When the Ethiopians
wanted to tax Somalis in the cities of Ogaadeen, the Somaliland border town of
Tog wajaale doubled its population as Somalis fled from the taxation. Somaliland
also has a large Diaspora spread out across the world.
Clan and
elections
The Somali clan system is a genealogic system dealing with the
problems of day-to-day life in a stateless society. The clan will, if no
alternative system exists, take care of justice and provide aid to members in
need, thus Ahmed Alahzari is right when he describes the clan system as a kind
of insurance company.[13] There are
many different family groupings of different sizes within the clan system, from
the relatively small family group “Laf” up to the big clan families,
some counting more than one million members; the groups have different types of
traditional leaders with different levels of power. The units that have
political importance vary from situation to situation and who the
“enemy” is, i.e. if the “enemy” is a member of your
clan, then your subclan might give support against his. Various types of clan
loyalty have had a clear influence on practical
politics.[14] Clan loyalties still
run high and a candidate can still often draw upon the support from his subclan,
thus Feisal Ali Farah, from the Ildgale subclan of Garharjis, drew much support
from Salaxley, the core area of his clan, both KULMIYE and UDUB could likewise
count on much support coming from Burao and Awdal respectively, the areas where
their leaders have their clan roots. Somalilanders often claimed that local
patriotism was involved and was more important in explain these patterns,
however the use of formal clan structures for propaganda purposes, and party
loyalties following clan defined geographical borders clearly indicate that clan
still play a role in Somaliland party politics.
[12] Estimates of the population
vary between 1.02 million and 3.5 million, inn all estimates nomads are said to
make up a large proportion of the
total.
[13] Ahmed Alazhari was
the former head of the Horn of Africa Business college in Hargeisa
During the early years of
Somaliland the different positions in the government were distributed according
to a clan based formula, as a way of appeasing the different clans.
The Legislative Framework
Overview
The general legislation in Somaliland is a patchwork of laws adopted by the
Somaliland legislature, legislation inherited from former regimes
[15] and Sharia. The legal system
is dual, the basis for legislation being the religious Sharia law that regulates
personal and family law and to some extent criminal law, whereas national law
dominates the public legislation and fills in the Sharia where the Sharia does
not give a solution. In cases where the Sharia and the national law are in
conflict, the Sharia law will have priority. The Somaliland courts have both
civil and religious judges.
When describing the legal system in Somaliland,
also the traditional system must be mentioned. The traditional legal system has
no formal written sources, and it is based on oral deliveries. Even though
there are many different clans and sub-clans in Somaliland, the traditional laws
are in general quite similar[16].
The traditional law is practised by the elders of the clans, and represents in
practice the most common ground for conflict resolution, even in modern
Somaliland.
Legislation related to the presidential elections
The basic principles of the presidential elections are mainly regulated by
the Constitution. The elections are further administered by the Presidential
and Local Council Elections Law (20:2001, hereafter E.L.), the Law on
Citizenship and the Regulation of Political associations and Parties Law
(14/2000). The legislation constitutes in main a comprehensive and satisfactory
regulatory for managing the elections. It contains regulations on the right to
vote, eligibility, electoral administration, registration of candidacy and
conduct of elections. Voting shall take place by direct, universal and secret
ballot. All paternal[17], (that is;
born by a Somaliland citizen father), citizens aged 16 and older can vote, and
permanent residence on the territory of Somaliland is not a requirement. Thus,
the large Diaspora still has the right to vote. No voters’ registers
exist, and no identification cards. The President and Vice-President are
elected by a simple majority vote elected from one nationwide constituency.
Candidates are nominated by the registered political
parties[18], and a small
non-refundable deposit must be
paid.[19]
Although the election
legislation is comprehensive, some of the deficiencies that have been revealed
during the conduct of the Presidential Elections should be addressed in future
reviews of the legislation.[20]
The Regulation of Political associations and Parties Law (14/2000, PPL) and the
registration of candidacy
The right to register a political party is regulated in this law. When the
Hargeisa conference decided that a multiparty system should be established in
Somaliland, no political party existed in the ordinary sense of the word. Many
were also of the opinion that the nation was not ready for the introduction of
political parties, fearing that political parties would lead to new fissures in
the fragile Somaliland unity. Another concern was that the political parties
might end up as a politicised clan-system, leading to one clan ruling over
others, leaving other clans, including minority clans, in opposition.
The PPL
aimed at meeting these concerns by imposing strict conditions for registering a
contesting political association. Only three political parties would be
registered. The law decided that the three political associations gaining 20%
of the votes or the highest number of votes during the District Council
elections in December 2002, would gain the right to register as political
parties. In order to register as a political association, the association would
have to have functional branches with at least 500 members in each of the six
regions of the country and pay a non-refundable deposit. A commission, "the
Commission on registration of political associations", was established for the
registration of political parties. The PPL has no opening for future
registration of further parties, and the Commission for registration of
political parties will dissolve within six months after the announcement of the
final results of the District Council elections. The final outcome of the
District Council elections showed that UDUB, KULMIYE and UCID would be the three
registered parties.
Only those three political parties have the rights to
nominate a candidate for Presidency. In the NORDEM teams’ opinion the
political plurality would gain from a wider access for nomination, that being by
allowing more parties to register and nominate a candidate, or allowing
nomination of non-party candidates.
It is in principle understandable that
Somaliland has opted for a strictly limited number of registered political
parties at this stage of the Somaliland history of governance, as the limited
number of political parties could contribute to preserve the existing stability.
However, in the NORDEM teams’ opinion, Somaliland should consider
establishing future mechanisms for the registration of political parties, and
the necessity to limit the number of registered political parties should be
revised. A shifting political picture could, in fact, reduce the current number
of party alternatives, and create a too centralised focus of power. For
instance, the future could bring a merger of two or more of the political
parties, formally or more likely informally.
The legislation should ensure
a possibility for the registration of additional political parties. Opening the
access to registration of political parties does not, however, mean that they
should automatically gain the right to be represented in the Parliament. The
election law regulates the election system, varieties of thresholds etc., but
should give equal opportunity to different political directions under shifting
political conditions.
[15] Notably the laws that were
in force in 1960, and later Somali laws that are being harmonized within a
Somaliland context.
[16] With
exception of the Isa clans that have traditional laws differing from other
clans’ laws on major aspects. In case of a conflict between a member of
the Isa clan and other clan – a common solution would be found through
negotiations.
[17] This means in
fact that naturalized citizens may not have the right to vote. However, this is
probably not the intention, and one of the very few naturalized citizens was
indeed reported to the observers as allowed to
vote.
[18] See more about the
registration of political parties under next headline.
[19] The amount is fixed to 1
000 000 Somaliland Shilling, approx. 140
USD.
[20] See Recommendations
The Electoral Administration
The election administration of Somaliland is outlined in the Presidential and
Local Elections Law. Its structure consists of Elections Commissions on four
levels: The National Election Commission (NEC), the Regional Electoral Offices
(REO), the District Electoral Offices (DEO) and the Polling Station Electoral
Offices (PSEO). The political parties have the right to appoint one agent with
consultative voting right at all offices and also in the NEC.
The National Election Commission
The National Election Commission (NEC) is an independent body consisting of
seven members. The NEC selects its own Chairman and Deputy Chairman, and the
Chairman is supposed to rotate on a six-month basis. Three members were
nominated by the President, two by the House of Elders and the remaining two by
the registered opposition
parties[21]. The appointments to
the NEC were approved by the House of Representatives on 21 January 2001. The
NEC works on a permanent basis, and the term of office is five years.
The
duty of the NEC is to organise and conduct all election activities relating to
local government, Parliament and President (Vice President), including main
issues like voters’ registration, selections of lower level electoral
office members, setting the dates for elections, district demarcations, setting
the number and location of polling stations, conducting and overseeing the
elections and the counting of votes. The NEC announces the preliminary result
of the elections, whereas the Supreme Court announces the final result. The NEC
also has the power to adjudicate electoral complaints forwarded to them from the
lower level electoral administration.
The NEC had limited experience, with
only one nationwide election behind them, and no electoral traditions to lean
on. Also, a budget of 1 mill. USD to manage the election limited NEC's
opportunity to offer optimal attention to all the elements that constitute an
election process. Despite this, the NEC seemed to be able to manage the
elections in an impartial manner. The party agents represented in the
Commission were sought for consultation in cases were difficult issues occurred,
and solutions were found by consensus. Where the limited election legislation
did not provide a solution, it was found through discussions after which an
agreement was reached.[22] On
several occasions, the NEC warned the Government against the misuse of
Government resources. During a conflict concerning district demarcation that
had strong clan-connotations[23],
the NEC proved capable of making independent decisions by setting aside
political and clan interest in opting for the solution that best served the
interests of the voters.
During the finalisation and the tabulation in the
aftermath of the announcements of a controversial preliminary result five days
after Election Day, numerous accusations of inefficiency and bias emerged.
Mistakes were indeed made that should be addressed, but it is likely that the
mistakes were due to inexperience and an eagerness to accommodate demanding
political party interests at all times.
The Lower Level Electoral Offices
All members of the lower level electoral offices are appointed by the NEC.
There is one regional electoral office in each of the six administrative regions
of the country: Hargeisa, Awdal, Saahil, Togdheen, Sanaag and Sool. The regions
coincide with the regions established under the British protectorate before
1960, apart from the Saahil region, that has been established recently. The
office has three members. The regional office is responsible for the
administration of the elections in its respective region, and for tabulating the
results of each of its districts after the Election Day.
There are 23
District Electoral Offices in Somaliland. The District Electoral Office holders
are a chairman, two scrutinisers (one of which is acting as a deputy chairman),
a secretary and two counting officers, a total of six members. The district
electoral office is responsible for conducting the election activities in its
respective region.
The Polling Station Electoral Offices (PSEOs) are
responsible for the conduct of election activities at the polling station. For
this election, 900 polling stations were established. Because of the lack of
voters’ registration, it was impossible to estimate the number of voters
per polling station. The NEC estimated before the elections a turnout of 1
million (based on the number of printed ballot papers), giving an average number
of voters per polling station of 1 100, which is manageable. As it turned out,
less than half a million voters turned out on Election Day, and the number of
voters overall seemed manageable at the polling stations. The PSEO has four
members.
The office holders cannot be members of the armed forces, be
chairmen of local councils or be a candidate. However, unlike the conditions
for a NEC membership, membership of a political party is not prohibited by the
E.L. The only exception is the chairman of the electoral office, who is this
respect is subject to the same restraints as the members of the NEC. This fact
may pose a problem in future elections, and some allegations surfaced also
during these elections that parts of the electoral administration were biased.
As long as Somaliland has opted for a non-partisan electoral administration, the
electoral legislation should reflect that no members of a political party can be
members of the electoral offices. If members of political parties should be
permitted, a political balance must be ensured.
Election administrators at
Regional, District and Polling station levels were all trained for two days by
the NEC before the elections. All office holders had access to the election
law, and to a “Blue-book”, a combined manual/protocol on Election
Day activities that had been produced for the use of polling station
administrators. Regrettably, the “Blue-book” was not used according
to intention on Election Day, most probably because its use was not sufficiently
clear for the officeholders. Having said this, the quality of the work of the
polling station electoral officeholders held a high standard considering the
level of experience and training.
The administrative preparation of the elections
Even though the District Council elections were considered a large success,
several shortcomings concerning these elections were identified and addressed by
the NEC. The main points were:
The 800 operating polling stations operating
in 2002 proved too few, resulting in long queues and hours of waiting for the
voters on the voting day. The NEC had estimated that the need for polling
stations amounted to approximately 1 400. However, lacking funds only allowed
for increasing the number by a 100, to 900.
In some regions the PSEO staff
were suspected of increasing the number of votes cast. In an attempt to meet
these accusations, the NEC decided to bring in a Chairman and the secretary of
the polling stations from other than their native region. In practice, the NEC
moved around 1000 staff from one location to another, an admirably resolute
operation considering the limited resources they had.
Cases of multiple
voting were reported. In order to discourage this practice, the NEC had, in the
information campaign conducted the last months ahead of the election, informed
the voters of the penalty of one year of prison for those caught in casting
their vote more than once. In this connection, women in particular were
targeted as voting more than once. The widespread use of henna to colour the
hands of the women apparently made it possible to hide or delude the inking of
the finger, a practice used to identify voters who had already cast their vote.
The party representatives observing the elections on the polling stations,
were too poorly trained to be able to fulfil their duties efficiently. The NEC
undertook to administer the training of trainers, who in turn trained party
representatives to every polling station throughout the country. By the help of
a South-African team and a local NGO, three times 929 observers were trained
through this programme. The training project also received foreign funding.
Monitoring the campaign
The NEC also made efforts to monitor that the political parties were
following the rules of the campaign. The party UDUB was accused of misusing
government resources, notably by using government cars for the conduct of
electoral campaigning. The NEC issued regulations that prohibited the use of
government cars for campaigning purposes. Logos and symbols of the UDUB party
was ordered to be removed from the government cars. In addition, the government
Radio Hargeisa was accused of bias favouring of the government party, and the
NEC expressed directly to the Radio Hargeisa that all parties should have equal
access and coverage by a government media outlet. However, the NEC complained
that they did not have adequate resources for monitoring the campaign in a
responsible manner.
Security measures
A curfew on motorised vehicles was decided for the Election Day, in order to
increase security. Only persons directly involved in the election
administration or its security in addition to observers, were allowed to drive.
Public transportation of voters was allowed only with permission from the
electoral office.
The security situation in the Eastern Sanaag and Sool
regions was not considered good enough to carry out voting in all areas of these
regions. The NEC decided to suspend the voting in 37 polling stations in Sanaag
(out of a total of 147) and in 87 polling stations in Sool (out of a total of
116).
Ballot papers
Ballot papers were printed in the format of a booklet, numbered on the ballot
itself and on the counterfoil, a method that ensures a high level of security.
The system of numbering secures an audit trail, and the booklet makes it easier
to control the number of ballots at hand. The distribution of ballot papers was
fully transparent, as the party agents were present to take note on the batch
numbers of all the ballots, and to oversee that they were well locked into the
box that would take them to its polling station. Lacking information about the
number of voters meant that ballot papers had to be distributed to the polling
stations in fixed numbers. The numbers were based on the anticipated turnout
at the various polling stations. Additional ballot papers were sent to the DEO
for distribution on voting day when needed.
The NEC had a total of 1 000 000
ballot papers printed, 200 000 less than for the District Council elections in
December 2002 where the turnout had been less than half a million.
The role of Political Party Agents
The Elections Law gives each party the right to appoint an agent to each
polling station, and each electoral office. The role of the political party
agents is further described in the procedural articles of the law. In short,
the tasks of the agents as described in the Elections Law can be summarised as
follows: The agents have the right to be present as observers at all the
activities of the electoral offices at all levels. If they have any concerns or
requests needing clarification, they shall be submitted to the electoral office,
and the concerns and requests shall be
recorded.[24]
Prior to the
election, the NEC signed, together with the three political parties, a Code
of Conduct that had been developed jointly by the NEC and the political
parties. The idea of the Code of Conduct was to create a basis for
co-operation, and to ensure an agreement about the terms according to which the
election administration should be managed, ensuring the active participation of
the political parties. According to the Code of Conduct, the NEC took on a
detailed obligation to co-operate with and inform the political parties, to
consult with the political parties before major decisions about procedural
issues were made, to monitor the activities of the political parties and the
executive branch and more. The idea of a Code of Conduct carries a lot of good
intentions as well as taking on a mutual duty to make sure that the elections
are carried in accordance with the legislation and democratic principles.
However, the Code of Conduct is probably more accommodating to the political
parties than serving the purpose of full integrity and independence of the NEC.
A solution for future elections could be that the members of the electoral
administration sign one Code of Conduct upon appointment, where they assure
their adherence to national legislation, to transparency, to neutrality and to
impartiality. The political parties could sign a different Code of Conduct upon
registration for an electoral contest, where they accept the rules of the game,
a level playing field for election campaign as well as the authority of the
electoral administration.
In connection with the counting and tabulation of
the election results, the agents have been given specific rights in accordance
with the legislation. During the counting at the polling station, two ballots
at the time will be shown to the party agents, a cumbersome procedure that
nonetheless secures an extraordinary transparency in the counting process. In
addition to this, the party agents sign the four envelopes containing unused,
spoilt, invalid/contested ballots and the counted votes. There are no
regulations giving the party agents or other observers the right to obtain a
signed copy of the protocol. In practice the agents were to sign the protocols
of the results of PSEO as well as the tabulations in DEO and REO. The intention
of the NEC for introducing this procedure has no doubt been to increase the
transparency even further, and to accommodate the interests of the political
parties. However, the practice raises several questions. Firstly, not even all
the members of the commissions themselves were required to sign all the
envelopes and protocols. Secondly, by requiring the party agents to do so, the
division of authority between the appointed members of the electoral
offices/commission becomes blurred, and the agents appear more as members of the
commission with a voting right than partisan observers. Thirdly, the NEC failed
to clarify the legal significance of the signatures of the party agents before
the elections, which in turn resulted in different practices in different
districts and regions. The different practices become only all too significant
because of the extremely narrow outcome of the elections published by the NEC.
At the time when the regional results of all the six regions reached the NEC
for final tabulation and calculation, the NEC decided that the party agents no
longer should have a role in the process, and this procedure was carried out
without the presence of the agents. As it turned out, the announcement of the
final result was postponed by several hours. Observers present outside the
office of the NEC would naturally question what was going on. As members of the
House of Elders, the House of Representatives and candidates or party leaders
came and left during the day, the integrity of the work of the NEC could be
questioned, simply by the lack of transparency. None of the leading
representatives of the political parties interviewed after the announcement of
the election result, actually questioned the integrity of the NEC at this stage,
but the lack of presence of party agents in the crucial endgame has all the
potential for targeting the NEC with bias.
In hindsight, the NEC should for
future elections reconsider the formal role of the party observers. The border
between the authority of the appointed members of the electoral commission and
offices, and that of the partisan party agents needs to be clarified. This
would make the electoral administration the sole responsible for the decisions
concerning the results at each stage of the elections, in accordance with the
spirit of the electoral law. In our opinion, the political parties would even
benefit from this clarification, because the political parties could not be held
hostage to their own signatures in the case of later claims against the outcome
of the elections.
[21] The opposition parties who
had the right to nominate candidates for the NEC, consisted at the time of all
registered political associations, not only those three who gained the right to
be registered as political parties after the Local Council elections in December
2002. Only the UDUB party could not propose candidates for these posts.
[22] See however some related
reservations under the headline “Political Party
Agents”
[23] See more about
this under VII.
[24] E.L. Art.32,
1.,2., 56, 1b), 63
Voter and Civic Education
Voter and Civic education is a massive challenge
in a country like Somaliland. Apart from the referendum in 2001 and the
District council elections in 2002, no elections have been held on the territory
since the late sixties. The previous experience of the voters is as a result
small. According to estimates, around half the population is nomadic. In
addition to this, a minimum of 60% of the population are illiterate, so even
though a limited coverage from newspapers gave some opportunities for a
voters’ education, the majority of the population could neither access nor
read the information. Only 2000 households possess a TV-set, and counting in
large families and neighbours having access to the same set, no more than 35 000
have in reality access to Somaliland TV. More households however, have access
to the Radio Hargeisa, and some information was indeed given this way. Not
every part of the country can, however, receive radiowaves.
With the
particular oral tradition of Somaliland in mind, the NEC organised travelling
troupes of actors with the purpose of informing voters about the elections.
Cars with loudspeakers driving around in cities were also used. On Election
Day, each polling station had posters with information concerning the candidates
and the procedures of voting. Unfortunately, these posters, however expensive,
were written texts unaccompanied by illustrations. For the future, more
illustrated voters’ information materials should be considered, taking the
high level of illiteracy into account. Related to this issue is the fact that
the massive training organised for electoral office holders, political party
agents and domestic observers[25],
surely has had a spin-off effect in terms of public awareness on electoral
matters.
[25] A total of approximately 7
500 citizens were trained through these projects.
The Role of Women in the Presidential Elections
The right of women to vote and stand as a candidate for elected office is
secured in the Constitution. Women take actively part in voting, and also in
electoral campaigns.
Currently, there are no women
in the House of Representatives, or in the House of Elders (an Elder can
according to tradition only be a man), and only one woman has a place in the
Government. In the National Election Commission, one of the seven members is a
woman. She became a focal point in the NEC, and was generally acknowledged as
very capable in her position. Women were to some extent also included in the
lower level electoral offices, and some 6 – 8 women chaired a polling
station electoral office.
44436840Women have traditionally
had no access to decision-making processes at any level, and in the clan-system
of Elders, no women have access. By the introduction of elected bodies, the
anticipation of increased influence through the political parties in democratic
elections was high. During the run-up to District Council elections,
women’s organizations like ”Women’s Political Forum”
(WPF) working for increased women activity in politics, and NAGAAD, an umbrella
organization for women’s rights NGOs worked actively to rally for active
participation of women in the electoral processes, and for the inclusion of more
women on the party lists. Regrettably, even though promises were made from two
of the six registered political associations, HORMOOD and UDUB, women were in
general placed too far down on the party lists to actually gain office, and in
the end only two women were elected.
[26]
Following the electoral
system, only the three registered parties could nominate candidates for the
posts of President and Vice-President, and out of those six nominated for this
election, none were women. One woman contested this sole right of the political
parties to nominate candidates, and claimed a right to stand as an independent
candidate. The Supreme Court ruled against her in a March 2003 decision with
reference to PPL article 7 section 1,b): “No independent person who has
not been endorsed in the name of an approved (a registered) party shall stand as
a candidate”. Even though no women were nominated to the top elected
positions, a woman becaome Vice-Chairman of KULMIYE. The WPF organisation, as
part of a projection, contacted all three parties before the elections asking
them about the parties intentions regarding participation of women in higher
decision making councils. KULMIYE answered WPF most positively, and in return
KULMIYE gained the official support of NAGAAD. Also UCID answered
positively[27], but UDUB did not
answer at all.[28] As a result, WPF
suggested in a press-conference that women should vote for KULMIYE or UCID.
One of the issues pointed out by women activists, is that it would be
important and timely if the law on parliamentary elections that is under
drafting, could include quota systems. Since women are almost completely absent
from national decision-making processes, help from the legislation is considered
as necessary to secure at least some women’s representation in elected
bodies.
[26] HORMOOD placed ultimately 2
women on the list, and UDUB ultimately none. Kulmiye placed two women, UCID one
and Sahan one. Asad had none.
[27] The promises the parties
made were: KULMIYE 10-20% parliamentary seats, a number of Director General
positions. UCID: 10% parliamentary
seats.
[28] See more on this
under "Electoral Campaign"
Civil Society
Considering the short time that has passed since the last violent conflict
and the trauma that Somaliland has gone through, the civil society is remarkably
vivid, with a wide range of non-governmental organisations in activity. Two
organisations, NAGAAD and COSONGO serve as umbrella organisations, the first for
women NGOs in particular. Both NAGAAD and COSONGO were actively involved in the
electoral processes, in particular as these two organisations were able to
organise and train a force of 600 domestic observers for the Election Day.
A NAGAAD-representative announced a few days before the elections that the
organisation officially supported the KULMIYE party. Strictly speaking, this
undermined the objectivity of the NAGAAD observers. However, the NORDEM team
never registered any complaints in this connection, nor did the team register
any actual bias in their observations. Ideally, domestic observers, apart from
those representing political parties, should be perceived as strictly objective
and not express support for any political party.
The Political Parties of Somaliland
From Political associations to Political Parties
The 14th April elections were the second elections that Somaliland
had conducted during a relatively short period. On December 15th 2002
Somaliland held a local election. Before this election six contending political
associations existed. The Somaliland constitution stipulated a system with only
three parties, thus the six had to be narrowed down to three, and the results of
the local election were to determine the three that should be allowed to
continue as political parties.[29]
Three of the initial organisation, HORMOOD, ASAD and SAHAN failed to attract the
necessary number of voters and had to close down. This could have left a lot of
bitterness. Nevertheless, after some initial grudges, the problem was solved in
what must be said to be a traditional Somali way, through elite accommodation.
Earlier, both during the time of the Somali republic and during the dictatorship
of Siad Barre, governmental and party positions were often used as rewards to
attract allies. This also happened now, UDUB attracted former members of
HORMOOD, ASAD and SAHAN partly by offering them minister posts. In march 2003,
UDUB expanded the government drastically by adding 8 new minister posts. The
appointments were done in three separate “waves”. During the first
“wave” three ministers were appointed, Ismael Umar Ahmed
“Boos” (Minister of Defence), Nuuh Sheik Umar Sheik Saad Musse
(Minister of State for Finance) and Adan Mirre Mahamed (Minister of State for
the Interior), the two former had a background from the ASAD party, the last
came from HORMOOD.[30]
The second
“wave” was probably dictated by other causes than the wish to
attract members of the disbanded political associations, three of the new
ministers were definitively appointed to strengthen Somalilands hold over the
contested Sool and Sanag provinces before the election and this was in many ways
a very successful strategy, although two of the new ministers had backgrounds
from ASAD.[32].
The last
“wave”, consisting only of Ismaan Quasim Qodax (appointed as the
minister of public works) seemed to be an additional attempt to please
former members of the disbanded political organisationsin this case again ASAD.
UDUB also offered good positions within their party organisation that managed to
attract the leaders of other parties. The former leader of the ASAD party,
Saleban Suleiman “Gaal”, was promoted to an executive committee
member in UDUB. Although lacking the access to appoint new ministers, the
KULMIYE party followed the same strategy as the government, giving important
posts to prominent politicians from the other parties, Abdhiraman Aw Ali
“Tolwa” from ASAD got the vice president position in KULMIYE and the
central committee was expanded by giving seats to members from HORMOOD, ASAD,
SAHAN and also from the minority clan GABOOYE, in total increasing from 26 to 58
members. Other prominent members of the former political organisations got
regional positions within the KULMIYE party.
[33]
The third surviving political
party, UCID, was small, it only got 49,444 votes during the local elections,
approximately 30.000 less than the second largest party in Somaliland, KULMIYE.
It had less potential to achieve power and wealth, thus it attracted a lesser
number of prominent politicians from the disbanding political
organisations.[34]Somaliland has
many and criss-crossing patterns of loyalty, and bonds created by common
experiences and shared background is also an important aspect. One of the groups
that found together again was the so called “Red Flag”, or Alanas, a
group of officers containing notable and cherished SNM military commanders such
as Colonel Mohamed Kahin Ahmed and Abdiraman Aw Ali “Tolwa” ,
officers that had shared a background from Soviet military
colleges.[35] During the late
eighties “Alanas” became too powerful for SNMs leader Ahmed Muhammad
“Silaanyo”, who imprisoned some of its members. However, the group
again became powerful, fighting together with “Silaanyo” and
“Gaal” during Somalilands first civil war, making up the so-called
“Khaak” fraction. Later, when the political organisations were
established, they again separated, ending up in different political
organisations.[36] One notable and
very important effect of the December election was that the whole Alanas, became
united again in the KULMIYE party. Abiraman Aw Ali “Tolwa”, got the
chairmanship in the organisation, other prominent members, such as Muhammed
Kahin Ahmed, Ibrahim Muhammed “Deganwheine” and Mussa Bihi became
members of the powerful central committee. This was a notable development indeed
many veterans of the SNM regarded the Alanas as heroes, however, many
Somalilanders also perceived them as militants. Even more notable was that most
of the prominent SNM veterans now became gathered in one party, the KULMIYE. The
political implications of this development was enhanced by an important article
published by the Director of the London based African Rights group, Rakya Omar,
highlighting the National Security Service (NSS) background of Dhale Ryhale
Kahin, who in theory was fighting the SNM during the late
eighties.[37] Some individuals,
especially within the KULMIYE party, tried to portray the election as a fight
between the SNM and the NSS. Although not refereed to in public statements,
such argumentation became rallying point for the KULMIYE members.
[38]
It is notable that none of
the failed political organisations, SAHAN, ASAD and HORMOOD, managed to join a
political party as a whole, the three political organisations split and were
almost equally divided between UDUB and KULMIYE, and the former political
organisations were integrated successfully into these two. However, some of the
fractions within these former political organisations, as the UFO group in
HORMOOD, stayed together as groups, existing within their new parties, and have
the potential to become political fractions within their new respective
parties.
The Parties:The government, The UDUB (United Democratic people's Party)
The United Democratic People’s Party (UDUB)
was formed as a new political party by the late president Mohamed Ibrahim Egal,
in July 2001. However Egal died on the 3rd of May 2002. His successor, Dahir
Riyale Kahin, was by many perceived as weak, reactive and as having a
communication problem.[39]
Contributing to such views was the fact that the new leader had little
connection with Somaliland’s founding organization, the Somali National
Movement (SNM). The two-meter tall Russian-trained intelligence officer was
theoretically fighting them during the
eighties.[40] Egal had made him the
Vice President of Somaliland as late as in February
1997.[41] When Egal died, Mr. Dahir
Riyale Kahin became the first non-Isaq to assume the office of the presidency.
He was from the Reer Dudub, Jibriil Yuunis sub-lineage of the Gadabursi clan and
thus from a minority clan in Somaliland.UDUB was in many ways built
up around Egal and his personal alliances, UDUBs internal strength was somewhat
weakened by his death, some chose to leave.
Nevertheless, Kahin was an
experienced administrator and he could lean on a highly experienced cabinet. He
could thus get the help of superb orators like the Minister of Family affairs
and Social Development, Edna Adan Ismael and Abdilahi Mahammed Duale, the
Minister of Information. The first held in high esteem by many Somalilanders,
Edna Adan was so popular that many had regarded her as a potential presidential
candidate in her own right. Although more contested, Abdilahi Mahammed Duale was
a well articulated and efficient campaigner, and these two added notable
strength to UDUB.[42]
UDUB is in
many ways a party without any ideology, however as compensation they stressed
Somali proverbs focusing on peace and stability. During the campaign UDUB
stressed “Naabad iyo Aanuu”, peace and milk, this in order to put
focus on UDUBs prime values, peace, prosperity, and responsible leadership. This
was closely connected with their name and the symbol they used, a Y formed pole
that most commonly is used to keep the traditional Somali house standing. UDUB
as a party was allegorically dedicated to be a pillar for Somaliland, ensuring
stability. Thus, because of a lack of more developed ideology, a focus on
stability became an ideological surrogate.
Through the Vice president
candidate, Ahmed Yusuf Yassin, the party has a religious aspect. Yassin is
deeply religious and has many followers within Somaliland’s religious
establishment and used religious arguments during the electoral
campaigning.[43]
KULMIYE (The Gathering), the strongest contender
KULMIYE is a party with many interesting traits; one of them being the
relatively strong emphasis on environmental issues in its program, focusing on
the preservation of endangered species and on the use of alternative energy
sources. Nevertheless, while stressing such soft issues, the party indeed has a
hard side to it. Its program stresses the removal of non-Islamic values in the
Somaliland Society. Strong Islamic leaders like KULMIYE deputy secretary Abdi
Assi Mohamad Samale and executive member Mohamed Eid Dembil, all of them
important in the Somaliland religious life and close to the Wahabit tradition of
Islamic revival, clearly show that the party has powerful religious elements
within its ranks.[44] However, it is
important to stress that most of the party leaders were known to be highly
secular. KULMIYE efficiently harnessed financial support from the Somaliland
Diaspora, often organized through clan lines.
KULMIYEs leader
Ahmed Muhammad “Silaanyo”’, has been one of the most important
politicians and leaders in Somaliland and indeed Somali politics for the last
thirty years. He was Minister of Planning and Coordination in Siad Barres
government from 1969 to 1973. Siad Barre then gave him the important position of
Minister of Commerce, a post he held from 1973 to 1978 and for a second period
from 1980, until he resigned and joined the Somali National Movement in 1982. He
rose in the ranks and became SNMs leader in
1984.[45] “Silaanyo”
actively participated in the politics of the newly established republic of
Somaliland after 1991, and he was a major supporter of the first president of
Somaliland Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali "Tuur". However, the two fell out and
“Silaanyo” became the latter's prime opponent, he became allied with
the powerful Alanas group, which consisted of prominent military leaders within
the SNM, all with Marxist leanings.In the end the alliance that
wanted to remove "Tuur" succeeded.
“Silaanyo” was feared by Tuurs
successor Egal, but in a strategically move typical of the latter, Egal made the
former Minister of Finance in his government in 1997. In 1999
“Silaanyo” was transferred to the post of Minister of Planning and
Coordination. However “Silaanyo”, left the government, he travelled
around the world to the Somaliland Diaspora and returned home and founded the
KULMIYE party in 2002. He chose Mohamoud Saxil "Fagadhe" as first Deputy
Chairman. The latter was born in the town of Talex in 1943 and came from the
Duhlbahante clan in the Sool region. "Fagadhe" was a former Somaliland Foreign
Affairs Minister. Later “Fagadhe” had to sacrifice his position. In
an attempt to draw former elements from the ASAD party, KULMIYE nominated
Abdulrahman Aw Ali Farah "Tolwa", from the Gadabursi clan, as KULMIYEs vice
president candidate and deputy chairman. Abdulrahman Aw Ali Farah, was indeed
very experienced, having previously served as the late president Egals first
vice president, and he was held in high regards because of his participation in
SNMs struggle.[46] Together with the
female deputy chairman, Sirad Ali Yussuf and general secretary Da’ud
Mohamed Gelle, he gave considerable popular strength to KULMIYE.
An
additional element in the KULMIYE party organisation was the
“Alanas”, or “red flag”, perceived militants, feared by
many, respected by all. The presence of this group strengthened the
organisations in the sense of adding many efficient leaders to the party, it
weakened the KULMIYE in the sense that it aroused fear amongst many
Somalilanders. During the months preceding the elections two other notable
elements were added to the organisation. By offering a quota system in the
Executive and Central committee, KULMIYE succeeded in drawing some support from
the GABOOYE minority clan, and later by the whole of NAGAAD, a gender
focused umbrella NGO.
KULMIYE also had a large advantage in their
exceptionally professional way of handling campaigning and the distribution of
information, they had the resources that UCID lacked and the professionalism
that UDUB lacked.[47]
The UCID party (the Justice and Welfare party)
While all the other parties had relatively well known faces, people with
years of experience and years of prominence in both Somaliland, and to a certain
existent Somali media, the leader of the UCID had been more active in the
Diaspora. His name was Faisal Ali Farah “Warabe”, a member of the
Iidagale sub- clan of the Isaq clan, born in
Hargeysa.[48] Farah was earlier an
employee of Siad Barre both as regional director and in the ministry of public
works. However, he chose to break with the government, and first moved on to the
private sector.[49] Faisal Ali
Farah fled from Mogadishu in 1990 and reached Helsinki, Finland. In the 1990's
he became active within many organizations of the Somali Diaspora and headed the
Somali Social-democratic party, both in 1997 and again in 2001. This did not
prevent him from being active in the Somaliland Diaspora, and in 2000, he became
the leader of the Somaliland association in Finland and in 2001, the European
Somaliland Society as well. Then he returned and formed the UCID party. His
motto was: “Old politicians out; new blood in”. Indeed, this was a
valid argument, as most of the leaders of KULMIYE and UDUB had worked together,
being colleagues in Egals various government, Feisal Ali Farah and his party
organisation were in many ways outside this powerful class. However, this also
had its disadvantages, Farahs lack of contacts and relative lack of fame made it
harder for him to gain financial support. Thus UCID became the party that had
the most limited campaigning funds. Nevertheless, in spite of the limited
financial resources, the party organisation was surprisingly efficient. The
party could also draw upon support from a majority of Feisal Ali Farahs own
clan, Ildgale, as a solid foundation for his party, as well as drawing votes
from other Somalilanders. In spite of such a clannish basis, UCID probably was
the party having the most thorough ideological foundations, Feisal Ali Farahs
stay in Scandinavia might have formed the party’s ideology. UCID wanted to
build a Scandinavian type “Welfare system", stressing the need for social
support to the Somalilanders. He pointed to Sweden, and to the Scandinavian
Social democratic centre left ideology as an example to follow. Indeed, he
actively tried to establish organizational connections with all the Scandinavian
Social-Democratic parties.
[29] The six initial contenders
were: UDUB (United Democratic People's Party). KULMIYE (the Gathering), ASAD
(the Alliance for Salvation and Democracy), The HORMOOD (Champions for Peace and
Prosperity), the UCID party (the Justice and Welfare party) and SAHAN (the
Somaliland Alliance for Islamic Democracy), all of them had an eager wish to win
in the December 15th local election. This local election thus had two
purposes, one to elect local councils, the second to limit the amount of
parties)
[30].
This last
candidate, Nuuh Sheik Umar Sheik Saad Musse is an excellent example of the
confusing reduction of parties in Somaliland. He had been working with
logistics in Saudi Arabia, and later established Nicos ( the National company
for insurances for vehicles) He was closely politically and familiarly related
to Omer Arte Ghalib, the leader of HORMOOD and later became involved in this
party.31 However, after the former’s personal defeat in the
December elections Omar Arte withdrew from politics and the politicians that
were close to him had to decide which of the three parties they wanted to join.
Nuuh Sheik Umar Sheik Saad Musse, together with many of his closest allies in
HORMOOD, chose to go to UDUB, tempted by the possibility of minister and
executive committee positions. The initial founders of HORMOOD, the UFO group,
mostly went to the second largest party, KULMIYE.
[32] Yasiin Mahamod Heer
“Fardoon” (Bent finger) was perhaps the president’s strongest
card to achieve this goal. He was the only one of the “Ballot box”
ministers that lacked a background in any of the political organisations that
participated in the December elections. He had however been a member of the
first government of Egal, working as a health minister from July 1993 to
November 1994. More important, he had been a representative for the Dolbahante
clan at the big clan gatherings of the early nineties. In 1996 he also became a
member of the parliament. It was widely believed that a Garad, a traditional
clan chieftain in the Dolbahante clan, pressured the president to make Yasin
minister. The Garad in question, Ismael was the 7th Garad of Dolbahante, from
the Yama Siad sub clan, and the eldest one of all the seven, thus enjoying huge
respect in Sool. The appointment was thus a strategic move to gather support
among the Dolbahantes. Another minister Aniisa Haji Hassan, had a background
from UDUB, thus his appointment had nothing to do with any strategy focused on
the inclusion of the pre December political organisations. However, he was also
from the Warsangeli clan and thus the perfect candidate for the post as
minister of Sanag. Again this appointment was mostly due to the wish to
strengthen Somalilands control of the eastern regions. Nevertheless, political
reasons still influenced the appointments, the second minister for Sool, Foad
Adan Ade, also a Dolbahante, had a previous background as deputy chairman of the
ASAD party. Amhed Mahmod Farah, another minister of state also had a background
from ASAD, thus even the second wave was influenced by electoral
considerations.
[33] Muhammed Barood, a member of
the UFO group, a group that started out as a non-violence oppositional group
under the Barre Regime and had formed a vital element in the HORMOOD party,
became KULMIYE Executive officer to the Region of Hargeysa. The UFO group had
been started in the early eighties as a self-help group; it soon became regarded
as oppositional by the Barre regime. It is a popular joke that they were
arrested for cleaning the sewers of Hargeysa hospital.
[34] It did however attract some
very notable politicians, such as Mohammed Hajji Elmi, the popular ex major of
Hargeysa, however the latter kept a low profile and gave voting support
only.
[35] Many of them also
shared a background from the Somali Salvation Democratic Front
(SSDF).
[36] Abdiraman Aw Ali
“Tolwa”, joined Suleiman Mohamed Adam ”Saleban Gaal” and
his party ASAD. Mussa Bihi joined SAHAN, however he later left them, Kahin
joined KULMIYE.
[37] NSS was
former dictator Siad Barres dreaded security apparatus
[38] Some also included Mr. Ahmed
Adan Qaybe, the Speaker of the House.
[39] He was by many named the
“Sadat” of
Somaliland
[40] This point became
a hot issue after the first election, sources supporting him claim that he saved
many lives when working in Siad Barres National Security Services, this by being
lenient. His political enemies, stress that he acted actively to suppress the
opposition in Somaliland, applying harsh methods.
The vice presidency was
usually given to a member of the Gadabursi
clan
[42] The presence of these
two in his government also did much to reduce the perception that UDUB
governance was NSS governance. Both fought the Barre Regime intensively, Siad
Barre had imprisoned Edna Adan and Abdillahi Mahmmed Duale had been an active
member of the SNM. Duale was not the only member of the government that had
fought the Barre regime, the new Minister of Defence, Ismael Umar Ahmed
“Boos” , also had a SNM background. The Minister of Reconstruction
and Reconciliation Abdilahi Hussein liman “Darawel” had also been
fighting the Barre regime and worn the uniform of an SNM soldier, however, the
later had joined quite late in the struggle.
[43] He is the sponsor and
supporter of the Committee to Guide and Inform on Good Behaviour, an organized
WAHABI group that tries to prevent westernisation of the Somaliland society by
blocki